Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1985

Book Reviews

William E. Griffith
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Thomas P. Bernstein



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On Détente
Harry Gelman

Soviet Imperium
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Notes & Views
1985 Anniversaries
Zbigniew Brzezinski

CP Checklist
Richard F. Staar

Communist Fronts
Wallace Spaulding

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Problems of Communism

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MARCH-APRIL 1985 VOL XXXIV

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Cover: A young Chinese woman in Western-style garb. Photo by Bertrand Laforet/Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Prosperity, Privatization, and China's Youth
Stanley Rosen

The unfolding of sweeping economic reforms introduced in December 1978 has had a profound impact on the work of China's Communist Youth League (CYL). The concomitant elevation of higher education and technical expertise at the expense of ideology has crippled youth work in China and left CYL cadres confused, uncertain, and demoralized. Once a primary channel of party recruitment and political socialization, the CYL is now considered by most youth as irrelevant to both their careers and China's current modernization drive.

Moscow and Southern Africa
Peter Clement

The Soviet Union's relations with the Front-Line States of southern Africa are guided by considerations of prestige rather than security. In the 1980's these countries have been distancing themselves somewhat from Moscow and pursuing closer relations with the West and the Republic of South Africa. This has created some unexpected problems for Moscow and posed new questions about its stakes in the Third World.

Rise and Fall of Détente
Harry Gelman

Exploration of the factors conducive to the emergence of Soviet-American detente in the early 1970's and its subsequent decline reveals that the fundamental interests of the two superpowers are less compatible than thought in détente's heyday. Yet these relations may perhaps not need to be as tense as they have become since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Given Soviet restraint (or lack of promising opportunities for advance) in the Third World, Western publics are likely to push their governments toward some efforts to ease tensions. There survive from the détente period some instrumentalities—formal and informal—that might be revitalized to accommodate such a development.

The Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well
Charles Gati

In the past, some East European regimes have successfully escaped from Moscow's control over their policies. Today, some of Moscow's Warsaw Pact partners—dissatisfied with the course of Soviet foreign conduct—are seeking more "elbow room" for themselves, sometimes in concert. Whether Moscow will be effective in dealing with such mini-coalitions depends on the resolution of the Soviet leadership crisis.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Notes & Views

On Anniversaries in 1985

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The year 1985 marks a number of major anniversaries, the end of World War II, the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, and the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reflects on the historical lessons of these major anniversaries and on their implications for European politics today.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984

Richard F. Staar

This list, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1985* (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1985), gives information on the major communist parties and movements recognized by Moscow as well as a number of "revolutionary democratic" parties viewed by the Kremlin as being at a less developed political stage. Data provided include the mid-1984 population estimates for the geographic entity in which a given party operates, the party's claimed or estimated membership, the key party leader, the last major congress or conference, the party's legal status, and its showing in the most recent national elections.

Communist International Fronts in 1984

Wallace Spaulding

This item, also published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1985*, updates information on membership and leaders of Moscow's major international communist front organizations for 1984, and summarizes the fronts' activities during the year.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Brezhnev's Foreign Policy

William E. Griffith

As the USSR and US resume arms control negotiations, Harry Gelman's book helps to see clearly the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. This overview of the rise and decline of "détente" provides a basis for an informed Western political opinion. However, the book neglects discussion of recent developments in high-tech that strengthen the Western hand in negotiations with the Soviets.

Revamping China's Military

Shu-shin Wang

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest army in the world. Yet it is not a potent fighting force. Much of its equipment is unsophisticated or obsolete; its strategy and tactics outdated; and most of its troops uneducated and unskilled. Since 1978, however, the Deng Xiaoping leadership has sought to modernize all facets of PLA operations, professionalize the PLA's officers and soldiers, and reassert the party's complete control over the military. Analysts disagree on whether or not opposition within the PLA will frustrate Deng's policies.

How Stalinist Was Mao's China?

Thomas P. Bernstein

Only a few years ago, during the radical phase of Mao Zedong's rule, China was embarked upon a unique ideological and developmental course, or so it seemed in the West. Mao openly questioned the relevance of the Soviet model, criticized Stalin for having exploited the peasants, and rejected the fundamental concepts of Soviet socialist construction. But if China's divergence from Soviet patterns was a central theme of earlier Western perceptions, convergence with Stalinism is the dominant theme of post-Mao reappraisals. However, a detailed comparative study of Maoism and Stalinism has yet to appear.

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Prosperity, Privatization, and China's Youth

Stanley Rosen

Socialist states, particularly those with a relatively low level of economic development, are commonly faced with contradictory policy choices. The pursuit of social equality, the stress on ideological remolding, and the attempt to fashion a "new socialist man" are all important political aims considered essential for the creation of a socialist society. But the realization of mature socialism is impossible without an expansion of productive forces and, ultimately, the industrialization of the country. This quest for a society that is both egalitarian and highly productive creates a tension between the political and economic goals of the leadership. Which values should be emphasized, and when? What type of economic development is acceptable, given ideological constraints? With what attributes should revolutionary heroes and models for emulation be endowed?

Nowhere is this tension between political ("red") and economic ("expert") goals felt more acutely than in the ideological/political organizations established to guide youth work. In the People's Republic of China (PRC) this organization is called the Communist Youth League (CYL); its primary functions are political socialization and party recruitment. Despite periodic oscillations between red and expert, youth work in China for more than a decade and a half following the Communist takeover in 1949 generally stressed the importance of both values. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), however, China's "radicals" altered this equilibrium mightily as they attempted to subordinate, permanently, all other values to politics and class struggle. Within the CYL, this was initially reflected in frequent admonitions to guard against those who sought to turn the organization into "a league of all the people" (instead of a league of committed revolutionaries), "a league concerned with production," "a league to provide recreational activities," or "a marriage bureau."[1] As the ideological fervor of the Cultural Revolution heightened, and after Chinese youth (many as Red Guards) were encouraged to "overthrow those in authority taking the capitalist road," CYL activities were suspended, and the league remained more or less dormant for a dozen or so years.

But what happens when those who helped to revive the youth league make a political decision to shift the work of the country—once again seemingly permanently—to an emphasis on rapid economic development, when the previous emphasis on politics is decried as "sham Marxism"? Put somewhat crudely, can a youth league staffed primarily by ideological watchdogs be refashioned into an advocate for "whatever works" socialism? Can youth's skepticism toward any ideological commitment be overcome? Can a new standard of morality and a convincing central belief system be forged to replace the discredited radical version of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought? And can new "revolutionary" models be imposed on a youth that has witnessed numerous, acute ideological gyrations at the top of the Chinese political system?

This essay examines these questions and tries to place in perspective the party's recent, and largely unsuccessful, attempts to fashion a comprehensive youth policy. Special attention is given to fluctuations in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy and how such

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[1] *Zhongguo Qingnian* (Beijing), October 1979, pp. 12–13; *Fujian Qingnian* (Fuzhou), November 1978, pp. 16–17; *Guangdong Qingnian* (Guangzhou), April 1978, pp. 8–9.

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Hu Jintao (at right), First Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee, with his predecessor, Wang Zhaoguo, who is now director of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee.

—New China Picture Company.

fluctuations have affected the scope and direction of youth work in China. In particular, this essay traces the reemergence of the youth league within the context of party reformers' efforts to revitalize league activities and broaden the appeal of the organization. However, this is not an investigation of the institutional and organizational arrangements between the CYL and the CCP. Rather, it is an analysis of the changes over time in Chinese attitudes toward and perceptions of CYL activities as reflected in the major debates and forums that have appeared in Chinese media. But these are not simply the views and perceptions of high-ranking officials; included as well are the opinions and attitudes of lower level cadres, "model" youth, "winners" and "losers" among the young people of China, and young heroes of the counterculture. The approach is chronological, beginning with the 10th CYL Congress in 1978. The main sources are national and provincial youth magazines and newspapers.

In many ways, the analysis that follows is an examination of CCP dictates and CYL responses. It is helpful at the outset, therefore, to get some sense of the relationship between the party and the league. While in theory an independent organization having its own hierarchy that parallels the party organization at each level, in practice the youth league is wholly dominated by the party. For one thing, the party is well represented on the CYL national leadership. The immediate past CYL first secretary, Wang Zhaoguo, is a member of the party's Central Committee (CC); both the current first secretary, Hu Jintao, and at least one other secretary, Li Haifeng, are members of Central Committee organs.[2] Moreover, a great many CYL cadres are party members.[3] For another, the youth league has little authority of its own. It has few outside sources of funding and often is unable

[2]See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Chinese Officials: National Level Organizations*, Washington, DC, CIA, August 1983, pp. 126, 9, 12, and 13.

[3]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (Beijing), Sept. 13, 1984; and New China News Agency (hereafter Xinhua), July 1, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–CHI*), July 2, 1984, p. K/4.

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to appropriate space for its programs. Thus, it is almost totally dependent on the party in these respects. Perhaps even more important, especially as concerns this essay, the party exerts an enormous indirect influence on CYL activities through its ability to shape the attitudes and values of Chinese youth.

In the narrative that follows, several key reasons for the weakness of the league are presented. First, the CYL's lack of success can be traced to its inability to serve two masters: the needs of youth and the shifts in party policy. While the party's economic policy has been relatively stable in recent years, there have been shifts on ideological issues. Given the nature of the CYL, it gets buffeted far more than most organizations as a result of these shifts. Changing party policies deeply affect debates within the league, further complicating the efforts of the CYL to come to terms with post-Mao "economics" or to respond to the real problems of youth.

Second, the inherent contradictions in "socialism with Chinese characteristics," in which both spiritual and material values are to be promoted equally, have made it difficult to fashion youth models who are paragons on both axes and remain believable. Inevitably there is a gap between the officially sanctioned models, who tend to embody spiritual qualities, and the values and ideals of ordinary youth, who tend to be oriented toward material success. Once again, the CYL has been unable to bridge this gap. Finally, in the competitive environment fostered by China's stress on economic development, league membership offers no tangible benefits to those eager for upward mobility. Since university entrance, advantageous job placement, and material prosperity do not depend on membership in the CYL, youth have been indifferent to the organization.

Current CYL Problems

In December 1978, when China's reformist leaders shifted the focus of the work of the country to the Four Modernizations, they were faced with youth who had "seen through" *(kantou)* everything, and so believed in nothing. Over the course of the next five years, under the impact of the party's new policies, youth groped to find the "meaning of life." For many, the answer lay in the abandonment of ideological/political public concerns and the adoption of private values including, as some put it in interviews, "the modernization of everyday life."[4] For others, it meant a redefinition of self-sacrifice and the role of ideology in the socialist transformation of the country. As a result, in China today youth tend to view social relations and their own futures in more individualistic terms than they did previously, often choosing as popular models young people who exhibit an independent spirit, even a lack of discipline.

If such rethinking among skeptical youth poses problems for party leaders, it is virtually crippling CYL work. Not only is the league's organizational structure incompatible with the new system of production, its activities are out of step with current youth attitudes. As the head of the ideology department of *Zhongguo Qingnian* (China Youth), the official journal of the league, has admitted, "in factories, league meetings and activities have become much less frequent and more superficial, and in most rural areas the league has ceased to function."[5] Indeed, available statistics from published and unpublished official reports reveal the seriousness of the problems currently inhibiting CYL work. For example, in 1979 there were 4,863 rural production brigades without league branches; by 1980 the number had increased to 6,548 brigades. Moreover, there were 180,000 production teams without any CYL members.[6]

Equally important, the league is plagued by a high dropout rate. When the 10th CYL Congress met in October 1978, the league had 48 million members. Despite recruiting some 26 million new members over the next four years, by the 11th CYL Congress in December 1982 there were still only 48 million members, less than 20 percent of the total youth population of 250 million (those between 15 and 28 years of age).[7] Nor has the

[4]This is based on discussions with Chinese students both in the United States and in the course of five visits to China from 1980 to 1984. Some might argue that although *norms* may have changed, youth *values* in fact are not so different from the pre Cultural Revolution period. Although there is some truth to this—in that it is finally possible for youth to express rather openly their cynicism and disinterest—I would suggest, based on interviews with hundreds of Chinese students since 1973, that a fairly significant value change has indeed occurred. Unfortunately, there is nothing comparable for earlier years to the large amounts of survey data now available. I discuss the earlier period in "Education and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth," in John N. Hawkins, Ed., *Education and Social Change in the People's Republic of China*, New York, Praeger, 1983, pp. 97-133; and in *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982, Chaps. 1 and 2.

[5]Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, "A Streak of Individualism Emerges in China's Youth," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 22, 1983.

[6]See Nov. 10, 1981, speech of Wang Jiangong, of the CYL Central Secretariat, reprinted in *Zhonggong Yanjiu* (Taipei), Aug. 15, 1982, pp. 101-17. Available statistics suggest that in 1979 there were approximately 699,000 production brigades and 5,154,000 production teams in China's commune system. See Francis C. Tuan and Frederick W. Crook, *Planning and Statistical Systems in China's Agriculture*, Washington, DC, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 181, US Department of Agriculture, 1983, pp. 8-9.

[7]Xinhua, Oct. 16, 1978, trans in *FBIS CHI*, Oct. 17, 1978, p. E/2; Xinhua, Dec. 20, 1982, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Dec. 20, 1982, p. K/65; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Dec. 25, 1982. Some of the "missing" CYL members can be accounted for. Between the 10th and 11th CYL congresses, 2.7 million members joined the party; another 2.9 million members were "lost" *(diushi)* when they moved from their original unit (i.e., graduating students, demobilized soldiers, those who married). See *Zhonggong Yanjiu*, Aug. 15, 1982, p. 113. It is unlikely that the majority of those not accounted for could have been "retirees," since, apart from purely demographic reasons, the age limit was extended from 25 to 28 during this time. Moreover, provincial youth magazines contain many letters and discussions about the dropout phenomenon. Finally, the number of league members eliminated as "unqualified" or as "leftist sympathizers" is unknown. By mid-1984, league membership had increased slightly, to over 48.5 million. See *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 13, 1984.

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league been an effective conduit for gaining membership in the party. In Shanghai in 1979, for example, 5,270 CYL members applied to join the party; in 1980 the figure dropped by 43.8 percent, declining even further in 1981.[8] Although 80 to 90 percent of students in Chinese universities are league members, and many of them are actively recruited by the party, only a small percentage are likely to join the CCP.[9]

The decline in the importance of the CYL is only one of many problems facing league officials. Not only has it been difficult to recruit new members, but many of those who have joined choose not to take part in the few activities the league offers. Moreover, despite the increasing concern of former youth league officials now in the central leadership, such as party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and CC Secretary Hu Qili, lower level units apparently do not consider league work particularly important. In Yunnan Province, for example, of the more than 600 middle schools with junior- and senior-high sections, only about one in six has a cadre especially assigned to handle CYL work.[10] Before Gansu Province divided its local government administration from commune management, each unit corresponding to the traditional Chinese township *(xiang)* had a cadre assigned to CYL work. Under the recent reorganization, this post has been abolished. League work has been reassigned to the *xiang* party deputy secretary, a person generally around 40 years old with six or seven major functions to perform. In a province already said to have "fairly weak" *(xiangdang boruo)* rural league organizations, the situation is expected to become worse.[11] The remainder of this essay will trace the evolution of the league's current problems and document changing youth attitudes.

The CYL in 1978

Following a 12-year hiatus, the CYL resumed national-level activities in autumn-winter 1978. In September, *Zhongguo Qingnian* reappeared for the first time since 1966. In October, the 10th CYL National Congress was convened, replacing the 9th Congress which had been chosen in 1964. But this was still a transitional period, and the divisions within the party leadership were reflected in various leaders' attitudes toward the CYL. For example, after 70,000 copies of *Zhongguo Qingnian* had circulated on September 11, the journal was withdrawn; 10 days later it reappeared with two loose sheets: one contained an inscription by Hua Guofeng and three of Mao's poems; the other had a picture of Mao chatting with delegates to the 3rd CYL Congress in 1957.[12] Although the 11th Party Congress in August 1977 had adopted a program to build a powerful, modern, socialist China before the end of the century, there was considerable divergence over how this should be done, with Hua stressing a major role for the "masses" and Deng Xiaoping arguing for a greater reliance on experts unencumbered with political activities.

The 10th CYL Congress in October further sent mixed signals to China's youth in a somewhat schizophrenic attempt to defend and extend the gains of the Cultural Revolution, while denouncing the "Gang of Four." Youth were admonished to "spot every kind of modern revisionism" and to be "ready to lay down their lives for the truth, which was fostered in the storms of the Cultural Revolution." Class struggle was stressed, with the division "between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the socialist and the capitalist roads," still forming the "principal contradiction in the new period." At the same time, youth were told that "an important criterion for judging a really politically conscious person today is whether he or she studies hard for professional competence and can master modern science and culture." On one point, however, there was no equivocation. The CYL was told that it "must accept the party's absolute leadership"—that it "should fight wherever the party orders it to fight." The questioning of party policies, which had been a feature of the Cultural Revolution years, was withdrawn in no uncertain terms.[13]

[8]From *Qingnian Yidai* (Shanghai), cited in *Chan Wang* (Hong Kong), Feb. 1, 1982, p. 22. It is interesting to note that a recent front-page report in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (July 5, 1984) lamented the steady aging of the party, also using Shanghai as an example. Just after 1949, youths 25 years old and under made up 41 percent of party members in that city, but during the 1950's the figure dropped to about 20 percent. By the 1960's the figure was below 10 percent, declining further in the 1970's to around 5 percent. The 1983 figure was only 2.25 percent. Nationally, the numbers fell from 26.6 percent in 1950 to 3.36 percent in 1983. See also *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 28, 1984.

[9]*Beijing Ribao*, Nov. 4, 1982. Overall, about 30,000 of the more than 1.2 million university and secondary technical-school students are party members. See Xinhua, July 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 17, 1984, p. K/2. The percentage of university students who are league members has, however, increased in recent years. In 1978, 60.4 percent of such students belonged to the league, rising to 69.2 percent and 76.2 percent in 1979 and 1980, respectively. See *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian, 1949-1981* (Education Yearbook of China, 1949-1981), Beijing, China Encyclopedia Press, 1984, p. 427. As will be argued below, however, such an impressive increase by no means indicates an equivalent concern with ideology or politics.

[10]*Yunnan Jiaoyu* (Kunming), February 1982, p. 2.

[11]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 10, 1983.

[12]*Dongxiang* (Hong Kong), Oct. 20, 1978, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Oct. 26, 1978, pp. N/1-3. *Dongxiang* also carried controversial articles criticizing Mao Zedong Thought as a religious cult and commenting favorably on the Tian An Men incident of April 1976 (allegedly a Deng-inspired mass demonstration—in which thousands expressed their affection in memory of Zhou Enlai, who had died that January—that became violent and had to be suppressed by police and the army. As a result, Deng was ousted from his party, government, and military positions for a second time.)

[13]Xinhua, Oct. 26, 1978, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Oct. 31, 1978, pp. E/1-9; Xinhua, Oct. 26-29, 1978, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Oct. 30, 1978, pp. E/1-18; Xinhua, Oct. 23, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 24, 1978, pp. E/2-9; and Xinhua, Oct. 16-17, 1978, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Oct. 18, 1978, pp. E/1-6. Provincial youth journals had been hammering hard at the absolute necessity for party control over the league even before the 10th CYL Congress. See *Guangdong Qingnian*, February 1978, pp. 8-9; and August 1978, pp. 7-8.

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Noted Chinese mathematician Chen Jingrun, right, helps two graduate students in their study of the theory of functions in January 1979.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

It is not surprising that youth remained puzzled on a variety of issues at this time. To get some sense of the magnitude of student misgivings, *Beijing Ribao* sponsored a discussion entitled "What Shall I Do for My Country?" Reportedly, some 400,000 youth took part, apparently seeking guidelines for establishing "true values" in fields ranging from politics to love. Many letters to the paper "demanded a clear answer [as] to which models young people should strive after."[14] For its part, the newly restored *Zhongguo Qingnian* organized a related forum to discuss the familiar red versus expert question. At issue was whether a brilliant young mathematician, Chen Jingrun, was a suitable model for Chinese youth. As is usual in these forums, the initial letter was provocative. Of course, it was necessary to promote study achievement, the letter writer said. But how could one legitimately speak of Chen's redness?

Over the next several issues, readers debated whether making Chen a model really was "lowering the standard for redness." Although the published letters all praised the young mathematician, some wondered, in light of Chen's elevation, where the erstwhile hero Lei Feng would now fit in the pantheon of model Chinese youth. In delicious irony, one reader objected that the study of Chen had little universal significance. While intellectuals might appreciate Chen as a model, he noted, ordinary beings were much better off with Lei Feng. Lei, after all, may not have been brilliant, but he did recognize the importance of technical expertise, and his redness was manifested in everyday acts. Before the Cultural Revolution, of course, it had been youth from intellectual backgrounds who had found little in common with Lei, an impoverished orphan whose family had been brutally exploited by landlords.[15]

[14]Xinhua, Oct. 23, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 24, 1978, pp. E/8–9.

[15]The forum had been stimulated by an earlier article on Chen Jingrun in *Renmin Wenxue* (Beijing). See *Zhongguo Qingnian*, September 1978, pp. 28-29; October 1978, pp. 22-25; November 1978, pp. 44-50; December 1978, pp. 20-23; and January 1979, pp. 13-15.

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Concurrent with this forum, *Zhongguo Qingnian* addressed the cynical, confused reactions of youth influenced by developments during the Cultural Revolution. Among the many problems addressed were the proper treatment of youth from exploiting class families, the corruption of youth values by the Gang of Four, and the role of youth in the new situation. The publication of "Awake, My Brother! *(Xinglai ba, didi)* by Liu Xinwu, one of the main proponents of "scar literature,"[16] stimulated another debate. The central character, Peng Xiaolei, has given up hope, declaring that "everything is lies, lies. I've seen through it all." By the end of the story, the protagonist has not yet decided "to return to the world," despite the fact that a party secretary he can respect has been transferred to his factory. Peng's tale struck a responsive chord with readers. While most published responses urged Peng to awake for the sake of the country, some expressed skepticism. As one youth who likened himself to Peng put it, Peng "encountered a Secretary Lu. Our unit also has a party secretary, but how can he be compared with Secretary Lu? My question is, at present there are millions upon millions of [Pengs], but are there millions upon millions of Secretary Lus?"[17] Similar discussions of the *kantou* phenomenon appeared periodically in youth journals over the next several years.

Impact of the 3rd Plenum

The decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, which met December 18–22, 1978, had a major impact on all areas of Chinese life. Most important was the decision to shift the emphasis of the party's work and the attention of the whole country to socialist modernization, which, according to the party's resolution, required both "great growth in the productive forces [and] changes in all methods of management, action, and thinking that stand in the way of such growth."[18] Other initiatives included the downgrading of class struggle; support for the slogan "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth"; the linking of income to output in agriculture; and the return of some of Deng's political and economic allies to key positions.[19]

CYL officials responsible for youth work seem to have been unprepared for the sudden policy shift. Some complained that youth had become "so fascinated with studying technical knowledge" that they now "refrained from speaking to political-work cadres." But party reformers seemed to ignore these cadres' pleas, insisting instead that they neither obstruct youth feverishly caught up in this new tide nor criticize such youth by labeling them "white experts."[20] It was indeed a difficult time for political-work cadres, who seemed to have become superfluous overnight. For example, Shanghai's Jiaotong University simply abolished its political department after determining that party committees of institutes of higher education would in future be evaluated mainly by the teaching and research work of their schools; those cadres still retained to handle political work were now incorporated within the teaching section.[21] Moreover, some provincial committees undercut the independence of CYL cadres, declaring that "study should be at the center of all CYL activities" in schools, in order to "develop talents."[22]

Under the new conditions, basic-level cadres were unsure as to which criteria should be stressed in CYL recruitment, a confusion that was reflected in local youth magazines.[23] Should academic achievement be the sole qualification for league membership? What about class origin? After all, had not party officials removed all remaining "rightist" labels in November 1978, as well as the class designations of former exploiters who had behaved themselves?

Party reformers responsible for promoting the league's new direction moved quickly to guide their uncertain colleagues in the youth league. In February 1979, *Zhongguo Qingnian* began a series entitled "CYL Work Must Be in the Service of Modernization," presenting examples of units in industry, agriculture, and education that had been able to adjust ideological/political work to the practical needs of the Four Modernizations. The message was clear: league cadres were to be trained in science, economics, and management. Promotion, it was suggested, should be determined by professional competence.[24] But social and political currents were moving too swiftly for many; demoralization among league cadres was common. With China's fledgling "democracy movement" at its height, featuring wall posters and tabloids questioning some of the most basic tenets of socialist China, those cadres in charge of ideological/

[16]Some examples of this type of literature, including "Awake, My Brother!", are translated by Geremie Barmé and Bennett Lee in *The Wounded: New Stories of the Cultural Revolution 1977–78*, Hong Kong, Joint Publications, 1979, pp. 179–203.

[17]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, October 1978, pp. 34–41; and December 1978, pp. 24–26, 34–37.

[18]*Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 7.

[19]Ibid., pp. 6–16.

[20]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, January 1979, p. 12.

[21]Radio Shanghai, Feb. 24, 1979, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 73179, Apr. 9, 1979.

[22]Radio Guiyang, Apr. 5, 1979, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 73316, Apr. 26, 1979.

[23]Xinhua, Nov. 16, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 17, 1978, pp. E/1–3; *Beijing Review*, Feb. 16, 1979, p. 8; *Fujian Qingnian*, December 1978, p. 20; October 1979, p. 16; *Guangdong Qingnian*, April 1978, pp. 8–9.

[24]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, February 1979, pp. 4–7; March 1979, pp. 20–21. Also see ibid., January 1979, pp. 10–12.

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Ma Zhongqi, right, received his Ph.D. from the Institute of High-Energy Physics in mid-1982, one of the first such degrees awarded in China since the Cultural Revolution.

***—China Pictorial* (Beijing), No. 1, 1983, p. 26.**

political work openly demanded to know whether the party's policy still was "to foster proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideology" *(xingwu miezi).* If this policy was in fact still in place, they asked, why were so many manifestations of bourgeois ideology allowed to circulate freely in society.[25]

A partial response came in late March–early April 1979, when the most extreme of the democracy activists were arrested and the "Four Basic Principles" (Uphold the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought) were published.[26] CYL cadres were assured that they had "scored achievements" and that their work was appreciated. Indeed, they were told, recent developments should be taken not as a signal to abandon ideological/political work, but rather as a sign that such efforts must be strengthened.[27]

For those in the trenches, however, such encouragement was little comfort against harsh realities. A full-page letter published in a popular magazine described the plight of two middle-school politics teachers. In the new atmosphere, students had returned to their academic studies with a vengeance, hoping to do well on the university entrance examinations. The clear exception was politics, for which students now had contempt. Even though the politics course met just two periods a week, the teachers could not guarantee that a classroom would be available in which to hold it. Their letter ended with an acknowledgment of the historic importance of the party's shift to socialist modernization and an appeal for help for all politics teachers whose work seemed to prevent their participation in that mission. The magazine offered no reply.[28]

But if students treated political-work cadres as irrelevant in the quest for socialist modernization, party reformers were even more damaging to these cadres' self-esteem, questioning their ability, competence, understanding, and commitment. According to these critics, because the large majority of CYL cadres had been engaged in political work during the "years of upheaval," they had missed out on a real education in basic Marxist theory. Even those who supported the new slogan "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth"—and this by no means included all CYL cadres—were not exempt from criticism, since most of them were either unsure of what the slogan meant or were reluctant to carry it out. Thus, there was open concern among many CYL cadres that the latest swing of the pendulum would again land them in trouble,[29] with some even asking rhetorically: "Why is it that those in charge now were criticized previously, and those now criticized were in charge previously?" As a result, the CYL was becoming paralyzed.[30]

To help overcome this paralysis, in September 1979, CYL officials launched a "tutorial" *(buke),* in part to provide a crash course in how to put into practice the party's new slogan and in part to deal with those who insisted on "remaining steadfast" against the new trends.[31] In a long letter to *Zhongguo Qingnian,* CYL cadres offered an agenda of topics and problem areas around which the lessons should be focused: (1) In the new era, what should be the main subject of the CYL? If

[25] *Zhongguo Qingnian,* April 1979, pp. 22–23.

[26] For a discussion in English of these principles, see the abridged *Renmin Ribao* editorial (Apr. 5, 1979) "Carry Forward the Revolutionary Tian An Men Spirit" that is reprinted in *Beijing Review,* Apr. 13, 1979, pp. 9–13.

[27] *Zhongguo Qingnian,* April 1979, pp. 22–23.

[28] *Xin Shiqi* (Beijing), September 1979, p. 42.

[29] *Zhongguo Qingnian,* September 1979, pp. 2–3.

[30] As a recent official document admits, the condition of politics teachers in China's secondary schools after the purge of the Gang of Four was indeterminate. Not many of the 200,000 teachers who were specifically assigned to teach politics classes had college-level training. The new reforms made many "ill at ease," and some of the most qualified simply "changed professions." See *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian 1949–1981,* p. 436.

[31] *Zhongguo Qingnian,* September 1979, pp. 2–3.

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it is the achievement of the Four Modernizations, how does this relate to politics? (2) How should CYL cadres reconcile the party's leadership of the league and the league's responsibility to conduct independent activities on behalf of youth? (3) How should education in the Four Basic Principles be structured? What exactly is socialism? (4) What is currently acceptable as communist morality? Is moral education necessary if "there is no one in our unit with long hair, bell-bottom trousers, or gaudy clothes"? (5) How should the principle of democratic centralism be realized within the league? (6) How can the league attract youth? And most important (7) where can the league obtain funds so that it can organize some activities?[32]

Over the next few years, several of these problems were to become acute. At the end of 1979, party leaders took a major step to revitalize CYL activities and make the organization more appealing to youth. Noting that the league's prior concern with ideological training and politics was insufficient in the era of the Four Modernizations, party reformers encouraged league officials to enter the sphere of economics. As an editorial in *Zhongguo Qingnian* put it, although the CYL is a political organization engaged in political work, "the Four Modernizations is now the most important politics, overriding all other politics."[33] Articles began emphasizing the importance of material civilization and discussing how to promote the wealth not only of individual households and productive enterprises, but of the country as a whole.[34] Membership in the CYL, or even the party, however, did not necessarily make one "progressive" in this drive for economic development. A lengthy account published just prior to the new campaign recounted the story of a 26-year-old who because of his production skills had been democratically chosen as a workshop director in his factory. An accompanying editorial explicitly noted that this pacesetter was neither a CYL nor party member, a pointed reminder to league officials to discover, cultivate, and recruit youths of this type.[35]

A factory in Chengdu, in Sichuan Province, at the forefront of the new reforms in enterprise autonomy, was chosen as the urban model for the new CYL to emulate. Originally, lack of interest on the part of the factory's youth had caused the CYL to become moribund. One workshop had even applied to abolish its CYL branch. However, after the league branch had shifted the focus of its activities from political concerns to work directly related to production, a new interest and excitement was generated. The league organized activities to study scientific management and other industrial techniques, promoted competition among work groups to increase production, and devoted extra time to help youths who had lagged behind.[36] Other units were also publicly praised in *Zhongguo Qingnian* for concerning themselves with the "practical needs" of youth, for solving concrete problems instead of "spending the whole day making 'zealous political appeals' and holding 'ideological meetings.' "[37]

The CYL's new emphasis on production was not restricted to urban areas. Following the establishment of the production responsibility system in the countryside—under which production teams divide land among their households and peasant families profit separately from their own crop yields[38]—party leaders encouraged league cadres to concentrate CYL programs on speeding up agricultural development and improving the living standards of the peasantry. In keeping with usual party practices, a rural model was chosen (Dingtao County in Shandong) and a lengthy investigation report compiled to reveal current shortcomings. The report explained how league cadres had erroneously perceived the new responsibility system to be particularly damaging to CYL work, since village youth were now putting their energies into aiding their families in the cultivation of their own pieces of collectively owned land. Indeed, it had seemed to many that the decline in the political role of the league and the return to "capitalist forms of management" were occurring simultaneously. Investigation teams from the Dingtao County CYL committee fanned out to production brigades in four communes to convince skeptics that "the test for the correctness of a policy is whether or not it promotes the development of the productive forces, whether or not it is beneficial to the construction of the Four Modernizations." While it was admitted that the league branch would have much less to do, league cadres were reassured that, far from becoming expendable, their responsibilities would actually increase. The solution was simply to organize activities around a smaller group of league members, with the branch still available for timely help when needed.[39] Since publication of this report, there have been literally hundreds of accounts in local youth magazines on the role of the league under

[32]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[33]Ibid., December 1979, pp. 2-3.

[34]Ibid., pp. 7-9; March 1980, pp. 15-20; and May 1980, pp. 27-28.

[35]Ibid., October 1979, pp. 2-8.

[36]Ibid., December 1979, pp. 4-7. Background on this factory is provided in *Xin Shiqi*, August 1981, pp. 31-32.

[37]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, January 1980, p. 21.

[38]On the production responsibility system, see, inter alia, Tang Tsou, Marc Blecher, and Mitch Meisner, "The Responsibility System in Agriculture: Its Implementation in Xiyang and Dazhai," *Modern China* (Beverly Hills, CA), January 1982, pp. 41-103; and David Zweig, "Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), July 1983, pp. 879-900.

[39]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, March 1980, pp. 24-26.

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the production responsibility system, many seeking to address the question, "What is to be done?" *(Zenma ban).* Most accounts have emphasized the importance of the league in aiding youth to become rich.[40] Nevertheless, provincial CYL committees have acknowledged that basic-level organizations are no longer functioning *(tingdun)*, are paralyzed *(tanhuan)*, or, at best, are "loose" *(songsan).*[41]

CYL Failure to Adapt

Judging from reports in the press, neither the urban nor the rural CYL models have been duplicated on a wide scale. The failure of the league to become a successful unit of production can be traced to three factors. First, there has been a great deal of opposition within the league to the new direction. Critics have been particularly distressed by what they perceive as the lure of material benefits—namely, money—to attract youth and the equating of modernization with individual wealth. As some put it in *Zhongguo Qingnian* in April 1980:

Since we want to achieve the Four Modernizations, why can't we organize youth to take part in voluntary communist labor? Why must everything be done in terms of collecting rewards? With economics as the new standard, what's to stop us from going further and organizing youth to sell melon seeds in front of theaters or to shine shoes outside bath houses?[42]

Party leaders responded by telling these critics to be realistic and recognize that voluntary labor, while a good thing, was not likely to be forthcoming; that they should not "change color" when "money" was discussed. In fact, far from placing money in opposition to the spirit of either communism or Lei Feng, they said, the accumulation of wealth would actually bring socialist China closer to communism. Finally, critics were warned not to use empty communist slogans in making demands on youth in socialist society; otherwise, in 9 cases out of 10, they would run up against a stone wall.[43] This debate over the relationship between material incentives and modernization, particularly as it applies to CYL work, remained an issue, becoming in late 1983 the focus of a forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (the CYL's daily newspaper).

Second, the league, as an organization, has no particular expertise or experience when it comes to production. Because of this, brigade officials and higher level leaders have not been interested in using the CYL for production purposes, in most cases choosing instead to ignore the organization's activities. While there are numerous reports in local youth magazines of league branches raising money by productive work and of recruits attracted to the league by the likelihood of increased income, these appear to be exceptional cases.[44] The portrait that emerges much more forcefully from published reports is one of the league as being of marginal importance both politically and as a unit of production—particularly in the countryside. For example, since it is assumed that league cadres have little to do, it is common for local party committees to use them as "trouble shooters" whenever particular problems arise. In one commune in Jinan, a CYL secretary was suddenly told to dispense with his usual work in order to take charge of family planning. Within the next two weeks, he was given a variety of specialized jobs, including that of eliminating illiteracy.[45]

In some provinces, county league secretaries and commune league cadres seem to spend little time actually handling youth work. An investigation of six counties in Fujian revealed that of 30 county-level CYL cadres, 12 (40 percent) had been assigned to other tasks for a long time; of 131 league cadres in 79 communes, 120 (92 percent) were perennially engaged in agricultural construction work or were squatting in remote villages to aid production there. In one county, the work of 12 commune CYL cadres was examined for the first six months of 1980. It was discovered that, on the average, each person had put in 1.5 days a month on CYL work. The above figures applied not only to those who had been recently assigned to league work, but also included those who had been doing full-time *(zhuanzhi)* league work for seven or eight years.[46] Another report, entitled "Where Is the County CYL Secretary?" was a plaintive plea from league members who had not seen their newly assigned secretary in five years because she was always away

[40]While these reports cannot all be listed, the following present a representative sample: *Guizhou Qingnian* (Guiyang), September 1981, pp. 4–6, 10; *Jilin Qingnian* (Changchun), June 1982, pp. 26–27; *Zhejiang Qingnian* (Hangzhou), July 1982, pp. 33–34; *Sichuan Qingnian* (Chengdu), August 1981, p. 17; *Fujian Qingnian*, September 1981, p. 6; *Xinjiang Qingnian* (Urumqi), October 1981, p. 8; *Heilongjiang Qingnian* (Harbin), June 1982, p. 30; *Huangjin Shidai* (Guangzhou), May 1982, p. 17; and virtually every issue of *Shanxi Qingnian* (Taiyuan) from mid-1981 to mid-1982.

[41]Representative reports on this problem can be found in *Hubei Qingnian* (Wuhan), October 1981, pp. 2–3; *Fujian Qingnian*, May 1982, pp. 8-9; and *Liaoning Qingnian* (Shenyang), June 1, 1982, pp. 20–23.

[42]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, April 1980, pp. 32–33.

[43]Ibid.

[44]See, inter alia, *Sichuan Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 19; *Shaanxi Qingnian* (Xi'an), December 1980, p. 16; *Gansu Qingnian* (Lanzhou), March 1981, pp. 10–11; *Heilongjiang Qingnian*, July 1980, p. 19; *Fujian Qingnian*, July 1981, p. 15; *Shandong Qingnian* (Jinan), April 1981, p. 8.

[45]See the forum entitled "What Is the Value of the Work of Youth League Cadres?" *Jilin Qingnian*, March 1981, pp. 16–20.

[46]*Fujian Qingnian*, March 1981, p. 10.

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investigating remote areas and had no time for youth work.[47] And in Liaoning Province, a 1980 study of 103 county and commune CYL secretaries revealed that 52 of them performed league work one-third of the time; of the others, such work occupied one-fourth or one-fifth of their time, with some doing less than one month of CYL work a year. The situation was similar in Henan Province.

The situation may be even more grave than these figures suggest. While *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* reports an increase in the number of full-time CYL cadres from 150,000 at the time of the 10th CYL Congress in 1978 to over 184,000 by December 1982,[48] in light of the examples above, this is not necessarily an indication that local-level appointees are doing much youth work. If this is the situation with full-time cadres, it is probably worse for those expected to handle youth affairs as one responsibility among several. Women CYL cadres, for example, are usually assigned family planning, health, and women's association work in addition to their league functions; for men the package most often includes militia, public security, and forestry work. With these added burdens, there is little time to organize league activities.[49] Finally, the party's cavalier attitude toward league activities can be gleaned from the many accounts of league branches signing production contracts with brigades, or of organizing fund-raising activities, only to find higher level officials reneging upon completion of the contract or refusing, under various pretexts, to turn over any money to the league branch.[50]

A third reason for the weakness of the league as a production unit follows from the second. Under the responsibility system, labor power has become more important than ever. Time spent on CYL work detracts from labor performed for one's family in fields leased from the production team. Although some units provide work points as compensation for league cadres, this appears to be relatively rare. The rural reforms hit particularly hard at those provinces in which league funding depended on the proceeds garnered from voluntary labor by league members working so-called cultural land, since such voluntary labor has greatly declined.[51]

[47]Ibid., November 1980, p. 3.

[48]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 28, 1980, and Dec. 16, 1982.

[49]*Jilin Qingnian*, May 1982, p. 9.

[50]*Shaanxi Qingnian*, April 1982, p. 25; *Fujian Qingnian*, January 1980, p. 12; and *Huangjin Shidai*, April 1981,. pp. 18–19.

[51]Among many reports, see *Gansu Qingnian*, August 1981, p. 13; *Sichuan Qingnian*, July 1981, p. 17; *Hubei Qingnian*, December 1980, p. 18; *Shaanxi Qingnian*, August 1980, p. 46; and *Jilin Qingnian*, May 1982, p. 9, and June 1982, p. 27. Although not particularly common, cultural land is land allocated by the commune or brigade in which a part of the proceeds from voluntary labor goes to support cultural activities, such as the purchase of books or newspapers or the financing of related youth pastimes.

[52]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, Aug. 26, 1981, p. 21.

[53]*Hubei Qingnian*, June 1982, p. 24.

A Fading Relevance

The emphasis on production has had an interesting effect on league recruitment in the countryside. Particularly after the drive to recruit "qualified" league members was intensified in 1981, local branches have been uncertain how to proceed. As some league cadres wrote to *Zhongguo Qingnian:*

To determine whether or not a youth met the standard of a league member, our previous practice was to find out whether or not he devoted himself to the interests of the public, loved the collective, and did his share for the construction of a socialist new countryside. Now production is contracted out to individual households. Youth are confined to the small world of a family or a household, calculating how to increase the family income and earn a larger bonus for the overfulfillment of the production quota. How can we examine whether a youth has a high degree of political awareness and possesses the collectivist spirit of devoting himself to the interests of the public?[52]

The party's answer was unequivocal. "Whether a rural youth can wrest high yields . . . and provide the state and the collective with more agricultural sideline products has now become a basic criterion for assessing his genuine love of the state, his concern for the collective, and whether or not he is doing his bit for the socialist cause." To take the former method of "going to work like a swarm of bees" followed by "everyone eating from the same big pot" as public-spirited and a love for the collective, while looking on devotion to one's contracted land as "calculated to further one's interest" is to use the incorrect old standard. Some places accepted the new rules with a vengeance, simplifying their recruitment decisions in the process. One method was to pass a regulation stipulating that only youth from households in which the average income per person was 300 yuan would be considered.[53]

Although the CYL has long been weak in the countryside, current conditions appear to be worse than ever. What has caused equal concern, however, is the decline of the league even in urban units where it had traditionally been strong, for example, in the schools. Confronted by its fading relevance and the prospect of decreasing numbers, the league has addressed the problem by seeking to recruit "winners," those who are likely to make a mark in the country's modernization drive, while paying little attention to those who have been less successful. This situation is especially clear in secondary schools. A recent investigation by the schools

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Young Pioneer cheerleaders at a sports meet in Shanghai.

—Liu Heung Sh'ing/Contact.

section of the Shanghai Municipal Youth League Committee discovered that only 12 percent of eligible (in terms of age) secondary-school students in Shanghai were league members. Moreover, membership in the CYL was very unevenly distributed, with the large majority to be found in "keypoint" schools,[54] schools containing both junior- and senior-high sections, and the graduating classes of senior high. In nearly 50 percent of Shanghai's secondary schools, there were fewer than 30 league members per school. League committees in many junior highs simply did not function due to small membership. The investigation also found that the CYL was making no attempt to recruit students who had simply dropped out of the Young Pioneers after their second year of junior high (age 14). Following the publication of this report, however, the Shanghai CYL committee made a concerted effort to recruit more students prior to graduation from junior high, apparently with some success.[55]

At the other extreme, there have been many complaints of schools simply pulling every student in a classroom into the league en masse, most commonly in senior-high graduating classes, in the hope that league membership will enhance a student's chances of gaining entrance to a university. Once at university, however, these members generally have no interest in taking part in league activities, a problem that has been raised in internal recruitment materials issued by universities and in letters and reports in youth magazines.[56] Thus, the league of the 1960's, to which youth reached out in hopes of being selected, has been replaced by the league of the 1980's, which must reach out to a largely indifferent youth.

At the same time, the league has paid scant attention to students not streamed into "fast" classes or to young workers not in state-run or large collectively run units. Those who have been particularly shunned are the "youth waiting for work" who some consider as "a bur-

[54]"Keypoint" schools receive priority funding, are allocated the best teachers, recruit the most outstanding students, and have the highest rates of promotion to universities. See *Chinese Education* (Armonk , NY), Summer 1984.

[55]*Shanghai Jiaoyu*, April 1982, p. 12; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, June 29, 1982.

[56]The internal recruitment materials are from Hunan Province. Also see *Hubei Qingnian*, June 1981, p. 10; *Zhongguo Qingnian*, Aug. 26, 1981; and *Shaanxi Qingnian*, July 1981, p. 29.

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den of society," "an encumbrance to the construction of the Four Modernizations," or a "fallen youth." Incredibly, it was not until August 1981 that the league branch in Guangzhou recruited its first youth engaged in the private economy; the report was treated as front-page news in the province's party daily.[57] The problem of CYL recruitment has been exacerbated by the continuing weakness of the Young Pioneers, which is still far from being the universal organization for youth aged 7 to 14 that it is intended to be.[58]

Confronting the Problem

Party leaders were not unaware of the problems plaguing youth work. They recognized that the post–Cultural Revolution cynicism had not yet been dissipated and that the CYL had remained unattractive to the majority of youth. For a brief period, starting from mid-1980, these issues began to be addressed directly. Forums in youth magazines and newspapers raised such issues as "The Meaning of Life," "What Is Happiness?" and "Should Students Be Concerned with Politics?" Youths who opposed "improper practices" *(buzheng zhifeng)*—even when the perpetrators were high party officials—were lauded in the press and put up as models. An organizational reform of the CYL, which would give it some autonomy from party control and make it more appealing to youth, was said to be "imperative" *(shizai bixing)*. The 3rd Session of the 5th National People's Congress (NPC—China's legislature) meeting in late August-early September, which promoted socialist democracy and advocated major political and economic reforms, contributed greatly to the general mood of change. There was a spirit of urgency, as if footdragging on vital reforms might cause a permanent alienation of the country's youth. (As will be shown below, however, by early 1981, such bold initiatives seem to have proved too controversial, and youth work reverted to the more comfortable concentration on ideological appeals.)

The meaning-of-life discussion garnered the most attention, both in China and abroad. Initiated by a letter from Pan Xiao, a youth disillusioned by events in society and in her personal life during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, the discussion featured letters and opinions in *Zhongguo Qingnian* from May 1980 to March 1981. Over 60,000 letters were received by the journal. Between July 1980 and February 1981, *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* also provided a forum for the debate, as did provincial youth magazines.[59] Pan Xiao's grievances gave flesh to the rather unarticulated, moody cynicism in Liu Xinwu's "Awake, Little Brother!" In primary school, Pan had been so excited by the deeds of such heroes as Lei Feng that she had been unable to sleep. Since then, life had become a series of disappointments. Searching for life's meaning in love, friendship, and the wisdom of the communist party had proved futile. She, too, had "seen through" everything. No longer seeking to "serve the people" or to "do her bit for the Four Modernizations program," she was writing "to fulfill the need of [her] individual character," so that "society [would not] regard [her] as an insignificant person."

Equally revealing was the forum in *Gongren Ribao* (Workers' Daily) entitled "What Is Happiness?"[60] Among the responses from readers, there was support for money, power, and the realization of one's ambitions as the key to happiness. One reader traced the success of the new economic reforms to the pursuit of wealth. Would commune members work so hard on their private plots or workers put in overtime, or cadres go hither and thither, she asked, if it did not mean more income? Even for the public-spirited, she went on, money would enable them to help others, to invest in the country's production. Thus, she concluded, even morality and social consciousness came from money. Another reader stressed the importance of power, citing the advantages accruing to commune party secretaries who apparently had little difficulty in arranging desirable work and a suitable wife for their sons.

A third forum at this time was entitled "Should Students Be Concerned with Politics?" Originating in a publication from Nankai University, the discussion spread to the whole country after *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* began a series, under the more positive title, "How Can We Manage Well the Relationship Between Study and a Concern for Politics?"[61] The early entries in the forum saw little relationship between obtaining scientific knowledge and

[57] *Guangzhou Ribao*, Aug. 20, 1981. The problems of youth ignored by the CYL are discussed in *Gansu Ribao* (Lanzhou), Jan. 15, 1982, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 80461, Mar. 31, 1982, pp. 97–100; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Dec. 12, 1981; *Wenhui Bao* (Shanghai), Dec. 14, 1979; and *Beijing Ribao*, Aug. 7, 1979.

[58] Problems of Young Pioneer organizations are discussed in *Yunnan Jiaoyu* (Kunming), February 1982, pp. 2–3, and September 1982, pp. 12-13; *Shandong Jiaoyu* (Jinan), November 1981, p. 10; *Jiangsu Jiaoyu* (Nanjing), May 1981, pp. 2–3, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Zhongxiaoxue Jiaoyu* (Beijing), May 1981, pp. 39–40, and February 1982, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Zhongxiaoxue Jiaoyu*, March 1982, pp. 47–48; and *Tianjin Jiaoyu*, May 1981, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Gongqingtuan* (Beijing), June 1981, pp. 45–46.

[59] In addition to the relevant issues of *Zhongguo Qingnian* and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, see *Chinese Education*, Spring 1981; *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), August 1980, pp. 4–5; *Sichuan Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 16–17; and *Guangdong Qingnian*, August 1980, pp. 4–5.

[60] A summary of the positions taken in this debate can be found in *Cheng Ming*, August 1980, pp. 20–22.

[61] Ibid.; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 27, Oct. 11, Nov. 8, and Dec. 18, 1980, provides some of the later entries in this series, which continued over two school terms.

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studying politics. The very discussion of politics was held to be of little value. But this was a period in which the party press was remarkably open in discussing the "so-called crisis of faith" and the increasing indifference of Chinese university students to classes in Marxism-Leninism.[62] A forum of specialists in political work at the middle-school level revealed the depth of the problem. Participants, some of whom were directly involved in the CYL, readily admitted that the majority of students were "unclear" regarding the superiority of socialism and did not have confidence in the Four Modernizations, the leadership of the party, or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Those who saw a real link between their own success in study and the future of the country "did not exceed 5 to 6 percent of the students." It was admitted that a bifurcation between intellectual and political work had occurred, with ideological education considered necessary for poor students, who were unlikely to make it to a university, and intellectual education reserved for those of superior academic ability. Keypoint schools in particular had ignored ideological education. The emphasis on the importance of participation in manual labor, in the wake of the downfall of the radicals, had been virtually eliminated.[63]

The situation was relatively clear, but complex. The CYL had not recovered its former status, and in fact was not functioning effectively in many units; youth saw politics as essentially irrelevant, not just to their own futures, but to the country's future as well; there was no convincing, central guiding ideology that could explain the meaning of life or the essence of happiness to a skeptical younger generation. If the problems could be succinctly stated, the solution was more ambiguous. There were those in the leadership who traced the youth malaise to the stultifying control exercised over the league by party organs and the lack of concern for the real interests of youth. For them, the negative feelings associated with politics and ideology stemmed not from an insufficient stress on those subjects, but from too much political control. By adopting a definition of politics more closely linked to modernization and material development, these reformers sought to reinvigorate youth work and allow the CYL greater autonomy in conducting its affairs. Their goal was to increase the prestige of the league so that outstanding youth would once again clamor to join. If the league could again appear to youth as a vital organization and an important route to social

[62] *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 3, 1980, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 76910, Dec. 1, 1980, p. 116; and *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 11, 1980, trans. in *Inside China Mainland* (Taipei), January 1981, pp. 8–11.

[63] *Jiaoyu Yanjiu* (Beijing), January 1980, pp. 45–50.



Instruction at a high school in Shanghai.

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

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mobility, both recruitment and socialization could be greatly enhanced.

Other leaders, particularly those specializing in political and ideological work, were not convinced that the solution lay in less control; on the contrary, in their view, it had been the very laxity in ideological/political work that had led to the current dilemma. More fearful about opening the league to independent-minded youth who found traditional political appeals irrelevant, they sought to tighten the political standards for CYL membership, to reintroduce ideological/political work into schools at all levels, and to place the league even more tightly under party control. Nonetheless, the views of the reformers held sway until the end of 1980.

Public Criticism and Party Debate

The initiatives of the reformers can be seen in the discussion of the relationship between politics and morality, the campaign to criticize improper practices, the initiation of direct local elections, and the reform of the youth league. All required a loosening of party control and therefore faced considerable resistance.

The politics-morality issue was directly related to the "improper practices" campaign. It turned on whether the slogan "Support the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" should be extended to include the phrase "This is the most important plank in the new morality." Those objecting to the extension complained, accurately as it turned out, that cadres engaging in corrupt activities and seeking special privileges could, using this slogan, present themselves as "the most moral of individuals," while accusing their critics of opposing leadership by the party. To prevent this, the critics insisted on a distinction between politics and morality.[64] That the issue was not merely academic became evident when improper practices by party officials became front-page news in party papers on virtually a daily basis in November 1980.

The most celebrated case, in terms of both publicity and impact, was Chen Aiwu's criticism of Wang Lei.[65] Chen, a cook at a well-known restaurant in Beijing, received national attention in October 1980 when he criticized Wang, then minister of commerce, for holding a banquet and paying only a nominal amount. In spite of various obstacles placed in his path and receiving little or no support from his colleagues, Chen was able to bring the case before the party's powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC) and eventually received public praise and recognition for his deed. His story sparked a nationwide campaign to uncover similar cases of improper practices by China's leading cadres. The case was particularly interesting because of the cleavage it revealed between party reformers and their well-entrenched opponents. The reformers looked upon such efforts by young people to improve the party's work style as an example of how socialist democracy functions. The campaign was held up to youth as an alternative to the "democracy movement," as being more efficacious than the "four greats" (*sida*—big character posters, great debates, airing one's views, and contending in a big way), which had been prevalent during the Cultural Revolution and had recently been excised from Article 45 of the Constitution.[66] This was democracy and law based on organization and order, rather than on anarchy.[67]

Many leading cadres, however, saw things differently. They reacted particularly strongly to this invitation for public criticism of their activities. Wang Lei immediately offered his resignation in a telephone call to a vice-premier, complaining that he should have been informed by the CDIC of the charge against him so that it could be discussed within the party. When the vice-premier, who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution and was considered to be sympathetic to the reformers, held a press conference for Chinese reporters, he dismissed Wang Lei's infraction as trivial and chided *Renmin Ribao* for openly criticizing a government minister prior to receiving permission from central party leaders. Some CCP leaders expressed concern that such revelations could damage the prestige of the party among the masses. The newspaper, preparing to reveal a similar transgression by an even higher official, shelved its plans.[68]

Other critics went further. Chen Aiwu's criticism, they protested apparently with some success, was in essence an example of the outlawed four greats and reflected a lack of organization and party discipline. Although the Discipline and Inspection Commission had drafted a Code of Conduct *(zhuize)* in December 1980, the campaign against special privileges temporarily stopped soon thereafter. Nevertheless, this inner-party debate on the acceptability of public criticism of cadres and the use of the press to point out mistakes and shortcomings of leading party and government organizations at all lev-

[64] *Banyue Tan* (Beijing), July 10, 1980, p. 26.

[65] Details on this case can be found in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 4 and 8, 1980; *Cheng Ming*, December 1980, pp. 50–51, and October 1981, pp. 40–41; and *Xin Shiqi*, December 1981, pp. 11–14.

[66] On developments in the democracy movement at this time, including the elimination of the four greats, see Stanley Rosen, "Guangzhou's Democracy Movement in Cultural Revolution Perspective," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1985.

[67] *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 4, 1980.

[68] *Cheng Ming*, December 1980, pp. 50–51.

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els surfaced at various times over the next year. Press criticism of improper practices burst forth again in August 1981, spearheaded once more by the whistle-blowing of Chen Aiwu, and has reappeared periodically since. One recent high-ranking official to be criticized in print, and to make a self-criticism, was Yang Bo, the minister of light industry.[69] Still, in the more conservative atmosphere of 1981, it was common for criticized cadres to take the offensive, denouncing their accusers for "impeding stability and unity."[70]

CYL Spirit of Reform

The spirit of reform in autumn-winter 1980 also affected the CYL. It was openly acknowledged in CYL publications that in many places "league members do not love the league, youth do not rely on the league, the number of league members requesting withdrawal is large, and the number of youth requesting entrance is small." The reform agenda required answers to the following questions: How can we better understand the nature and tasks of the league? How should we understand and manage the relationship between the league and the party? How can we make the league really represent the interests of youth, and be of service to them? What should be the basic content and form of the league's activities?[71]

Many of these issues were addressed at a conference on basic-level CYL work held from October 5 to 14, 1980. Admitting that about 30 percent of the country's 2.2 million CYL branches were either loosely organized or functionally paralyzed, the participants debated such questions as league autonomy, youth interests, and cadre recruitment and training.[72] The answers proposed called for a youth organization less concerned with ideological and moral issues, and more concerned with promoting members' personal interests and solving practical problems. Thus, educational advancement, marriage, employment, and so forth, were to become more important tasks for the CYL.[73]

Reports in local youth magazines began to stress these service functions of the league. In one factory,

Yang Bo, China's Minister of Light Industry, shown in May 1982.

—New China Pictures Co. via Eastfoto.

some youths preferred to play soccer instead of working hard; after the league showed its concern by buying them a new ball, they were so moved they became diligent workers. Marriage-introduction bureaus and youth-service bureaus became popular. There was also a more realistic portrayal of models. One story, acknowledging the unpopularity of most youths commended by local CYL branches, traced this unpopularity in part to the desire to lavish undiluted praise on the anointed. For example, an outstanding technical worker in a Hubei factory was chosen as a model by the local CYL branch. Not content merely to stress his work ability, league cadres tried also to justify his selection in terms of his redness, as a fervent student of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist works. Other youths who knew him found this portrayal more than a trifle amusing, and reacted cynically. As he himself responded: "If I had read so many books on Marxism-Leninism, where would I find the time to study technical matters, and do innovative work?"[74]

Organizationally, the league had two glaring weaknesses. As it was frequently stated in youth magazines, the problems were "one, no money; two, no power" *(yi wuqian, er wuquan).*[75] The solution required a new relationship between the party and the CYL. The issue of

[69]Yang bought some watches and bicycles for friends, ate a few free dinners, and used some pull to get his daughter a more agreeable job. He blamed the Gang of Four and Mao's personality cult for negatively influencing him. See *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 31, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 8, 1984, pp. K/3–6; and *The Economist* (London), Feb. 18, 1984, p. 39.

[70]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 4 and Dec. 11, 1980; *Shenyang Ribao*, May 9, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 11, 1981, pp. S/5–6; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 6, 8, and 22, and Sept. 26, 1981.

[71]*Zhongguo Qingnian*, November 1980, pp. 2–3.

[72]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 18, 1980.

[73]Ibid., Nov. 13, 1980, and Jan. 6, 1981; *Shanxi Qingnian*, December 1980, p. 17.

[74]*Hubei Qingnian*, November 1980, p. 14; *Huangjin Shidai*, March 1981, pp. 14–15; *Shanxi Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 14; *Gansu Qingnian*, March 1981, pp. 10–11; and *Sichuan Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 19.

[75]*Guangdong Qingnian*, November 1980, pp. 15–16.

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league autonomy had begun to be addressed soon after the September 1980 NPC plenum. As one prominent report accompanying the launching of the reform campaign stated the problem:

The leadership of some units also only stresses one-sidedly that the CYL must be "obedient." As soon as you bring up the interests of youth, you are labeled as someone "placing the interests of the party in limbo." Apparently the interests of the party and the interests of youth are incompatible. They take the party's "absolute" leadership to the point of negating and rescinding the function of the league.[76]

Throughout the remainder of 1980, *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* forcefully addressed weaknesses in CYL work, focusing primarily on the heavy hand of the party and the unsuitability of many cadres—in terms of age, knowledge, or professional training—for league work. In Tianjin, for example, of 169 district-, county-, and bureau-level cadres, 62 percent were junior-high graduates and 11 percent were senior-high graduates.[77] Some local youth publications continued the discussion into the next year, publishing detailed accounts as well as forums on why leading league cadres and ordinary members had resigned. The blame again was placed on party policies.[78]

The Reins Are Tightened

There were those in the party, however, who viewed greater independence for the CYL in less favorable terms. They had seen the dangers inherent in an organization even partially "liberated" from party control, particularly under the new forms of socialist democracy being promoted. These new forms included the direct elections for county-level people's congresses held throughout China in 1980.[79] Part of the larger process of "democratic institutionalization," the local elections were peaking in the autumn of 1980 at precisely the same time democracy activists were facing another crackdown.[80] Nevertheless, while CYL organizations were told to take part in this "acceptable" form of democracy, it was in fact the "dissidents," taking advantage of the new provisions for independent candidates, who gained the most attention by running for office or supporting candidates in a number of highly visible constituencies. For example, in a freewheeling election campaign in Beijing University, replete with public-opinion polls and rousing speeches, the top vote getter, Hu Ping, won a seat on the People's Assembly for Haidian District on a platform stressing the importance of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.[81] As Wang Xizhe, a leading democracy activist in Guangzhou (Canton), told an interviewer in late December 1980, local election candidates in Beijing's West Ward had had "quite a degree of success" in raising the case of Wei Jingsheng, the "democracy movement's" most celebrated activist, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison in October 1979.[82]

By December 1980, however, it was clear that the strategy that had sought to accommodate youth through a loosening of controls and a direct appeal to their material interests had lost out; the dangers from "bourgeois liberalization" were too great. More conservative forces, arguing for a long-term effort to reeducate China's youth in socialist values, had prevailed. The key event was the Central Work Conference, held from December 15 to 25, with the new line set forth in a major speech by Deng Xiaoping. Deng's own conversion to a more conservative position seems to have been based on events in the last part of 1980. Although the fortunes of Deng and the party reformers had blossomed between the 3rd Plenum in December 1978 and the 3rd Session of the 5th NPC in September 1980, things had become more problematic by the end of the year. Neither Hua Guofeng, who reportedly was ready to resign as party chairman, nor Ye Jianying attended the work conference. Deng's economic reform program had run into serious problems, and the invitation to intellectuals and youth to "emancipate the mind" and discard outmoded philosophies had, in the absence of any convincing replacement, led to a search for material comforts and individual success, to further exploration of Western concepts of freedom and democracy, or, as in Pan Xiao's case, to utter confusion and hopelessness.[83]

Deng's speech at the work conference addressed these concerns. In arguing that a period of "readjust-

[76] *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 23, 1980; *Zhongguo Qingnian*, September 1980, pp. 4–5.

[77] *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 11, 1980.

[78] Ibid., Oct. 11, Nov. 6, 22, 27, and Dec. 2, 16, 1980; *Huangjin Shidai*, January 1981, pp. 12–13; February 1981, pp. 16–17; March 1981, pp. 14–15; and April 1981, pp. 18–19.

[79] For a discussion of direct county elections, see the special feature in *Beijing Review*, Feb. 25, 1980, pp. 11–19; and Brantly Womack, Ed., "Electoral Reform in China," *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Fall–Winter 1982–83.

[80] See, e.g., the special feature on big character posters, "The Dazibao: Its Rise and Fall," in *Beijing Review*, Oct. 6, 1980, pp. 22–28. See also Rosen, "Guangzhou's Democracy Movement. . . ."

[81] See *Monthly Bulletin on the Chinese Democracy Movement* (Hong Kong), April 1981, pp. 3–15; *Qishi Niandai* (Hong Kong), February 1981, pp. 15–20; and March 1981, pp. 68–90.

[82] Wang Xizhe, "Democracy and Chinese Communism," *New Left Review* (London), January–February, 1982, pp. 62–70.

[83] Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1981: Reform, Readjustment, Rectification," *Asian Survey*, January 1982, pp. 33–46.

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

Chinese young people in Western garb outside a shop on a Shanghai street in 1984.

—Sven-Erik Sjöberg/Pressens Bild AB via Photoreporters.

ment" was necessary, he placed stress on "guaranteeing stability and solidarity." This included the strengthening of political work and a renewed call to "uphold the leadership of the party." To combat the prevalent cynicism as well as the negative influence reaching China from the West, Deng spoke of the necessity of creating "a high level of spiritual as well as material civilization," which was to include "the principles of Communist thought, ideals, beliefs, virtues, and discipline, as well as comradely relations between people, and the like." As he put it, "how can socialism be built up without this kind of spiritual civilization, without Communist thought, without Communist virtue?" Deng acknowledged that some would argue that the readjustment meant the end of liberalization and a change in direction from the 3rd Plenum, that dictatorship had replaced democracy, but he discounted such sentiments, saying that "liberalization" and democracy were never intended to be extended to antiparty, antisocialist forces.[84]

Although the full force of the shift was not felt until after the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in late June 1981, the change in the CYL was much more rapid. At a meeting of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region CYL secretaries convened by the CYL Central Committee from January 7 to 16, 1981, top priority was given to ideological and political work in handling the league's tasks. Using the same terminology as Deng had in attacking "bourgeois liberalization" and "putting profits first," the CYL, in order "to educate youth in the spirit of communism," adopted the slogan "learn from Lei Feng and build a new style"—which must have seemed an oxymoron to discerning readers.[85] Indeed, judging from press reports there was great skepticism that a recycled Lei Feng could be compatible with a "new style." Political-work cadres were at pains to refute those who called Lei "outdated," an "ascetic monk," a "slave," or even a "fool of the revolution." Although it was acknowledged that people of specialized learning were required to scale new heights in science and technology, "Lei Feng–type models" were still needed for tractor drivers, water control personnel, and other "ordinary workers." Even Chen Jingrun, the mathematician whose status as a model had been contested by those nostalgic for Lei Feng back in 1978, was mobilized to report that he had always been a good student of Lei's. The close link between red and expert was to be restored.[86]

Within the CYL, the principal task for 1981 was to educate the membership to become "league members worthy of the name," a campaign that encouraged the withdrawal of completely inactive members and the expulsion of those who had committed serious mistakes. At the same time, party leadership was to be strengthened at the expense of league autonomy. For example, leading members of CYL organs were to be allowed to attend "relevant" meetings of party committees, so they could understand what the party was thinking and doing, and thus serve the party better. It was precisely such a limited role for the league—as a mere transmission belt for party decisions—that had been a major source of dissatisfaction in 1980.[87]

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[84]Deng's speech is translated in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), July 1981, pp. 101–19. Although Deng provided the first authoritative exposition of the term "spiritual civilization," it had earlier been used in Ye Jianying's September 1979 speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the PRC and endorsed in the spring of 1980 by Li Xiannian and Hua Guofeng. Thus, it seems to mark a clear setback for the party's reformist faction. See Stuart Schram, " 'Economics in Command?' Ideology and Policy since the Third Plenum, 1978–1984," *The China Quarterly*, September 1984, pp. 417–61; and Carol Lee Hamrin, "Competing 'Policy Packages' in Post-Mao China," *Asian Survey*, May 1984, pp. 487–518.

[85]Xinhua, Jan. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Jan. 22, 1981, pp. L/1–2.

[86]*Beijing Ribao*, Mär. 6, 1983; and *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology* (Armonk, NY), Fall 1981, pp. 32–41; *Hongqi* (Beijing), Apr. 16, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, May 20, 1981, pp. K/14–21.

[87]Radio Beijing, Feb. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Feb. 20, 1981, pp. P/1–2; AFP, Feb. 9, 1981, in *FBIS–CHI*, Feb. 9, 1981, p. L/9; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Feb. 10, 1981.

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Deng Liqun, member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CC) and head of the CC's Propaganda Department.

—New China Pictures Co. via Eastfoto.

Reemergence of Communist Morality

The emphasis on the building of a spiritual civilization was accelerated with the February 25 proposal by nine mass organizations, including the CYL Central Committee, to launch activities to promote "civilized and courteous behavior," followed three days later by the inauguration of the Five Stresses and Four Beauties *(wujiang simei)* campaign.[88] The proclivities of some youth to promote excessively the "two strivings and three oppositions (strive for democracy and freedom; oppose bureaucratism, special privileges, and feudalism) were to be curbed; the notion that a "bureaucratic class" existed within the party was ridiculed. In fact , Propaganda Department Director Deng Liqun, then a vice president of the Academy of Social Sciences and a frequent and public defender of political-work cadres, lashed out at those who spoke of a serious "crisis of faith" among the younger generation and who wanted to "practice democracy by kicking aside the party committees"; they were, he noted, "essentially identical" with the Gang of Four.[89] As a result of these assaults, by April, most of the remaining publishers of so-called people's magazines *(minjian kanwu)* were arrested.

Following the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee in June, ideological/political work was, if anything, further intensified. With the demotion of Hua Guofeng and the adoption of an "authoritative assessment" criticizing Mao and excoriating his radical allies for having led China down the path of "sham Marxism,"[90] Deng Xiaoping felt secure enough to move to the left (where the military had been since January) and announce that the essence of bourgeois liberalization was the rejection of the party's leadership. For independent-minded youth, it became more difficult to justify one's uncertainty over either the direction of the country or one's own contribution to the modernization effort. Thus, according to a report in the July 11, 1981, *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao,* in calling for a study within the CYL of the lengthy resolution produced by the 6th plenum, Deng Liqun could state confidently: "In the past, present, and future, Comrade Mao Zedong is always our great leader and teacher."

When the 3rd Plenum of the 10th CYL Central Committee met in August, the stress was on imbuing young people with a communist morality and teaching them to love the motherland, the socialist system, and the party. Mao Zedong Thought was to be the guide for practical work. The success of the Four Modernizations, which had been made the major task of CYL work in March 1979, was hardly visible on the agenda, although the "general interest" in "pushing economic construction upward and developing production so as to improve the people's livelihood year after year" was noted.[91] Party leaders had thus moved a long way from the calls for a separation of politics and morality, from the search for an autonomous role for the CYL, and from the "imperative" reform of the league said to be necessary to win back the support of youth.

[88] *Zhongguo Qingnían Bao*, Feb. 28, 1981. This campaign was an attempt to improve interpersonal relations, which had deteriorated drastically during the Cultural Revolution.

[89] *Chan Wang*, May 1, 1982, pp. 22–25; Xinhua, Mar. 27, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 30, 1981, p. L/10–12.

[90] See the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981, which is also trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, July 1, 1981, pp. K/1–38. For an interesting overview of the 6th plenum and the resolution, see David S. G. Goodman, "The 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?" *The China Quarterly*, September 1981, pp. 519–27.

[91] *Cheng Ming*, October 1981, pp. 7–14; Xinhua, Aug. 10, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Aug. 11, 1981, pp. K/1–4; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, July 11, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, July 27, 1981, pp. 13–15.

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Still, the shift to ideological/political work seems not to have been an immediate success. As one youth philosophized about the relationship between red and expert: "Those with talent can work for the Four Modernizations; those with limited capability can also contribute by doing good deeds."[92] An investigation of more than 300 students in their first year of senor high at a keypoint secondary school in Tianjin revealed that over 90 percent were concerned only with university entrance. The majority planned to take the entrance exam two or three times; 12 admitted they would continue to try until they reached the age limit. As one student remarked, in a reference to China's campaign to encourage educated youth to go to underdeveloped areas, "I'll take the university entrance exam until it is no longer possible to do so; then, if unsuccessful, I'll go to a border area. I wouldn't have the face to remain in Tianjin."[93]

To demonstrate that the new political emphasis was warranted, the press began to publicize negative models, some of whom came complete with the requisite diaries. The most prominent of these was Feng Daxing, who was found guilty of robbery and murder. Cited as the logical, if extreme, consequence of the "ultra-individualist mentality" then prevailing among many youths, who "grovel at the feet of the material culture of the West," Feng's diary raised some of the same points as Pan Xiao's letter had. He considered Marx, Lenin, and Mao to be "unreliable"; therefore, "regardless of communism," he believed only in himself. It followed from this, he supposedly noted in the diary, that "what belongs to others can be made mine; it is all right to reach the goal by any means." After being captured, his main concern was not repentance, but to obtain "peace for my soul." He felt unworthy only of his parents, said the official commentary accompanying the diary, "not of the party and the people who had nurtured him." What made Feng's case, and others of this type that were publicized, particularly suitable for wide dissemination was his status as a "winner." As one of the top students at Beijing Foreign Language Institute, he was a lesson to those who felt that entrance to university meant everything. His example was also to serve as a warning to those who felt that red and expert had no necessary connection. As his diary showed, Feng had not engaged in any political studies or activities for a year. Along with some other groups at the school, the CYL committee accepted part of the responsibility for not having paid enough attention to Feng.[94]

Increasing Privatization of Values

There were few major innovations in youth work in 1982; the emphasis on ideology and politics, with its stress on establishing social ethics and promoting spiritual civilization, remained prominent. Recognizing that most Chinese youth, if they bothered to consider the subject at all, viewed communism as an abstract, distant concept, the party leadership began to urge CYL officials to concentrate on patriotic values as the necessary first step to developing a communist world outlook, a policy that was more fully articulated in 1983. As Wang Zhaoguo, who had replaced Han Ying as first secretary of the CYL Central Committee in November 1982 put it at the 11th CYL Congress in December of that year, league educational efforts would center on teaching youth about Chinese contributions to civilization, the struggles against oppression before the birth of "New China," the benefits socialism had already brought, and so forth.

There was in fact a more compelling reason for this new focus on patriotism. The year had produced a series of shocks that demonstrated in a highly visible way to those outside China that even some of the most favored Chinese preferred life abroad. In July, China's top female tennis player, Hu Na, asked for political asylum in the United States; in September, Zhou Lingfei, the grandson of Lu Xun, the writer most admired in post-1949 China, decided to live in Taiwan with his new bride; in October, an air force pilot, Wu Ronggen, defected to Taiwan. There were also unconfirmed reports of two aborted attempts to divert Chinese airliners to Taiwan. Thus, league activities were to give more attention, once again, to the interests of youth, to help them solve employment, study, marriage, and recreation problems.[95] It was a relatively low-key approach, in keeping with the long-term strategy of transforming youth. However, in addition to the cases noted above, there was ample evidence of the distance still to be traveled, as well as of the general lack of urgency with which most leaders, particularly at the lower levels, continued to

[92] *Hunan Ribao* (Changsha), reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu* (Beijing), November 1981, pp. 53–54.

[93] *Tianjin Jiaoyu*, 1981, pp. 6–9, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Jiaoyu Xue* (Beijing), March 1981, pp. 31–34. This article raises an interesting methodological question. Most contributors to local, and even national, journals are unknown to Western researchers. In this case, I was able to discover that the author was a political-work cadre who had sympathized with the innovations of the Cultural Revolution and had been demoted as a result. As someone less than enthusiastic about the new reforms, with an axe to grind, he had a compelling reason to argue that they were a disaster ideologically. It is interesting that such people still retained access to the open media.

[94] Feng's case is discussed in a 14-part, four-and-one-half month forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* in 1982. It also appeared in numerous other places. For an English source, see *Xin Shiqi*, November 1981, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 80272, Mar. 9, 1982, pp. 10–14.

[95] Xinhua, Dec. 21, 22, and 27, 1982, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Dec. 28, 1982, pp. K/1–6.

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treat the "soft task" *(ruan renwu)* of league work.[96]

The cynicism of youth was visible from both their own attitudes and the complaints of CYL cadres. While the latter complained that recruitment of new members had become especially difficult "now that youth were only interested in money and have become completely apathetic about politics" *(mamu de hen)*, there are letters from students objecting to teachers attempting to force them to become league members. One student even allegedly resisted joining the CYL because he found those in the league worse than those outside. Perhaps one cadre summed up the prevailing atmosphere best when he referred to the icons of revolutionary progressiveness: "Some say that Zhang Side was 'demobilized,' Lei Feng was 'transferred to civilian work,' the Foolish Old Man has 'retired,' and Bethune has 'returned home'; now that it is the time for individuals to take care of themselves, who has time to study them!"[97]

There were many articles detailing the trials and tribulations of "advanced elements" on all fronts. Young students who tried to emulate Lei Feng, national models and NPC deputies opposing corruption and theft, workers given commendations for particular expertise, all were said to have been ridiculed and even beaten. Although these problems had been the subject of a continuing forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian* during the last part of 1981, there were few signs that the situation had improved in 1982. The continuation of this phenomenon was traced, in part, to the attitude of leading party cadres, who were primarily concerned about making employment and housing arrangements for their children, and preferred not to "make any waves" by backing advanced elements under attack.[98] This "laid back" style was not atypical in other contexts. A visiting American, whose English class consisted of students headed for the United States, tried to prod her charges to go beyond the words in the text, to think creatively. Finally, one frustrated student who had not uttered a word all term burst out in Chinese: "Look, I got through the Cultural Revolution by eating, working, and sleeping as if I were in a trance *(shachi, shazuo, shashui)*. Why risk anything now?" The rest of the class laughed knowingly.[99]

Young people, following Mao's exhortation to "Walk and train yourself to be ready for war," on a march in the countryside in 1971.

—MAGNUM.

The two major forums for youth carried in the press in 1982 reflected the increasing privatization of values. The first forum, from *Zhongguo Qingnian*, considered the question, "Can Friendship Be Developed Under Conditions of Competition?" The second forum, which had a much wider readership, concerned the revolutionary hero Zhang Hua. The friendship/competition discussion sought to explore student relationships after the restoration of the university entrance examination.[100] As is typical, the opening segment was provocative. One youth related his fall from grace after he failed the examination for middle school. He joined 80-some other students for a humiliating half year repeating work at his primary school (the school refused to keep them any longer) before he was able to enter as the "second shift" of a regular middle school. The education bureau thought so little

[96] *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, June 8, July 24, Sept. 28, and Nov. 16, 1982.

[97] *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, May 11 and 18, and Aug. 24, 1982, p. 3. Zhang, the Foolish Old Man, and Bethune are characters in Mao's "three well-read articles," which were extensively circulated during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang was a revolutionary martyr eulogized in "Serve the People" (1944); the Foolish Old Man (Yu Gong) stems from a Chinese fable and appears in "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed The Mountains" (1945); Norman Bethune was a Canadian doctor who came to China in 1938 and died while operating on wounded Chinese soldiers ("In Memory of Norman Bethune"—1939). See the appropriate sections in the *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Beijing, Foreign Language Press, 1976.

[98] Rosen, "Education and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youths"; and *Zhongguo Qingnian*, August through December, 1981.

[99] Personal communication to author, December 1982.

[100] *Zhongguo Qingnian*, June 1982, pp. 18–19; August 1982, pp. 24–29; September 1982, pp. 30–33; October 1982, pp. 15–17.

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The young Shi Zhan says goodbye to his teacher before leaving to enroll in the Chinese University of Science and Technology in September 1980.

—New China Pictures Co. via Eastfoto.

of these students that they did not bother to issue teaching materials to the instructors. Classes were held in two dark, filthy rooms outside the school. From then on, everyone judged him as a "second shift student." He had no "face" to see his former friends, whose parents no longer allowed them to associate with him. His relatives, even his teachers, addressed him sarcastically. A second youth told how friendship was inevitably dissolved when one youth entered a keypoint school. Their competition had turned into a zero-sum game: the success of one was seen as a defeat for the other. Responses from readers were invited. Many described similar failures, offering advice to those having to cope with not being accepted to a good high school. Some admitted that competition had negatively influenced their collectivist spirit; they would provide help to poor students, but never to anyone considered a competitor.

Some stories had happy endings, even though academic competition was the driving force in a relationship. One student, for example, considered another his enemy because the second student was always top in the class on math tests, even though his overall grades were not as high as those of the first student. What was particularly galling was that the successful student had transferred into the keypoint classroom from an ordinary class. For the less-gifted math student, the competition became a war. Then he discovered that his opponent was not particularly interested in the competition; he was devoting all his efforts toward preparing for the provincial keypoint senior-high exam. This infuriated the combative student even more. It ended happily when the math whiz suggested both try for the same provincial keypoint, and both were successful.

If the above forum showed that friendship did not necessarily have to be abandoned under competitive conditions, particularly when both friends were able to succeed, the Zhang Hua case revealed the extent to which pragmatic materialism had affected student attitudes and governed the relationship between individuals of "unequal value." It showed a rationality that even human-capital theorists might have found embarrassing. Briefly, Zhang was a 24-year-old medical student in Shaanxi Province who leaped into a nightsoil pit to rescue a 69-year-old peasant from drowning. However, along with the peasant, Zhang was overcome by methane fumes and died in the hospital after he was rescued in turn by a passing dairy worker. Posthumously hailed as a national hero for his selfless act, Zhang was the subject of an extensive media campaign—including the obligatory diary excerpts—launched in October in China's major newspapers. He was portrayed as a university student and party member who admired Lei Feng and had interests beyond his own professional success.[101]

While most discussions followed the usual practice of merely enumerating in glowing terms what other university students could learn from Zhang Hua's lofty ideals, Shanghai's *Wenhui Bao* tried a different, and in retrospect fatal, approach. Noting almost casually in an editors' note that "we may occasionally come across some objection" when learning from advanced elements, the editors published a letter from a Hangzhou youth who argued against the behavior of Zhang Hua, calling it an emotional act that in fact damaged the long-term interests of the state. For a young student with much to contribute to the Four Modernizations, in whom the state had already invested heavily, to risk his life for an old peasant was "to exchange gold for the same amount of stone." A forum under the title "Is it Worthwhile for a University Student to Risk Death to Save an Old Peas-

[101]For example, in *Guangming Ribao* there were 39 stories on Zhang Hua from October 7 to 30, and 10 stories from November 2 to 28.

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ant?" was started, presumably to refute the Hangzhou youth's objection. Unexpectedly, 1,600 letters were received within a few days, with the dissenter garnering a good deal of support. Although the Zhang Hua study campaign limped along until the end of the year, and the infidel duly made a self-criticism under pressure, it seems clear that most college students found Zhang Hua's sacrifice both tragic and foolhardy.[102]

New Model Youth

Following the 11th CYL Congress in December 1982, youth work in 1983 was marked by a number of significant developments. The appearance of Zhang Haidi, the most important model for youth since Lei Feng, signaled a major step forward in emulation campaigns. The youth league began a three-year rectification movement, with emphasis in the first year on strengthening basic-level rural organizations. The emphasis on patriotism as the route to acquiring a communist belief system continued. The growing acquisitiveness of Chinese youth was addressed in a lengthy newspaper forum. Finally, near the end of the year, in a sudden shift in tactics, a campaign against "spiritual pollution" was launched which, before it was reined in and circumscribed, threatened to undermine the low-key, long-range approach the party had been following to win back the affections of the country's youth.

The movement to study the example of Zhang Haidi was a significant innovation in several respects, most notably because Zhang was still alive.[103] Cynicism regarding previous models stemmed, in part, from their timely demise. Lei Feng could never be questioned about the several "original" diaries rumored to be touring the country simultaneously. Skeptics had wondered why Zhang Hua had been made a hero and a living, breathing Wang Baoan, the young dairy worker who took the same risks in successfully pulling Zhang out of the manure pit, had been essentially ignored. Their inescapable conclusion was that dead martyrs were more useful than live heroes.

Zhang Haidi, who overcame physical handicaps and callous treatment by bureaucrats to pursue higher learning; her achievements have been publicized by Chinese youth officials.

—New China Picture Company.

Zhang Haidi was unusual in other respects as well. Though 28 years old at the time of her elevation to national model, she had spent the past 20 years either in bed or in a wheelchair, her paralysis the result of a failed operation. Although she was denied schooling, Zhang had learned foreign languages and had studied medicine, painting, and music. In 1981 she passed the university entrance examination. Moreover, she used her acquired skills to aid her neighbors. But discrimination due to her disability had been overt and frequent. When she could find no one who would give her a job, she unsuccessfully attempted suicide (although this fact is virtually unmentioned in much official praise for her).[104]

Zhang Haidi is a response to the Hu Nas and Zhou Lingfeis of China. More explicitly, she provides the answer to Pan Xiao's well-publicized question of 1980: "What is the Meaning of Life?" In a forum organized by *Zhongguo Qingnian* as part of its Zhang Haidi study campaign, readers addressed the question, "What Kind of Outlook Regarding the Value of Life Should Contemporary Youth Hold?" The accepted answer, from Zhang herself, is that "the meaning of life lies in making contributions, not in making demands." She is praised for her "communist outlook on life," her patriotism, and her

[102] *Wenhui Bao*, Oct. 18, Nov. 9 and 16, and the summing up on Dec. 28, 1982. Zhang Hua is likely to be revived periodically. For example, from November 9 to 29, 1983, there were 18 articles on Zhang's sacrifice in *Guangming Ribao*. More recently, 100 students from the same PLA medical college that had produced Zhang Hua have become national models for rescuing more than a dozen tourists who had fallen from a cliff. Political-work cadres have thus argued that the Zhang Hua incident was not an aberration, but rather reflected a widespread "spirit of socialist humanism" among youth. See Xinhua, Feb. 25, 1984, reprinted in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 28, 1984, pp. K/6–8.

[103] See, e.g., *Zhongguo Qingnian*, March October, 1983; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Mar. 10 and Apr. 30, 1983; *Qishi Niandai*, June 1983, trans. in *Inside China Mainland*, July 1983, pp. 12–16; *Cheng Ming*, July 1, 1983, pp. 58–59; and *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 8, 1983.

[104] For Zhang's suicide attempt, see *Cheng Ming*, July 1983, pp. 58–59.

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thirst for knowledge: "I really think I'd like to spend my whole life in the library."[105]

Although Zhang is repeatedly called a Lei Feng for the 1980's, and party leaders blithely say that a communist outlook on life makes Zhang, Lei, and all advanced people alike, it is important to note the very real differences between the two models. First, Lei Feng devoted his whole life to Mao Zedong; Zhang Haidi seems unconcerned with politics or ideology. Second, if one may be perverse for a moment, the development of Lei Feng's indomitable spirit was inseparable from the exploitation by landlords in the old society; Zhang's spirit stemmed, in part, from callous treatment by bureaucrats in a socialist society. Third, Lei was content to be a rust-free screw; Zhang takes pride in her accomplishments and her independence. When advised to take advantage of her trip to Beijing to have her hair done, she rejected such advice, saying "I am what I am!"

The current model who really embodies the Lei Feng spirit has been anointed by no less a body than the Central Military Commission, headed by Deng Xiaoping and a source of much of his power. Named Zhu Boru, he is praised for the purity of his life-style, his self-sacrifice, and his obedience. Ready to go anywhere, "he lets the party make arrangements for him."[106] Nonetheless, it is Zhang's independence and self-confidence rather than Zhu's austerity that matches the most popular models among Chinese youth.

Obstacles to Reform

The serious attention the youth league has begun to receive is presumably due to the increasing influence of former CYL cadres such as Hu Yaobang and Hu Qili at the top of the political system. Many of the current proposals are not new, but they are being pushed with far greater energy and urgency. The foremost obstacle remains the lack of conviction of those at lower levels who are expected to implement the reforms. Work already conducted at test points, reveals continuing major weaknesses in the CYL's organizational form, schedule of activities, funding, and ability to gain access to limited space. With the new emphasis on individual families under the production responsibility system, the basic unit for CYL activities should devolve from the brigade to the work group level. CYL activities will not be conducted during busy periods, but will be arranged so as not to interfere with production. Since league dues and meager direct allocations cannot meet league expenses, branches are being encouraged to increase CYL funding through a variety of production activities, including the cultivation of oilseed crops, the establishment of seedling nurseries, and the undertaking of various forms of sideline production. The space lost for CYL activities after the implementation of the production responsibility system may have to be restored through administrative coercion, if no other means can be found.

The crux of the CYL's problem is said to be its cadre force. Thus, the first year of the rectification has concentrated on building a strong leading group at the commune and brigade levels. This involves a variety of methods, including reliance on democratic elections, transfers of outstanding individuals from other jobs, holding of training classes, an increase in full-time cadres, and an improvement in methods of remuneration. Because the economic burden that currently falls on those devoting time to CYL work is particularly onerous, several reforms have been suggested: (1) league cadres should have reduced agricultural responsibilities within the work group; (2) those who cannot meet their production quota because of time spent on league work should not be docked work points; (3) league cadres who must take days off from production should not be penalized financially; and (4) at the end of the year, league cadres who do especially well in their work should be treated exactly the same in terms of spiritual and material rewards as other cadres.[107]

Throughout the latter part of 1983, the press offered a wide variety of examples of compliance and deviation from reform standards. The most successful branches were those that could entice "able people" *(nengren)* to accept the post of CYL branch secretary. Fujian was singled out for special praise; in one district, over 30 percent of the new CYL branch secretaries were from specialized or keypoint households, or had high technical skills. Acclaim was also forthcoming for those CYL units that had become integrated into the economic life of the community, particularly when the league could serve as a springboard to upward mobility for ambitious youth. The key in this case was to have the league serve a gatekeeper function. Thus, there were a number of cases reported in which valued jobs in the countryside

[105]For a reader's letter complaining that a life limited to struggle, without asking anything in return, is an unrealistic approach toward seeking happiness, see *Zhongguo Qingnian*, August 1983, p. 11. Needless to say, this letter was the subject of much criticism from other letter writers, more supportive of the Zhang Haidi model.

[106]On Zhu Boru, see *Renmin Ribao*, July 28, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 2, 1983, pp. K/11-13; *Hongqi*, June 1, 1983, trans in *JPRS*, No. 83922, July 19, 1983, pp. 1-7; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 14, 1983.

[107]A good summary of the proposed reforms appears in Shu Hui, "Chinese Communists Unfold League Rectification to Coordinate with Rural Reforms," *Zhonggong Yanjiu*, July 15, 1983, pp. 82–89. Also see *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, May 21 and June 2, 1983.

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were reserved for CYL members, sometimes only after the applicants passed an exam administered by the league. There were stories of recently returned youth who, having received their education outside the village, used their newly acquired knowledge to help local youth become rich. Other stories told of how district or other officials, after receiving letters from village youth seeking advice on how to become rich, actively encouraged the local league branch to emphasize the pursuit of wealth. The point of many of these accounts was that even a recalcitrant league branch should not be an obstacle to local youth seeking prosperity. Thus, hostile league branches could be bypassed and later transformed.[108]

Units cited for poor policy implementation were guilty of familiar errors, stemming primarily from a refusal to consider CYL work essential. Thus, in the general reduction of cadres under the new reforms, full-time league cadres were often found to be expendable. Remuneration for CYL cadres remained a problem. The two most common methods of payment—a fixed subsidy, or a floating rate equivalent to the average income of a commune member—did not take account of work performance. This has opened the door to at least two negative tendencies. Owing to the nonproduction nature of CYL work, job performance is neither monitored nor measured. Thus, those CYL workers who have connections with cadres can in effect receive a guaranteed wage for very little work and can concentrate their efforts instead on more profitable tasks, such as sideline production. On the other hand, more dedicated CYL cadres often become quite demoralized when they see little relationship between energy expended and rewards received.

But there was a potential contradiction brewing in league work throughout 1983. Indeed, some CYL officials questioned the propriety of certain CYL practices: the appeals to the well-educated, upwardly mobile, and economically ambitious to take the lead in reviving CYL work; the constant reports in youth magazines that all young peasants shared a fervent wish—a thirst for knowledge and a thirst for wealth *(qiuzhi qiufu)*; the CYL-sponsored public commendations of so-called 10,000-yuan households, with peasants chanting "making money is glorious" *(deqian guangrong)*; and so forth.[109] In fact, the role of money and the striving for wealth were being openly discussed in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*. Beginning in August, a forum for readers entitled "Is 'Looking to Money' *(xiang qian kan)*[110] a Correct Slogan?" considered the function of money in the country's development. The 11th CYL Congress had listed two functions for the league: "a school where young people can study communism in the course of practice, and the shock force in which young people can contribute to the Four Modernizations." However, some provincial CYL organs, in listing their tasks for pushing league work forward in 1983, emphasized organizational reform and economic development, with the building of spiritual civilization mentioned only in passing.[111]

Opponents of the increasing stress on material over spiritual values must have felt vindicated when Deng Xiaoping, at the 2nd Plenum of the 12th Central Committee in October 1983, proclaimed that spiritual pollution cannot be allowed on the ideological front. Leading CYL cadres quickly took up the campaign, complaining that some league organizations had been ignoring theoretical study and political work. Ironically, the ferreting out of capitalist tendencies actually provided the underworked cadres with something to do. Although it is too early to assess fully the influence this campaign has had on the league, at a minimum it caused a great deal of confusion at the basic levels. Interpreted broadly by conservative local officials, pollution was taken to include any manifestations of "bourgeois" behavior, ranging from hair perms and fashionable clothes to excessive enjoyment of leisure time. More ominously, peasants who had prospered as a result of the rural reforms were accused of "putting money ahead of everything." Guidelines were unclear, with the press at pains to distinguish what was popular *(tongsu)* from what was vulgar *(yongsu)*. The campaign was narrowed very quickly to exclude the countryside and to support the desires of youth for a richer, more fulfilling life; nevertheless, it provided a sharp reminder of the conservative constituency that could be mobilized were party reformers to falter.[112]

Popular Heroes and Survey Data

But what of the popularity of unsanctioned models with whom youth identify, arguably an even more important indicator of youth values than are state-sponsored

[108]Success stories are reported in *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 17, 1983; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 6 and Nov. 12, 15, 26, and 29, 1983; and July 12, 24, and Aug. 14, 1984.

[109]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 30 and Oct. 11, 1983; *Banyue Tan*, Dec. 25, 1983, pp. 5–7.

[110]"Looking to money" was, of course, an unauthorized replacement for "looking to the future" (also pronounced *xiang qian kan*, but using the character for "money" instead of the one for "future"), which had been a slogan of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee held in December 1978. Between Aug. 9, 1983, and Feb. 4, 1984, there were 13 installments of this forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*. In the midst of the spiritual pollution campaign, on Nov. 12, the title of the forum was changed to "Oppose 'Looking to Money' for Everything." For examples of the looking to money philosophy in practice, see *Cheng Ming*, May 1983, pp. 21–22; and July 1983, pp. 34–35.

[111]*Sichuan Ribao*, Jan. 19, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Feb. 2, 1983, pp. Q/7–8.

[112]*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 25 and 30, 1983; Radio Chengdu, Oct. 26, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Oct. 27, 1983, p. Q/1; *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 17, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Nov. 21, 1983, pp. K/1–2; and *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 4, 1983, and Jan. 12, 1984. Also see Thomas B. Gold "'Just in Time!' China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," *Asian Survey*, September 1984, pp. 947–74.

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heroes? Such heroes can be found in popular movies and books which, though produced by state film studios and published by respectable presses, often contain more lively and realistic characters than the stereotypical models anointed by the Ministry of Propaganda. There is, for example, Liu Sijia, the rebellious worker of the movie "All Colors," who was voted the most popular character by more than 3 million Chinese filmgoers. Liu dresses well, smokes, drinks, and freely expresses his own opinions. Moreover, he attacks bureaucratic rigidity with little concern for the consequences. In the popular film "Our Blood Is Always Hot," one of the leading characters turns to Christianity when the CYL is indifferent to her problems. When she has difficulty choosing between the cross and her CYL badge, an angry foreman rips off the badge. The sympathetic factory director restores her badge and leaves it to her to decide whether she will remain a Christian. Since the ending is ambiguous—Will the girl solve her problems? Will she abandon Christianity?—the film seems to say that the league no longer has an uncontested monopoly on the affections of youth. It has to prove its value in a competitive marketplace, with the consumers increasingly independent and skeptical.

A popular novel, made into an equally popular movie, entitled "Flower Wreath at the Foot of High Mountains," concerns China's "defensive counterattack against Vietnam" in 1979. The story depicts a rather believable military unit, replete with the daily complaints of junior officers and men. In one sequence, before the unit is to cross into enemy territory, an army journalist comes to interview the men, hoping to hear "noble thoughts." The deputy commander pats his breast pocket and tells his friends jokingly to open it after his death and take out his diary, which will contain all the "noble thoughts" they want. When he is gravely wounded while gathering sugar cane for his men in enemy territory, his comrades open his breast pocket only to find a picture of his wife and four-year-old son. His last wish is to die gazing at that photograph. After the battle, the whole company recommends the deputy commander for a medal, saying the sugar cane saved their lives. But the recommendation is turned down because of his undistinguished "political" record and because he broke army regulations in cutting the sugar cane.[113] Widely read, this novel won an award as one of the best works of fiction in 1982.

Other popular heroes, including those recognized by the state for positive values as well as those officially excoriated, display a strong independent streak. Ye Wenfu, the poet who criticized special privileges in such poems as "General, You Can't Do That," was a popular speaker at university campuses in Beijing in 1980–81. In a speech at Beijing Teachers' University in April 1981, he revealed his long-standing impatience with Lei Feng–style models. As for his personal philosophy, he said, "The secret of my success is being faithful to my own feelings. I am what I am. I don't take advice from my friends. I don't let myself be pushed around. I want to be myself in my poetry."[114] Those who were martyred during the Cultural Revolution, such as Yu Luoke and Zhang Zhixin, are similarly admired because of their resistance to tight political control.

The declining identification with post-"Liberation" heroes, the lack of a central guiding ideology to replace what is now discredited as "sham Marxism," and the retreat to private concerns can be seen in survey data conducted by Chinese social scientists.[115] Such surveys commonly reveal an aversion to and an avoidance of politics. They also show the tremendous pull of the urban areas. No one, it appears, wants to be a peasant or even to remain in the countryside, including rural party members and village youth. While many surveys tend to group responses into all-encompassing and ambiguous categories, there are some that provide detailed enough data to allow for more independent analysis and, in turn, quite different interpretation of the data. For example, Tables 1 and 2 reproduced on pages 26 and 27 are drawn from a survey conducted among second-year junior-high students at three ordinary schools in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. In Table 1, on study motivation, the authors grouped the results into three categories: individual motivation; tending toward societal motivation; and societal motivation. By amalgamating "In Order to Work," "To Gain Promotion," and "A Thirst for Knowledge" under the "tending toward societal motivation" category, the Chinese social scientists were able to argue that roughly 32 percent of the students were moving away from individual motivation. Even more misleading was their treatment of category three. Combining

[113]See the reports of Takashi Oka in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 18 and Oct. 11, 1983, and of O'Callaghan, loc. cit. Also see Ian Findlay's report in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 6, 1983, pp. 70–71. More generally, see Paul Clark, "Film-making in China: From the Cultural Revolution to 1981," *The China Quarterly*, June 1983, pp. 304–22.

[114]*Cheng Ming*, February 1982, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 80510, Apr. 7, 1982, pp. 59–68. Several of Ye's works appear in Helen F. Siu and Zelda Stern, Eds., *Mao's Harvest*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 158–71.

[115]For translations of surveys conducted by Chinese social scientists, see Stanley Rosen, Ed., "Recent Survey Data on Chinese Youth," *Chinese Education*, Winter 1984–85 (forthcoming); idem, "The Political Socialization of Chinese Youth," ibid., Spring 1985 (forthcoming); and David S. K. Chu, *Sociology and Society in Contemporary China, 1979–1983*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1984. For an analysis of several surveys, see Alan P.L. Liu, "Opinions and Attitudes of Youth in the People's Republic of China," *Asian Survey*, September 1984, pp. 975–96; and Rosen, "Education and Political Socialization."

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Table 1: Motivation for Study Among Young Students

(N = 883, with 24 not responding)

Motivation	Male		Female		Total	
	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent
Four Modernizations	203	50.25	248	51.77	451	51.07
Serve the people	10	2.48	14	2.92	24	2.71
Communism	3	0.74	—	—	3	0.34
In order to work	2	0.49	4	0.83	6	0.68
For one's own future	64	15.84	55	11.48	119	13.48
For family livelihood	1	0.25	1	0.21	2	0.23
A thirst for knowledge	77	19.06	100	20.88	177	20.05
To gain promotion to next level of schooling	44	10.89	57	11.90	101	11.44

SOURCE: Fu Peisheng et al., "A Research Investigation into the Individual Psychological Traits of Young Students," *Wenzhou shizhuan xuebao*, No. 1, 1982, pp. 19–34, (reprinted in People's University Photocopied Materials series *Zhongxiaoxue jiaoyu* [Beijing], June 1982, pp. 29–44, at p. 30).

"Four Modernizations," "Serve the People," and "Communism" together produced the striking conclusion that approximately 54 percent of the respondents—thus, the main trend *(zhuliu)*—had merged their individual interest with broader social goals. Studying for the Four Modernizations, however, tells us little about a student's motivations. Those condemning Zhang Hua's sacrifice in the manure pit as irrational would have presumably ticked off this choice. More revealing are the disaggregated figures that show that only 27 of 883 (3.06 percent) chose "Communism" or "Serve the People" as their motivation for studying. Table 2 is more straightforward, showing that, aside from the heroes whose pre-1949 deeds are celebrated in primary- and secondary-school language readers, those most loved and respected are individuals in contact with the students on a daily basis (parents and teachers garnering over half the choices), surely a sign of privatization.

Unresolved Contradictions

It is evident from this analysis that the two basic functions of the youth league—political socialization and party recruitment—are being imperfectly performed at best. Recruitment has been weak because the CYL no longer offers any real opportunity for upward mobility. Moreover, with so few individuals willing to become activists, the relationships between the league, the party, and society have become tenuous. Erosion of the league's recruitment function potentially could have serious impact on future party-society relations. As Richard Solomon argued persuasively over a decade and a half ago, the critical measure in evaluating the strength of the party's links to society, and its ability to operate successfully, is not really the ratio of party to population. Rather it is the number of nonparty people willing to compete for party membership, willing to carry out the daily tasks of policy implementation in hopes of eventually being chosen for party membership. If the party attracts five competitors for each new member chosen, its effective operational cadre has increased five-fold, and it has gained control of the motive power that derives from ambitious people anxiously competing for elite status.[116]

The league's socialization function remains beset by contradictions. Is the party more concerned with accommodating youth interests or with controlling youth behavior? Is it more important to make the CYL "relevant," or to promote "communist ideology" within the organization? The inner-party debate continues, although the reform faction supported by Deng clearly has the upper hand. The recent controversial *Renmin Ribao* editorial suggesting that the writings of Marx and Lenin cannot provide solutions to "all" current problems is indicative of how far pragmatism has gone.[117] With each new bold announcement, one listens half-expectantly for the other shoe to drop in reaction. Indeed, in a recent speech at

[116]Richard Solomon, "On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conceptions of Motivation and Political Role Linking State to Society," *The China Quarterly*, July–September, 1969, pp. 76–114.

[117]*Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 7, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 7, 1984, p. K/1.

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the 3rd Plenum of the Central Advisory Commission in October 1984, Deng openly addressed such concerns and offered comforting words for the skeptical.[118]

Still, the contradictions are becoming even sharper, as China fashions a new socioeconomic structure in its quest for "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The CYL has been ordered to "help young people realize the importance of learning scientific, technological, and management know-how from advanced countries, including capitalist nations"; but an internal speech to cadres taking advanced training at Beijing University laments the fact that 70 to 80 students sign up for an elective course on the economics of capitalism, while only 7 or 8 students opt for a course on Marxist economics.[119] Since the Four Modernizations drive urgently needs talented people, an overtly competitive atmosphere has been introduced between and within the nation's elite universities. When the Ministry of Education decided, in May 1984, to single out 10 universities for priority treatment (the allocation of an additional total allowance of some 100 million yuan from the state, an increase in opportunities for exchanges with the outside world, and so forth), China's academic leaders jockeyed to have their institutes included. One consequence was a three-day demonstration protest by students at Nanjing University, which had lost out. Some universities have devised their own special programs to meet the state's demands for increasing numbers of talented young people. Beijing Normal University has made available additional financial aid for its best students, with the money to come from funds currently allocated equally throughout the student body. Once again, protests followed. Qinghua University has chosen 50 students for similarly favorable treatment, despite the open admission that some are unconcerned with politics (a startling confession since politics is currently defined as support for the Four Modernizations).[120] Indeed, students and educators increasingly question the value of education in politics. There are suggestions that the written politics examination be eliminated from the university entrance exam, in part because some highly qualified science students have done poorly on it.[121] A recent

[118]Xinhua, Dec. 31, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 2, 1985, pp. K/1-6.

[119]The exhortation to help young people learn from capitalist nations is from the "Decision on Giving Full Play to the Role of the Communist Youth League in Reforming the Economic Structure," adopted by the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CYL Central Committee on Dec. 14, 1984. See Xinhua, Dec. 14, 1984, trans. in *FBIS CHI*, Dec. 17, 1984, pp. K/10–17; the figures on students are contained in a report by the vice-minister of education, Peng Peiyun, on May 15, 1982 (circulated in printed form to those in education circles in Beijing), p. 11.

[120]See Stanley Rosen, "Recentralization, Decentralization and Rationalization: Deng Xiaoping's Bifurcated Educational Policy," *Modern China*, July 1985, forthcoming.

[121]*Gaojiao Zhanxian* (Beijing), September 1984, pp. 28–30, and December 1984, pp. 25–26.

Table 2: Patterns of Respect Among Young Students

(Responses to the question: Who are the people you respect and love the most?)

(N = 869, with 38 not responding)

Persons respected	School A		School B		School C		Total	
	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent
Revolutionaries of the older generation	173	32.64	81	40.10	76	55.47	330	37.97
Scientists	5	0.94	—	—	—	—	5	0.58
Teachers	110	20.75	57	28.22	30	21.90	197	22.67
Parents	184	34.72	47	23.27	24	17.52	255	29.34
The PLA	8	1.51	—	—	—	—	8	0.92
Workers	3	0.57	—	—	—	—	3	0.35
Revolutionary martyrs	3	0.57	—	—	—	—	3	0.35
Communist Party members	10	1.89	2	0.99	—	—	12	1.38
Lei Feng	2	0.38	—	—	—	—	2	0.23
Those who realize the Four Modernizations	—	—	2	0.99	—	—	2	0.23
Others	32	6.04	13	6.44	7	5.11	52	5.98

SOURCE: Fu Peisheng et al., "A Research Investigation into the Individual Psychological Traits of Young Students," *Wenzhou shizhuan xuebao*, No. 1, 1982, pp. 19-34, (reprinted in People's University Photocopied Materials series *Zhongxiaoxue jiaoyu* [Beijing], June 1982, pp. 29–44, at p. 32).

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survey of Beijing middle-school students revealed that 95 percent voted politics as their least favorite course.[122]

At the other end of the scale, employment prospects for the large majority who cannot get to university are bleak. A survey conducted by the Dalian Municipal CYL Committee in Liaoning Province acknowledges that "most factories and enterprises have reached the ceiling of hiring and are no longer in a position to hire more people; some factories are ready to lay off workers with 70 percent of their wages paid." A significant part of the league's current task, therefore, is to help prepare secondary-school students to lower their aspirations.[123] In Guangzhou, while the city was able to provide jobs for 50,569 "youths waiting for work" between 1979 and September 1983 (90 percent of the total number), only 7.9 percent were given jobs in the highly desirable state sector of the economy, known as "the iron rice bowl" because of the fringe benefits and security such employment entails.[124]

China's newspapers daily extol the importance of intellectuals to the success of modernization; but an extensive study of factories, universities, and research institutes in Shanghai revealed that only 22 percent of leading cadres have harmonious or comparatively harmonious relations with scientific and technical personnel. The survey also revealed that 58 percent of the leaders use such personnel, but do not trust them.[125]

These data are presented not to suggest that the reform package faces imminent collapse, but merely to indicate that the domestic critics who refer to the new economic reforms as "capitalist practices," to the policy of allowing some to get rich first as "polarization," and to the open door policy as "worshiping and having blind faith in foreign things" may have plenty of ammunition and some latent support if Deng's initiatives prove unsuccessful. China's socioeconomic structure clearly is changing, and with it the values of young people.[126]

What of the CYL in this highly charged atmosphere? For the reformers, the long-term solution—which requires the merging of economic, social, and political goals in youth work—must start with changes in personnel. At the basic levels, this is being attempted through the recruitment as CYL cadres of those most successful under current policies—such as those from keypoint and specialized households in the countryside. Since 1982, under Hu Yaobang's initiatives, strict new requirements regarding age and cultural level for CYL cadres have begun to be enforced. While at least 25 of Hu's former CYL subordinates have been promoted to the Central Committee, an equally impressive number are beginning to be transferred to key positions at the provincial and municipal levels; presumably, they will argue for the enhanced importance of youth work.[127] Whether they can resuscitate in the new age of materialism an organization long associated with ideological goals remains an open question.

[122] *Beijing Qingnian Bao*, May 22, 1984, reprinted in *Baokan Wenzhai* (Shanghai), May 29, 1984, p. 3.

[123] *Jiaoyu Yanjiu*, March 1984, pp. 57–60.

[124] *Guangzhou Yanjiu*, August 1984, pp. 36–39. Admittedly the national figure for yearly job allocations in the state sector, though steadily declining, is still over 30 percent.

[125] *Keji Guanli Zixun* (city unknown), reprinted in *Baokan Wenzhai*, May 29, 1984, p. 1.

[126] Xinhua, Dec. 14, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 17, 1984, p. K/13. An interesting recent survey of 1,680 youth, half from Guangzhou, a coastal city very much influenced by the new reforms, and half from Chengdu in the interior, found that youth in Guangzhou, because of greater contact and knowledge, were less affected in some ways by "spiritual pollution" than were youth in Chengdu. See *Guangzhou Yanjiu*, August 1984, pp. 18–22.

[127] For detailed statistics from the Young Cadres Bureau of the party Central Committee's Organization Department on the changing age and cultural level of provincial, district, and county CCP cadres, which show an *increase* in age and a continuing low cultural level from 1979 through 1981, see *Zugong Tongxun* (Beijing), excerpted in *Baokan Wenzhai*, Aug. 24 and Dec. 21, 1982, both p. 1. More recent statistics show that this trend has been reversed. For an argument that factional ties continue to constitute a key ladder to success, despite the publicized emphasis on such criteria as youth, education, and technical expertise, see William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December, 1983, pp. 16–35. Among former CYL cadres who now hold leading positions outside the capital are Gao Zhanxiang in Hebei, Wang Jiangong in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, and Li Ruihuan in Tianjin. This information is derived from interviews (see note 4).

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Moscow and Southern Africa

Peter Clement

While largely peripheral to Soviet global security interests, southern Africa has been central to Moscow's image in the Third World. The joint Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975–76, more than any other Soviet foreign venture, became a symbol of the USSR's willingness and capability to project power to distant shores in support of its friends. This event, coming as it did on the heels of Washington's recognition of Moscow's military parity and superpower status during the early 1970's, transcended its African context; it marked the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power claiming the rights and perquisites of its new status. It also reinforced Moscow's view of the region as yet another arena in the East-West competition. With the intervention in Angola, the USSR has established itself as an important actor in southern Africa, principally by providing military assistance. The development of arms supply relationships with Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (who are among the so-called Front-Line States),[1] as well as support for insurgents in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, has underscored the growing role of the Soviet Union in the region.

In the 1980's, however, the USSR has had to deal with several setbacks and dilemmas. Its relations with Tanzania and Zambia have leveled off, and Robert Mugabe's electoral victory in 1980 over Moscow's preferred candidate, Joshua Nkomo, has limited its opportunities in independent Zimbabwe. More important, the pro-Soviet governments in Angola and Mozambique, both of which are facing deteriorating security situations, signed disengagement and nonaggression accords with the Republic of South Africa, in February and March 1984, respectively. They have also sought closer economic and diplomatic relations with the West.

This article will review the course of Soviet fortunes in southern Africa during the early 1980's, focusing on Angola and Mozambique, Moscow's key clients in the region. It will also attempt to assess Soviet interests and prospects in southern Africa and the factors that may shape Soviet policy there in the near future.

[1]Soviet policies in the region have been facilitated by the creation in the mid-1970's of a loose political alliance--the Front-Line States—committed to coordinating diplomatic and economic actions against the white-minority government in Rhodesia. Its current members are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and it is committed to majority rule in all of southern Africa.

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Soviet Stakes in the Region

To put Moscow's current involvement in southern Africa in a proper perspective, one should briefly examine general Soviet objectives there and the resources committed to their pursuit.[2] Soviet policy is determined by a number of goals which have remained unchanged since the late 1950's. Moscow aims to:

- supplant or undermine United States, West European, and Chinese influence in the region in the political, economic, and military spheres;
- promote pro-Soviet or leftist change corresponding to the broad ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism; this bolsters Moscow's claim that "the world correlation of forces" is shifting in its favor;
- reinforce its superpower status and perceived indispensability in settling major international disputes by

[2]Soviet objectives in Africa and the question of targets of opportunity versus a grand design are thoroughly discussed in David E. Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1978, pp. 20–39.

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having a role in the resolution of problems in southern Africa;

- obtain air and naval access to counter US strategic forces, monitor US military activity, and transport assistance to friendly regimes in the region;
- win the African states' political support for its initiatives in international forums.

While Moscow's long-term objectives may also include the obstruction or denial to the West of access to southern Africa's mineral resources, Soviet behavior to date does not suggest the existence of either any immediate plans to exploit possible Western vulnerability in this respect or a long-term strategy of denial.

Moscow's pursuit of these objectives is enhanced by a number of factors. The availability of allies, in this case the Cubans and East Europeans, has enabled it to play a role in the region without necessarily committing its own personnel and resources. The Soviet Union itself has the capability to provide weaponry quickly and inexpensively, taking advantage of the Africans' security concerns. The Soviet ideological blueprint for action and organization appeals to newly independent states whose leaderships are in the process of consolidating their power. The appeal of ties to Moscow is further strengthened by the black Africans' perceptions of close relations between Washington and Pretoria.

At the same time, other factors are working against Soviet policies in southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa unquestionably dominates the region economically and militarily, and is willing to apply military and economic pressure on its neighbors. The Front-Line States, not to mention South Africa, retain many important ties to the West. In addition, Moscow has no relations with or leverage in Pretoria and has therefore not been able to broker diplomatic solutions to conflicts in the region. The Soviet economy has also failed to serve as a successful model for African development plans, and Moscow is perceived as unable or unwilling to provide meaningful economic and developmental assistance to most Third World states.

Compared to other regions of the Third World, however, southern Africa ranks relatively low as a Soviet foreign policy priority. This can be seen, in concrete terms, in the figures for Soviet economic and military assistance. These figures generally reveal a direct correlation between a region's geographic proximity to the USSR and the amount of aid extended to it.[3] Nonetheless, Moscow has shown a great interest in seizing opportunities to retain and expand its influence in southern Africa. This is clearly evident from the sizable contingent of Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern European advisers in the region, particularly in Angola and Mozambique.[4]

[3]In the period 1954–1981, for example, the size of Soviet economic aid given to the Middle East and South Asia was far greater than to any other region, a pattern that remains fairly consistent to the present. US Department of State, *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, Washington, DC, February 1983, pp. 17–19.

[4]The Soviets and East Europeans reportedly have 1,600 military and 3,900 economic advisers in Angola, and 550 and 1,800 respectively in Mozambique. There are some 9,435 Cuban economic advisers in Angola and 1,000 in Mozambique; and 1,000 military advisers in Mozambique. Ibid., pp. 14, 20, 21. In 1984 there were reportedly some 25–30,000 Cuban troops in Angola. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Cuba Said to Resist Leaving Angola," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1984.

Soviet, East German, and Angolan officers at a military review in Luanda.

—Baudelet/Gamma-Liaison.

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Angola is Moscow's most important asset in southern Africa. Moscow has gained access to valuable air and naval facilities there and a route by which it can supply assistance and training to the region's remaining liberation movements—the South West African People's Organization of Namibia (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Owing to their presence in Angola, the Soviets can also monitor, and potentially exploit, unrest in neighboring Zaire.

Until recently, Mozambique had greatly strengthened the Soviet Union's overall position in the region, not by giving it regular access to military facilities, but by maintaining close political ties. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) regime in Maputo increased its reliance on Moscow in the 1980's by asking for military assistance to counter periodic military raids by South Africa and the Pretoria-backed National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO or NRM).[5] Moscow has taken advantage of its connection with Mozambique to help the liberation struggle in South Africa by furnishing assistance to Mozambique-based members of the ANC.[6]

The Soviets have sought to institutionalize their influence over the long term through a host of political and ideological ties. Apart from the Friendship and Cooperation treaties signed with Luanda and Maputo in the mid-1970's, they have established party-to-party agreements and cadre training programs that enable them to identify and cultivate future leaders in the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—since then renamed MPLA–Party of Labor, or MPLA–PT—and FRELIMO. In addition, the large Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisory presence facilitates Moscow's influence-building efforts by creating a dependence on the technical services provided by these advisers.

From Moscow's vantage point, however, recent trends in both Angola and Mozambique are equally distressing. Since the beginning of the 1980's, Luanda and Maputo, while maintaining contacts with the Soviet bloc, have sought to expand their political and economic ties with the US and Western Europe. In both countries, these efforts were undertaken to attract much-needed investments and economic assistance, as well as to enlist Western help for pressuring Pretoria to abandon its policy of aggressive support for RENAMO and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Both initiatives strike at Moscow's key vulnerabilities—its failure to fulfill its clients' economic needs and its inability to mediate with South Africa.

Moscow's bilateral relations with Angola and Mozambique have always been plagued by friction over economic assistance. The Africans have long complained about the small size and poor quality of Soviet aid packages. Moreover, Mozambique has been refused admission to the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), reportedly because of Soviet reluctance to bring yet another impoverished Third World state into CEMA ranks.[7] Apart from these problems, both Angola and Mozambique have protested Moscow's violations of bilateral fishing accords, particularly when the local populace is suffering from food shortages.[8]

The Angolan Quandary

Almost a decade after Moscow and Havana helped bring the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola to power, the regime in Luanda still faces a major threat from its rivals in UNITA, despite the support of some 25–30,000 Cuban military personnel.[9] As a result of countering a growing insurgency, bankrolling the large Cuban combat force, and compensating for losses of revenue because of the declining prices of oil—Angola's principal source of hard currency—the Angolan economy has deteriorated sharply.

The leadership in Luanda has been forced to adjust its policies and priorities to cope with this situation. While maintaining its close military relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba, it has sought to expand its ties to the West. For example, in late 1981, Luanda opened a dialogue with the United States, which has encompassed such issues as the establishment of diplomatic relations and a resolution of the Namibian question. Angola also concluded economic accords with Portugal during the visit of President Antonio Eanes in April 1982,

[5]RENAMO was established in the mid 1970's by the Rhodesian white-minority government in an effort to counter Mozambique, which was actively supporting black guerrillas in Rhodesia. Following Rhodesia's independence, South Africa took over the support of the movement, aiming to pressure Maputo to stop backing the ANC; South Africa claims to have given up this support following the Nkomati agreement. RENAMO lacks a coherent political program and focuses its propaganda on ousting the Marxist, "foreign-dominated" government of Samora Machel. Various press accounts estimate RENAMO's size at 10 15,000.

[6]Glenn Frankel, "South African Rebels Make Comeback," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 1, 1984.

[7]William Roberts, "Bureaucracy, Shortages Afflict Angola, Mozambique," *The Christian Science Monitor (Boston)*, May 3, 1982.

[8]Glenn Frankel, "On Day of Somnolent Solemnity, Samba Revives East Europeans," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 8, 1983.

[9]Expanded UNITA activity and the MPLA-PT's growing dependence on the Cubans are discussed in a three-part series by Fred Reed, "African Bush War," *The Washington Times*, Nov. 29 Dec. 1, 1982. See also *The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1982. Journalists' accounts of the upsurge in UNITA activity are borne out by MPLA statements that acknowledge the "seriousness" of the situation. See, for example, a speech by President dos Santos made on March 21, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS MEA*), Mar. 21, 1983, p. U/1. UNITA, which proclaimed 1983 "the year of the anti-Cuban campaign," stepped up its radio broadcasts as the fighting increased. An August 1983 report claimed that in the twelve-month period ending that month, 501 Cubans were killed and 726 wounded. See *FBIS MEA*, Aug. 16, 1983, p. U/1.

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and signed various agreements opening the way for trade with the European Economic Community.[10]

This gradual shift in policy did not come easily, because the MPLA–PT leadership has been split into several factions. Their differences apparently were not overcome by the granting, in December 1982 by the MPLA–PT's Central Committee, of "emergency powers" to President José Eduardo dos Santos.[11] When Luanda broadened its dialogue with Washington in late 1982, several pro-Soviet figures were dismissed from their party posts, including the ideology chief Ambrosio Lukoki and Ruth Lara, wife of Lucio Lara, the reputed head of the MPLA–PT's pro-Soviet faction.[12] This shake-up suggested that dos Santos's talks with Washington had met with strong resistance within the party.

From the beginning, the Soviet leadership responded to Angola's overtures to the West with a mix of blandishment and pressure. During Lucio Lara's trip to Moscow in January 1982, an unprecedented 10-year, $2 billion economic assistance package was initialed. The timing of Lara's visit, only a few weeks after the first round of US-Angolan talks, suggests that it was designed to demonstrate Moscow's commitment to Angola and to strengthen the pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA–PT, as well as to undercut any American aid that might be offered as part of a Namibian settlement package. Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov used the occasion of the visit to express Moscow's concern about Luanda's latest foreign policy moves and warned the Angolans about the "dangers of doing business with the West."[13] What is more, Moscow's media treatment of Lara's trip was that usually given to visits by heads of state, suggesting dissatisfaction with President dos Santos.[14]

An upsurge in high-level exchanges throughout 1982 reflected Moscow's desire to shore up its position in Angola and get to the bottom of increased speculation about a breakthrough on Namibia. In the wake of Lara's talks in Moscow, Cuban Foreign Minister Isodoro Malmierca met with Angolan leaders in Luanda[15] and presumably presented the Soviet and Cuban position on the Namibian question. At the conclusion of his visit, on February 4, a joint communiqué was issued outlining the Cuban-Angolan stand on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, including the conditions for their departure.[16] These conditions were: the withdrawal of South African forces from Angolan territory, cessation of Pretoria's aggressive activities against Angola, and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibian independence.[17] Two months

[10]See Helen Kitchen, "US Interests in Africa," *The Washington Papers*, No. 98, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1983, pp. 21–22. Angola's most recent negotiations for affiliation with the EEC are mentioned in *The Economist* (London), Jan. 5–11, 1985. In 1983, Angola also established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

[11]Luanda Domestic Service, Dec. 9, 1982, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Dec. 9, 1982, p. U/1.

[12]Ibid.

[13]For Soviet coverage of Lara's visit, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 21–24, 1982. The large economic aid package is discussed in US Department of State, op. cit., p. 13. On the eve of the visit, *Pravda* printed a photograph and a biographic sketch of Lara on its front page, coverage usually reserved for heads of state. See *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1982.

[14]*Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1982.

[15]Luanda Domestic Service, Feb. 1, 1982, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Feb. 2, 1982, p. U/1.

[16]For the text of the communiqué, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Feb. 7, 1982, p. K/1.

[17]UN Security Council Resolution 435, passed in July 1978, calls for: a cease-fire, a phased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, and the establishment of a UN force to oversee preparations for Namibian elections.

Dmitriy Ustinov, Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Rusakov, and Andropov aide Viktor Sharapov, confer with Cuba's Defense Minister Raúl Castro in the Kremlin in December 1982.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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Angolan leader José Eduardo dos Santos, flanked by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarëv to his left and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to his right, upon his arrival in Moscow for consultations in May 1983.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

later, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichev spent four days in Luanda; his visit was followed by that of the East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer.[18] In November, Lara, and subsequently Angolan Defense Minister Pedro Tonha, traveled to Havana.[19] In December in Moscow, Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro conferred with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Yuriy Andropov, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, and other top leaders.[20]

Despite these consultations, however, Luanda continued to negotiate with the United States, sustaining Soviet suspicion and uncertainty about the direction of its policies. The April 1983 visit to the White House of Alexander "Kito" Rodrigues, a close protégé of President dos Santos, for talks on Namibia with Vice-President George Bush prompted a hasty invitation to dos Santos from Moscow.[21] Surprisingly, during dos Santos's visit, the Soviets did not repeat their earlier warnings against dealing with the West. In a dinner speech, Premier Tikhonov hinted at Moscow's flexibility, acknowledging "the great importance that Angola attaches to the speediest just solution of the Namibian problem," as well as Moscow's "full support" for the search for a settlement.[22] The Soviets had apparently decided that they

[18]ANGOP, Apr. 30, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, May 3, 1982, p. U/1.

[19]*Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, and ANGOP, Nov. 17, 1982, in *FBIS MEA*, Nov. 18, 1982, p. U/1.

[20]For Soviet media coverage of Raúl Castro's talks in Moscow, see *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 31, 1982, and Moscow Domestic Service in *FBIS–SOV*, Dec. 30, 1982, p. K/1.

[21]For comment on talks in Paris between Alexander "Kito" Rodrigues and Frank Wisner, US deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, that led up to Rodrigues's trip to Washington, see Luanda Domestic Service, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Mar. 25, 1983; Rodrigues's subsequent meeting with Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz was reported in *The New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1983, and *The Washington Post*, Apr. 15, 1983.

[22]For the texts of Tikhonov's as well as dos Santos's dinner speeches, see *Pravda*, May 18, 1983; the joint communiqué was published in *Pravda*, May 21, 1983.

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could ill afford to antagonize dos Santos if they were to retain some influence in the event his diplomacy succeeded.

However, the fragility of dos Santos's diplomatic maneuverings—and also his increased need for Soviet military support—was underscored by the battle for Cangamba in August 1983. In retrospect, the battle represented a turning point: it (1) enhanced the claims made by Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, of UNITA's growing military ascendancy; (2) caused Luanda to refocus its energies away from diplomacy onto the battlefield; and (3) prompted Moscow and Havana to reevaluate the Angolan situation as a whole. The two-week battle for Cangamba, a large MPLA–PT garrison in central Angola, was the first major conventional assault by UNITA in the history of the civil war. Each side claimed to have inflicted nearly a thousand casualties on the other, and Luanda even accused South Africa of providing crucial air support to UNITA.[23] Although victorious, UNITA could hardly afford to lose so many men in future battles. As for the MPLA–PT, it subsequently admitted that "the People's Republic of Angola is experiencing one of the most difficult movements in its history; its people have no choice but to defend, by all available means, the motherland."[24] Luanda then announced the adoption of new conscription policies and the establishment of new regional military councils to bolster the regime's defenses.[25]

While the USSR had only one straightforward decision to make, whether to increase its military assistance to Luanda, the more sensitive question had to be answered by Havana: whether it was prepared to instruct its forces to assume a more active, offensive role in the war to counter the insurgency. The issue of the Cuban forces' presence and role was becoming a source of growing friction between Angola and Cuba; Luanda, which spends much of its hard-currency earnings to underwrite the maintenance of the Cuban troops, reportedly believes that the Cubans have assumed a predominantly defensive posture and are thus reluctant to engage enemy forces.[26]

The Soviets quickly made their decision known. Following Lara's unpublicized visit to Moscow in late August–early September 1983, shipments of Soviet arms to Angola were stepped up. Diplomats in Luanda reported a major surge in deliveries, about 10 in September alone, including new T–72 tanks, helicopters, and assorted small arms.[27] The Soviets may also have decided to create a new air defense line in southern Angola, since, according to broadcasts from Pretoria, Soviet SA–8 surface-to-air missiles had been deployed there that summer.[28]

Following Moscow's move, Havana decided to augment its already significant troop presence in Angola; hints about it first appeared in September. Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge met with Jorge Risquet, Cuban Politburo member in charge of African affairs, on September 8.[29] Subsequently, Cuba's Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon told reporters in London that "Cuba is prepared to send more troops to Angola if necessary."[30] Meanwhile, Cuban radio broadcasts broached this sensitive and rarely-discussed topic, presumably to prepare the domestic public. On September 16, for example, Havana Domestic Service reported President dos Santos's statement that "more assistance would be requested from friendly countries if it became necessary to defend the country's sovereignty";[31] this comment was echoed by Angola's ambassador to Cuba during a press conference in Havana.[32] According to various press reports, a drawdown of Cuban forces in Ethiopia started in November and December; some of them returned to Cuba while others were moved directly to Angola.[33]

To complement this military buildup in Angola, the Soviets employed more aggressive diplomacy, apparently to impress upon Pretoria the seriousness with which they viewed Angolan developments. In November, Soviet delegates to the United Nations warned the South Africans directly to desist from their policies of destabilization in southern Africa, adding that the USSR would provide Luanda "all the support it needed."[34] While it remains unclear whether the UN warning was given at Moscow's own initiative (or Angola's), it attested

[23]The battle for Cangamba is described by AFP in *FBIS–MEA*, Aug. 16, 1983, p. U/1, and by Luanda Domestic Service, Aug. 18, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Aug. 19, 1983, p. U/1.

[24]Dakar PANA, ANGOP editorial, Sept. 6, 1983, in *FBIS–MEA*, Sept. 9, 1983, p. U/2.

[25]Ibid.

[26]The financial costs of the Cuban troop presence have become a serious economic problem for Luanda. See Edward Girardet, "Angola—Yet to Come to Grips with Independence," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 16, 1983, who states that "nearly two-thirds of Angola's total revenues go to defense, including the exorbitant costs of maintaining Cuba's military expeditionary force." *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1983, reported that much of Luanda's $1.8–2.3 billion revenue from the Cabinda oil earnings goes to pay for the Cuban soldiers and Soviet equipment. Reports of Cuban reluctance to fight on the front lines are discussed in "Angolans Begin to Ask Just What Cubans Are Doing for Them" in the *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 29, 1981, and more recently in Glenn Frankel, "Luanda Bolsters Soviet Tie: Angolan Rebels Gain Strength," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 4, 1983.

[27]Frankel, "Luanda Bolsters. . . ."

[28]Johannesburg Domestic Service, Aug. 13, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Aug. 15, 1983, p. U/3.

[29]Luanda ANGOL in French, Sept. 8, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (hereafter *FBIS–LAM*), Sept. 12, 1983, p. Q/1.

[30]AFP in Spanish, Sept. 22, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Sept. 23, 1983, p. Q/4.

[31]Havana Domestic Service, Sept. 16, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Sept. 19, 1983, p. Q/6.

[32]Luanda Domestic Service, Sept. 22, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Sept. 22, 1983, p. U/1.

[33]The Cuban drawdown in Ethiopia has been discussed in a Reuters dispatch, *The Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 1984, and by Edward Cody, "Cuba Eyeing Withdrawal of Troops from Angola," ibid., Mar. 13, 1984.

[34]Don Oberdorfer, "Soviets Warn South Africa Against Military Activity in Angola," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 5, 1984.

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

South African armed forces being briefed before "Operation Proteus" inside southern Angola in late 1981.

—Baudelet/Gamma-Liaison.

to growing Soviet concern about the South African threat.[35] Later that month, a naval task force was dispatched from the USSR to Luanda and then to Maputo, rounding the Cape in the process.[36]

In mid-December, "operation Askari," a new South African incursion into southern Angola to push back SWAPO, added some urgency to Soviet and Cuban plans to bolster the MPLA–PT's military position. As the operation, which involved some 10,000 South African regulars, continued into January 1984, a TASS dispatch demanded the cessation of "direct and indirect aggression" by Pretoria, asserting that these actions were "directly linked to the stepped-up aggressiveness of international imperialism, first and foremost US imperialism"; it also warned that "aggression cannot go unpunished."[37] *Pravda* subsequently noted that Soviet-Angolan-Cuban consultations had been held on January 11 in Moscow, and that "an understanding was reached to strengthen the defense capability, independence, and territorial integrity of Angola."[38]

The Lusaka Accord

By late January 1984, however, Angolan and therefore Soviet concerns shifted from the battlefield to the bargaining table, when the South Africans, somewhat unpredictably, initiated a round of intense diplomatic activity with the Angolans. These talks, which were facilitated by US intermediaries, focused on Pretoria's mid-December proposal for a cease-fire on the Angolan-Namibian border. They culminated in the accord signed at Lusaka, Zambia, on February 16 which called for the staged withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola in exchange for Angola's commitment to prevent SWAPO from entering the area. A joint monitoring commission was established to police the area of disengagement and to prevent infiltration of northern Namibia by SWAPO guerrillas.

At first, Moscow reserved judgment, then expressed grudging approval of the Lusaka accord. On March 18, Soviet political commentator Aleksandr Bovin candidly laid out on Moscow television the factors that figured in

[35]The Soviets contended that the Angolans had requested the UN message, while Luanda subsequently claimed that it had been a Soviet initiative. See John de St. Jorre, "Destabilization and Dialogue: South Africa's Emergence as a Regional Superpower," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 26, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, Georgetown University, Apr. 17, 1984, p. 6.

[36]Moscow Television Service, Nov. 24, 1983, trans. in *FBIS SOV*, Nov. 28, 1983, p. J/1; and *Noticias* (Havana), Dec. 2, 1983.

[37]TASS, Jan. 5, 1984, in *FBIS SOV*, Jan. 5, 1984, p. J/1.

[38]*Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1984.

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the Angolan decision to sign an agreement with South Africa; nevertheless, he criticized the accord, calling it "naive" to think that Pretoria's destabilization efforts could be stopped by "treaties and agreements." He concluded by stating that the region's fundamental problems were all linked to the existence of the white-minority government in Pretoria, implying that the armed struggle should be continued.[39]

On March 29, CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko offered the most authoritative Soviet comment on the Lusaka accord. He implicitly expressed acceptance of South Africa's accords with Angola and Mozambique, but criticized Washington and Pretoria for exploiting African vulnerabilities in order to impose their own solutions on the region:

A complex situation is now developing in southern Africa, where the South African racist regime, with the connivance of the United States, believes itself entitled to ignore the resolutions of the UN Security Council on independence for Namibia and to carry out acts of open aggression against neighboring African states.

Using the carrot and stick method and taking advantage of the African peoples' interest in living in peace and stability, the United States and some of its allies are striving to impose their wishes on the people of southern Africa.

But the people will judge the situation in southern Africa by whether the security of the African states, which are the victims of aggression by the Republic of South Africa, is truly guaranteed, by whether the people of Namibia are able to obtain their freedom and independence, and by whether the disgraceful system of apartheid is finally ended. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it continues to come out firmly in support of Angola, Mozambique, and the other "Front-Line States," and also of the fighters for the liberation of southern Africa from colonialism and racism.[40]

Perhaps most revealing was another comment in Chernenko's speech, that "no one has the right to turn back the pages of history"—an allusion to Moscow's stated belief that Washington is seeking to undo Soviet gains made around the world in the 1970's.

Soviet irritation with the Lusaka agreement stemmed from several interrelated factors: Angola's decision not only to "deal with the enemy" but to do so without consulting Moscow, and the concomitant growth of the United States's diplomatic role in the region. While Moscow presumably had been informed about the Angolan–South African talks held in January and February, there are indications that relations between Angola and the Soviet Union may be experiencing some strain. For example, President dos Santos failed to attend Andropov's funeral in February 1984, and during a trip to Eastern Europe the following August he omitted Moscow from his itinerary, which seems unusual in view of the assistance that Angola was receiving from the Soviets at that time.

The View From Havana

The Cubans, like the Soviets, were reportedly not consulted before the signing of the Lusaka accord. This would explain the hasty invitation to President dos Santos to come to Havana, presumably to give a full account of the developments.[41] During dos Santos's visit, on March 19, 1984, a joint communiqué was issued, reaffirming the two sides' adherence to the February 4, 1982, communiqué on the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.[42] Immediately following dos Santos's trip to Havana, according to Moscow-based diplomats, Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca made an unpublicized visit to Moscow, presumably to brief the Soviets on the Cuban-Angolan discussions.[43]

It was probably the Lusaka agreement that induced Havana to reevaluate its position on keeping Cuban troops in Angola. On February 22, Cuba's authoritative daily *Granma* had discussed the Angolan–South African disengagement, prompting speculation among Western diplomats based in Havana that Castro might be preparing the way for an eventual withdrawal from Angola.[44] In April, the general situation in Angola was again noted in media coverage of a UNITA attack on an apartment building in the city of Huambo that claimed some 80 Cuban casualties, including 14 dead.[45]

While the communiqué issued at the conclusion of dos Santos's visit to Havana seemed uncompromising, it may well have been designed to protect Havana's prestige rather than to impede a Namibian settlement. In

[39]Moscow Television Service, Mar. 16, 1984, trans. in *FBIS SOV*, Mar. 19, 1984, p. K/1.

[40]For the text of Chernenko's speech, see *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 30, 1984.

[41]For reports that the Lusaka accord took Castro by surprise, see Jay Mallin, Sr., "Angola Pact Labeled Damaging to Castro," *The Washington Times*, Apr. 13, 1984.

[42]For the complete text of the March 19 communiqué, see Havana International Service, Mar. 20, 1984, trans. in *FBIS LAM*, Mar. 21, 1984, p. Q/1.

[43]Richard Owens, "Angola Deal and Pretoria Pact Cause Moscow Acute Unease," in *The Times* (London), Mar. 27, 1984.

[44]*Granma* (Havana), Feb. 22, 1984. For the opinions of Western diplomats based in Havana, see Pierre Cayrol's comments in a Paris AFP dispatch of Feb. 26, 1984, in *FBIS LAM*, Feb. 27, 1984, pp. Q/17 18.

[45]For a Cuban account of the Huambo incident, see *Cuba Internacional* (Havana), No. 8, 1984, p. 65.

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Angolan leader José Eduardo dos Santos with Fidel Castro in Havana in March 1984.

—Prensa Latina.

fact, President Fidel Castro has sought to present Cuba as a constructive factor in the talks on Namibia; in a July 26 speech, for example, he expressed Cuba's desire to participate in them.[46] More important, Castro's public statements about Cuba's involvement in the talks suggest that he wants to assuage the Cuban public in the event of a breakthrough on Namibia.

Castro apparently views the Angolan problem as part of the broader issue of US-Cuban relations. The military operation against Grenada in October 1983 and American policy toward Nicaragua have heightened his concern about US intentions toward Cuba and probably prompted him to open talks with the US in July 1984 on the issue of Cuban refugees, which yielded an agreement the following December. This dialogue may lead to discussions of other controversial topics such as Central America and Angola. Some press accounts cite hints given by the Cuban leadership that it has decided to withdraw its troops from Angola in 1985.[47]

It is not clear what Moscow's response to these signs of Cuban flexibility is. Until quite recently, Soviet media had not acknowledged the US-Cuban agreement on the refugee question, which was signed during one of the periodic downturns in Soviet-Cuban relations. Several events have pointed to recent differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union: Moscow and Havana have offered conflicting versions of the Grenada episode; Fidel Castro was the only member head-of-state not to attend the CEMA meeting in Moscow in June 1984; finally, a comparatively low-level Soviet delegation was sent to Havana for last year's July 26 national holiday celebration.

Such frictions notwithstanding, Castro will have to accede to Soviet wishes on the Angolan question. He could hardly do otherwise. Without Moscow's economic assistance—valued at an annual $4 to 5 billion—Cuba's economy would collapse; moreover, Cuba's defense capability depends almost entirely on Soviet miliary aid. However, if increased Cuban involvement in Angola were to raise the possibility of increased social unrest in Cuba itself, Castro and the Soviets together might decide that its costs outweigh its benefits—which are still uncertain. Nevertheless, Soviet-Cuban tensions might be exacerbated if Castro were to believe that the USSR either had sold out in Angola, or was using the Cuban troop issue as a pawn in the bigger game of Soviet-American relations.

The Namibia Angle

The situation arising from the implementation of the Lusaka agreement has thus brought mixed results for the Soviets.[48] They may see little need to undermine the continuing dialogue between Luanda and Pretoria, since the cease-fire and South Africa's withdrawal from southern Angola have diminished somewhat the security threat to the MPLA–PT regime. If the cease-fire holds, Luanda and the Cubans will be able to redirect their energies to combat UNITA. Although the Soviets probably have misgivings about leaving SWAPO in the lurch, preserving the regime in Luanda is their more important short-term priority.

[46]For the text of Castro's speech, see Havana Domestic Service, July 26, 1984, in *FBIS LAM*, July 30, 1984, pp. Q/1–20. Castro recently reaffirmed his willingness to cooperate with US mediators on a Namibian settlement in an interview with US reporters; see *The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1985.

[47]Carl J. Migdail, "Why Castro Wants to Deal with the US," *US News and World Report* (Washington, DC), July 30, 1984, pp. 77–78.

[48]*Pravda*, for example, noted on May 18, 1984, that that week's Politburo session had discussed "the situation that has developed in southern Africa as a result of the support given by the current US administration to the policies of the Pretoria racists."

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At the same time, the Soviets have been concerned about the direction that Luanda's talks with Washington and Pretoria have taken on the issue of Namibia. Indeed, on August 3, 1984, Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister Venâncio da Moura publicly stated that his government had "accepted the principle" of a gradual Cuban withdrawal from his country.[49] This formulation was somewhat more explicit than the February 4, 1982, Angolan-Cuban communiqué. Within a month of making his statement, da Moura was in Moscow for talks with his Soviet counterpart, Il'ichev, which TASS characterized as "businesslike and friendly,"[50] suggesting that some differences emerged, possibly over da Moura's comments on the Cuban troop withdrawal.

Angola's commitment to the Lusaka accords could only heighten Moscow's concern about Luanda's intentions, especially in conjunction with Mozambican President Samora Machel's agreement with South Africa signed at Nkomati in March 1984, in which it was agreed that all ANC military elements were to be ousted from Mozambique. The Soviets may fear a similar development in Angola. Nevertheless, the recent buildup in Angola of Soviet equipment and Cuban combat forces, as well as high-level Cuban declarations of willingness "to fight at the side of the Angolan people until final victory is achieved," suggest that more offensives against UNITA are in preparation.[51] A serious setback for UNITA could strengthen arguments within the MPLA–PT to carry on fighting—with the help of Cuban forces—and thus dash the Namibian negotiations. A limited MPLA–PT victory or a stalemate, on the other hand, might persuade Luanda of the intractability of the UNITA problem; while continuing the armed struggle would remain an option, the growing economic deterioration of the country would make it, at best, a risky one.

The recent increase in Soviet contacts with SWAPO's leaders suggests that Moscow may be trying to warn them against the temptation to strike a deal with Pretoria. During his May 1984 talks with SWAPO's President Sam Nujoma in Algiers, Politburo candidate member Eduard Shevardnadze stressed Moscow's "support for the peoples of southern Africa for the liquidation of racism and apartheid and for the granting of independence to the people of Namibia *with SWAPO at its head*"—reinforcing the view that Moscow is opposed to a power-sharing solution in Namibia.[52] Nujoma subsequently met with Castro in Havana on June 25.[53] At the same time, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev invited his SWAPO counterpart to discuss "the situation in Angola and a Namibia settlement."[54] The Soviet press seized upon the breakdown of talks between SWAPO and the South Africans in late July to question Pretoria's commitment to pulling out its remaining forces from southern Angola.[55] It stressed Washington's role in "inciting" South Africa to insist on linking Namibian independence to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. For its part, Pretoria continued charging Moscow with pressuring SWAPO to block the negotiations. A May 27 Johannesburg radio broadcast, for example, had reported that a request was made by a "Soviet representative" that Nujoma not sign the document issued at the

[49]Luanda Domestic Service, Aug. 3, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Aug. 6, 1984, p. U/1.
[50]*Izvestiya*, Aug. 29, 1984.



Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, leader of the forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), photographed in December 1983.

—Philippe Chatenay/SIPA–Special Features.

[51]For example, see comments by Cuban Politburo member Risquet on Cuban losses in and commitment to Angola made during a ceremony at Huambo, quoted by Havana International Service on June 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS LAM*, June 12, 1984, p. Q/1.
[52]Moscow Domestic Service, May 29, 1984, trans. in *FBIS SOV*, May 30, 1984, p. CC/12.
[53]Havana Domestic Service, June 25, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, June 25, 1984, p. Q/2.
[54]*Izvestiya*, June 29, 1984.
[55]*Pravda*, July 31, 1984.

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

Sam Nujoma, president of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), meets with East German party and state leader Erich Honecker in Luanda in February 1979.

—ADN Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

conclusion of SWAPO's talks with the other Namibian parties that had just taken place in Lusaka.[56]

Perhaps to remind Angolan negotiators subtly of the many interests at stake in a Namibian settlement, the Soviets hosted Nujoma for a high-profile, two-week visit in October 1984—a time when the Angolans were elaborating a new position on Namibia with visiting US diplomats. During his trip, Nujoma met with Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarëv, as well as Deputy Foreign Minister Nikita Ryzhov.[57] *Pravda* published an interview with Nujoma entitled "We Believe in Victory"; it noted US and South African efforts to "stall" Namibian independence and quoted Nujoma as saying that "under such circumstances, the only way out is to seek independence by force of arms."[58]

The manner in which the new Angolan negotiating position was made public in November 1984 suggested that, once again, Luanda was not closely coordinating its actions with Havana and Moscow. Key points of its position surfaced in the Western press in early November.[59] The Cuban daily *Granma* also released a detailed account of Luanda's points on November 15—the first such public disclosure of the fact that in the Namibian talks Luanda was negotiating a specific timetable for Cuba's limited withdrawal from Angola.[60] Two days later, *Pravda* also acknowledged it in an account attributed to *Granma*.[61] On November 22, the Luanda Domestic Service made public the Angolan government's official position by broadcasting the text of the letter—without giving its date—that had been sent to the secretary general of the United Nations.[62] By disclosing the fine print of the dos Santos proposal, both Moscow and Havana appear to have tacitly accepted some linkage between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and a Namibian settlement.[63]

In retrospect, it appears that the Soviets and Cubans may have decided that dos Santos's tactic of going public was a useful maneuver, despite its implicit acceptance of linkage. Apart from placing the burden of sustaining the negotiations on Pretoria, it similarly pressured the United States to substantiate its claim to objectivity in mediating between South Africa and the black African states. It also strengthened Luanda's position by demonstrating its willingness to make concessions—to send home some 20,000 Cubans—for the sake of reaching an agreement on Namibia.

Indeed, the move appeared to catch Pretoria by surprise. The South Africans responded with a statement that *all* the Cubans would have to leave Angola, and within a three-month rather than a three-year period.[64] Moreover, by disclosing its position and moving the US-brokered talks out of private back channels, Luanda complicated the negotiating process since both sides find it more difficult to make concessions without losing face. Moscow and Havana may also hope that the publicity will lock dos Santos into his current position, and thus limit his flexibility as the negotiations develop.

Given the Soviets' displeasure at being excluded from the Rhodesian independence talks, it is possible that they might prefer a protracted military stalemate in Namibia since this would allow them to establish a more influential position among SWAPO hard-liners. A peaceful settlement could reduce a Namibian government's need for Soviet arms—thereby diminishing Soviet influence—especially if SWAPO chose to emulate the generally pragmatic policies of Zimbabwe's Mugabe.

Setback in Mozambique

Mozambique's close proximity to South Africa has proved a mixed blessing for the Soviets. While permitting

[56]Johannesburg Domestic Service, May 27, 1984, trans. in *FBIS MEA*, June 1, 1984, p. U/3.

[57]TASS, Oct. 22, 1984, in *FBIS SOV*, Oct. 23, 1984, p. J/1 and *Izvestiya*, Oct. 26, 1984.

[58]*Pravda*, Oct. 10, 1984.

[59]Bernard Gwertzman, "Angola Reportedly Offers a Cut in Cuban Troops," *The New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1984.

[60]*Granma*, Nov. 15, 1984.

[61]Pravda, Nov. 17, 1984.

[62]Luanda Domestic Service in *FBIS-MEA*, Nov. 23, 1984, p. U/1.

[63]In brief, dos Santos's proposal calls for the phased withdrawal of 20,000 Cuban troops from southern Angola over the three-year period following the initiation of UNSCR 435 and South Africa's reduction of its military presence in Namibia to 1,500 troops.

[64]*The Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1984.

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Moscow to give direct support to the African National Congress's struggle against the Pretoria regime, it has also exposed Maputo to the constant threat of direct South African action in retaliation for its harboring the ANC. But it is the rapid expansion of RENAMO's activities that has gradually transformed Mozambique's security problem into a full-fledged crisis.

Since 1981–82, the RENAMO insurgency has spread into almost all of Mozambique's 10 provinces.[65] RENAMO's modus operandi is a mix of hit-and-run tactics, economic sabotage, intimidation, and exploitation of popular dissatisfaction with government policies. Its guerrillas have destroyed roads, bridges, and rail lines, causing severe economic dislocation in the countryside. By damaging the Beira-Mutare pipeline—the main fuel supply line for Zimbabwe—several times since October 1981, RENAMO demonstrated its ability to disrupt neighboring states as well. Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia are also vulnerable to such sabotage, since their sole access to the sea—excluding routes through South Africa—is through Mozambique.

As the RENAMO movement strengthened, Soviet and Mozambican officials have been consulting with increasing frequency in order to assess the military situation. In May 1982, for example, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, and Admiral Sergey Gorshkov hosted the Mozambican Chief of Staff General Sebastiao M'bote and Finance Minister Marcelino dos Santos.[66] The following month, General Aleksey Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, toured military facilities in Mozambique and declared that Moscow "will give every support" to Mozambican political and military needs.[67] He may have had other motives for his visit. One analyst noted that "it is difficult to surmise whether Yepishev's concern was for the cohesion of the Mozambican military or for the military agreement Maputo signed with Portugal in April."[68] To underscore their support, the Soviets dispatched several vessels to Mozambique for a "working visit."[69]

With the deterioration of the military situation in late 1982, Moscow—and Havana—apparently began to reassess and reshape its posture in Mozambique. In November, at the time of Brezhnev's funeral, President Machel met with Defense Minister Ustinov and Marshals Ogarkov and Sergey Sokolov;[70] following their talks, General Nikolay Zotov, chief of the Main Directorate for Foreign Military Assistance of the General Staff, was dispatched to Mozambique for an on-the-ground appraisal. The Mozambican media reported that he had "offered advice on methods for training local forces against the public threats posed by bandit groups."[71]

At the same time, radical steps, including the introduction of Cuban combat forces, were probably considered to stabilize the situation. Cuba's Vice-President Juan Almeida publicly voiced Havana's willingness to provide additional "technical and advisory support."[72] Also, Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro met in Moscow with Soviet General Secretary Andropov, Marshal Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to discuss the situation in southern Africa.[73] Rumors within the diplomatic community of an imminent Cuban move into Mozambique gained additional credence when Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquím Alberto Chissano told reporters that "increased military assistance from the socialist countries would be sought" if measures were not taken to "restrain Pretoria's aggressive policies."[74] Such comments were not taken lightly by the South Africans, who warned Maputo that the introduction of Cuban troops would be "unacceptable."[75] In retrospect, it appears that Maputo may have been posturing, in an attempt to persuade Pretoria to rein in the RENAMO insurgents, at least temporarily.

Shows of Soviet support and solidarity continued in 1983. In March, Machel stopped over in Moscow en route to the summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement being held in New Delhi, and met privately with Andropov, Gromyko, and Ustinov.[76] In May, a South African air attack against suspected ANC camps near Maputo prompted a rare TASS statement on Mozambique: "The Soviet Union considers it necessary to declare once again its solidarity with the People's Mozambique, its invariable support for the Mozambican people in their indomitable struggle against the forces of imperialism, colonialism, and racism."[77]

The Soviet media had paid little attention to the RENAMO problem until the situation in Mozambique deteriorated significantly in late 1982. In the first important statement, on November 29, 1982, a Radio Moscow

[65]The growing RENAMO threat is discussed by Jay Ross in a three-part series, "Mozambique: The Hidden War," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 6-8, 1984.

[66]*Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 27, 1982.

[67]Ibid., June 6, 1982, p. 3.

[68]Seth Singleton, "The Shared Tactical Goals of South Africa and the Soviet Union," in *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 12, Apr. 26, 1983.

[69]Maputo Domestic Service, June 22, 1982, trans. in *FBIS MEA*, June 23, 1982, p. U/1.

[70]TASS, Nov. 16, 1982, in *FBIS SOV*, Nov. 17, 1982, p. K/1.

[71]Maputo Domestic Service, Dec. 26, 1982, trans. in *FBIS MEA*, Dec. 28, 1982, p. U/2, and Jan. 2, 1983, in *FBIS MEA*, Jan. 5, 1983, p. U/2.

[72]Havana Domestic Service, Dec. 28, 1982, trans. in *FBIS LAM*, Dec. 29, 1982, p. Q/3.

[73]See note 19.

[74]See de St. Jorre, loc. cit., p. 3.

[75]Ibid.

[76]*Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1983. For the complete text of their communiqué, see *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 7, 1983, pp. J/1-5. It is noteworthy that Machel, unlike Tikhonov, did not mention the United States when describing "imperialist" activities in southern Africa.

[77]TASS, May 27, 1983, in *FBIS SOV*, May 31, 1983, p. J/1.

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commentator said that RENAMO "in terms of numbers and weapons, is already on a par with the UNITA bands operating in Angola."[78] An *Izvestiya* article in December openly acknowledged that RENAMO was operating "in 7 of 10 provinces" and had over 10,000 members.[79] In March 1983, an issue of the Soviet weekly *New Times* carried a cover story on the history of RENAMO entitled "Behind the Mask: South Africa's Undeclared War Against Mozambique." Apart from its acknowledgment of the growing RENAMO threat, the article's most significant revelation was that "Soviet pilots" had played a role in "preventing Beira port from being paralyzed" by the insurgents.[80]

The Soviets suffered their first casualties (or at least their first acknowledged ones) in the Mozambican insurgency during the summer of 1983. In an attack on the Morrua mine in Zambezia Province, RENAMO killed two Soviet economic technicians and took two dozen others hostage. The kidnapping was intended to draw attention to the Soviet and East European presence in Mozambique, since one of RENAMO's key criticisms of the Machel regime has been that it is dominated by foreign Communists.[81]

The onset of a calamitous famine in 1983 further aggravated the economic situation and added a sense of urgency to President Machel's search for solutions. Despite Soviet statements of solidarity and continued military assistance, Machel decided to seek peace with Pretoria. He made a successful tour of Western Europe in the fall, during which Portuguese and American officials may have facilitated his efforts to make discreet contact with the South Africans. Then, in late December 1983, Machel surprised most observers by announcing that high-level talks with Pretoria had begun on December 20; his goal, he acknowledged, was to create a modus vivendi in southern Africa.[82] After detailed negotiations, the two sides met at the border town of Nkomati on March 16, 1984, to sign a formal nonaggression pact; the pact stipulated that neither side would allow its territory to be used to prepare acts of violence against the other. Equally important to Maputo were subsequent agreements on economic and financial assistance, trade, and tourism, and on joint operation of the crucial Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project.[83]

[78]Radio Moscow in English to Africa, Nov. 29, 1982, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Nov. 30, 1982, p. J/2.

[79]*Izvestiya*, Dec. 9, 1982.

[80]*New Times* (Moscow), No. 10, March 1983, pp. 26–28.

[81]Glenn Frankel, "Mozambique Confirms Rebels Killed 2 Soviets, Kidnapped 24," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 25, 1983.

[82]*Notícias* (Maputo), Dec. 22, 1983.

[83]For a detailed account of the factors that led President Machel to Nkomati, see de St. Jorre, loc. cit., pp. 1–3.

Samora Moíses Machel, Chairman of the FRELIMO party and President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, meets with Soviet Politburo member and Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov (second from right) in Moscow in March 1983. To Ustinov's right is Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha and Mozambican President Samora Machel at ceremonies in connection with the signing of the Nkomati accord between the two countries on March 16, 1984.

—Embassy of South Africa.

Moscow's Response to Nkomati

Although Machel had revealed Maputo's intentions to reach a rapprochement with Pretoria in December 1983, the Soviet media virtually ignored the talks until the signing of the Nkomati agreement. This represented a clear, albeit implicit, expression of Moscow's dissatisfaction. Moscow viewed the Nkomati accord as a direct criticism of its economic assistance programs. In a rather defensive interview with the Maputo daily *Notícias*, Soviet Ambassador Yuriy Sepelev attacked "those who spread calumnies and intrigues" about Soviet-Mozambican cooperation. Noting that the USSR had been blamed for Mozambique's difficulties, the Ambassador argued that the root problem was the "distorted economy" inherited from the Portuguese in 1975. He then detailed recent Soviet extensions of economic aid and credits.[84]

An article in the June 24 issue of *Sel'skaya Zhizn'*, commemorating the anniversary of Mozambican independence, stated that "the young republic relies on the experience and fraternal support of the countries of the socialist community, particularly the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Bulgaria, in overcoming numerous difficulties in socioeconomic development." The article also noted the "subversive actions" of South African and CIA-armed RENAMO bandits, but did not mention the Nkomati accords.[85] The placement of the commemorative piece in a national paper that deals chiefly with agricultural issues, rather than in *Pravda* where it had appeared in previous years, indicated Moscow's displeasure with Mozambique.

The Nkomati agreement represented a setback for Soviet prestige and interests. Apart from providing opportu-

[84]AFP, Apr. 18, 1984, in *FBIS–MEA*, Apr. 19, 1984, p. U/2.
[85]*Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), June 24, 1984.

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nities for Western inroads into a "socialist-oriented" state, the accord seriously diminished the already limited capabilities of the ANC, and it could potentially obstruct Moscow's longer term objective of undermining the white-minority regime in Pretoria. Still, the Soviets have acquiesced to President Machel's decision, partly because their stake in Mozambique is much smaller than that in Angola. Whereas a joint Soviet-Cuban intervention had brought to power—and is sustaining—the MPLA–PT, Moscow did not play a comparable role in FRELIMO's rise to power. Thus, Soviet prestige is not as clearly linked to the fortunes of the Machel regime.

Despite their displeasure with the turn of events in Maputo, the Soviets have not written off Mozambique. An article about it in the April 30, 1984, issue of *Pravda* highlighted Maputo's continued commitment to socialism, while referring somewhat skeptically to the prospects of the Nkomati accords.[86]

Soviet Prospects

Apart from the damage it inflicted on Soviet prestige, the Nkomati agreement has not seriously altered the basic underpinnings of Soviet-Mozambican relations. Inasmuch as the accords have not diminished Maputo's need for military assistance to neutralize or defeat RENAMO, Moscow remains a key factor in President Machel's policy calculations. Indeed, future military cooperation was discussed at a June meeting in Moscow between Soviet officials Ustinov, Ogarkov, and Yepishev and the Mozambican deputy defense minister.[87] Moreover, despite their opposition to Machel's policies, the Soviets continue to give him high-level attention. While in Moscow to attend Andropov's funeral in February 1984, for example, Machel met with Politburo member Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev; *Pravda* noted in its accounts of the talks that the "prospects for further development of relations are favorable."[88]

Still, recent events have probably heightened Moscow's uncertainty about the future of its relationship with Mozambique. In October 1984, indirect talks between the Machel government and RENAMO, with Pretoria serving as intermediary, led to speculation that Maputo might be seeking a political settlement with the anti-Soviet RENAMO forces.[89] Not surprisingly, the Soviet media stepped up their attacks on the Nkomati accords and highlighted alleged South African efforts to resupply RENAMO with arms, which would be a violation of the agreement.[90]

Although the negotiations with RENAMO have since broken down, another trend that disturbs the Soviets—the growing US-Mozambican cooperation—continues. In January 1985, for example, Washington and Maputo announced the beginning of "a limited military relationship." The United States reportedly will offer $1 million in nonlethal military assistance and $150,000 for training Mozambican forces. (During 1984, the US had also provided some $22 million worth of food assistance.)[91] Should this trend continue, the Soviet position in Maputo could be slowly eroded.

Nonetheless, Moscow is likely to maintain close military ties with Maputo, even as the latter continues to court the West. Despite its recent dealings with Washington, Mozambique remains dependent on Soviet military aid; this will enable the USSR to monitor developments in the region, exploit possible differences within FRELIMO's leadership, and promote suspicions in Mozambique regarding South African and US policies.

Mozambique's leader Samora Moíses Machel meets with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko in Moscow at the February 1984 funeral of Yuriy Andropov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[86]On April 30, 1984, *Pravda* wrote about the accords that "time will show how events develop."

[87]*Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 28, 1984.

[88]*Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1984.

[89]Alan Cowell, "Mozambique Truce Accord Reached," *The New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1984.

[90]See, for example, the articles by I. Tarutin, "Racists Maneuvering," *Pravda*, Nov. 19, 1984, and "Beneath the Cover of Peacemaking: South Africa Continues Subversive Activities Against Mozambique," ibid., Dec. 17, 1984; and Y. Bochkaryov, "Southern Africa: Out to Destabilize," *New Times*, No. 49, December 1984, pp. 12–13.

[91]*The Washington Post*, Jan. 16, 1985, and Maputo Domestic Service, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Jan. 16, 1985, p. U/1.

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By maintaining close relations with Mozambique, the Soviets will be well-placed in the event of new hostilities between Maputo and Pretoria.

In Angola, raising the military ante may be Moscow's easiest option. The Kremlin leaders probably view a continued military stalemate—which perpetuates Luanda's dependence on the USSR—as preferable to a settlement that might be seen as a Soviet capitulation under US pressure. More difficult for Moscow might be a situation in which the dos Santos regime accepts Washington's proposals on Namibia and agrees to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, as part of a Namibian settlement package. Angola's willingness to send back the Cubans would also presume a resolution of the UNITA problem; most important, of course, would be the manner in which Luanda sought to resolve the UNITA issue. If, for example, the MPLA–PT believed that the settlement had effectively severed UNITA's lifeline to Pretoria, it might opt for a military solution, despite the Cubans' departure. Moscow might not be sanguine about Luanda's chances of success, but such a course would increase Angola's dependence on Soviet military assistance and advisory support. Still, this scenario would hardly be ideal from Moscow's vantage point: while it might prolong the military stalemate and thus avert a Soviet loss of influence in Angola, it would also require the USSR to increase significantly its stake in a growingly shaky investment. UNITA's declared policy of focusing its attacks on economic targets, such as oil refineries and diamond mines, might further increase the regime's economic troubles.

If, on the other hand, dos Santos seeks to gain domestic stability through some form of a power-sharing arrangement with UNITA, Moscow's position would become even more uncertain. Much would depend on Savimbi's role in a coalition government. While Savimbi himself has declared that when his party is brought into the government, he wants "the socialist states to play a role in Angola's future," one of UNITA's stated goals is to oust the Soviets and Cubans.[92]

The possibility of a Soviet-inspired coup against dos Santos cannot be ruled out entirely. However, given the complexity of factors—race, tribe, ideology, and personality—that shape MPLA–PT politics, the Soviets could not be certain that even a successful coup would have the result they desire. For example, if Lara, a mulatto, came to power by overthrowing dos Santos, a black, racial tensions that have long existed within the MPLA–PT might be further exacerbated; new divisions might also be created in the military. All this would only serve to strengthen UNITA's position. Of course, a failed coup attempt could also leave Moscow with very little influence. Moreover, a Soviet-sponsored coup attempt aimed at subverting a Namibian accord supported by most Africans could also jeopardize Soviet equities and credibility throughout black Africa. More important, a coup would not take Angola out of the economic and security crisis that had originally prompted it to respond to South African diplomatic overtures. If the USSR succeeds in destroying the recent South African-Angolan diplomatic gains, Pretoria might resume military and political pressure on Luanda.

Moscow might consider another alternative, such as offering its "cooperation" to Luanda, in exchange for guarantees that a coalition government made up of representatives from both the MPLA–PT and UNITA would retain its leftist orientation and its close ties to the USSR. The Soviets could then continue to play a role in Angola, albeit a lesser one, through their military assistance program. In such a situation, Moscow would probably seek to put a positive face on the settlement, noting Luanda's continued leftist orientation, Washington's recognition of the MPLA–PT (albeit in a coalition with UNITA), and the pure intentions of the Cubans—claiming that they had first eliminated the South African security threat and then left when asked to do so. In this situation, the Namibian settlement would be portrayed as a victory for the Cubans and the MPLA–PT. If SWAPO won the election, the Soviets would most probably continue to cultivate Luanda, and also turn their attention to independent Namibia in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

There exists some evidence that Moscow may be preparing for such an eventuality. Increasing candor in the Soviet press in late 1983 and throughout 1984[93] about Angola's precarious security situation suggests Moscow's recognition that the MPLA–PT will have to take some dramatic steps to salvage its increasingly untenable position. Alternatively, such accounts may signal Moscow's view that the Angolan problem is a long-term one, and that the USSR might be compelled to sustain its sizable commitment for years to come.

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[92]Philippe Chatenay, "UNITA's Czech Hostage Adventure," *Le Point* (Paris), July 2, 1984, pp. 28–29.

[93]These have included: "60 percent of the country's bridges and 90 percent of its transport facilities have been destroyed by the aggressors," Sergey Kulik, "Angola '84: A Year for Defense and Production," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 3, 1984; "tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted in January 1984," ibid; "Luanda is experiencing a shortage of food and other essentials as its population has doubled due to the influx of refugees from the south," Vyacheslav Molev, "People's Angola: The Struggle Continues—Victory is Inevitable," *Za Rubezhom* (Moscow), No. 44, Oct. 28–Nov. 3, 1983, pp. 12–13; and "not only the territorial integrity but also the independence of the young republic have been endangered," A. Dolgov, "Insidious Designs," *New Times*, No. 37, October 1983, pp. 20–21. Also, see reports from the war zone by a Soviet journalist, N. Semenov, "Angola: A Repulse for the Interventionists," *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1984, pp. 16–18, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 23, 1984.

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Other Regional Efforts

While Angola and Mozambique remain central to Moscow's position in southern Africa, the Soviets have concurrently sought to improve their relations with the other states in the region. It is likely that these efforts have been given new impetus by the growing uncertainty in Moscow about its position in Angola and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe. The Soviets have gradually developed ties to the Mugabe government of Zimbabwe which, immediately following independence, were quite limited because of Moscow's support for Mugabe's rival, Nkomo. Since 1981 the two countries have signed a number of accords on media, culture, and trade. In July 1983, they reached an agreement to establish a TASS link in Zimbabwe, as part of Harare's efforts to present reporting of world events from both Eastern and Western perspectives. After a long delay, Zimbabwe appears to be ready to open an embassy in Moscow. Moreover, Prime Minister Mugabe may soon make his first visit to the USSR, which he had shunned during a tour of Eastern Europe in 1981.[94]

In their efforts to bolster their position, the Soviets have also sought to highlight and exploit differences between Washington and Harare. For example, they gave extensive media coverage to the reduction of US economic aid to Zimbabwe, following the latter's abstention in the UN vote of condemnation of the USSR for the Korean airliner shootdown in September 1983.[95] The Soviets seem to have been encouraged by Mugabe's professed commitment to Marxism-Leninism. In August 1984, Moscow sent a delegation to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union's (ZANU) 2nd party congress, described by *Pravda* as an "important stage in Zimbabwe's development along the path of independence and social progress."[96]

While Moscow does not currently have a military relationship with Zimbabwe, security problems there could create a need for Soviet assistance. New tensions could develop as Prime Minister Mugabe moves to establish a one-party state; also, unrest could flare up again in Matabeleland, giving South Africa an opportunity to meddle. Indeed, in June 1984, Zimbabwe's security officials disclosed evidence of Pretoria's exploitation and exacerbation of tensions in Matebeleland in the preceding two years.[97] Given this security problem, the appeal of relatively cheap Soviet arms and quick delivery could lead Mugabe to overcome his wariness of the USSR.

Zambia. In Zambia, on the other hand, Moscow's position did not improve substantially when major arms deals were signed in 1979–80.[98] While the USSR has been able to send advisers and maintenance personnel to Lusaka together with a shipment of MiG–21's, it has not been able to translate this into political influence. Perhaps because most of Zambia's security problems disappeared following the establishment of independent Zimbabwe, President Kenneth Kaunda apparently does not perceive himself as beholden to the USSR and has adhered to his long-standing policy of nonalignment. Indeed, Kaunda's desire to be a regional peacemaker and his willingness to negotiate with Pretoria—which have been underscored by his role in facilitating the negotiations that led to the Lusaka accord, and similar talks with SWAPO—reflect a divergence between current Zambian and Soviet interests, and perhaps also their long-term objectives.

Still, the Soviets have succeeded in establishing links with various groups in Zambia. Apart from setting up the standard Friendship Society in Lusaka, the CPSU has signed an interparty accord with Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party. This has led to a number of party-to-party exchanges and delegation visits since 1981.[99] Moscow probably views this as a useful mechanism for identifying and cultivating Kaunda's successors within the ruling elite.

Lesotho. With the loss of access to the ANC via Mozambique, the Soviets have stepped up efforts to maintain friendly relations with other states contiguous to South Africa, especially Lesotho which is surrounded by South Africa on all sides. Since 1983, Lesotho's Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan has made a somewhat dramatic "turn to the East" in order to attract international attention to his country's problems and to elicit additional foreign aid. Moscow has taken advantage of Jonathan's initiative. A Soviet delegation headed by a member of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations visited Maseru in June 1984 to discuss eco-

[94]See David E. Albright, "New Trends in Soviet Policy Towards Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 27, April 1984, p. 5.

[95]*Pravda*, Sept. 15, 1983, for a discussion of the "profound differences" that emerged during Prime Minister Mugabe's talks with President Ronald Reagan in September.

[96]See the CPSU message to the ZANU party congress in *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1984.

[97]Glenn Frankel, "Zimbabwe Spells Out its Case on South African Support of Rebels," *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1984.

[98]For an accounting of Soviet hardware in the Zambian military inventory, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983/84*, London, 1983, p. 75.

[99]See *Pravda*, Mar. 15, 1984, on a Soviet party delegation visit to Lusaka as part of an interparty accord; see also *Izvestiya*, Oct. 4, 1984, for an account of a Zambian parliamentary delegation's visit to the USSR.

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nomic and technical cooperation.[100] In August in Moscow, Lesotho's minister of information and broadcasting signed an accord on media cooperation with TASS.[101] In the near future, Soviet officials and technicians will most probably be posted to Lesotho to oversee the implementation of these accords. Prime Minister Jonathan acknowledged the departure of 38 students for the USSR in late August of last year.[102] In September, Lesotho's Minister of Foreign Affairs Vincent Montsi Makhele visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries.[103] Nonetheless, Pretoria's pressure on Maseru to halt the ANC's activities in Lesotho, together with its support for the insurgents of the Lesotho Liberation Army which is reportedly based in South Africa, will probably deter Jonathan from expanding his country's ties to the Soviet Union any more, lest his relations with Pretoria deteriorate even further.[104]

Alternative Tactics. In addition to traditional diplomacy, the Soviets continue to employ propaganda and disinformation in their bid for influence in southern Africa. These efforts generally play on black African fears of Pretoria and seek to undermine US negotiation efforts. Moscow has broadcast disinformation about alleged US–UNITA collaboration in Angola, in order to raise doubts about Washington's intentions in its dialogue with the MPLA–PT.[105] It has also spread disinformation that portrays Washington and Pretoria as military and political allies. In December 1983, for instance, a story surfaced in the Zimbabwe *Herald* alleging US plans to test and deploy cruise missiles in South Africa; it was later exposed as a Soviet hoax and the newspaper disclaimed it. The *Herald* again fell prey to Soviet forgeries about Washington's recruitment of helicopter pilots to serve in South Africa and about US offers to sell F–5 fighter aircraft to Pretoria.[106]

The Soviets may also be reconsidering their tactics in South Africa itself. Soviet academics recently told visiting American scholars that the USSR is regaining interest in groups other than the banned ANC, for example, the United Democratic Front (UDF), a legal multiracial association of several hundred groups in South Africa.[107] An article in the Soviet scholarly journal *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* recently described the UDF as being "consonant in many respects" with the ANC program. It argued, moreover, that the reason why Pretoria has recently moderated its policies in southern Africa was because it had to concentrate on combatting the growing struggle for liberation within its own borders.[108]

Establishing Priorities for 1980's

In a broader context of Soviet foreign policy, the current situation in Angola and Mozambique reflects the growing Soviet problem of dealing with client states that face insurgencies. It is ironic that the Soviets, who have supported world revolution and national liberation movements, now find their "revolutionary" clients besieged by new "liberators." For example, the regimes in Angola and Mozambique, as well as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, are facing growing insurgency movements. The Soviet Union has been forced to assume the unfamiliar and uncomfortable role of a counterinsurgency power in some Third World states.

In the 1970's, the Soviet Union exploited opportunities in the Third World, establishing a network of allies and clients, which seemed to portend greater gains. In some cases, however, these "victories" have thrust upon the Soviets obligations and burdens similar to those carried in the past by Western powers. Moscow has now been saddled with the task of propping up dictatorial regimes that are being challenged by domestic rivals and foreign powers. In addition, it faces the difficulties inherent in attempts to foster the Soviet economic blueprint on less developed Third World countries. The Soviets have so far underestimated the intractability of such problems, and may have underrated the willingness of hostile regional powers—or of the United States—to increase the costs of sustaining a Soviet empire in the Third World.

By the time these negative trends were becoming apparent in the early 1980's, Soviet policymaking was further complicated by economic and political problems at home.[109] Slow economic growth, and especially a hard-

[100]Maseru Domestic Service, June 14, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, June 15, 1984, p. U/2.
[101]*Izvestiya*, Aug. 7, 1984.
[102]Maseru Domestic Service, Aug. 22, 1984, trans. in *FBIS MEA*, Aug. 23, 1984, p. U/2.
[103]*Pravda*, Sept. 6, 1984.
[104]Simon Jenkins, "Destabilization in Southern Africa," *The Economist*, July 16, 1983, p. 23.
[105]See, for example, Radio Moscow in Zulu to southern Africa, "US Behind Ship Bombing in Angolan Port," trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 2, 1984, p. J/1; also a broadcast of the Moscow World Service, Jan. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Jan. 3, 1985, p. J/1.
[106]These disinformation efforts are discussed by Glenn Frankel, "Officials See Soviets Between the Lines of Phony Stories About US in Africa," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 3, 1983. For a study of Moscow's propaganda and disinformation operations, see Richard Schultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsiya*, New York, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984.
[107]Reuters, July 24, 1984, citing Helen Kitchen, director of the African Studies Program, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.
[108]A. Urnov, "The South African Knot," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1984, pp. 118–21.
[109]The costs of Moscow's relations with the Third World—and the dilemmas they pose for Soviet policy—are discussed by Stephen Sestanovich in "Do the Soviets Feel Pinched by Third World Adventurism," *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1984.

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currency shortfall, led Moscow to cut back its economic assistance to several allies and clients. For example, in an attempt to increase its hard-currency earnings in the open market, Soviet oil shipments to East European states were reduced by about 10 percent.[110] This could hardly be encouraging to much less important clients like Angola and Mozambique, and may have contributed to their decisions during this period to broaden their economic ties to the West.

The foreign policy implications of these economic trends for Moscow's Third World clients have been debated at the highest levels of the CPSU. Various statements made in 1982 and 1983 by the then General Secretary Andropov and Politburo member Chernenko suggest that the issue of Soviet commitments to Third World states was a point of contention. Andropov, in his address to a Central Committee Plenum in December 1982 rather weakly stated that "the Soviet people wish the young states great success in consolidating their independence and in their fight for prosperity and progress." He made pointed references to the "difficult period of national self-assertion and social development" faced by young states, adding that they "are hampered by their colonial heritage of backwardness, internal strife, and conflict."[111]

In his address to the foreign visitors to the plenum, Chernenko was more strident: "We warmly greet the representatives of revolutionary-democratic parties and national liberation movements and organizations battling against imperialism and neocolonialism. In this heroic struggle, comrades, we are with you."[112] TASS later reproduced an article by Chernenko on the CPSU's fidelity to proletarian internationalism, in which he stressed that "our party has always been opposed to the emasculation of the meaning of the concept of internationalism, to playing down its combative, active, pointed anti-capitalist character."[113]

Similarly, Viktor Grishin, head of the Moscow party organization and a member of the Politburo, had sounded a hard line in November 1982: "Loyal to the principles of internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet people have done and will continue to do all in their power to support foreign class brethren who have chosen the road of building a new society—from Cuba in the west to Vietnam in the east."[114]

General Secretary Andropov used the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum to elaborate further his position on this question:

It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's goal and another thing to build it. A certain level of productive forces, culture, and social consciousness is needed for that. Socialist countries express solidarity with these progressive countries, render assistance to them in the spheres of politics and culture, and promote the strengthening of their defense. We contribute, to the extent of our ability, to their economic development as well. But, on the whole, their economic development, just as the entire social progress of these countries, can be, of course, only the result of the work of their peoples and a correct policy of their leadership.[115]

Andropov's comments suggest not only that there were limits to the economic support that emerging states could expect from Moscow, but also that these states would be well-advised to examine the level of their development before calling themselves socialist.

An examination of Soviet academic writings on the Third World reveals a parallel debate between "pragmatic gradualists" and "orthodox ideologues" on the issue of Soviet relationships with developing countries.[116] One Soviet scholar has argued that Moscow should be more concerned with providing an attractive model of "effective socioeconomic growth" and "just social relations" in its efforts to further socialist revolutions. This line implicitly favors a longer view of pro-Soviet change in the Third World, while focusing more immediately on the resolution of economic problems at home.[117]

Of course, the major analytical problem with a given debate lies in distinguishing between a discussion of the issue itself and a pretext behind which high-level political rivals maneuver to best one another in the succession struggle. Chernenko, as noted above, appeared to be criticizing Andropov's "weak" support for Soviet friends in the Third World. After becoming general secretary himself, however, Chernenko softened his position. Addressing a meeting on the new party program in April 1984, Chernenko stated that the main text of the program should be devoted to questions of the country's internal development, "for it is upon a solution to them

[110]Michael Dobbs, "Burdened Soviets Plan to Cut Back Energy Sales to Eastern Bloc by 10%," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 11, 1982.

[111]For the text of Andropov's speech, see *FBIS SOV*, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. P/1 11.

[112]*FBIS SOV*, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. P/12 13.

[113]TASS, Jan. 4, 1983, in *FBIS SOV*, Jan. 4, 1983, p. R/1.

[114]Moscow Domestic Service, Nov. 5, 1982, trans. in *FBIS SOV*, Nov. 8, 1982, pp. O/2 12.

[115]*Pravda*, June 16, 1983.

[116]The current state of this long-standing debate is discussed in Tom Zamostny, "Moscow and the Third World: Recent Trends in Soviet Academic Writing on the Third World," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, April 1984, pp. 223 35. This issue has also been the subject of several works by Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, most recently, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger, 1983.

[117]Zamostny, loc. cit., p. 231. For the original article, see Yu. Novopashin, "The Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process: Methodological Aspects," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982.

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At left, Capt. M. Sokolov, head of a group of Soviets who pilot ships in the harbor of Maputo, seen with Mozambican captains J. Nencembe and S. Niyantombo in April 1983; at right, D. Keirun, a member of the council of the joint Soviet-Mozambique fishing company MOSOPESCA, with P. Zenin, a Soviet fish-packing specialist.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

that our successes in foreign policy and in the struggle for peace depend in the long term, as does the progress of competition with capitalism as a whole."[118] This shift would suggest either that Chernenko's views changed after he assumed the responsibilities of leadership, or that his earlier position was merely tactical, designed to expose the vulnerability of his principal rival within the leadership.

While analysts cannot be certain of the context and meaning of these debates, it is possible to identify trends in Moscow's record of assistance to its Third World friends in the 1980's that may be a reflection of these debates. In Angola, for example, Moscow has recently made major new economic and military aid commitments. Apart from the 10-year, $2 billion economic aid package signed in January 1982, the Soviets delivered some $800 million worth of military hardware in 1983, and are probably sustaining these levels to support the MPLA–PT in the war with UNITA.[119]

At the same time, however, one could argue that the Soviet record in Mozambique reflects a decision to "draw the line" and to minimize the commitment of resources. For example, Moscow has made no effort to increase its economic assistance at this time of great hardship in Mozambique. One is struck by the marked contrast between the high-profile Soviet response to the famine in Ethiopia—Moscow's key African client—and the virtual disregard to famine in Mozambique. The Soviets seem satisfied to keep their hand in Mozambique by giving primary military assistance.

In looking at these examples, it would appear that several diverse considerations are shaping Moscow's response to the needs of its Third World clients. In the case of Angola, the Soviets are not only bolstering an embattled client, but have demonstrated their resolve to counter the diplomacy of a US administration that they perceive as attempting to push them back around the globe. In the case of Ethiopia, the Soviets have sought to consolidate their relationship with this important ally that sits astride the geostrategic Horn of Africa. Viewed against these priority areas, Mozambique may be perceived as a less important, and potentially risky, investment, given its close proximity to South Africa.[120]

An important aspect of the challenge to the Soviet Union in southern Africa lies in the classic clash of patron and client priorities. Angola, Mozambique, the Soviet Union, and Cuba may have similar political and ideological objectives, but they bring different perspectives and priorities to their relationships. Faced with security problems threatening their very survival, the regimes in Luanda and Maputo have had to make some difficult policy choices. Indeed, President Machel's deci-

[118]For the text of Chernenko's address, see *Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1984.

[119]US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1984*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 119. Similarly, Moscow has been willing to increase its assistance to the beleaguered Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In addition to raising levels of arms deliveries, the Soviets have also begun to provide Managua with oil, as much as 52 percent of its current consumption needs, according to a Sandinista spokesperson. (See Reuters, Sept. 7, 1984, which cites the official Nicaraguan news agency.) At the same time, the USSR has been unwilling to make an open-ended commitment to Managua and has sought to maintain a low profile there. The Soviets' strategy in Nicaragua is discussed in Peter Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua: The Two Sides of Soviet Policy," *Comparative Strategy* (New York), Vol. V, No. 1, 1985.

[120]As for Nicaragua, the Soviets probably see a relatively low-cost opportunity to bolster a revolutionary regime in Washington's backyard, diverting US attention and resources away from areas of greater security interest to the USSR.

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sion to make peace with Pretoria and President dos Santos's willingness to compromise on a resolution to the Angola-Namibia tangle underscore a fundamental reality of international relations: sovereign states are guided first and foremost by self-interest.

Moscow, which views the situation in southern Africa in the broader context of superpower rivalry with the United States, has little at stake save its prestige; it can afford to take the long view of any negative trend or setback. Luanda and Maputo, on the other hand, must shape their policies in light of the day-to-day reality of South Africa's military and economic predominance. For Havana, prestige is a factor, but the Cuban troop presence in Africa is an issue that pulls at Cuban policy from opposite directions. On the one hand, Havana derives financial benefits from its involvement in Africa.[121] On the other hand, a drawn-out war, with its rising numbers of casualties and flagging morale, could have adverse effects on Cuba itself.

The clash of these complex and at times contradictory factors is best exemplified by the current situation in Angola. Moscow has significantly increased its military and economic assistance to the MPLA–PT over the past three years, and yet its position is as tenuous and uncertain as ever. While it gratefully accepts this indispensable assistance, Luanda continues to negotiate with Pretoria and Washington. One may assume, therefore, that the Angolans are seeking to resolve the interrelated problems of Angola's security and Namibia's independence while taking on the challenge of peaceful economic development.

In Angola the Soviets have found themselves in the unusual position of attempting to preserve the status quo, that is, a manageable level of instability and tension. But the Soviets are hamstrung by not having diplomatic relations with all of the regional adversaries, which gives Washington an advantage in brokering many bilat-

[121]For a discussion of current and anticipated economic benefits for Cuba, see Sergio Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin, Eds., *Cuba in Africa*, Latin American Monograph and Document Series, No. 3, Pittsburgh, PA, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1982, pp. 165–172.

Rioting in Lenasia, the Indian quarter of Johannesburg, in September 1984 over new voting procedures that would allow South Africa's "coloureds" greater voting rights than the black population.

—David Barrit/Gamma-Liaison.

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eral negotiations. Indeed, the United States, by working on a regional settlement and a degree of normalization of relations between Pretoria and its black African neighbors, has become the force of change there.

On another level, it is ironic that Pretoria's aggressive behavior, which initially facilitated Soviet influence-building in the region, has now led the Angolans and Mozambicans to consider policies incompatible with Soviet interests. As Pretoria shifts to diplomacy—albeit one backed by a military fist—it could present the USSR with even greater challenges. Even if peaceful diplomacy fails, the USSR will face difficult choices in Angola, where growing UNITA success could force Moscow to choose between greater involvement in the counter-insurgency—more arms and Cubans—and the demise of the MPLA–PT regime.

Nonetheless, the recent setback in Mozambique and the continuing problems in Angola do not portend an end to Moscow's involvement in southern Africa. As one analyst of Soviet foreign policy recently noted:

Soviet strategists fully appreciate that (1) southern Africa is NOT important per se to the Soviet Union; (2) it is important to the West; (3) the United States is caught between moral opposition to apartheid and the economic and perceived strategic benefits of the status quo.[122]

The very existence of a white-minority regime in the region's most populous state will continue to spawn new opportunities for the Soviets. This was underscored in September 1984 by the rioting that followed the creation of a three-chamber parliament—giving limited representation to Coloureds and Asians but not to Blacks—in Pretoria. Should Pretoria engage its neighbors in peaceful negotiations, Moscow's position may be challenged further as black regimes move to salvage their own positions in the region. On the other hand, if diplomacy fails and Pretoria maintains or increases its policy of "destabilization," initiating a new cycle of tension between itself and the black African states, Moscow's role among the Front-Line States will be considerably enhanced. Thus, Soviet opportunities in southern Africa will depend, to a large degree, on decisions made in Pretoria.

[122]Singleton, loc. cit., p. 1.

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Rise and Fall of Détente

Harry Gelman

There is a widespread tendency in the United States and elsewhere in the West to focus only on the immediate in Soviet-American relations. In view of the pessimism about this relationship that has evolved in recent years, it is difficult to recall the state of mind that prevailed within the US elite at the high point of détente, say between the spring of 1972 and the fall of 1973, when a consensus in the United States had come to expect a steady broadening of the Soviet-American relationship, periodically reinforced by summits and agreements, in which "cooperation" would more and more predominate over "competition."[1] It has also become easy to forget that the shift from that optimistic period to the less promising present did not occur overnight with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the election of Ronald Reagan. Although these events undeniably brought qualitative changes to the relationship, it is some 10 years since the Soviets began their interventions in Africa, more than 10 years since the passage of the Jackson and Stevenson amendments by the US Congress and the Soviet renunciation of the trade agreement with the United States, and nearly 12 years since the Soviet-American crisis during the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East.

Given this problem of foreshortened perspective, it is important in seeking to assess current prospects for some improvement in US-Soviet relations to try to reconstruct in some detail the factors that contributed to the rise and subsequent fall of détente over the last 15 years. In this context, four general questions raised by the détente experience and the present predicament of superpower relations seem particularly important. First, was the decay of détente inevitable? That is, did détente collapse because elites of the two societies held opposing assumptions about the goals of the relationship from the outset? And, if so, to what extent were these conflicting notions avoidable exaggerations and mistakes, illusions and misunderstandings—as is often suggested—and to what extent were they, rather, the inescapable product of incompatibilities of national interest? Second, to what extent do the changes introduced into the relationship since the end of the 1970's represent the passing of a watershed—a sharp break with what went before—and what aspects merely represent the culmination of a long, incremental process of erosion? Third, what, if anything, remains today from the wreckage of the brief détente of the early 1970's? And finally, what should one consider "normal" for the Soviet-American relationship—the atmosphere of 1972, or that of 1984? If the answer is "neither," then we must ask what mix of attributes found in the two periods is normal, and thus what features of the post-détente era must be expected to last indefinitely and what features might, in principle, be changed for the better.

Motives for Détente

To begin with, it should be noted that although there were some points of symmetry in the motives that drew Washington and Moscow into détente, the practical inducements that each side perceived did differ consider-

[1]This assumption was initially more widely shared than is generally recognized. For example, William Casey, currently director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, played in 1974, as chairman and president of the Export-Import Bank, a major role in defending the principle of extending large credits to the Soviet Union when this principle first began to lose support in the US Congress.

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Signing of the Protocol of the first session of the Joint Soviet-American Trade Commission in Moscow, August 1, 1972: at left, US Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson; at right, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Patolichev.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ably. On the Soviet side, the Brezhnev leadership's approach to the United States in the early 1970's was impelled by a mixture of considerations. Four factors were probably of particular importance in persuading the Politburo that it had an interest in expanding bilateral dealings with the United States:

- the leadership's extraordinary anxiety about China at the start of the decade;
- the Politburo decision that the problems of the Soviet economy made manifest by its disappointing performance of 1969 required a much more vigorous effort to expand importation of Western, particularly American, technology and capital;[2]
- a growing awareness that Moscow's new *Westpolitik*, which emerged in 1969–70 and was aimed at furthering the long-term Soviet goal of convening a European security conference that would legitimize Soviet gains of World War II and possibly open the way for insinuation of greater Soviet influence into Western Europe, could not reach fulfillment without specific new Soviet negotiations with the United States;
- and finally, the Soviet discovery of an interest in reaching strategic arms agreements with the United States that would constrain US deployment in areas of American technological advantage while adequately protecting those strategic programs to which the Soviets gave priority.

In each of these realms, Soviet hopes and expectations about what might be obtained from the United States experienced a sharp rise in the first years of the 1970's and a long decline thereafter.

On the American side, the impulse to expand relations with the USSR was also channeled by a set of specific circumstances, many—although not all—of which have likewise now long since vanished. Perhaps the most important of these conditioning factors was the Vietnam war, which had envenomed American society, destroyed the American foreign policy consensus, increasingly hemmed in the presidency, created growing political constraints on all US military programs, and offered the Soviet Union an irresistible opportunity to seize on the negative worldwide reaction to promote the erosion of American influence and the advance of Soviet influence

[2]On the economic factor, see Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 124–26, 129–31.

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with a multitude of audiences. At the same time, not the least important consequence of the war was to strengthen the illusion—adhered to with astonishing tenacity by distinguished Americans from Averell Harriman to Henry Kissinger—that given sufficient inducement, the Soviet Union both could and would get the United States out of its predicament on terms short of total defeat.[3]

In addition, the American leadership was pointed into more intimate dealings with the Soviets by a confluence of other specific considerations. Attempts to negotiate constraints on Soviet strategic nuclear programs seemed increasingly desirable as US concern over the third generation of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) grew; moreover, such negotiations seemed increasingly possible as Soviet concern over the US advantage in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology became more evident. A geopolitical windfall at the turn of the decade—the emergence of Sino-Soviet military confrontation and the opening of Sino-American dealings—simultaneously seemed to offer another major point of negotiating leverage upon the USSR. Creation of a broad, incrementally growing arms control regime with the Soviet Union, which built on earlier partial agreements such as the test ban treaty, had the added attraction of offering Washington an opportunity to counteract the enervating domestic effects of the Vietnamese war by appealing to a latent tradition of bipartisan support for efforts to reduce tensions.

The movement of the Brandt government of West Germany into dealings with the East in 1969–70 meanwhile had both created new opportunities that the United States could seek to exploit through negotiations with the USSR on European issues, and increased the potential political penalties in Europe for not doing so. Some sections of the US business community anticipated important profits from investment in and trade with the Soviet Union, although on the whole this economic motive was a much less important factor for the United States than it was for the Soviets. And finally, there was Mr. Kissinger's well-known vision of remaking the Soviet perception of self-interest, of enticing the USSR into a network of relationships with the United States that would inhibit Soviet expansionist behavior in the world arena.

Process of Mutual Disillusionment

Détente progressively unravelled as each of the two sides incrementally discovered that it could not obtain from the other the really enormous concessions needed to realize its own wish list. The process of disillusionment on both sides, which began as early as the fall of 1973, became mutually reinforcing.

The Soviets found, above all, that the United States was unwilling to make the huge transfers of capital and technology that the Soviet leaders had apparently envisaged at the onset of détente. In addition, the Politburo learned that the United States was unwilling to side with the USSR against China; that important elements in the US polity viewed détente as sanctioning a degree of intrusion into the internal control practices of the Soviet dictatorship that the Soviet oligarchs regarded as threatening to their legitimacy and therefore as intolerable; and that the United States was unwilling to accept as consistent with détente those specific Soviet military advantages in the overall central and regional strategic match-ups that the Soviets regarded as both natural and essential to their interests.

Finally, the Politburo found that the United States was also unwilling to legitimize under the umbrella of détente what Moscow regarded as the natural process through which the USSR intended to supplant American influence wherever possible in different parts of the world and incrementally to reverse the many geopolitical advantages the US retained over the Soviet Union as a great power on the world scene. On the other hand, the Kremlin leaders themselves regarded as illegitimate and deeply resented the US role in supplanting Soviet influence in Egypt after 1973, as well as the subsequent US refusal to alleviate Soviet regional weakness by accepting the Soviet Union as coarbiter in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Americans gradually found that the Soviets lacked sufficient leverage on Vietnam to bring about a lasting compromise settlement in Indochina, had no intention of spending their political capital with Hanoi in pursuit of this chimerical purpose, and in fact were unwilling to refrain, at the height of the détente period, from supplying Hanoi with the military materiel used to cast aside the supposed settlement and to bring about the eventual humiliating defeat of the United States.[4] This American discovery during the first half of the 1970's was followed, toward the close of the decade, by the galling realization that the Soviets had ensconced

[3]Reflecting this rather pathetic bipartisan craving for a *diabolus ex machina*, Mr. Kissinger states that "in all my conversations with [Ambassador] Dobrynin I stressed that a fundamental improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations presupposed Soviet cooperation in settling the [Vietnam] war." Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1979, p. 266.

[4]Some months after the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement on Vietnam, when Soviet and North Vietnamese conduct began the process of violation of the Agreement that was ultimately to culminate in its destruction and the American debacle, Kissinger felt obliged to tell Dobrynin that "a continuation of substantial Soviet deliveries of military supplies [to Hanoi] would be considered an unfriendly act; a new offensive by Hanoi would have the profoundest consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations." Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1982, pp. 317–18.

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themselves in the former US military facilities in southern Vietnam.[5]

The Americans also discovered that, despite the hopes fostered by some US leaders, the SALT I Interim Agreement did not resolve the threat to the retaliatory capability of the United States originally perceived as latent in certain of the Soviet third-generation ICBM's. Instead, this agreement was eventually found to have allowed the replacement of these weapons with a fourth generation of ICBM's, which posed an even greater threat.[6] The disruption of the US arms control consensus that resulted from this belated discovery gave impetus to the subsequent growth of disagreement in the United States over the acceptability of a SALT II treaty that also did not resolve the issue of the threat posed by increased Soviet missile accuracy and throw-weight.

In addition, the Soviet achievement in the first half of the 1970's of what is generally called a "robust" parity in strategic capabilities was followed, in the second half, by what turned out to be a sustained and successful unilateral Soviet effort to build a more decisive theater nuclear superiority in Europe to supplement the substantial existing local Soviet advantage in conventional forces.[7] Concern over trends in the European military balance therefore tended to reinforce the growing anxiety in the United States about the purposes underlying the Soviet buildup of intercontinental strategic weapons.

The net result, by the end of the decade, was a profound schism in the US elite, with one group questioning the assumptions of the other—once more broadly shared—about the efficacy and legitimacy of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The political effects of disillusionment under this heading were greatly magnified by disappointment with Soviet conduct in other policy realms, so that the ratification of SALT II was ultimately defeated by a mixture of factors, some of which had little to do directly with arms control or the nuclear force balance. By the time that America entered the post-détente era of the 1980's, the arms control process with the Soviet Union had thus become not only far more problematic in its own right but also far more isolated from surrounding sources of mutual confidence. The role of arms control had been transformed from that of "centerpiece" in a broadening relationship with the Soviet Union to that of an increasingly precarious vestige of stability in a widening sea of mutual hostility.

Soviet Third World Offensive

The major factor whose effects coincided with the growth of the arms control debate in the United States in the second half of the 1970's and ultimately helped to prevent the ratification of SALT II was of course the major expansion of the Soviet military and political presence in different parts of the world—in particular in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. This presence grew partly through the incremental broadening of the scope of Soviet naval and air operations to more and more distant areas, and partly through the associated process of Soviet arms assistance to radical nationalist ("liberation") movements or to newly independent states in territories formerly dominated by the West.

Such efforts to expand the Soviet geopolitical position around the world could always be interpreted in at least three ways. On one level, this behavior could be seen as nothing more than the natural endeavor of a latecomer to catch up, analogous to the behavior of imperialist Germany in Africa prior to World War I. On another level, it could be interpreted as reflecting the equally natural desire of the Soviet Union to achieve real equality in stature with the other superpower, the United States—which had long enjoyed (and for that matter, still enjoys) a world presence and power-projection capability not matched by the USSR. These first two explanations for Soviet conduct were repeatedly adduced in some quarters in the United States to demonstrate the nonthreatening nature of successive Soviet actions and their compatibility with détente. Those who took this view also tended to see little pattern in Soviet efforts to exploit instability in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and treated them instead as isolated regional events, each of which should be of relatively minor concern to the United States.

However, superimposed on these two interpretations was a third one, engendered both by Soviet rhetoric and by some actions of the Soviet leaders. This view, which under the impact of events became fairly widely held in the United States by the end of the 1970's, saw the Soviet impulse to expand as part of an internally driven, perpetual contest with the West and the US, to which all other purposes and relationships were subordinated—a

[5]Beginning some four years after the American withdrawal, the Soviet military establishment incrementally attained benefits in Vietnam that it had long coveted: the right to use and develop large naval support facilities at the former US base at Cam Ranh Bay, to build and operate electronic facilities there, to use Vietnamese airfields to stage long-range naval reconnaissance flights from the Soviet Far East, and finally, to base Soviet medium bombers and fighters at Cam Ranh Bay. *The New York Times*, Mar. 29 and July 9, 1979; *The Washington Post*, Dec. 21, 1983; *Jane's Defense Weekly* (London), July 21, 1984.

[6]That is to say, the SS–18 (which replaced the third-generation SS–9); the SS–19 (which replaced the SS–11); and the SS–17 (which replaced the SS–13).

[7]On the present European balance in long-range nuclear weapons, see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1984–85*, IISS, London, 1984, Table 2, pp. 136–37. On the European balance in conventional weapons, this same publication states: "The numerical balance—particularly in equipment—continues to move gradually in favor of the East. At the same time, the West has largely lost the technological edge in conventional equipment which allowed NATO to believe that quality could substitute for numbers." Ibid., p. 151.

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quasi-religious struggle impelled by the central myth under which the Soviet leadership seeks legitimacy. In effect, Moscow came to be seen as pursuing a zero-sum game that precluded acceptance of any point of final equilibrium or settlement with the main opponent; in this interpretation, the purported Soviet quest for "equality" was in fact a never-ending drive to supplant.[8]

The existence of such an impulse was suggested and advertised, inter alia, by official Soviet rhetoric asserting it the unalterable and inevitable duty of the USSR to come to the aid of "revolutionary and national liberation movements."[9] To be sure, the Soviets never behaved as though this meant unqualified support for all such movements; Moscow always was highly selective in fulfilling this supposed obligation, being in practice guided almost exclusively by considerations of Realpolitik and calculations of net Soviet advantage in the struggle with the USSR's principal rivals. However, at no point in the evolution of Soviet-American bilateral dealings in the 1970's did the Soviets cease to make clear that neither détente nor peaceful coexistence would be allowed to halt Moscow's efforts to change the world at the expense of the United States.[10] The Soviet leaders evidently did not see how the Soviet position in the world could possibly be improved unless that of the opponent were whittled down; moreover, they apparently saw US behavior in Egypt and elsewhere in the Near East in the mid-1970's as an indication that the Americans mirrored this outlook.

It is difficult to believe that the members of the Politburo were oblivious to the effects of Soviet behavior in the Third World upon public opinion in the United States, in particular its contribution to the rightward evolution of the American polity late in the decade. But insofar as they gave consideration to restraint at all, the Soviets apparently saw any potential sacrifice of opportunities for gain as inadequately compensated—when matched against benefits derived from a relationship with the US that became less and less rewarding as the decade went on.

Throughout the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies, the Soviet leaders sought to maintain a wall between the bilateral Soviet-US relationship and the interaction of the two powers in the world arena, i.e., to reject American attempts at "linkage," which would have held aspects of the bilateral relationship hostage to Soviet behavior elsewhere. In retrospect, this Soviet effort was destined to fail. If Soviet behavior could not adapt to the conception of détente held by the American public, then those aspects of détente that the Soviet leaders wished to preserve could not survive. This was especially true because of the wounded state of the American presidency from 1973 on, which rendered all dealings with the Soviet Union vulnerable to attack from both the Left (in 1974) and the Right (thereafter).

The spectacular series of Soviet advances in the Third World between 1975 and 1979 were particularly traumatic for much of the American public because they coincided with a series of extraordinary American humiliations, from the evacuation of Saigon in 1975 to the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. Although the Soviets were certainly not responsible for all American misfortunes, they exulted in them and openly sought, with varying degrees of success, to profit from them.[11] The two sets of phenomena became increasingly linked in the world's perceptions, with much of the American public—and the Soviets themselves—seeming to share the Chinese judgment at the time that the United States was a "retreating wave" on the world scene, and that the Soviet Union was an "advancing wave."[12] As a consequence, by the end of the 1970's a sizable majority in the United States had come to see the advent of détente as having opened the way for an explosion of Soviet efforts to wrest advantages from an internally and externally stricken America in several different spheres simultaneously.

The more profound effects of the clash of interests of the two powers in the Third World were indirect.[13] Concern over deployments that enhanced Soviet power in

[8]For a more extended discussion of this point, see Gelman, op. cit., pp. 32–38, 214–18.

[9]As early as 1974, Defense Minister Andrey Grechko asserted, with considerable hyperbole: "At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not restricted merely to their function in defending our Motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity, the Soviet state actively, purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear." A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), May 1974.

[10]To do so, argued one Soviet writer midway through the 1970's, would translate détente into the "preservation of the status quo," whereby "imperialism could continue unhindered its tyranny in the areas remaining in its sphere of influence." B. Pyadyshev, "Opponents of Détente from Miami," *Za Rubezhëm* (Moscow), Oct. 30, 1975, pp. 15–16.

[11]Particularly striking was Soviet behavior in response to the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran. Itself lacking a good opening to the new Iranian regime, the Soviet leadership sought to gain one by fanning the flames of Iranian hostility toward the United States, and therefore it hailed the takeover of the US Embassy, at first quite explicitly, in the broadcasts of an "unofficial" radio station based in the USSR and under Soviet control. See the discussion in Gelman, op. cit., pp. 36, and 229 fn. 16.

[12]As a *Renmin Ribao* editorial of May 9, 1975, put it: "The Soviet social-imperialists, harboring ambitious dreams and stretching their hands everywhere ... are leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to replace the U.S. imperialists at a time when the latter are becoming increasingly vulnerable and strategically passive." Reprinted in *Peking Review*, May 16, 1975, p. 8. On Nov. 4, 1977, *Peking Review* stated: "The Soviet Union has decided to employ an offensive strategy to ... weaken and supplant U.S. influence in all parts of the world in its attempt to establish its own world hegemony." This last-cited commentary quoted Brezhnev as having declared: "Strengthening its economic and defense potential has enabled the Soviet Union to launch an active and successful offensive in the international arena." Brezhnev speech at anniversary celebration of the Academy of Sciences, *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 8, 1975.

[13]There were also some direct effects. The conflict of Soviet and American interests in the Third World was largely responsible for the demise of such bilateral negotiating initiatives of the early Carter administration as the Conventional Arms Transfer and Indian Ocean talks.

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both strategic and European contexts, resentment at US humiliations, and anger at the obstacles created for Jewish emigration from the USSR were all given focus in the public mind by a series of specific, dramatic, visible events around the world that cumulatively seemed to confirm the hostility of Soviet intentions, creating a pattern much more readily perceived by a wide audience than the abstruse calculations and complex allegations of defense analysts about the military balance.

The China Factor?

Some have suggested that Moscow's increased efforts to expand the Soviet presence and influence in the Third World after 1975 was prompted, in part, by chagrin over its failure to head off or rupture the new American relationship with China. In this view, disappointment with the unwillingness of the United States to forgo its China connection combined with other factors to disillusion the Soviets with the results of détente and thus helped to influence Moscow to launch an offensive in the Third World.[14] This interpretation seems to me implausible on several grounds.

It was, of course, evident from the outset—that is, from the time of the extended crisis on the Sino-Soviet border in the spring and summer of 1969—that US relations with China were a paramount Soviet concern. The USSR was intent at that point on avoiding excessive difficulties with the United States during a period of military confrontation with China. Thereafter, Moscow pursued three goals: (1) to minimize the ability of the United States to derive leverage in Soviet-American dealings from Sino-Soviet difficulties; (2) to head off any US movement toward military alignment with China against the Soviet Union; and (3) if possible, to induce Washington instead to align itself with Moscow against the interests of Beijing.[15]

Soviet anxieties under these headings produced a variety of actions in the 1970's. At the outset, when the US détente with the USSR and the American opening with China were developing simultaneously, the Soviets were apparently sufficiently exercised about the possibility of Sino-American collaboration to make some marginal concessions in dealings with the United States, notably

[14]See William G. Hyland, *Soviet-American Relations: A New Cold War?* R-2763-FF/RC, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, May 1981, p. 25.

[15]See Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, R-2943-AF, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, August 1982, pp. 46–52.

Chinese (nearest the camera) and Soviet border guards confront one another in June 1969 on Damanskiy Island in the Ussuri River (known in China as Zhenbao Island).

—Xinhua via Eastfoto.

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Soviet party and state leader Leonid Brezhnev and US President Gerald Ford toast each other at a banquet on November 24, 1974, in Vladivostok.

—David Hume Kennerly/FPG.

by accelerating the negotiations resulting in the signing of the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement in July 1971.[16] After that summer, however, the situation in the Sino-Soviet-American triangle never again demonstrably educed tactical concessions from Moscow. Instead, the Soviets resorted to a long series of warnings and appeals to the United States—warnings against US conclusion of a "military alliance" with China, and appeals to Washington to reach some sort of understanding with Moscow, formal or informal, directed against Beijing.

The appeals for cooperation against China seem to have been concentrated in the first half of the decade, when a large measure of détente still existed. Two requests for formal written agreements with anti-Chinese intent were particularly notable: one was made in 1970, during the SALT I negotiations; the other, in 1974, in the final weeks of the Nixon presidency.[17] Warnings against US collaboration with China against the Soviet Union, on the other hand, recurred throughout the decade as détente dwindled. Toward the end of the 1970's, when the United States, in reaction to Soviet behavior in other areas and to the general decay of détente, finally did begin to seek a significant degree of security cooperation with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union went so far as to warn publicly that this could adversely affect arms control negotiations.[18] Here, for once, Moscow appeared to subscribe to "linkage."

Nevertheless, it is anachronistic to suggest that this turn in American policy late in the decade was responsible for stimulating Soviet activism in the Third World beginning in 1975. Although Washington would not accept a security relationship with the USSR directed against China, Brezhnev's warnings against a US "military alliance" with the PRC addressed a contingency that was never, in fact, a real possibility during Kissinger's tenure in office. Despite extensive Sino-American exchanges of information and views during the Nixon and Ford administrations, it does not appear that such security measures as US arms sales to the PRC, naval port visits, and joint contingency planning—let alone the creation of an "alliance" with China—were under active consideration in this period.[19] American policy did not begin to move in this direction until the second half of the Carter administration, and this shift from 1978 on—the incremen-

[16]Hyland, op. cit., p. 25; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 766–67.

[17]On the Soviet 1970 proposal, see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, New York, Holt, Rinehard & Winston, 1973, p. 189; also Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 547–48. On the Soviet 1974 suggestion, see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1173–74; also Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1978, p. 1030.

[18]*Pravda*, June 17, 1978. In January 1979, the Soviets did briefly hold up the final stages of the SALT II negotiations in response to the visit of Deng Xiaoping to the United States.

[19]In addition, of course, it must be remembered that at no point in Sino-American dealings has the PRC in fact indicated willingness to accept a relationship approximating a formal "alliance" with the United States.

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tal triumph of the perspective on the strategic triangle held by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski over that held by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—was itself propelled in large part by the American reaction to the Soviet offensive in the Third World.

It is reasonable to suppose that despite their repeated expressions of concern about the Sino-American relationship in private contacts with US leaders,[20] the Soviet leaders were well aware of the evidence that the Kissinger-Nixon policy toward China was a limited one, and that it was amply balanced by American interest in reaching agreements with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the bulk of Soviet published comment between 1971 and 1975—particularly after the signing of the SALT I agreement in May 1972—suggested a growing inclination to assume that the United States would not wish to jeopardize the arms control process and other overriding American interests by entering into a close security relationship with Beijing.[21] It should also be remembered that even as late as November 1974, when détente had already begun to decline, the Chinese leaders were dealt a humiliation when the United States consented to hold a summit meeting with Brezhnev at Vladivostok. The Soviets had chosen this site, adjacent to China, with precisely that effect in mind, and can only have been gratified and reassured by the Ford administration's acquiescence in this slight to Beijing.

It could be argued, to be sure, that the Soviets were disturbed in this period not by an expectation that the United States would line up with China against the Soviet Union, but rather by the repeated confirmation that Washington would not consent to an arrangement with Moscow directed against China. It would be farfetched to conclude, however, that Kissinger's refusal to depart from the course he steered between the two powers sufficed to incite the Soviet leadership to undertake greater activity in the Third World against American interests.

The Stevenson Amendment

It seems likely to me that a much more potent factor in reinforcing the Politburo inclination to seize on the opportunities that began to open up in the Third World af-

[20]See, e.g., Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 524, 766; idem, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 233, 294–95. 1173–74.

[21]In August 1971, speaking privately to the Yugoslav ambassador in the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming trip to China, Brezhnev is said to have asserted that "the Americans, regardless of all Nixon's demagogy and maneuvers, know very well that China is not, and cannot be, a real partner of the United States in the modern world. This role can only be filled by the Soviet Union." Slobodan Stankovic, "Michunovich Describes Yugoslav-Soviet Disagreements," RFE–RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report 187, Sept. 20, 1982.

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Moscow on March 24, 1974.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ter 1975 was the December 1974 passage by the US Congress of the Stevenson Amendment to the Export-Import Bank bill, an action that limited to US$300 million the total that the Bank could guarantee in loans to the Soviet Union over the following four years without seeking further Congressional approval, and that banned the use of any of this money for the development or production of energy. From the Soviet perspective, this event was a real turning point abruptly ending hopes that America might furnish decisive help to the Soviet economy. Immediately at issue was the prospect of extremely large loans from the US to the Soviet Union over the next few years for the Yakutsk/North Star Siberian energy development projects. These capital transfers and the associated technology inputs were probably the biggest single dividend the Politburo had anticipated from the détente relationship. The passage of this legislation under the nose of a preoccupied Secretary of State Kissinger rendered moot an elaborate tripartite compromise that he had worked out with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and Senator Henry Jackson granting the Soviets most-favored-nation status under the Trade Act in return for certain Soviet concessions over Jewish emigration. The Soviet response was to disavow the emigration compromise and to abrogate the October 1972 trade agreement with the United States,

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indignantly proclaiming that the USSR could never be bribed to permit interference in Soviet internal affairs.[22] One suspects, however, that the problem was that henceforth the bribe would always be too small.

The reasons why the US Congress took this step in 1974 are of continuing interest today because they vividly suggest that American and Soviet expectations from the relationship are always likely to be out of phase. The American legislature, in addition to being influenced by certain more extraneous considerations,[23] was fundamentally opposed to the evident intent of the American executive-branch leadership to make large credits available promptly to the USSR as an inducement for *subsequent* Soviet good behavior. Various parts of the coalition in the American elite that forced through the Stevenson Amendment were disturbed at Soviet behavior in the Arab-Israeli crisis before and during the October 1973 war, were angry at Soviet encouragement and applause for the Arab oil embargo, were annoyed at Soviet continuation of very substantial arms shipments to Vietnam, or were concerned that once very large credits were transferred to the USSR, the Soviet debtor could exercise political leverage over the American creditor by threatening to delay repayment. In general, this coalition was determined to ensure that all future credits to Moscow somehow be made contingent upon *prior* good Soviet behavior in all arenas.[24]

It seems unlikely, however, that the Soviet leadership, for its part, was ever willing to contemplate such a bargain, either explicit or tacit, with the US elite. The Soviets apparently expected large American economic assistance as a down payment in a relationship that the Soviet leaders would, at most, evaluate on an ad hoc basis to determine what, if any, acts of political restraint the returns from that relationship might from time to time justify. The members of the Politburo apparently never dreamed that the agreements concluded with the United States in 1972 and 1973 implied a general commitment to desist from pursuing perpetual struggle for competitive advantage with the Americans. They therefore saw nothing inconsistent between the sweeping ritualistic promises recorded in May 1972 and such actions as their public and private efforts, the following year, to induce the Arabs to wield the "oil weapon" against the West. [25] They were evidently surprised that American resentment over this behavior contributed to Washington's withdrawal from what Moscow saw as American obligations under the détente bargain.

But, quite apart from whose action caused whose reaction, it is questionable whether—even if the Stevenson Amendment had not passed—the economic benefits at stake would have sufficed to induce the Soviet leaders to refrain from exploiting the qualitatively new opportunities that emerged after 1975 in Africa and elsewhere. However, this we will never know.

The 1970's in Retrospect

Initial misconceptions on both sides, then, did seem to have played an important—albeit not exclusive—role in bringing about détente's demise in the 1970's. Brezhnev, for his part, misjudged the ability of the US presidency to deliver on the American side of the tacit bargain reached in 1971–72.[26] He also underestimated the capacity of a rampaging American pluralism to veto executive commitments. For this reason, he misjudged the readiness of the United States either to provide the kind of economic help envisioned by the Soviet Union at the start of the decade or to accept the kind of strategic arms agreement that was tolerable to the USSR at the close of the decade. At the same time, he greatly overestimated the willingness of the US public to accept with equanimity the successive challenges and injuries to American interests—in the Third World and in global and regional military balances—that he and his colleagues regarded as essential to Soviet interests and as a legitimate part of the détente understanding.

American leaders, for their part, erred in supposing that the Soviet Union could or would—as part of the détente bargain—deliver to the United States an acceptable and lasting compromise in Vietnam. They also erred in supposing, or at any rate in suggesting to the

[22] *The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1974; *The New York Times*, Jan. 15, 1975.

[23] There can be little doubt that major sections of the Congress and the press were, in addition to all else, interested in using the occasion as part of a more general campaign to attack and constrict the powers of the presidency in the immediate aftermath of Watergate. For some of those involved, the pros and cons of the Soviet-American relationship were secondary to this endeavor.

[24] It is worth stressing that this was a coalition in which *liberal* forces played a major role, enforcing their will to defeat an effort by essentially conservative political elements to hand over large sums of money to the Soviet Union. On this remarkable role reversal a decade ago, see Gelman, op. cit., pp. 148–51, 250 n. 68, and 251 n. 69.

[25] It will be recalled that a document on "basic principles" of Soviet-US relations signed at the 1972 summit pledged both sides to refrain "from efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." The context had seemed to refer to behavior of all kinds, and not merely weapons deployments. See "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), June 26, 1972, pp. 898–99.

[26] It is difficult to estimate with confidence Brezhnev's perception of the quid that he was offering in return for the American quo, since various concessions emerged and then vanished incrementally. One may surmise, however, that in 1972 he may have seen four such elements as most important: (1) those limited constraints on previously existing Soviet deployment programs for third-generation ICBM's that he accepted in SALT I; (2) the embarrassments that he was forced to accept in dealings with Vietnam and Egypt in the spring and summer of 1972 as a result of his dealings with the United States; (3) his temporary consent to allow expanded Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union; and (4) his temporary moderation of the customary vehemence of Soviet propaganda attacks on the United States.

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US Congress, that SALT I could prevent the growth of the Soviet threat to American land-based retaliatory capabilities. They erred, too, in their hopes that the Soviet leaders could be induced to display restraint in the Third World as the result of the construction of a network of relationships with the United States. Finally and most decisively, they erred in assuming that construction of such a network of inducements would be politically possible in the United States in the absence of far more prior Soviet restraint than the Politburo was willing to consider.

However, beyond these initial errors on both sides, the role of historical accident in undermining détente should not be underestimated. A long list of fortuitous developments that were not foreseen in 1970—Watergate, the death of Portuguese dictator Antônio de Oliveira Salazar and its consequences in Africa, the revolutions in Addis Ababa and Kabul, the fall of the Shah, Pol Pot's disastrous pugnacity toward Vietnam after 1975—impacted from different sides and in different ways on the relationship between the superpowers during the 1970's and progressively exacerbated their underlying conflict of interests.

Finally, in view of the extent to which those interests continue to conflict, one should have no illusions about the possibilities for the relationship in the 1970's had the two sides not begun the decade with separate sets of faulty assumptions. If mutual expectations had been significantly lower, the ultimate disillusionment and bitterness would have been less; but by the same token, far less would have been attempted. What attitude would the American leadership have adopted in 1970 had it known with certainty that any hopes of inducing Soviet restraint in the Third World were foredoomed? What attitude would Brezhnev have taken in 1970 had he known that his hope of decisive American help for the Soviet economy was misplaced?

In short, given the objective outside factors that impinged on the relationship in the 1970's, and given the inescapable asymmetries in the attitudes and goals of the Soviet Union and the United States—especially Moscow's assumptions about the military requirements of Soviet security and about its right and duty to help change the global "correlation of forces" in the USSR's favor—it seems highly probable that under any circumstances the competitive aspects of the relationship would have strongly predominated over the cooperative aspects. Even if optimistic illusions associated with détente had not been fostered (only to be killed), the atmosphere by the end of the decade would very probably have been rather harsh in any case—perhaps analogous to that prevailing in the late 1960's.

A column of Soviet armor in Kabul in January 1980 at the outset of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

—Hubert Van Es/Photoreporters.

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

US President Jimmy Carter, second from left (flanked at his right by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and at his left by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski), meets with Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in Washington in February 1979.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

The US and the Post-Détente Era

Relations between the superpowers need not, however, have deteriorated as far as they have in the years since late 1979, during what might be termed the "post-détente era." This period has clearly witnessed a further exacerbation of bilateral tensions.

On the American side, this trend stems from the American reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan and the decisive victory of the point of view represented by Zbigniew Brzezinski. As suggested earlier, there seems little doubt that this tipping of the scales within the Carter administration coincided with the culmination of a broader shift within the American polity that had been going on throughout the late 1970's. This hardening of attitudes regarding Soviet behavior affected not only the US elite but also popular opinion, and in turn played its part in the election of Ronald Reagan. The increasing Soviet pessimism about prospects for the bilateral relationship that Moscow evidenced in the 1980's doubtless derived as much from a recognition of this underlying shift in the American center of political gravity as from perceptions about the personal world view of the new American president.

This shift was reflected from the start—that is, since 1980—in both demonstrative American gestures and in more basic, secular changes that have become more and more important as time went on. Some of the punitive steps taken against the USSR in 1980, while regarded as infuriating and injurious by Moscow, did not in themselves represent fundamental and long-lasting changes in US behavior. The announced rationale for many of the more notable moves against Soviet interests in President Carter's last year was that of imposing "sanctions," that is, they were conceived as ad hoc responses aimed at punishing specific Soviet acts, with the extremely faint hope of getting the Soviets to undo what they had done (e.g., to get out of Afghanistan), and with the somewhat greater hope of inhibiting future Soviet misdeeds. Many of these steps were either intrinsically one-time in nature (the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games) or were at least posed as theoretically reversible upon evidence of better Soviet conduct (the elimination of Aeroflot landing rights, the embargo on grain sales).

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At the same time, the political reaction that the invasion of Afghanistan evoked within the Carter administration and among the public also tended to reinforce strongly certain longer-term shifts in US policy already under way, trends of greater import to Soviet interests than the "sanctions." They included, among other things, the collapse of support for the ratification of SALT II, the trend toward heightened US military spending, and the tendency of the United States to seek security cooperation with China.

It seems likely that one of the chief Soviet grievances against Mr. Reagan is that he has sought to extend and institutionalize this broad underlying shift in the American posture that began under his predecessor. The late–Carter period rationale of "punishing" specific Soviet acts in an empirical spirit has now been overlaid by assumptions about an unending struggle against the Soviet Union and what are now judged to be long-term requirements dictated by the hostile essence of the relationship. These assumptions bear a strong resemblance to those that have impelled Soviet competitive behavior against the United States in the world arena for many years.[27]

One characteristic of this new American posture, particularly in the first two years of the Reagan administration, was a degree of sustained stridence in rhetorical denunciation of the Soviet Union that the Soviet oligarchs had not heard for many years. Although they may have expected more reserve in propaganda emanating from the highest level, the Soviet leaders were probably affronted primarily because this rhetoric appeared to be consciously employed as part of a broad effort to undo the gains registered by the Soviet Union over the United States in the 1970's. On the one hand, the attacks on the USSR were used to muster public support for large increases in expenditures for strategic and conventional weapons programs that were openly advertised, at least initially, as intended to restore American military superiority. On the other hand, the same attacks were used, in effect, as tacit justification for a new American refusal to accept as a basis for future strategic arms control agreements certain of those existing Soviet advantages that had been previously accepted and, in the Soviet view, legitimized during the 1970's in SALT I and SALT II.



A US-manufactured VAX II computer bound for the Soviet Union at Stockholm's airport where it was intercepted as a strategic item.

—Arne Jönsson/Pressens Bild AB via Photoreporters.

In addition, the United States in the post-détente era has sought to impose America's new zero-sum view of the relationship with the Soviet Union upon Washington's European allies. This was reflected in the unsuccessful attempt to compel the West Europeans to abandon their gas pipeline deal with the Soviets, and more generally in the greatly intensified and sustained efforts to induce the West as a whole to constrict the flow of technology and scientific ideas to the East. At the same time, the effort to limit Western inputs into the growth of Soviet military strength has merged with a much vaguer and inconsistently applied desire to minimize Western help to the Soviet economy as a whole, on the general grounds that any easing of Soviet economic dilemmas must also ease constraints on resources available to the Soviet military. In broadest terms, the present administration has manifested to the Soviet leaders an aspiration to wage economic warfare against them, albeit on a scale greatly exceeding Washington's actual political capabilities.[28]

Finally, the last four years have also seen specific American efforts to offset Soviet interests in three major

[27] Specific examples of the tendency of the Reagan administration to strive to reduce asymmetries that appear to give the Soviet Union an important tactical advantage include the decay in American adherence to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which many consider to have been long rejected by the Soviet Union; the effort to impose a sharper strategic focus upon control over trade with the USSR, in response to Soviet central coordination of foreign trade activities for strategic purposes; the effort to enforce greater secrecy controls upon the American government and upon American research, in emulation of Soviet practice; the effort to compete more vigorously with the KGB by allowing a longer leash to US covert action; and the sporadic effort to limit the access of Soviet spokesmen to the United States and to the American media, in response to similar Soviet constraints on American spokesmen.

[28] One of the reasons this goal is not often avowed explicitly—in addition to the impossibility of getting America's allies to accept it—is its incompatibility with the US domestic political realities that induced Mr. Reagan first to abandon the Carter boycott on grain shipments to the USSR and then to conclude the new "boycott-proof" long-term grain agreement with the Soviet Union (see fn. 52 below).

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



At left, a young woman in the crowd that demonstrated in Bonn in October 1983 against deployment of new US nuclear weapons in West Germany (behind her, the Soviet flag); at right, the first U.S. Pershing missiles arrive at the Mutlangen base of the United States in West Germany's Baden-Württemberg Province on November 24, 1983, the day after the Bundestag voted to accept deployment.

—Christopher Morris/BLACK STAR and François Lochon-Pierre Perrin/Gamma-Liaison.

geographic areas, in each case carrying through on initiatives already begun under the Carter administration, and hence enjoying a broader consensus in the United States than have some other features of the Reagan program.

In Europe, the Reagan administration has carried forward the train of events inaugurated with the NATO double-track decision of December 1979, when the Atlantic alliance resolved to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in order to restore the credibility of Western strategic deterrence in Europe—threatened by the Soviet deployment of SS–20 missiles there—unless negotiations could remove that threat. The Soviet Union proved unwilling to give up the military and political advantages inherent in the SS–20 deployments, and despite an enormous Soviet political campaign and great domestic tumult in Western Europe, was ultimately unable to prevent the start of the Western INF counter-deployment.[29]

In Japan, the Reagan administration has found it possible to continue and enlarge the trend of heightened Japanese military cooperation with the United States begun by the Carter administration. This trend, which significantly helps US military capabilities against the Soviet Union in the Western Pacific, gained impetus from the continued Soviet militarization of the southern Kuriles (claimed by Japan), and from the threat perceived by Japan in Soviet SS–20 deployments in Asia.[30]

And with China, despite an initial crisis in Sino-American relations occasioned in part by President Reagan's ideologically motivated inclinations toward Taiwan, the US government ultimately found it possible to reestablish the trend of unacknowledged security cooperation with the PRC inaugurated by his predecessor. The United States was able to do this partly because Mr. Reagan shifted his priorities, but—more important— because the Soviet Union's policies attacking Chinese geopolitical interests in Asia made it impossible for Beijing to abandon its loose security connection with America despite its desire to reduce tensions with Moscow.[31] In all three cases, therefore—with Europe, Japan, and China—the post-détente era has witnessed specific American achievements in the regional competition with the Soviet Union that have been facilitated by Moscow's pursuit of its own military priorities and by its heavy-handed behavior.

[29]In this connection, the key events were the reelection in the spring of 1983—despite crude Soviet efforts to prevent it—of the West German coalition pledged to carry out the INF deployment, and the subsequent November 1983 vote in the Bundestag to do so. It is true, of course, that since deployment started, the USSR clearly has not given up the effort to halt it, particularly in view of the conditional nature of the Netherlands' commitment to deploy cruise missiles and the ongoing political struggle in Belgium over when—and whether—to begin deployment in that country. See, e.g., *The Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 30, 1985.

[30]See, e.g., Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Northern Threat," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1984, esp. pp. 4–9.

[31]In Beijing in December 1984 Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov initialed agreements by the Soviet Union to help China modernize some industrial plants built with Soviet help in the 1950's and to engage in various forms of scientific and technological cooperation with the PRC. The visit, however, brought no apparent movement on the fundamental geopolitical issues that continue to divide the two countries. See *The New York Times*, Dec. 29, 1984. For a discussion of the two contrasting aspects of Chinese relations with the USSR, see Harry Gelman, "Soviet Policy Towards China," *Survey* (London), Autumn-Winter 1983, pp. 165–75.

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A cartoon from the Soviet humor magazine Krokodil *(No. 17, 1984), captioned "A Seance at the Pentagon," shows a Hitler-like spectre holding a banner that reads "Anticommunism."*

—Sovfoto.

Soviet Response

The Soviet leadership's response to all these developments has been to reaffirm the policies that have been perceived as threatening by each of its various adversaries, and to assert heightened defiance of them all, beginning, of course, with the United States. The Moscow oligarchy has deployed against the United States a degree and volume of propaganda vituperation not heard since the 1950's, and far surpassing Mr. Reagan in rhetorical extravagance. The American President was repeatedly compared with Adolf Hitler, and incessantly charged with leading the world toward "the flames of nuclear war."[32] This rhetoric was not moderated, but, on the contrary, further elevated after Mr. Reagan began to moderate his own attacks on the USSR in 1983. It is clear that this Soviet language was intended, at least in large part, to frighten Western publics and thereby pressure Western governments to make concessions to the Soviet Union. In addition, the propaganda campaign was evidently pressed by certain segments of the Soviet elite, particularly in the military establishment, as tacit justification for apparently controversial claims in resource allocation.[33]

The exceptionally noisy and savage Soviet rhetoric of the last few years may also have reflected heightened internal and external stresses placed on the Kremlin leadership. The grave and mounting problems of the Soviet economy have been exacerbated by the heightened challenge of the Reagan military program. The Soviet oligarchs have also been compelled to deal in the early 1980's with an apparently unendable war in Afghanistan, a severe challenge to the stability of their position in Poland, and the previously mentioned setbacks to Soviet hopes of blocking INF deployment and of drawing China away from its orientation toward the United States. The tensions created by these multiple pressures were dramatized in both the confusion and the pugnacity displayed by the leadership in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's September 1983 destruction of a South Korean airliner.[34]

These pressures have arisen at a time of at least temporary deterioration in the effectiveness of Politburo leadership. The semi-paralysis of policy characteristic of Leonid Brezhnev's last years, as his health worsened, has been followed, since his death, by an interregnum of two successive ailing general secretaries and an increasing perception, both at home and abroad, of policy deadlock, inertia, and vacillation. The perceived physical and political weakness of Konstantin Chernenko engendered in the Soviet Union in 1984 a growing malaise associated with a sense of exceptional weakness and division at the center. Many Soviets, particularly in the military, appeared to regard this prolonged dearth of vigorous leadership as damaging to the national interest. This "time of troubles" for the Kremlin in the early 1980's contrasted sharply with the simultaneous partial recovery in the status of the US presidency.

[32]See, e.g., Vladimir E. Shlapentokh, "Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1984, pp. 88–94.

[33]Particularly noteworthy was a 1981 article by Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov in which he went so far as to criticize "party propaganda" explicitly for not having done enough to inculcate in the Soviet population awareness of the danger of war. N. Ogarkov, "Guarding Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91.

[34]Soviet confusion was displayed in many ways: notably, in the five-day delay before explicitly acknowledging that the USSR had shot down the Korean airliner; in the use of two conflicting public explanations (that the shootdown was justified because the airliner was allegedly on an espionage mission, and that it was justified because the airliner had allegedly been mistaken for a US military reconnaissance plane); and in somewhat discordant statements made by one or two Soviet officials abroad in the weeks following the incident. Soviet pugnacity was of course reflected, among other things, in the vehement refusal to apologize or admit error.

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Arms Control Impasse

A major symptom of the deterioration of superpower relations after late 1979 was the grinding to a halt of the arms control process, the principal remnant of détente that had endured through the second half of the 1970's. The decay of this process was in fact far advanced by the time of the signing of the SALT II agreement in June 1979. Ratification of this treaty was threatened from the outset by the unwillingness of major sections of the US elite to accept certain aspects of the bargain that had been concluded—particularly the failure of SALT II to place greater constraints upon Soviet land-based ICBM's and upon the Soviet advantage in throw-weight (perceived as posing a growing threat to US retaliatory capabilities) or to avoid what some saw as intolerable ambiguities in some of the provisions regarding verification. In an environment of growing concern over Soviet military adventures in the Third World and geopolitical advances, and of simultaneous US humiliations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put an effective end to the already dwindling chances for ratification of SALT II, and contributed to the election of an American president who had during his campaign termed that treaty fatally flawed.

Meanwhile, the NATO dual-track decision on INF deployment in Europe, adopted in the same month that Soviet airborne forces began landing in Kabul, set in motion decisive changes in Soviet arms control priorities. After having reluctantly persuaded themselves that the Alliance was serious and that there was a real possibility that the Pershing II's and cruise missiles would some day arrive, the Soviets in the first half of the 1980's shifted the emphasis of their negotiating efforts to the prevention of these deployments.

This shift in priorities was facilitated by the long delay in the presentation of a US negotiating position in the strategic arms reduction talks (START), and by the eventual Soviet discovery that this position projected cuts in Soviet land-based missile capabilities that the Soviet leaders considered out of the question. Expecting little from START over the short term, the Soviets became more and more inclined to make these negotiations hostage to satisfaction of their demands regarding INF. Defeated on the INF front in late 1983, Moscow opted, for the time being, to suspend both sets of negotiations. Nuclear talks regarding both intercontinental strategic weapons and intermediate-range weapons thus remained in abeyance throughout 1984, ostensibly awaiting satisfaction of the Soviet demand that the Western INF deployments be undone as a prerequisite to resumption of talks, but in fact awaiting a Politburo decision on how and when to climb down from an untenable position.

Chief Soviet arms negotiator Yuliy Kvitsinskiy boarding an airliner in Geneva after breaking off the INF talks with the United States there in November 1983.

—UPI.

In these circumstances, the existing arms control regime established through the series of agreements signed in the détente era of the 1970's has begun to erode. The SALT II treaty, whose provisions, although unratified, the United States unilaterally undertook to respect, will expire at the end of 1985, and the United States has already indicated plans for a second new ICBM—the Midgetman—which would require changes in any renegotiated treaty. The Soviets, for their part, have already begun to diverge more and more significantly from the letter and spirit of the existing unratified treaty. They have done so by declining to make certain reductions specified by the treaty; by developing and deploying, contrary to the treaty provisions, two new ICBM's (the SS–24 and the SS–25); and perhaps most strikingly, by displaying a more and more cavalier atti-

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Soviet Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov at a September 9, 1983, press conference at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which he briefed Soviet and foreign journalists on the shooting-down of Korean Air Lines flight 007; with Ogarkov is Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

tude toward the ludicrously ambiguous provisions of the treaty regarding telemetry encryption.[35]

At the same time, the viability of the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) treaty, which had long ago been ratified by both sides and which for a decade had been regarded as the more successful half of SALT I, was being increasingly threatened both by American plans and by Soviet transgressions. The future American challenge to the treaty is inherent in US plans for space defense. The Soviet nibbling at existing ABM treaty obligations is implicit in the USSR's development of new SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems that may have capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles, in Soviet development of rapidly deployable components for a new ABM system, and especially in the Soviet construction of a large new radar of a kind and in a place (central Siberia, far removed from the Soviet periphery) apparently banned by the treaty.[36]

Whatever implications this gradual process of mutual preparation to jettison commitments and understandings reached in the 1970's may have for the military balance, this feature of the post-détente era is likely to be increasingly nerve-wracking for Western populations. Moreover, the threat to stability perceived in the growing shakiness of the arms control structure is generally seen as greatly exacerbated by new technological developments with grave implications for arms control—most notably, in the short run, the advent of the cruise missile with its possibly insoluble problems of verification.

At the same time, the experiences and revelations of the post-détente period have probably made it even more difficult to assemble an adequate consensus in the American elite and public in support of whatever new arms control structure the US government may seek to create with the Soviets to replace the old one. Evidence suggesting that the Soviets are in fact already violating the ABM treaty is likely to become an increasingly important factor in future internal US political struggles over the acceptability of arms control formulas reached in any new negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is all the more likely to be the case in view of the strong conviction in many (although not all) quarters in the United States that the Soviet Union had previously flagrantly violated at least one earlier arms control agreement, the 1972 Bacteriological Weapons Convention ratified by Moscow in 1975, by manufacturing and transferring to Vietnam mycotoxins for use in Indochina.[37] Thus, one of the striking new features of the post-détente era has been a significant enlargement of the portion of the US elite and public that is inclined to believe that the Soviet Union does, in fact, violate arms control agreements.

Against this background, the chief pressure on Moscow to reach a new compromise arrangement with Washington is likely to come from a perception of Soviet technological inferiority to the United States in the new realm of space defense. As in the early 1970's, the United States is again seeking to use Soviet awareness of a potential American advantage in strategic defense as a lever by which to force Soviet concessions regarding the strategic offense. Meanwhile, the chief pressure on the American side, as before, is likely to come from the growth of public apprehension in the United States and allied countries. In view of the objective difficulties, it is by no means clear whether these two factors will be sufficient to produce a viable new agreement in the arms control talks scheduled to begin in March 1985.

[35]The SALT II "Common Understanding" on this subject is one of the best examples to date of an arms control provision setting forth criteria so inherently ambiguous as to virtually dictate contemptuous circumvention in the absence of good *political* reasons, outside the treaty itself, not to engage in such actions. That is, this provision, because of its really exceptional ambiguity, was especially dependent on an atmosphere of goodwill to induce a degree of Soviet voluntary compliance in interpretation sufficient to satisfy the United States. In June 1979, it was therefore already becoming an anachronism, and shortly became much more so. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereafter, ACDA), *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 266.

[36]See Michael Krepon, "Both Sides Are Hedging," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Fall 1984, pp. 153–72, esp. pp. 158, 161–62.

[37]See, e.g., US Department of State, *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan*, Special Report No. 98, Washington, DC, Mar. 22, 1982; and J. H. Turnbull, "Yellow Rain," *Defence* (Eton, England), No. 14, May 1983, pp. 265–70.

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Slowdown in Soviet Gains

Another distinctive feature of the post-1979 era has been a noticeable general slowdown in the previously rapid multiplication of Soviet military and political footholds around the world. The Soviets have been principally concerned about defending and consolidating the main geopolitical advances staked out by the USSR in the late 1970's, notably in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Indochina. In Africa, their position has been somewhat weakened, at least for the time being, as a result of diplomatic agreements signed by South Africa with Angola and Mozambique. In the Middle East, where Soviet political leverage had already been gravely hampered since Moscow's estrangement from Sadat's Egypt and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in 1979, the Soviet Union for a time seemed humiliated by its inability to prevent the Israeli conquest of southern Lebanon or the arrival of the Western powers in Beirut. In Afghanistan, the Soviets are widely perceived to have become bogged down since 1980 in a seemingly endless punitive war against the local population. In the Far East, despite a steady increase in their theater nuclear advantage and a gradual expansion in their new military position in Cam Ranh Bay,[38] the Soviet Union has been forced to deal in the 1980's with increasingly adverse reactions from local states—notably Japan, China, and the ASEAN countries—to these very military advantages. Even in the Caribbean and Central America, where since 1979 they have contemplated the prospect of risk-free advances in Soviet influence as a result of Cuban exacerbation of US difficulties, by mid-decade this prospect, while still fairly promising, had become much less of a sure thing.

As in the past, many in the United States have heavily overemphasized voluntaristic explanations for what has seemed to be a sudden change in Soviet fortunes around the world. Observers who in the late 1970's had

[38]Symbolic, in this regard, was the arrival of Badger medium bombers at Cam Ranh Bay in November 1983. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 21, 1983; Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 22, 1983.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Geneva in January 1985 for a meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz at which the two agreed to resume arms control negotiations between their countries; at his left is Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov, and to his right, Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoliy Dobrynin, deputy foreign minister Georgiy Korniyenko, Vasiliy Markov, and Aleksei Obukhov.

—Peter Jordan/Gamma-Liaison.

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persisted in seeing evidence of a "master plan" in the succession of Soviet advances in Africa, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia now perceived evidence of a deliberate Soviet decision to hold back from efforts to advance. Some who in the immediate wake of the invasion of Afghanistan had conjured up visions of imminent further such Soviet invasions in the crude style of Hitler, now saw the Soviet Politburo as being newly and inexplicably inhibited from executing such plans. President Reagan did not hesitate to cite the Soviets' failure to make new additions to their orbit as evidence of the success of his policies; and even some Americans who are not supporters of Mr. Reagan have seemed to believe that the general posture of the Reagan administration has dissuaded the Soviet leadership from adventurist initiatives it would otherwise have taken. The Soviet failure to take violent action to halt the 1982 Israeli advance to Beirut or the expulsion of the PLO from that city was sometimes cited as an example of such allegedly unwonted Soviet caution. Such views appear to me to exaggerate considerably both the extent of the Reagan administration's inhibiting influence upon Soviet behavior and the extent to which the stagnation of Soviet fortunes in the Third World over the last few years can in fact be attributed to any new Soviet inhibitions.

There is little doubt, of course, that the Soviets do face some important new problems and constraints. For example, Soviet military manpower, particularly ground forces manpower, has been increasingly stretched by the competing demands created by the recent growth of the list of adversaries. The Soviet leaders, in addition to satisfying the ongoing requirements of their buildup against China in the east and NATO in the west, felt obliged to hold very large forces in constant readiness to crush the Poles during 1980 and 1981 should the need have arisen, and have also, of course, believed it necessary to allocate more than 100,000 troops on a permanent basis for the war against the Afghans. It is possible, as some Chinese analysts contend, that the Politburo has considered itself "pinned down" by the Afghan war, in the sense that it has been constrained more than hitherto from making large new commitments of Soviet ground force resources in additional theaters. In addition, there is some evidence, persuasively put forward by Stephen Sestanovich and others, to suggest that since Brezhnev's death the Soviet regime has become at least somewhat more pessimistic about the economic and political cost/benefit ratio of commitments to Third World regimes in marginal situations.[39] And Charles Wolf and some Rand colleagues have also produced evidence suggesting that the effective burden on the Soviet economy of supporting the Soviet empire—including the cost of subsidizing countries such as Cuba and Vietnam for strategic and political reasons—has finally grown to proportions that are likely to give Soviet leaders reason for caution in assuming additional such burdens.[40]

However, although these inhibiting considerations may indeed play some role in Soviet thinking, particularly in marginal situations, there is little reason to doubt that the primary cause of the recent slowdown in the advance of Soviet fortunes has been the same factor that was the primary cause of the rapid Soviet advance in the late 1970's: the scope of perceived opportunities. The wave of favorable circumstances that began a decade ago, permitting decisive Soviet exploitation, has receded. The Soviet leaders are well aware that past advances have been predicated upon openings created by domestic and international instability and violence, and that the Soviet Union is at a great disadvantage in competing with the West in economic dealings with the Third World states in the absence of such turmoil. But they have reason to be confident that more such instability and new such opportunities will be generated somewhere in Asia and Africa before the 1980's are over, as they have already been generated in Lebanon and Central America. In such countries as the Philippines and Pakistan, where severe threats to the stability of the American position now exist, the Soviet leaders may already see the seeds of future opportunities. In 1984, Moscow already showed signs of increased activity and some modest improvement of its position in the Middle East, building in part on the Western fiasco in Lebanon.[41] In sum, there is little reason to assume that the Politburo believes that the long-term effort to expand Soviet presence and influence on the world scene at the expense of the West and the United States must come to a halt, or that it has ceased to pay dividends.

Until the next dramatic evidence of Soviet advance does materialize, however, the perception of a near-stagnation of Soviet fortunes around the world is likely over time to cause a gradual dilution of the American consensus that the Reagan administration has sought to mobilize against the USSR. The slackening since 1980 of the wave of Soviet advances has contrasted vividly with American official rhetoric, and thus has slowly eroded the broad consensus that had supported Mr.

[39]Stephen Sestanovich, "Do Soviets Feel Pinched by Third World Adventurism?" *Guardian* (Manchester), June 17, 1984.

[40]Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., *The Costs of the Soviet Empire*, R–3073/1–NA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, September 1983.

[41]Among other things, the Soviets have concluded major new arms deals with Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, and are in the process of restoring normal diplomatic relations with Egypt.

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Carter's new posture toward Moscow in his last year in office and has gradually added to the pressure on the Reagan administration to find ways of coming to agreements with Moscow.

Principal Legacies

Given these changes in the five years of the post-détente era, what has endured from the preceding decade? I would cite five salient developments.

First, several new Soviet-American institutional relationships that came into existence in the last decade still remain in being, although their value remains limited in present circumstances. Perhaps the one with the greatest potential importance for the future is the joint Standing Consultative Commission, which has dealt with matters of arms control interpretation and compliance since ratification of SALT I. Although now virtually paralyzed—like most Soviet-American forums—by mutual distrust and the halt in the arms control process, this institution is an important structural innovation and could be useful to both sides in the future.[42]

In addition, certain other arms control–related venues established as a consequence of initiatives taken in the 1970's continue to exist, notably the mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna and the Stockholm talks regarding "confidence-building measures" (CBM's). Although both are presently little more than propaganda battlefields—in the case of MBFR, largely because of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to acknowledge its existing conventional force advantages in Europe, and in the case of the Stockholm conference, because of the Soviet preference for generalized mutual pledges with asymmetrical effects on Western interests rather than for concrete and binding CBM's—they remain available instrumentalities should the Soviet posture some day be modified.

Beyond this, an important channel remains from the network of informal contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union that had enormously expanded in the 1970's. This network has in recent years been constricted by the worsening of the bilateral atmosphere, by the Reagan administration's attempts to impose reciprocity with regard to some contacts,[43] and by certain recent Soviet efforts to tighten security controls over all Western communications and contacts with the Soviet population.[44] Nevertheless, the continued existence of these informal contacts remains a modest factor making for political stability in the relationship, even though the Soviet Union has always been far more interested in expanding such contacts in the US to press the Soviet viewpoint upon the American elite than in allowing American views to reach Soviet policymakers.

Finally, it is noteworthy that one aspect of the Soviet-American trade relationship has endured since the 1970's and, indeed, has become more firmly institutionalized in the post-détente era. This is, of course, American grain exports to the USSR, resulting from the growing realization in Moscow during the last decade that Soviet agriculture was unlikely in the foreseeable future to be able to supply the feed needed to expand meat production. A long-term grain-sales agreement negotiated in the Carter administration was partially breached by the boycott imposed by President Carter in 1980, but it has now been succeeded by a "boycott-proof" agreement reached with Moscow by the Reagan administration.[45] Although an extraordinary anomaly in the overall posture of that administration toward the USSR, this permanent grain trade is now also a modest element of stability in the relationship.[46]

Next are two trends of the 1970's that continue to hamper Soviet competitive efforts against the United States. The first of these is the previously mentioned fact that Soviet encirclement of China has continued to fuel Sino-Soviet antagonism and has impelled China to maintain a degree of security association with the United

[42]Article XIII of the May 1972 ABM treaty provided that the Soviet Union and the United States should subsequently establish a Standing Consultative Commission charged, among other things, with considering questions of compliance with the treaty, possible cases of interference with national technical means of verification, and any related "ambiguous situations." ACDA, op. cit., pp. 141–42. The SCC was then set up by a Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries in December 1972. *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 15, 1973, pp. 60–61. It was given jurisdiction over the SALT I Interim Agreement as well as the ABM treaty, and its jurisdiction was extended to SALT II under Article XVII of the SALT II treaty. The SCC was thus intended to meet periodically to resolve compliance questions behind the scenes and with a minimum of publicity. It seems fair to say that its ability to perform this function to the satisfaction of the United States has deteriorated radically in recent years, largely because of the evolution of Soviet reactions to US complaints into a posture of stonewalling as the political relationship deteriorated.

[43]E.g., Washington has imposed reciprocal restrictions on the movements of Soviet journalists and some Soviet diplomats in the United States (*The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1983), and has periodically sought, with very mixed success, to impose limitations on the ability of Soviet visitors such as USA Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov to conduct propaganda in the United States (ibid., Apr. 20, 1983). In general, the enormous asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union make such efforts to enforce reciprocity far more difficult for Washington than for Moscow.

[44]E.g., in 1982 the Soviet authorities sharply curtailed phone links between the USSR and the West and eliminated all automatic dialing in such links (ibid., July 2 and Sept. 4, 1982). In 1984 the Soviets issued legislation greatly expanding and rendering even more vague and sweeping the definition of information considered state secret (ibid., Feb. 4, 1984), and putting citizens at risk of punishment for giving, without official permission, shelter, transportation or any other unspecified "services" to any foreigners (*Los Angeles Times*, June 14, 1984).

[45]The new five-year grain agreement, signed in August 1983, pledged the US government not to exercise "any discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control exports of the commodities" bought by the Soviets under the agreement. *The New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1983.

[46]US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Lionel Olmer visited the Soviet Union in January 1985 for talks on the state of trade relations between the two countries.

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Nikolay Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, receives Dwayne Andreas, chairman of the board of directors of the US grain firm Archer-Daniels-Midland and cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, in the Kremlin on November 29, 1984.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

States.[47] The net effect has been to guarantee that a considerable portion of Soviet military efforts continues to be directed against China and away from the United States and its European allies. At the same time, the US association with China probably continues to create a sense of encirclement in much of the Soviet elite, and to feed Soviet bitterness and pugnacity toward the United States. All these mutual, interlocking effects are likely to go on for some time.

The other trend of the 1970's adverse to Soviet interests that has continued in the 1980's is the malaise in the Soviet economy, the first symptoms of which had originally helped impel the Soviet leadership to seek a remedy by associating with the United States. The secular decline in the rate of growth of the Soviet economy—which began to gather speed not long after December 1974, when the Soviets in effect lost hope for an American remedy to this problem—today impinges on three major aspects of the Soviet competition with the United States. Soviet economic difficulties render the burden of military spending increasingly onerous, and make the prospect of heightened superpower arms competition a grim one. Soviet technological backwardness in most nonmilitary areas of production helps make the Soviet Union a marginal factor in a world economic system dominated by the capitalist industrial powers, and also makes it difficult for the USSR to consolidate some of those Third World gains it initially staked out through the provision of security assistance. Finally, as suggested earlier, Soviet economic constraints are apparently increasing the effective burden of supporting the Soviet empire, and may be making Soviet leaders somewhat more cautious about assuming large new burdens in marginal cases for the sake of political and strategic benefits.

Finally, two major countervailing trends inaugurated in the 1970's apparently continue to favor Soviet competitive interests against the United States. First, despite all that has been said thus far, the qualitative change in the late 1970's that saw the Soviet Union's emergence as a much more visible competitor to the United States in more distant parts of the world has not been undone. Despite some ebbing of Soviet fortunes in certain places from the high tide of advance registered in the last decade, the Soviet geopolitical presence remains much more far-flung than before the détente era, and it is likely to continue to be so. The USSR has not been forced to abandon the most important of the new bridgeheads established in the 1970's—in Ethiopia, Aden, Afghanistan, and Indochina—and there seems little reason to expect it to do so in this decade. The Soviet Union continues to strive to consolidate and, if possible, improve these positions.

All of these places, along with the earlier bridgehead established in Cuba, are linked to the gradually growing deployment of Soviet military and naval strength into previously unbroached regions, from the South China Sea to the Red Sea to the Khyber Pass to the Gulf of Mexico. The effort to continue this long-term process is in turn linked to extensive programs of naval construction and weapons building. It is true that in all major respects, the Soviet Union's political presence, geopolitical weight, and power-projection capabilities in distant regions around the world remain inferior to those of the United States. But this very fact appears to render Soviet leaders determined to persevere in efforts to build on what was accomplished in the 1970's, where safe opportunities permit. These realities seem to ensure that whatever fortunes befall Soviet efforts in the future, the United States and the Soviet Union will remain geopolitically engaged across a broader canvas than was the case before the 1970's, and that this worldwide in-

[47]This relationship was most recently exemplified by the January 1985 visit of General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, to China. For an account, see *The Washington Post*, Jan. 12, 1985.

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teraction will remain an essential aspect of the bilateral relationship.

Second, along with this enlarged global presence, the Soviets thus far appear to retain in the post-détente era the essence of the advances they registered in the last decade in the central strategic and regional nuclear balances. The 1970's was not only a period in which the Soviet Union attained what is generally termed a "robust" overall parity with the United States in strategic nuclear capabilities, but also a time during which the USSR established and enlarged an important advantage in theater nuclear capabilities in both Europe and Asia. Although the Soviets are undoubtedly concerned at the prospect that the United States will attempt to use its technological advantages to undo the Soviet central strategic gains of the 1970's, they seem grimly determined to make every sacrifice necessary to prevent this from happening. In Europe, despite the violent Soviet objections to NATO's limited INF deployments begun in 1983, the Soviets have every reason to believe that they will retain a considerable advantage in intermediate-range nuclear delivery capability even after these deployments are completed.[48] In Asia, where the Soviet nuclear advantage has always been much greater, the Soviet SS–20 building program, accelerated since 1982,[49] appears designed to guarantee to the USSR a decisive theater nuclear edge whatever contingencies may emerge from future Chinese or American deployments.

The Soviet aircraft carrier "Minsk" cruises in the Pacific in November 1982.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

These present realities, which reflect the Soviet sense of what is required to adequately serve Soviet security, seem to guarantee continued tension between the Soviet Union and those of its adversaries—notably the United States and China—who find this degree of Soviet insurance unacceptable and threatening. Beyond this, the evident Soviet desire to retain simultaneously all three existing sets of nuclear force ratios is likely to come into increasing conflict with the exigencies of a revived arms control process, particularly as the superpowers move to link in some fashion negotiations on central and regional systems, in accordance with the preliminary agreement reached in Geneva this January.

Conclusions

What does all this suggest for the future? First, it would appear that neither the atmosphere of 1972 nor that of 1984 is "normal" for the Soviet-American relationship. That relationship is likely to be extremely competitive in the foreseeable future, and there is little ground for hope that bilateral cooperation can diminish the competition to secondary importance or make the relationship, on the whole, a "friendly" one, as was being suggested in 1972. This generalization will probably hold true regardless of the personalities who lead the United States and the Soviet Union over the rest of this decade. The relationship is essentially adversarial, and this underlying reality is probably not subject to change by US policy. At the same time, the degree of tension seen in the last few years is highly abnormal and untypical, and can possibly be significantly reduced. But whether this will in fact happen will depend upon the interplay of many variables, some of which can indeed be

[48]Indeed, as one authoritative figure has noted, the NATO decision to limit INF deployment goals to 572 warheads on Pershing II and cruise missiles was driven by a reluctance to seek full European nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, since a higher goal might suggest "an attempt to establish a 'Eurostrategic balance' and thus to decouple the US strategic deterrent from Europe." See James A. Thomson, "The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Policy, 1975–1979," *International Affairs* (London), Autumn 1984, pp. 601–14.

The Soviet advantage in short-range warheads in Europe is, of course, even greater, and is likely to remain so. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1984–85*, Table 2, pp. 136–37.

[49]In May 1983 the Western press reported that there was evidence that the USSR was now building at least ten new regimental bases in Siberia to accommodate more than 100 new SS–20 missiles. These bases—said to be in various stages of completion—would, when finished, approximately double the existing number of deployed SS–20's in Asia. *Los Angeles Times*, May 8, 1983; and *The New York Times*, May 8, 1983.

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affected by the US posture and negotiating position, but some of which will be beyond the control of any American government.

Second, the most important underlying cause of the present tension is not the behavior of the Reagan administration, although it can be criticized for several reasons. Rather, it is the assertive dynamism of the Soviet regime striving to press outward on the world scene, and the associated peculiar Soviet view of the military requirements essential to Soviet security. These factors—internally generated by a combination of historical, geopolitical, and ideological considerations—were critical in the destruction of détente in the 1970's and in the sea change in American public opinion that helped bring the Reagan administration to power.

Consequently, although the November 1984 reelection of President Reagan may have some effect on the Soviet-American atmosphere over the rest of this decade, the ultimate outcome of the prolonged leadership succession struggle that has been going on in Moscow since at least 1982 will probably have a much greater effect. Given the virtual certainty of continued intense competition between the superpowers in the world arena, much will depend upon whether personalities come to the fore in the Soviet leadership who are willing to modify the present Soviet view of acceptable geopolitical compromise, a view that proved fundamentally unacceptable to the majority in both American political parties in the last decade.

Although the content of the Soviet-American arms control agreements concluded in the 1970's appears, on balance, to have played at best only a marginal role in restraining strategic nuclear competition, the arms control *process*—the ritual sequence of negotiate/sign/negotiate—appears to have played a much larger role as a talisman of stability for the multitudes. Although the implications of the agreements reached became a matter of increasing disputation within the US elite, the fact that agreements were being reached remained the essential matter for millions in the United States and in the West who had neither knowledge of nor interest in the minutiae involved. The effective end, for the time being, of this cycle of negotiation—signalled by the US failure to ratify SALT II at the close of the 1970's and then confirmed by the Soviet walkout from negotiations four years later—was thus a traumatic political event of major proportions, quite apart from the concrete consequences for the strategic balance. This change, the most important one brought by the demise of détente, is increasingly unacceptable to the American consensus. The Reagan administration has therefore been under growing domestic pressure to reach, in its second term, some agreement in new talks with the USSR. Hence, the planned talks on strategic defense, strategic arms, and theater nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the political viability of any nuclear negotiations that the two powers may undertake in the future will always remain highly vulnerable to the political consequences of a successful advance by one of the parties at the expense of the other in the world arena. This generalization appears especially likely to be true in the United States, and to be relatively independent of the preferences of any particular American government. Regardless of the degree of urgency attached to arms control and the desire of part of the US elite to protect this process at almost any cost, no American nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union, whatever its terms, would be likely to be ratified in the next few years if the USSR in the same period somehow found it possible to achieve dominant influence over the government of, say, Pakistan or Iran. Even if linkage is formally excluded from the negotiating process, it is always likely to exercise a tacit but decisive role in the US ratification process. All major Soviet-American bilateral negotiations should therefore be understood to have an unstated global political aspect.

The fact that no major Soviet geopolitical advances have in fact occurred since 1980 appears to stem much more from happenstance than from any fundamental change in Soviet attitudes. Thus, this relative quiescence could change without notice at any time. Although the Soviet leaders feel somewhat burdened by their war in Afghanistan, and are also likely to be somewhat reluctant to assume major new economic burdens for the sake of new Third World clients, there is still no evidence, and little reason to believe, that they are willing to accept the status quo in the overall division of political forces in the world, which still greatly favors the United States. Moscow therefore continues to await major new geopolitical opportunities, and is unlikely to be willing to sacrifice such an opening—should one present itself at acceptable risk—for the sake of any bilateral agreement with the United States. In addition to all other impediments, therefore, the Soviet-American relationship will always be vulnerable to independent factors that may unexpectedly open to the USSR new avenues of opportunity.

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Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well

Charles Gati

Give or take a few months, four decades have passed since the Soviet bloc that Stalin conceived began to take shape. During these 40 turbulent years, two types of challenges have confronted Soviet authority over Eastern Europe. First, Moscow has had to cope with popular movements, riots, uprisings, and revolutions such as those that erupted in East Berlin (1953), Poznan (1956), Budapest (1956), Warsaw (1968), Prague (1968), several Polish cities (1970 and 1976), and most recently—and most dramatically—throughout Poland under the banner of the Solidarity movement (1980–81). When facing more or less spontaneous challenges of this type—popular movements seeking freedom, economic well-being, as well as independence—Moscow, acting directly or indirectly, invariably managed to reestablish most or all of its authority. Second, the Soviet Union has had to cope with regime claims such as those that were advanced by Yugoslavia (1948), Albania (1961), and Romania (1964). When facing more or less controlled challenges of this type—demands by a single communist party leadership for autonomy—Moscow invariably failed to reestablish its authority.

Although both popular outbursts and individual regime claims for autonomy are bound to occur again, Moscow must also find a way to cope with a third and different challenge: the growing dissatisfaction and assertiveness of its essentially loyal allies in the Warsaw Pact. In the mid-1980's—for the first time acting concurrently, though not conspiratorially—several like-minded regimes have come to see the need to make a renewed effort to trim excessive Soviet influence over their policies. Lacking in the dramatic quality of past confrontations and rooted in a common desire for more "elbow room" rather than real independence, the primary challenge today in Eastern Europe is a subtle attempt by several regimes to reach out to Europe without offending or provoking the Soviet Union; indeed, it is an attempt to move toward the West without appearing to move away from the East. By so trying to square the circle, the East European regimes hope to reap Western economic benefits and gain a measure of respectability at home—and keep Moscow satisfied as well. At a deeper level, they are responding to a sense of European identity and consciousness that has been growing on the continent, east and west. But by proceeding cautiously and by affirming their commitment to the Soviet bloc, that is, to "socialist internationalism," the East European regimes are also responding to the most fundamental political fact of life in the region: their continued dependence on Soviet power for survival.

What are the recent causes and manifestations of this maneuver by East Europe's leaderships? At a time of Soviet leadership changes, is Moscow likely to tolerate a further erosion of its authority in the region? If so, are we witnessing the gradual "decline" of the Soviet empire or merely a new phase in its evolution?

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Causes of Regime Discontent

The current East European maneuver, which is spearheaded by Hungary, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), reflects East European apprehensions about the direction of Soviet economic policy toward Eastern Europe since the early 1980's and about the direction of Soviet foreign policy generally.

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Marshal Viktor Kulikov, second from left, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, at a meeting of the Committee of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, held on December 3, 1984, in Budapest.

—Interfoto MTI/Eastfoto.

As for the direction of Soviet conduct abroad, a large segment of the East European communist elites appears to have grown critical of Moscow's lack of diplomatic skill and mistaken priorities. Without disagreeing with broad Soviet foreign policy objectives, they are particularly disturbed by the Soviet Union's heavy-handed treatment of Afghanistan; its inability to improve not only party-to-party but also state-to-state relations with China; and, above all, its clumsy and counterproductive handling of, and subsequent withdrawal from, the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks in Geneva in late 1983. Although only the Romanian government has addressed these issues directly in public, extensive contacts with Hungarian, East German, and Polish functionaries indicate that, from their perspective too, Soviet conduct appears plagued by miscalculations and missteps.

While granting that the Soviet Union had to do "something" about Afghanistan in 1979, these functionaries wonder if the Kremlin accurately estimated the difficulties the Soviet armed forces would encounter. They wonder if the political and economic costs of the operation will not ultimately exceed the presumed benefits of military victory. Like many a Western observer, they wonder if Afghanistan will turn out to have been "Moscow's Vietnam." Without having specific measures in mind, they speculate whether the Soviet Union should not adopt an "alternative" to the policy it is presently pursuing there. In their view, then, Moscow has allowed itself to be bogged down in a war that it cannot easily win and from which it now cannot extricate itself—but for which Eastern Europe has also had to pay in terms of Western diplomatic complaints and economic penalties.

East European political elites seem to be equally nonplussed over Soviet policy toward China. They applaud the recent improvement in state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well,[1] but they are dissatisfied with the slow pace of the normalization process. Although they share Moscow's suspicions over China's rapprochement with the United States and Western Europe, and believe that Chinese attacks on Soviet "hegemonism" have been unnecessarily harsh, they find the Soviet position altogether inconsistent. If the issue is ideology, they ask, then why does Moscow respond in the same way to present-day Chinese statements and policies as it once did to Mao's statements and policies? If, on the other hand, the primary issue is power rather than ideology, then why cannot Moscow find a diplomatic formula to ease tensions between the two countries? In the East Europeans' view, then, it is primarily though not exclusively the Kremlin's inflexibility that stands in the way of at least partial rec-

[1]For the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, see *The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1984. On January 20, 1985, Xinhua reported the departure of a high-level Chinese trade delegation to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to sign economic agreements with those states. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Jan. 23, 1985, p. H/2.

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onciliation. In the meantime, all of the East European regimes, with the exception of Romania, feel compelled to emulate publicly the Soviet posture toward China which they regard as deeply flawed and believe to be rooted in the Soviet leaderships' grudge against a former—more tractable—ally.

Closer to home, the East European political elites appear especially critical of Soviet policies toward Western Europe in general and of Soviet handling of the INF talks in particular. Rightly or wrongly, it is widely believed among these elites that the Soviet Union could have prevented the deployment of Pershing II ballistic and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe.[2] They maintain that a more subtle Soviet diplomatic effort—to encourage West European hopes about substantial Soviet concessions—would have so altered the political balance in the Netherlands, Belgium, and even the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that the installation of US missiles would have had to be canceled or at least postponed. By first threatening to withdraw from the Geneva INF talks (if the missiles were deployed) and then actually withdrawing (when the missiles were deployed), the Kremlin made it easier for the United States to accomplish that which the Soviet leaders so vigorously and indeed vehemently sought to circumvent. In other words, in the East Europeans' view, Moscow should have temporized, not so much in order to conclude an agreement but in order to keep the Atlantic alliance guessing—and divided.

The common element in the East European elites' critique of Soviet conduct toward Afghanistan, China, and the INF talks is an increasing concern, mixed with condescension, about the recent lack of subtlety in the Kremlin's approach to the outside world. In a critique reminiscent of West European reservations about US foreign policy, East European functionaries think of their Soviet ally as being unduly heavy-handed, inflexible, much too self-righteous and clumsy, and insufficiently appreciative of the merits of quiet diplomacy. They are concerned, clearly, because an intransigent Soviet policy creates an unfavorable atmosphere for the expansion of their own economic, cultural, and political relations with the West, particularly with Western Europe.

The expansion of economic relations with the West is an especially urgent priority for Eastern Europe now, and it is so perceived by all of the regimes in the Soviet bloc (with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia). The main reason for the urgency—and the second general cause of unease with Soviet conduct—is that since the early 1980's, Soviet subsidies to Eastern Europe have steadily declined and there has been a concurrent—and steep—deterioration in Eastern Europe's terms of trade with the Soviet Union. While acknowledging that the Soviet Union has its own economic problems, the East European regimes nevertheless resent getting less in the 1980's than they did in the middle and late 1970's. With a feeling of indignation, they wonder whether the Soviet Union could not afford to do more for them if it did not waste its resources fighting an elusive enemy in Afghanistan, keeping a vast army along its Chinese border, and installing modern and expensive intermediate-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

The essential facts are quite simple and well-known. To alleviate the impact on its East European allies of the sudden rise in the world market price of energy in the early 1970's, Moscow agreed to provide oil and gas to the East European countries at a price that would only gradually catch up with the prices other countries were paying on the world market. Because of cheap energy as well as the overpricing of East European manufactures, Eastern Europe is estimated to have received an implicit Soviet subsidy amounting to US$5.8 billion a year in the 1974–78 period, about $11.6 billion in 1979, about $17.8 billion in 1980, and about $18.7 billion in 1981. The average subsidy for 1982–84 is thought to have dropped to $12.1 billion per year, reaching about $10 to $11 billion in 1984.[3] Although some Western economists consider these staggering estimates excessive, there is no disagreement about either the existence of Soviet subsidies in the 1970's or their decline since 1981.[4] Due to the decline and then seeming disappearance of Soviet energy subsidies in 1984, the overall amount has sharply decreased. Concurrently, the steady deterioration in the terms of Soviet–East European trade—by approximately 20 percent since 1980—means that the East European regimes must sell more of their products in exchange for the same amount of goods received from the Soviet Union. A simple (although admittedly extreme) example illustrates the extraordinary change that has taken place. In 1974, Hungary sold 800 "Ikarus" buses to the Soviet Union in order to purchase 1 million tons of Soviet oil. In 1981, it had to sell 2,300 "Ikarus" buses for 1 million tons of So-

[2]Even that most loyal ally of the USSR, the Czechoslovak government, appeared less than eager to receive Soviet missiles in retaliation for the INF deployments. See RFE–RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich—hereafter *RFE Research*), Dec. 23, 1983, Czechoslovak Situation Report 21/83.

[3]See Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. More recent information is derived from periodic reports by Wharton Econometrics, Washington, DC. See also Charles Wolf, Jr., et al. *The Costs of the Soviet Empire*, R3073–1–NA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1983.

[4]For an excellent analysis of Soviet–East European economic relations, see Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in Sarah M. Terry, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 155–88; Marer (p. 179) speaks of a "net cumulative subsidy of about $14 billion" in 1971–78.

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viet oil. By 1984, the "price" of the same amount of Soviet oil may have reached 4,000 "ikarus" buses.[5]

From a purely economic point of view as well as from the Soviet perspective, changes in Soviet–East European trade relations are fully warranted. The Soviet Union has to cope with its own serious economic stringencies. Keeping up with the United States in the military competition is expensive. The availability of cheap Soviet energy has substantially declined in recent years, while the costs of producing new oil have significantly risen.[6] Why should Moscow not receive the world-market price at long last for the energy its allies so desperately need? The answer from the East Europeans is that they made an implicit contract with the Soviet Union in the 1970's. That contract, or understanding, called for Moscow to protect the East European states from the worst effects of international economic turbulence in exchange for which the East European regimes would maintain do-

[5] *Magyarország* (Budapest), July 31, 1983. The figure for 1984 is the author's rough estimate.

[6] John P. Hardt, "Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe," in Terry, op. cit., pp. 210–12.



Buses produced at the "Ikarus" factory in Budapest (top) are exported to the Soviet Union in exchange for energy; the first stage of the Volovetskaya pumping station (bottom) on the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod main line that will ship Soviet natural gas to Eastern Europe.

—Interfoto MTI/Eastfoto and TASS from Sovfoto.

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mestic stability and support Soviet foreign policy objectives. To the extent that, with the notable exception of Poland, there has been relative peace and quiet in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is blamed for reneging on this tacit understanding with the East European leaderships.[7]

Given the decreasing advantage that the East Europeans derive from the Soviet economic connection and their assumption that the Kremlin is assigning decreasing priority to their problems, combined with misgivings about heavy-handed Soviet behavior elsewhere, the East European regimes have ample reason in the mid-1980's to ponder how they will be able to maintain domestic peace as well as support Soviet foreign policy objectives. Thus they have reason to reconsider their relations both with the Soviet Union and the West.

Manifestations of Concern

Precisely because the current maneuver by several East European governments—the process of inching toward the West—is so incremental, its public manifestations are only occasional and frequently subtle. In fact, one indicator of this trend—the relative share of East European trade with noncommunist countries (see Table 1)—shows a decline since 1981, though this is hardly due to political intent in Eastern Europe or even Western Europe. Indeed, it is a function of the region's still-growing hard-currency debt (see Table 2), which has made Western credit available to Eastern Europe only on a selective basis since the Polish crisis of 1980–81. Every country in the area, but especially Romania and Hungary, has made it a top priority to reduce Western imports in order to save hard currency, and Poland has been all but unable to renew its once-extensive commercial ties with the West.

Notwithstanding the temporary setback in East European trade with the West, other trends point to rising political dissonance in the bloc, especially in the GDR, Hungary, and Romania.

Most surprising, and potentially significant, has been the apparent breakdown of synchronization between Soviet and East German approaches toward the Federal Republic.[8] Beginning in November 1983 and continuing after the INF talks had collapsed, the GDR turned out to be only a reluctant supporter of a vehement and vociferous Soviet-led Warsaw Pact campaign against NATO aggressiveness and, later, West German "revanchism."[9] Although all East European leaders, except Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania, added their denunciations and innuendoes, the GDR's Erich Honecker (as well as Hungary's János Kádár) made a point of pleading for restraint. Honecker asked for a "coalition of reason" in both German states, adding that such a coalition would serve the interests of "the German people"—a formulation contrary to the GDR claim positing the existence of two German nations since the formation of the GDR in 1949.[10] Echoing Kádár's favorite phrase, Honecker also appealed to the "small- and medium-sized states" of Europe to do what they can to "limit the damage" to intra-European cooperation caused by Soviet-American tensions.[11]

Table 1. East European Foreign Trade with Noncommunist Countries

(Percent of total foreign trade)

	Exports	Imports
1960	27.6	28.5
1970	30.9	32.5
1980	36.3	38.5
1981	36.0	34.5
1982	33.8	29.6
1983	31.5	27.2

SOURCE: Adapted by the author from the US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984*, CPAS 84–10002, Washington, DC, September 1984, p. 102. Data for 1983 is preliminary.

Table 2. Hard-Currency Debt to the West

(in current US dollars, billions)

	1970	1975	1980	1981	1984
Bulgaria	0.7	2.1	2.5	2.1	2.5
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.2	3.4	3.4	4.1
GDR	1.4	4.8	11.2	11.0	12.3
Hungary	0.6	2.3	5.8	6.2	8.2
Poland	1.1	7.7	22.0	23.2	27.0
Romania	1.6	3.1	9.3	9.7	8.4
TOTAL	6.0	21.2	54.2	55.6	62.5

SOURCE: Jan Vanous, Centrally Planned Economies Service, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Washington, DC.

[7]For an up-to-date discussion of East European expectations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, see F. Stephen Larrabee, *Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Romania, Hungary and East Germany*, RAND, forthcoming.

[8]Charles Gati, "East Europe's Communists Are Tugging at Russia's Leash," *The Washington Post*, Outlook Section, July 8, 1984. Ronald D. Asmus has written several perceptive reports on the subject, including "Moscow's Campaign Against East-West German Relations," *RFE Research*, Aug. 29, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 160.

[9]Moscow initiated the campaign in late spring 1984, accusing the Bonn government of seeking to revise Europe's postwar borders and of trying to "erode the socialist system in the GDR." For particularly salient examples, see *Pravda* (Moscow), July 27 and Aug. 2, 1984, and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 11, 1984.

[10]*RFE Research*, Apr. 30, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 68.

[11]For a survey of the dispute between East Berlin and Moscow over relations with Bonn, see *RFE Research*, Aug. 31, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 158.

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Erich Honecker, left, East German party and state leader, met with Helmut Kohl, West German chancellor, in Moscow in February 1984 at the time of the funeral of Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov.

—Jürgens.

Some actions by the GDR were also out of phase with the Soviet campaign against the FRG. In the first half of 1984, the GDR allowed an estimated 25,000 people to leave for West Germany. In July 1984, at the height of the virulent Soviet campaign against the Federal Republic, the two German states reached an agreement that provided for new West German bank credits in exchange for East German concessions concerning emigration, family reunification cases, and the like.[12] Although the GDR's "concessions" were rather minor, the fact that a deal was struck at this time signaled Honecker's desire to distance himself from the latest Soviet position.

True, it is quite possible that, *before* November 1983, the GDR might have been encouraged by Moscow to feign tolerance toward the unofficial East German peace movement and present itself to the West in other ways too as a state dedicated to peace and harmony in Europe. There might well have been collusion between Moscow and East Berlin in an effort to make the West German peace activists believe that both Washington and Moscow were under pressure from their respective allies.[13] Granted the utility of such "fraternal cooperation" prior to the collapse of the INF talks, it is still all but impossible to find similar reasons or, indeed, any rationale from the Soviet perspective for continued dissonance in 1984. Hence, the likely explanation for what happened last year and continues in 1985 is that Honecker, having earlier received either mixed or confusing signals from Moscow and eager to take advantage of leadership disarray in the Kremlin, decided to pursue the inter-German dialogue on his own.

Soviet attacks on the "limited détente" between East and West Germany, and East Germany's spirited defense of it, lend credence to this interpretation.[14] Although Soviet newspapers focused on Bonn's aggressive intentions, the real target was East Berlin. An article in *Pravda* stressed that the relationship between the two German states must be evaluated in the context of general East-West relations and cannot be isolated from them. It reminded East Berlin of NATO's present "crusade against socialism" and of Bonn's desire to "solicit concessions on matters of principle that affect the GDR's sovereignty." Another *Pravda* piece, which repeated some of the same accusations, was meant to underline Moscow's anxiety. It was an unsigned editorial (and hence fully authoritative and official), and it made mention of the Deutsche Mark 950-million credit deal that the two Germanies had just concluded. The editorial expressed specific reservations about travel concessions which, it claimed, would only serve to allow Bonn to have "new channels for political and ideological influence."

At first, the GDR rather vigorously defended its position. Obviously responding to the July 27 *Pravda* article in its August 1 issue, *Neues Deutschland* maintained that Bonn was being pressured both by "revanchist" forces and by "realistic" elements and that it was not self-evident which side would turn out to be more influential. Of course, this was precisely the argument on which Moscow had based its own policies toward the FRG a year or so earlier—but now the situation was said to be different and the old policy was considered untimely and inoperative. In its article, *Neues Deutschland* also asserted that both German states were "independent in their internal and external affairs."

[12]On July 26, 1984, the GDR reached a US$330 million (950,000,000 Deutsche Mark) credit agreement with the FRG. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–EEU*) , July 26, 1984, p. E/1.

[13]Pedro Ramet, "Church and Peace in the GDR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1984, pp. 44–57; also Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1983, pp. 301–41.

[14]Lev Bezymenskiy, "In the Shadow of American Missiles," *Pravda*, July 27, 1983; and "On the Wrong Track," ibid., Aug. 2, 1984.

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When, under growing Soviet pressure, Honecker ultimately postponed his visit scheduled for September 1984 to the Federal Republic, it was not clear for how long and to what extent the East Germans would place their "internationalist obligations" ahead of their self-interest.[15] Down but not out, Honecker showed up in maverick Romania on the 40th anniversary of that country's liberation—the only top communist leader from the Soviet bloc to do so.[16] This not-so-subtle expression of displeasure with Moscow notwithstanding, East Berlin shied away from engaging Moscow any further in public disagreements. The compromise they appear to have reached allowed the GDR to improve ties with the Federal Republic and thus continue the dialogue in the spirit of the Helsinki process, on condition that East Berlin proceed slowly, without publicity and summitry, and calibrate each step along the way so as not to embarrass the Soviet Union or counter its policies toward the West.

Ironically but not surprisingly, Hungary—once the object of East Germany's ire for Kádár's reformist experiments—became the primary defender and promoter of Honecker's course. Indeed, it was an authoritative Hungarian statement issued at the beginning of 1984 that gave a much-needed ideological rationale for the GDR's (and Hungary's) approach to European cooperation.[17] Written by Mátyás Szürös, a Hungarian Politburo member and Central Committee secretary in charge of foreign policy, and published in the official party monthly, *Társadalmi Szemle*, the article rejected the traditional (read Soviet) view according to which the "national interests [of the East European states] necessarily had to play a secondary role and generally had to be subordinated to interests and objectives that were seen as common ones." Szürös added: "There is no question of this kind of subordination today." He also argued against "uniform solutions," calling instead for "methods that make optimum allowance for [national] characteristics." Turning directly to the realm of foreign policy, Szürös maintained that, in the absence of a world communist movement with a recognized center, each East European country had the right to take advantage of "specific possibilities." Alluding to one of the "specific possibilities," Szürös wrote: "Historical traditions and contemporary characteristics do make it possible for relations between a particular socialist and capitalist country to flourish [even] when the general trend is one of deterioration of East-West relations and of a narrowing of contacts."

So much for a common front against imperialist machinations! Whether or not Szürös—formerly Hungarian ambassador to Moscow as well as to East Berlin—sent a copy of his article to Honecker will probably never be known, but the East Germans certainly found his arguments useful and convincing. Indeed, when—in the aftermath of a predictable rebuttal by two Prague diehards published in the Czechoslovak party daily *Rudé Právo* and the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *Novoye Vremya*[18]—Szürös reiterated his views in the form of an interview,[19] *Neues Deutschland* promptly reprinted it in full.[20] In subsequent articles, too, the Hungarians sought to encourage the GDR's *Westpolitik*, praising Honecker's meetings with the leaders of Sweden, Greece, and Italy, and enthusiastically endorsing his proclaimed preference for diplomatic solutions.[21]

That the normally so very circumspect Kádár regime allowed itself to be embroiled in a debate over the relative merits of international and national obligations was the result of a conscious decision. The original Szürös article was intended to serve four major objectives. First, it was to signal to the Hungarian party apparatus and to the country's attentive public the regime's recognition of the need to back up the economic reform movement at home with an activist foreign policy based to a greater extent than before on the country's national interest.[22] Second, it was to signal to the Soviet Union that while Hungary would remain a loyal ally and fulfill its bloc obligations, it must also look West both for economic reasons and for the purpose of satisfying the public's urge to belong to "Europe." Third, it was to signal to West European governments—to the Federal Republic and Austria in particular—the Kádár regime's commitment to the Western connection even at a time of high tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fourth, it was to signal to some of the more orthodox Warsaw Pact states, especially neighboring Czechoslovakia, Hungary's pride in its achievements and its growing impatience with innuendoes questioning the validity of its socialist path.

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[15]See Ronald D. Asmus, "A Postmortem on Honecker's Visit," *RFE Research*, Oct. 17, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 191.

[16]*FBIS–EEU*, Aug. 24, 1984, pp. H/3–6. En route to Romania, Honecker sent a telegram of greetings to Gustav Husák while flying over Czechoslovak territory. Ibid., Aug. 22, 1984, p. D/6.

[17]Mátyás Szürös, "The Reciprocal Effect of the National and the International in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), January 1984, pp. 13–21.

[18]Michael Stefanak and Ivan Hlivka, "The National and the International in the Policy of the KSC," *Rudé Právo* (Prague), Mar. 30, 1984; "On the National and the International," *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), No. 16, April 1984.

[19]*Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Apr. 4, 1984.

[20]*Neues Deutschland*, Apr. 12, 1984.

[21]See Tibor Thurzó, "GDR Diplomacy: A Sense of Responsibility and Activity," *Népszava* (Budapest), July 26, 1984; and Jenö Bocskor, "East German Foreign Relations: a Multilateral Dialogue," *Magyarország*, Aug. 5, 1984.

[22]On the relationship between Hungarian domestic policies and pressures for increased contacts with the West, see Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984, pp. 1–23.

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Romania's team at the summer 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Unlike other Warsaw Pact members, Romania decided not to join the Soviet-led boycott of the Games.

—Eddie Adams/Photoreporters.

As for Romania, it has continued to live up to its reputation as the Soviet bloc's leading maverick. It continues to irritate Moscow by maintaining fraternal ties with China regardless of the state of Sino-Soviet relations; by differing from Soviet positions on a multitude of issues, including Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the Middle East; and by refusing to join the Soviet-ordained boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Also, unlike Honecker and Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, Ceausescu did visit the Federal Republic in October 1984.[23] In addition, Romania remains the only Warsaw Pact state to have officially and publicly opposed both NATO INF deployments and Soviet counterdeployments. Thus, it is a fair guess that the Romanian regime is pleased with the emerging East Berlin–Budapest maneuver. One leading member of the Romanian Communist Party's Political Executive Committee (Politburo) is known to have approached a Hungarian official and informally inquired about the possibility of coordinated political activity.

However intriguing such a constellation might be, Ceausescu's leadership style precludes consistent cooperation with the other East European states in the Warsaw Pact. Romania suffers not only from a deep economic crisis but also from the consequences of Ceauşescu's apparent megalomania. It has come to be that the President's closest associates, including Politburo members, feel obliged to make recommendations or advance fresh initiatives as if they had been devised by Ceauşescu, for only then do these proposals have a chance of being seriously considered. The resulting alienation of the political elite has led to a paralysis of the decision-making process that no amount of posturing can hide or overcome.[24] The problem is further exacerbated by the President's unwillingness or inability to offer any rationale for his frequent tactical shifts in policy, which seem unrelated to his own professed strategic direction, and by his excessive preoccupation with prestige and protocol at the expense of substance. The upshot of these developments is that Romania's long-standing and potentially still significant position as the semi-independent member of the Warsaw Pact has lost much of the attraction it might have once had for the other East European leaderships. Moreover, as long as the harsh Romanian treatment of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania continues, Kádár will find it impossible to make common cause consistently with Ceauşescu—and he is unlikely to do so under any circumstances.

Among the other Warsaw Pact members, the Polish regime—overwhelmed by seemingly insoluble economic problems, facing popular hostility, and mired in factional infighting—remains on the sidelines. Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria continue to back Soviet orthodoxy.[25] Thus, the most that can be expected is East European mini-coalitions countering Moscow on some specific issues.

Judging by the admittedly sketchy evidence available about the proceedings of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), including the 1984 summit meeting in Moscow, such a mini-coalition appears to have come into being, with Romania, Hungary, and the GDR together pressing Moscow for concessions on the present CEMA price structure and on a variety of energy-related issues.[26] If they can further harmonize their views, act concurrently and yet unobtrusively, and place political topics on the agenda of the bloc's multi-

[23]For an analysis of the cancellation of the Honecker and Zhivkov visits, see *RFE Research*, Oct. 19, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 189.

[24]For an evaluation of Ceauşescu's recent leadership, see Trond Gilberg, "Romania's Growing Difficulties," *Current History* (Philadelphia), November 1984, pp. 375–89.

[25]While Czechoslovak official statements echo the Soviet position, Bulgarian statements are more circumspect. For example, during the Sofia celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of socialist Bulgaria's founding, Mikhail Gorbachëv, the leader of the Soviet delegation spoke of West German "revanchism"; Zhivkov avoided any such references and repeated his suggestion to turn the "Balkan Peninsula into a zone free from nuclear weapons." *RFE Research*, Oct. 5, 1985, Bulgarian Situation Report 12/84.

[26]See *RFE Research*, June 15, 1984, Aug. 31, 1984, Oct. 19, 1984, RAD Background Report Nos. 94, 95, 155, and 189. More recently, these countries appeared to differ with Moscow over the terms for renewing the Warsaw pact treaty; see *The New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1985.

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lateral institutions, they could also press Moscow for sufficient "elbow room" in order to protect their Western connections from the vicissitudes of Soviet-American relations. Of course, the central question is how the Soviet Union is likely to treat such a maneuver, however unobtrusive, by a coadjutant East European mini-coalition.

Soviet Dilemmas

There is every reason to assume that Moscow is deeply concerned about the "Europeanization" of East European communism.[27] At the same time, it is not self-evident that this is a process which Moscow can readily arrest or contain. For as James F. Brown once astutely observed, [28] the Soviet Union pursues two competing, if not altogether contradictory, objectives in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, it seeks *bloc cohesion*—strict conformity with its own values, patterns, and policies. This goal, if realized, would help legitimize the Soviet experience at home and enhance the power of the Soviet Union abroad; its implementation, however, would almost certainly entail the use of coercive measures, including Soviet military intervention. To avoid that eventuality, and for other reasons as well, Moscow has as its other goal the *viability* of the East European regimes and indeed the *stability* of the region as a whole. A viable and stable Eastern Europe would, among other benefits, enhance the appeal of Soviet foreign policy to the West, the Third World, and the more independent-minded and presently anti-Soviet communist parties throughout the world.

But the elusive goal of East European stability also demands a high price from the Soviet Union. Short of granting the region independence, an option Moscow is not considering, there are only two noncoercive ways to obtain a measure of stability. One is to allow the East European regimes to attempt economic policies of a kind that produce consumer satisfaction by transforming "gulag communism" into "goulash communism." The other way is for the regimes to adopt political approaches of a kind that satisfy national or even nationalist aspirations by being informed less by Soviet values and interests than by each country's own customs and traditions. In short, the alternatives are bloc cohesion enforced by Soviet military power and economic subsi-

[27]See Charles Gati, "The 'Europeanization' of Communism?" *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1977, pp. 539–53.

[28]J. F. Brown, *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1975.



A summit meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance convenes in Moscow in June 1984 after many postponements.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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dies or a modicum of East European stability made possible by Soviet tolerance of "goulash communism," "national communism," or some combination of the two.

In the abstract, Moscow does not object to "goulash communism." True, there are Soviet—and East European—diehards who regard excessive reliance on consumer satisfaction as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation. Such stale complaints aside, all communist regimes would like nothing better than economic well-being, partly to demonstrate the superiority of centrally-planned economic systems and mainly to take the edge off popular economic and political discontent. The problem is not only that Soviet-type economies have not done well in Eastern Europe; it is also that they are seen not to have done well because the populations in Eastern Europe tend to assess their prevailing living standards less by comparing them with their own past than by comparing them to present living standards in such countries as the Federal Republic, Austria, or Finland. To achieve anything approaching that kind of consumer satisfaction, however, would presumably require larger Soviet subsidies, a reformist course on the Hungarian (or Chinese) pattern, and a political opening to the West to encourage credit, investments, and transfer of advanced technology—measures that entail considerable economic restructuring and political risk. Therefore, despite official endorsements of "goulash communism," the policies that might lead to consumer satisfaction and hence to political stability are, in fact, abhorrent to most Soviet and many East European leaders.

The Soviets Union is also concerned about stability obtained by paying more than lip service to the East Europeans' national or nationalist aspirations. While Moscow does encourage nationalism in the Third World or Western Europe—wherever it might spark anti-American or anti-Western sentiments—it is certainly less favorably disposed toward East European expressions of nationalism. When the GDR celebrates the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth, or Czechoslovakia takes pride in its national hockey team's victories, that's fine. When successive Polish regimes feel compelled to accommodate themselves to the traditional influence of the Catholic Church, that's fine, too, provided that the regime retains its capacity to inhibit and, if necessary, to control the Church's activities. But, in the Soviet view, respect for national values must not entail any policy aimed at fulfilling the region's traditional longing to be accepted by, and indeed to rejoin, the European community. For, as long as the Soviet Union itself is not perceived as belonging to the European community, East European desire to belong is suggestive of anti-Soviet tendencies.

Herein lies the essential reason for the current tug of war between the proprietors of power in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As several East European regimes now see it, they must, for the sake of domestic political stability, actively, if cautiously, inch toward the West. They certainly do not want Soviet interventions; they cannot, as Poland found out, count on sufficient Soviet economic help; and most of them worry about the unforeseeable consequences of market-oriented reforms. The only alternative they see in the mid-1980's, then, is a gradual opening to the West, which, despite obvious risks, offers the promise of public approval. From a Soviet perspective, however, the reasons for such an opening are less compelling. Unlike their junior allies—even the Poles, the Czechs, or the East Germans—many Russians remain genuinely afraid of Western influences. The Soviet leaders also appear to be less apprehensive about, and possibly even to underestimate, the region's persistent instability and the major sources of that instability—nationalist and economic pressures. The Soviet leaders' attitude is also shared by the typical Soviet tourist visiting Warsaw, let alone Budapest, when he asks: "Why are these people complaining when they live better than we do?" It seems that even after 40 years of experience, Moscow cannot accept the fact that East Europeans judge the performance of their political and economic order by European and not by Soviet standards.

Of course, the Soviet Union has gone to considerable lengths to have peace and quiet, if not genuine stability, in Eastern Europe. It has long tried to steer a middle course between the objectives of cohesion and stability, bending now in one direction and then in another and hoping all along that the problem or problems will some day, somehow, disappear.

"When the Cat's Away...."

Whether Moscow can continue to muddle through in this way in the years ahead depends as much or more on its capacity to shape a *properly calibrated* policy toward the region than on economic conditions. The evidence of the post-Stalin era (see Table 3) indicates a significant correlation between the unity or lack of unity of the Soviet leadership, on the one hand, and East European popular movements and regime assertiveness, on the other. Specifically, it has been all but impossible for the Soviet Union to pursue its two competing goals of bloc cohesion and East European stability in a judicious and calibrated fashion at times of unsettled leadership in the Kremlin. Under such circumstances, the Soviet leaders, preoccupied with the struggle for power, have tended to send mixed signals to their East European cli-

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Table 3. Kremlin Politics and Eastern Europe

State of Soviet leadership		East European Assertiveness	
Periods of relative turbulence	Periods of relative tranquility	Popular movements	Regime demands for autonomy
1953–57		**East Berlin, 1953** **Poznan, 1956** **Warsaw, 1956** **Budapest, 1956**	**Poland, 1956** **Hungary, 1956**
	1957–64		Albania, 1961 to present
1964–69		**Warsaw, 1968** **Prague, 1968**	**Romania, 1964 to present** **Hungary, 1968 to present** **Czechoslovakia, 1968**
	1969–79	Polish cities, 1970 and 1976	
1979 to present		**Poland Solidarity, 1980–81**	**Mini-coalitions, 1983 to present**

ents. Sensing confusion in the Kremlin, East Europeans—leaders and people alike—have then tried to use the opportunity to shift the balance of decision-making authority to their side. "When the cat's away, the mice will play."

Of the three periods of Soviet leadership turbulence that have occurred so far, the volatile and highly personalized struggle for power in 1953–57 resulted in several popular upheavals and considerable elite disorientation in Eastern Europe.[29] To recall briefly, this was the time when Lavrentiy Beria was reportedly rethinking the "German question"; when at first Georgiy Malenkov and then Nikita Khrushchev advocated a "new course" for Eastern Europe; when Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan urged, while Vyacheslav Molotov and others opposed, reconciliation with "national communist" Yugoslavia; when a divided Soviet leadership felt it needed Tito's blessing to invade Hungary; and when a visibly shaken Kremlin first tried to obstruct and then grudgingly accepted Władysław Gomułka's appointment as Poland's new leader.

Apparent confusion in Moscow led to unparalleled factional infighting in the East European communist parties, especially in Poland and Hungary. Sensing divisions at the top in Eastern Europe, no wonder that large segments of the attentive public, led by intellectuals, and subsequently the people as well gained courage and expressed their long-suppressed convictions.[30] Of course, in the end they did not get their way, for the Soviet leaders, facing the prospective disintegration of their empire, managed to pull themselves together and reestablish their authority. For about seven years after the defeat of the "anti-party" group in 1957, they appear to have united behind Khrushchev and followed a rather calibrated policy toward Eastern Europe, one that stressed the goal of cohesion without necessarily stifling every national experiment.[31]

The second—certainly far less volatile—period of Kremlin turbulence began in 1964 as a palace conspiracy against Khrushchev and continued until 1969 or so with intense jockeying for position after his ouster (pri-

[29]Of the vast literature on Soviet politics in the mid-1950's, the East European connection is explored most usefully in Veljko Mičunović, *Moscow Diary*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, and in Strobe Talbot, Trans. and Ed., *Khrushchev Remembers*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1970.

[30]For two excellent books on Poland and Hungary in 1956, see Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1958; and Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1961.

[31]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.

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At left, representatives of the Solidarity trade union with Polish party leader Stanisław Kania in Gdansk on December 30, 1980; above, Kania with Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on October 30, 1980.

—TASS from Sovfoto; Jean Claude Francolon and Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

marily between Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin).[32] As long as his colleagues refused to give him the kind of extensive authority that Khrushchev had had between 1957 and 1964, Brezhnev was only *primus inter pares*. During the early Brezhnev years, then, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe once again lacked a sure hand. While Khrushchev's confusing on-again, off-again campaign for CEMA integration was an important factor in Romania's 1964 declaration of semi-independence, the Kremlin preoccupation with Khrushchev's ouster in that year allowed Romania to make stick its claim for a measure of autonomy in the Warsaw Pact.

The Hungarian and Czechoslovak reform movements, which also started in the mid-1960's, received considerable stimulation from the ongoing Soviet debate about economic reform.[33] It is highly instructive that most Czechoslovak leaders were under the strong impression that what they were doing met with Soviet approval. Even after their economic reform movement became the political "Prague Spring" in 1968, many of them continued to believe—and they had reason to believe—that the "Soviet comrades" at least understood and probably supported their efforts for "socialism with a human face." In point of fact, according to Zděnek Mlynář's vivid testimony and other evidence,[34] *some* of the Soviet leaders did. Even if one accepts the premise that the Czechoslovak reformists around Alexander Dubček were somewhat naive about Soviet intentions, they operated on the basis of frequent consultations with Kremlin leaders at the highest level—and received contradictory signals.

The third, current period of Kremlin leadership turbu-

[32] See, e.g., Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, New York, Viking, 1969.

[33] On the mid-1960's Soviet economic reform debates, see Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, "The Limits of Soviet Economic Reform," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1984, pp. 33–43.

[34] See Zděnek Mlynář's, *Nightfrost in Prague*, New York, Karz Publishers, 1980; and for a systematic treatment of differing Soviet positions concerning Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

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lence can be traced to about 1979, when Brezhnev's illnesses and absences became chronic. Eventually an intense struggle to succeed him developed between Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Andropov's rule was short-lived, and Chernenko's rule as *primus inter pares* in the Politburo (as his mentor Brezhnev once was) turned out to be of even shorter duration. This power struggle has been taking place at a time of economic stagnation affecting the entire bloc. For the first time, concerned about a recurrence of a "time of troubles" in the Kremlin, several East European leaders had allowed their preference for or against a specific contender to succeed Brezhnev to come out, with Ceauşescu reportedly opting for Chernenko, and Andropov receiving the endorsements of Kádár and Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husák.[35] As Moscow may see it, the East European regimes, once compelled to accept taxation without representation, have come around to seeking representation without taxation.

In addition to fostering the incipient mini-coalition described earlier in this article, the absence of a firm leadership in the Kremlin had affected adversely the management of the crisis of 1980–81 by the Polish regime. What must be regarded as the paralysis of power in the Kremlin had a profoundly unsettling influence on the Polish leadership, which for almost 18 long months could not decide what it should or should not do.[36] It goes without saying that the rise of Solidarity was primarily a function of internal developments, both economic and political. It is also true that the Polish party has always tended to be deeply divided, probably more so than any other ruling communist party in the world. One can further assume that Moscow, anxious to avoid fighting two wars at the same time (in Afghanistan and Poland) and concerned about Western sanctions, preferred not to intervene militarily if at all possible. Finally, it is quite likely that the Kremlin kept postponing the decision to act in the hope of further exacerbating the Polish crisis—that it waited for the political order to become chaotic and economic conditions to become unbearable so that the likes of General Wojciech Jaruzelski—surely a "moderate" by Soviet standards—would at last see no alternative to a comprehensive and brutal crackdown.

Yet, the question still remains: Why did the Kremlin tolerate such an extraordinary display of pluralism for a year and a half? What kind of Leninist leadership would hesitate for so long to protect the Soviet empire from such a fundamental challenge to its existence? Indeed, did Moscow seek only to intimidate Poland by completing all preparations for intervention in December 1980 and again in March 1981, or did the preparations for, and subsequent cancellations of, military action indicate vacillation and drift, an inability to take a decisive step?

In my opinion, there is no question but that all Soviet leaders knew what they wanted. In one way or another, they were determined that Poland must remain in the fold. But for well over a year they could not decide how to achieve that goal, primarily because no Soviet leader wanted to be held responsible for the failure of either policy option: accepting the process of "socialist renewal" or ordering an end to it. Responsibility for a failed option would have spelled political defeat for its proponent, and hence no Soviet leader—and certainly none of the contenders for the top position—was willing to press for the adoption of a high-risk alternative. Put another way, an in-between policy of muddling through was a political imperative dictated by political ambitions permeating the intrigue-filled atmosphere of the Kremlin at that time.

Therefore, it is as misleading to assign "prudence" to the Soviet leaders for having waited as long as they did as it is to shout "deception" every time they appear to have emitted confusing signals. Given Brezhnev's incapacitating illnesses, the by then irregular participation of Mikhail Suslov (de facto "second" secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and East European troubleshooter), in the decision-making process, and the intense struggle for succession under way, any but the most cautious or circumspect policy in Eastern Europe was politically unpalatable. Indeed, the ultimate decision to instigate an internal coup that would reestablish communist authority was adopted precisely because it entailed fewer risks than the alternative of direct Soviet military intervention. More important, the fact that such an internal coup was not attempted earlier must be understood as a symptom of Soviet immobility, which, in turn, exacerbated divisions within the Polish party and generated false hopes among the Polish people as well.

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[35]See, e.g., "Hungary's Hope for Continuity," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Feb. 29, 1984; and *RFE Research*, Dec. 8, 1982, Romanian Situation Report 21/82.

[36]Both before and after the December 1981 "crackdown," Soviet treatment of Poland was marked by a good deal of vacillation and apparently confusing signals. For an early analysis of Soviet options and immobilism, see Charles Gati, "Polish Futures, Western Options," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 292–308. The release of Lech Wałęsa from house arrest in November 1982, less than 24 hours after Brezhnev's death, prompted Warsaw wits to make up the following story: Andropov, the new Kremlin chief, calls Jaruzelski: "On whose authority did you release Wałęsa?" Jaruzelski: "I'd discussed the matter with Comrade Brezhnev." Andropov: "And what did our beloved Leonid Il'ich tell you?" Jaruzelski: "He said and I quote: 'you may release that no good Pole only over my dead body.' " More recently, the public trial of four security police officers charged with the Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko's murder was also seen in Poland as a function of General Jaruzelski's ability "to take advantage of what many believe to be disarray in the Kremlin as a result of a struggle to succeed Konstantin U. Chernenko as the Soviet leader." *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1985. That at least *some* Soviet leaders disapproved of such a public trial was indicated by a TASS report, which identified the four security police officers only as "four citizens" who "attributed their act" to their desire to prevent Father Popieluszko from pursuing "activities harmful to the state." Ibid.

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Conclusions

As far as the Soviet Union and its reluctant East European allies are concerned, there is something to be said for the old aphorism that "the foreign policy of large countries is a function of domestic political conditions, and the foreign policy of small countries is a function of external conditions." To the extent that this is a valid observation, it should be stressed that neither regime nor popular defiance and assertiveness in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has ever been *caused* by immobility in the Kremlin. Rather, they are due to repression, the gap between economic promise and performance, and the absence of autonomy. These deep-rooted, substantive, and systemic causes of pervasive discontent and defiance generate *crises* mainly when East Europeans sense division and drift in Moscow; when they believe that they can get away with "more"—usually more independence—than they might be able to do when the Soviet leadership appears less preoccupied with the struggle for power. In short, Kremlin turbulence does not create crises in Eastern Europe, it turns inherent instability into explicit regime demands or popular explosions.

Even with Mikhail Gorbachëv at the helm, it is quite likely that the GDR, Hungary, Romania, and possibly Poland, acting alone or together, may succeed in obtaining more "elbow room" from the Kremlin and move inch by inch toward the West. That expectation is based on two assumptions. One is that Gorbachëv *will not* be an unchallengeable leader in the near future—with authority comparable to Khrushchev's between 1957 and 1964 or to Brezhnev's between 1969 and 1979—who could properly calibrate the Kremlin's East European policy. The other assumption is that at least some of the East European leaders seeking more "elbow room" *will* have sufficient authority, experience, and finesse to calibrate the processes of change in their own countries; and that they will not allow popular sentiments to push them beyond the limits of Soviet tolerance. Even if these assumptions, and the forecast of gradual "Europeanization" based on them, turn out to be accurate, it remains wishful thinking to anticipate the "collapse" of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Diversity is not independence; tolerance is not liberty. While Soviet–East European relations are almost certainly entering a new phase, and one or more mini-coalitions are posing a very serious challenge to Moscow's concept of bloc cohesion, the empire, though rather unwell, is still alive.

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On Anniversaries in 1985

EDITORS' NOTE: The Year 1985 brings a host of fateful anniversaries: the 40th of the Yalta Conference, of the end of World War II, of the establishment of the United Nations, and, of course, of the introduction of atomic weapons. It is the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, of West German entry into NATO, and of the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It is also the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski has kindly responded to questions by Sophia Sluzar, Senior Text Editor of Problems of Communism, *on the major anniversaries relating to postwar Europe and their implications for East-West relations today.*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Let us begin with Yalta. Many people, and especially the East Europeans, view Yalta as a Western, and particularly American, sellout of Eastern Europe to the USSR. Is this a just estimate and could a better agreement have been reached at the time? Would it be correct to say that the USSR has succeeded in imposing its interpretation of the Yalta provisions on the rest of the world? Also, do you see the Yalta Conference as bringing about the division of Germany?

ZB: It is important to differentiate between the formal and the substantive consequences of Yalta. The formal consequence was an alleged agreement, which President Roosevelt even presented to a joint session of Congress as evidence of a consensus among the Big Three powers regarding postwar peace arrangements. In fact, he knew better at the time and, in effect, was misleading the American public. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt returned from Yalta with deep misgivings regarding the future and a gnawing realization that a conflict over the fate of all of Europe was developing. At Yalta, by obtaining Stalin's signature to a commitment on behalf of democracy in eastern Europe they pacified their consciences, but by leaving the execution of the agreement to Stalin's tender mercies they foreshadowed and in effect acknowledged Soviet control over eastern Europe.

To be sure, that control had been conceded in a preliminary fashion already in Tehran, back in November-December 1943, and by 1945 it was a physical fact, with the Soviet armies present in eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the Anglo-Americans refused to test Soviet willingness to make concessions, despite overwhelming Soviet weakness and American strength. We do not know whether the Soviets would have yielded, but we *do know* that they were not tested. The West showed neither foresight nor courage, and this is why Yalta is not only a symbol of the subsequent division of Europe but a major historical blot on the record of Anglo-American leadership.

The division of Germany was the natural outcome of the differences that subsequently surfaced regarding the future of the rest of Europe. Through Yalta, Stalin continued to hope that he would get a free hand in all of Europe. At Yalta, he began to sense that the West would contest him, and that contest emerged already in July 1945 at Potsdam and became very sharp and overt within a year thereafter.

The Austrian State Treaty—by which the occupation forces, Soviet and Western, were withdrawn upon Austria's promise of perpetual neutrality—evidently holds a special attraction for East Europeans. Can you foresee certain circumstances under which Hungary, for

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example, could achieve a similar arrangement (as it could not in 1956)?

ZB: No one in 1953, prior to Stalin's death, would have forecast the Austrian Peace Treaty of 1955. Yet within two years, following considerable turmoil within the Soviet Union, and after persistent and intelligent Western negotiating, the Soviets did agree to an arrangement that clearly is compatible with the wishes of the Austrian people and acceptable to both the East and the West.

Accordingly, there is a not-so-hidden lesson in that experience: the Soviet leadership is about to enter a phase of great uncertainty and possible internal turmoil, and the West could find itself in a position gradually to begin to negotiate arrangements for other parts of central Europe that would be more conducive to stability and more acceptable to the people concerned. But the West will have to be imaginative about it and look for new formulas. I doubt that the Soviets will agree to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, but perhaps a formula could be found for combining membership in the Warsaw Pact with special security and de facto quasi-neutrality arrangements for some of the Pact's members.

The division of Germany became crystallized in 1955 with the FRG's entry into NATO and the GDR's entry into the Warsaw Pact. Can you foresee a peaceful resolution of the division?

ZB: Over time and through a gradual process I can foresee the creation of a situation which, without it even being so designated, would be tantamount to a loose confederation of the two German states. This may not be a reunification in the formal sense, and it may even involve continued membership of these two German states in rival systems of alliance, and yet it could involve much more organic national unity than now seems feasible. A loose confederation of the two German states, perhaps associated with some special security arrangements, would not be destabilizing to the rest of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act has been described by some as the European peace settlement that never took place after World War II. Is this how you see it?

ZB: The Helsinki Final Act is a preliminary peace agreement. From the standpoint of the West, it is a major accomplishment in two critically important areas: (1) By acknowledging the territorial status quo in Europe, it deprives the Soviet Union of the opportunity to pose as the defender of the existing territorial status quo. In other words, the Poles and the Czechs need to be less alarmed about the possibility that peaceful change in Europe might reopen the issue of existing territorial arrangements and reawaken German territorial aspirations. The Helsinki Final Act commits all parties to the existing frontiers and that enhances the sense of security in Europe without which peaceful evolution to a better East-West relationship is impossible. (2) The Helsinki Final Act legitimizes Western interest in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe by making human rights an international norm. In other words, democratization and pluralization of the communist states is compatible with and indeed even mandated by what the Helsinki Final Act postulates.

Comparisons between Yalta and Helsinki seem almost inevitable. How would you contrast these two meetings?

ZB: The fundamental difference between Yalta and Helsinki is that Helsinki focused on the tangible and the achievable; Yalta was rhetorically on the high ground but in effect it was a testimony to Western weakness and shallowness. Roosevelt, for example, began his negotiations regarding the future of Poland by telling Stalin that he cared neither for existing Polish frontiers nor for, in effect, an independent Polish government. Hardly the best way to obtain a satisfactory bargain when dealing with what in any case was a ruthless and brutal dictator. Roosevelt did not succeed in ingratiating himself with Stalin; he simply earned Stalin's quiet contempt.

The Soviet government has always stressed the importance of propaganda. What themes is the Soviet Union likely to stress with regard to the various anniversaries in 1985 and why?

ZB: The Soviets will make a special effort to elevate V-E Day into a joint American-Soviet festival for the purpose of publicly flagellating Germany. The aim in this is to weaken West Germany's commitment to the West, so that subsequently the Soviet Union will have a freer hand in its overtures for a separate German-Soviet accommodation.

Is there anything novel about this Soviet approach?

ZB: I do not discern any particularly novel aspect to these efforts. The Soviets are still determined to detach Western Europe from the United States and to decouple American security from that of Western Europe. Their goal remains to create a situation in which Western Europe is de facto subordinated to the Soviet Union. This has been the steady and persistent Soviet objective since 1945.

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Looking back over the last 40 years, what could the West or the United States have done differently with regard to the Soviet Union?

ZB: This would require an entire book and can only be answered in a cryptic telegraphic fashion: (1) The West should have been tougher at Yalta and Potsdam, though one cannot be certain how much could have been obtained. (2) The West should have pressed the Soviets more during the East German uprising of 1953, to see whether more significant concessions could not be obtained. (3) The West could have explored more fully post-Stalin overtures by Beria and Malenkov regarding the possible neutralization of Germany, as the beginning to a larger neutralization of central Europe. (4) The West could have been more responsive to the Rapacki plan of 1956–57, again in order to see whether some neutralization in central Europe might not be contrived. (5) At the same time, the West should have been more inclined to back the Hungarians in 1956, in order to see whether an Austrian status for Hungary might not be attainable. (6) The West should not have been as indifferent as it was to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. (7) The West could have been more forthcoming with economic assistance to Poland before the crackdown by the regime against Solidarity, because there was a fleeting chance that a compromise solution might emerge between the regime and Solidarity, especially if sweetened by credits that might have made some mutual accommodation relatively easier to attain.

But all of these are "ifs" and cannot be argued with any degree of certainty. They do illustrate, however, a central point: the West has not exactly been most active or imaginative in its policy toward the East.

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Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984

EDITORS' NOTE: By arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1984. This Checklist continues a series presented in Hoover's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) *since 1976, and jointly published with* Problems of Communism *since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1985 edition of the* YICA. *The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to the Editors,* Problems of Communism, *301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

Richard F. Staar

IN AN ARTICLE published in the September 1984 issue of *Agitator*, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said that 95 countries of the world have communist parties, with a total combined membership of "almost 80 million." The number of countries was two less than—and the total membership the same as—Zagladin had reported in 1983.[1] Judging from the lack of any concrete information during the year confirming the existence of communist movements in North Yemen (Sanaa) and Somalia, it is assumed that these are the two countries whose parties Zagladin has dropped from the rolls.

[1]"International Life: Communists on the Leading Edge of the Struggle," *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 17, September 1984, p. 39; also reported in *Pravda* (Moscow), June 5, 1984; cf. Zagladin interview on Moscow domestic television on Sept. 27, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Sept. 30, 1983, p. CC/1.

Richard F. Staar, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA), has resumed editorship of the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs *after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna from 1981 to 1983. His monograph on Soviet foreign policy will appear in May 1985.* *He is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, John B. Dunlop, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, James H. Noyes, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the* Yearbook *editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.*

The monthly magazine Problems of Peace and Socialism (the English-language edition of which is published in Toronto and London under the title *World Marxist Review*) continues to serve as the sole international press organ that speaks for the majority of communist parties. The journal sponsored a conference in Prague on December 4–6, 1984, with representatives from 91 parties reportedly in attendance. Names of two of these parties were not listed, at their request (presumably because they operate underground).[2] It is noteworthy that the French and Yugoslav parties did not send delegations to this meeting of Soviet-line and independent Marxist parties. Of the 89 parties listed, nine do not qualify as full-fledged communist movements by Moscow's definition: the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Party of Labor, the National Liberation Front of Bahrain, the Benin People's Revolutionary Party, the Congolese Labor Party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, the Independence Congress Party of Madagascar, and the Yemen Socialist Party (South Yemen). With the exception of the Madagascan party, all are "revolutionary democratic" movements by Moscow's definition, and all except those in Bahrain, Kampuchea, and Madagascar qualify for the higher category of "vanguard revolutionary democratic" regimes, i.e., ruling parties that Moscow

[2]"Communiqué on the Results of the Work of the International Magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism*," Moscow TASS in English, Dec. 7, 1984, in *FBIS–SOV*, Dec. 10, 1984, p. BB/1; also listed in *Rudé právo* (Prague), Dec. 7, 1984.

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feels may develop over time into full-fledged communist parties.[3]

The Prague meeting heard calls for a world conference of communist and workers' parties, the last having been held in 1969 in Moscow. The delegate from Argentina, Oscar Arevalo, stated that 12 Latin American parties at a meeting in Buenos Aires on July 6–7, 1984, had proposed such a "world forum." East German party leader Erich Honecker also referred to this suggestion at a plenum of his ruling Socialist Unity Party on November 22 and indicated a willingness to initiate "consultation about a world meeting of communist and workers' parties."[4] The CPSU has been somewhat less than forthright in promoting such a new world congress. It is a matter of record that many independent-minded communist parties—e.g., the Dutch, French, Italian, Japanese, Swedish, and Yugoslav parties, not to mention the Albanian, Chinese, and North Korean—are likely to boycott any such meeting. However, the Polish party daily claims that "*more than 60 parties* are now in favor of holding such a [world] congress."[5]

Despite this lack of unity in the world communist movement, it is still useful to enumerate the parties that the CPSU recognizes as communist or on the road to becoming communist parties. The Checklist identifies what are believed to be the 95 countries alluded to by Zagladin and their communist parties. In some states—Australia, India, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, and Sweden—Moscow evidently recognizes two competing communist organizations even though it may feel much closer to one, as in the case of Spain's new Communist Party.[6] Several movements operate on geographic territories that have no national sovereignty—e.g., Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin. Also listed are 10 of the approximately 20 "revolutionary democratic" movements—those in Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Grenada, Kampuchea, Mozambique, and South Yemen. In Ethiopia, the Commission for the Organization of the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia transformed itself into the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, a step toward full-fledged acceptance by Moscow as a ruling communist movement. Finally, in italics, are a variety of significant communist movements *not recognized* by Moscow (often pro-Beijing), such as the Democratic Kampuchean (or Kampuchean Communist) party of Pol Pot.

The parties are listed by geographic region, with Africa now treated separately from the Middle East. Where the name is not simply "Communist Party of . . . ," we provide the acronym of the party name, keyed to a "Legend of Acronyms" at the end of the Checklist. With only a handful of exceptions, indicated by footnotes, the population estimates are as of mid-1984 and from a single source, *The World Factbook—Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Four.*[7] The latest party membership figures are either official claims or an estimate as of December 31, 1984, provided by the author of the individual country profile in the *YICA*. Other columns in the Checklist provide the name of the party's leader; the date of the most recent national conference or congress of the party; its legal status (legal, outlawed, ruling, or unrecognized); and its results in the most recent national elections (where relevant).

Claimed membership of the Chinese Communist Party remains unchanged at 40 million, although the current verification campaign reportedly may reduce the total by some 400,000.[8] The CPSU reports a gain of 213,000 members, whereas the Polish United Workers' Party reportedly continues to lose members—it is down nearly 1 million members since the summer of 1980. Over the past two years the Yugoslav League of Communists grew by 346,000, reversing a declining trend. The Soviet claim of 120,000 members for the Afghan party seems suspect, particularly when it is further asserted that 60 percent of these individuals, or 72,000, serve in the armed forces (Western estimates put the *total* indigenous military at about 35,000).[9] Communist parties in a number of West European countries report declines in membership from the levels reported in last year's Checklist. The French party lost some 100,000; the Italian, some 30,000; the Austrian, an estimated 4,000. Only in Greece and Portugal were gains registered (an estimated 14,500 and 13,000 respectively).

There were a few notable changes in the leadership of the communist movements during 1984—including the election of Konstantin Chernenko to replace the deceased Yuriy Andropov in the Soviet Union, of

[3]A list of 20 such "vanguard parties" appears in Richard F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Détente*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, forthcoming in May 1985, Table 1.3. See also, Wallace Spaulding, "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement,'" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1982, pp. 77–82.

[4]DYN agency report (Buenos Aires), July 7, 1984, and ADN report (East Berlin), Nov. 22, 1984—both cited by Kevin Devlin, "New Moves for a World Communist Conference," RFE–RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich—hereafter *RFE Research*), Dec. 20, 1984, RAD Background Report, No. 221, pp. 2–3.

[5]See Sylwester Szafarz in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Feb. 24, 1984, cited by Devlin, loc. cit. Emphasis added.

[6]The older Communist Party of Spain (PCE) is criticized for having "lost its positions catastrophically as a consequence of its deviation from Marxism-Leninism and its orientation toward so-called Eurocommunism." See V. Zagladin in *Rudé právo*, Aug. 18, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Aug. 23, 1984, p. BB/5.

[7]US Central Intelligence Agency, CR WF 84-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984.

[8]*The Washington Times*, Dec. 10, 1984.

[9]"Triumph in Kabul," *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1985; cf. Edward Girardet, "After 5 Years, Afghan War Is Bleak," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Dec. 27, 1984, p. 28.

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CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1984

L—legal; O—outlawed; R—ruling; U—unrecognized.

Subsaharan Africa[a]	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
A. Angola (MPLA–PT)	7,770,000	31,000 claim[e]	José Eduardo dos Santos	1st Ext., Dec. 1980	R	— (1980); all 203 approved by MPLA
B. Benin (PRPB)	3,910,000	200 claim	Mathieu Kerekou	2nd, Nov. 1979	R	— (1984); all 196 approved by PRPB
C. Congo (PCT)	1,745,000	8,685 est.	Denis Sassou Ngouesso (Chairman)	3rd, Jul. 27–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 approved by PCT
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	31,998,000	30,000 est.[f]	Mengistu Haile Marian	1st, Const., Sep. 6–10, 1984	R	n/a
1. Lesotho	1,474,000	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	No data	U[g]	n/a
E. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	13,413,000	130,000 claim	Samora Moisés Machel	4th, Apr. 1983	R	— (1977); all 226 approved by FRELIMO
2. Nigeria (SWPP)	88,148,000	No current data	(Idi) Dapo Fatogun	1st, Dec. 1965	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	535,000	10,000 claim 2,000 est.	Paul Vergès	5th, Jul. 1980	L	32.73 (1983); 16 of 45, none in Paris[h]
4. Senegal (PIT)	6,541,000	No current data	Amath Dansoko[i]	2nd, Sep. 28–30, 1984	L	0.5 (1983); none
5. South Africa	31,688,000	No current data	Moses Mabhida	6th Conf., Dec. 1984, in London	O	n/a
6. Sudan	21,103,000	1,500 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th, Oct. 1967	O	n/a

The Americas[a]	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
7. Argentina	30,097,000	200,000 claim 70,000 est.	Athos Fava	Ext., Sep. 1983	L	1.3 (1983); none
8. Bolivia	6,037,000	300 est.	Jorge Kolle Cueto	4th, Apr. 1979	L	— (1980); none
9. Brazil	134,380,000	8,000 est.	Giocondo Dias	7th, (Natl. Mtg.) Jan. 1984	U	(1982)[j]
10. Canada	25,142,000	2,500 est.	William Kashtan	25th, Feb. 1982	L	0.05 (1984); none
11. Chile	11,655,000	20,000 est.	Luís Corvalan	16th, June 1984	O	n/a
12. Colombia	28,248,000	12,000 est.	Gilberto Vieira	14h, Nov. 6–11, 1984	L	1.2 (1982); 3 of 199

[a]Arabic numerals indicate the 95 countries in which Moscow apparently recognizes the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "J" are 10 significant "revolutionary democratic" parties (a majority of them ruling), organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

[b]Population figures are estimated totals in July 1984, from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Four*, CR WF 84–001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, April 1984, except where more precise data are available.

[c]Normally the party secretary general or general secretary, except where some other official is the most important person, in which case his position is noted in parentheses.

[d]An em-dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses. In some cases, data from pre-1984 elections have been updated since last year's Checklist.

[e]The MPLA–PT claims more than 15,000 members and more than 15,000 candidate members.

[f]Reports on the WPE Constituent Congress in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* of Sept. 11, 1984, spoke of 13,000 to 15,000 paid party cadres.

[g]The 1970 ban on the Communist Party of Lesotho was partially lifted in 1984 so that it can take part in coming elections. *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), Oct. 2, 1984.

[h]The Réunion Communist Party won 29.8 percent of the vote and one deputy in elections to the European Parliament in June 1984; its share of the vote in December 1984 elections to some of the territory's cantons was only 25.5 percent.

[i]At the September 1984 Congress, the PIT "promoted" Seydou Cissoko to party chairman and elected Amath Dansoko general secretary.

[j]The communist party itself was not allowed to run, but it elected several of its members on the list of the Brazilian Democratic Movement.

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The Americas[a] (cont.)	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,693,000	10,000 claim 3,500 est.	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	14th, Apr. 8, 1984; 15th, Sep. 15–16, 1984	L	3.2 (1982); 4 of 57 via United People's Coalition
(PPC)[k]		*No current data*	*Manuel Mora Valverde*	*14th, Mar. 10–11, 1984*	*L*	*n/a*
14. Cuba	9,995,000	434,143 claim	Fidel Castro Ruz	2nd, Dec. 1981	R	— (1981); all 499 approved by PCC
15. Dominican Republic	6,416,000	500–1,000 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1980	L	7.1 (1982); none
16. Ecuador	9,091,000	500 est.	René Mauge Moskera	10th, Nov. 1981	L	3.6 (1984); 2 of 71 to Broad Left Front, and 4.0 to Moskera for president
17. El Salvador	4,829,000	500 est.[l]	Shafik Jorge Handal	6th, Aug. 1970	O	(1984)
F. Grenada (MBPM)	113,000	No current data	Kenrick Radix	n/a	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	332,000	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	8th, Apr. 27–29, 1984	L	22.6 (1983); 11 of 41 and 1 in Paris
19. Guatemala (PGT)	7,956,000	750 est.	Carlos González	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1984)
20. Guyana (PPP)	837,000	200–300 est.	Cheddi Jagan	21st, Jul.–Aug. 1982	L	19.5 (1980); 10 of 65
21. Haiti (PUCH)	5,805,000	No current data	René Theodore	1st, late 1978 or early 1979	O	(1984)
22. Honduras	4,424,000	No current data	Rigoberto Padilla Rush[m]	3rd, Mar. 1977	O	(1981)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,338,000	50 est.	Trevor Munroe	3rd, Dec. 14–21, 1984	L	Boycotted 1983 elections
24. Martinique	330,000	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	8th, Nov. 1983	L	9.07 (1983); 4 of 41, none in Paris
25. Mexico (PSUM)	77,659,000	40,800 claim	Pablo Gómez Alvarez	2nd, Aug. 1983	L	4.3 (1982); 17 of 400
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	2,914,000	250 est.	Luís Sánchez Sancho	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984); 2 of 96
G. (FSLN)		4,000 claim	Bayardo Arce Castano (Coord. Pol. Committee)		R	67.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PPP)	2,101,000	35,000 claim[n] 750 est.	Rubén Darío Souza	6th, Feb. 1980	L	— (1984); none
28. Paraguay	3,623,000	3,500 est.	Antonio Maidana (arrested 1980)	3rd, Apr. 1971	O	(1973)
29. Peru	19,157,000	5,000 est.	Jorge del Prado	8th. Ext., Jan. 1982	L	2.8 (1980); 2 of 60
30. Puerto Rico	3,197,000	125 est.	Franklin Irrizarry	Unknown	L	— (1984); none
31. United States of America	236,413,000	17,500 claim	Gus Hall	23rd, Nov. 1983	L	0.01 (1984); none
32. Uruguay	2,926,000	7,500 est.	Rodney Arismendi	20th, Dec. 1970	O[o]	6.0 (1984); none
33. Venezuela	18,552,000	4,000 est.	Jésus Faría	6th, Aug. 1980	L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195[p]

[k]Manuel Mora Valverde was ousted from the leadership of the PVP by Humberto Vargas Carbonell in December 1983 and responded by holding a rump 14th congress of a "Costa Rican People's Party" in March 1984.

[l]The Armed Forces of Liberation, associated with the Salvadoran CP, have an estimated 1,500 combatants. See *Time* (New York), Apr. 9, 1984. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, in which the Salvadoran Communist Party is a minor member, makes an exaggerated claim of 50,000 members.

[m]Rush was reportedly expelled from the Central Committee and the post of secretary general because he allegedly operated "abroad" in comfort while the party suffered in Honduras. See *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* (clandestine in Honduras), Oct. 9, 1984.

[n]This claim relates to the number of supporters signing petitions to register the party in anticipation of the 1984 presidential election.

[o]The Uruguayan Communist Party is not formally legal, but it was allowed to participate in the 1984 elections as a member of the Broad Front Coalition, winning 6 percent of the votes (altogether, the Front won 21 percent).

[p]During May 1984 municipal elections, the United Left Coalition, in which the Venezuelan Communist Party participated, polled 4.5 percent of the vote in Caracas, compared to 7.3 percent for the (Marxist) Movement Toward Socialism. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), May 29, 1984, p. 41.

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Asia and Pacific[a]	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
H. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,448,000	120,000 claim	Babrak Karmal	Natl. conf., Mar. 1982	R	n/a
34. Australia	15,462,000	150 est.	Judy Mundey	28th, Nov. 4, 1984	L	— (1984); none
(SPA)		1,000 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	5th, Sep. 28–Oct. 1, 1984	L	— (1984); none
35. Bangladesh	99,585,000	3,000 est.	Muhammed Farhad	3rd, Feb. 1980	L	— (1981)
36. Burma	36,196,000	3,000 claim	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chairman)	2nd, Jul. 1945	O	n/a
37. China	1,034,907,000	Over 40 million claim[q]	Hu Yaobang	12th, Sep. 1982	R	— (1981); all 3,202 approved by CCP
38. India (CPI)	746,388,000	478,500 claim	C. Rajeswara Rao	12th, Mar. 1982	L	— (1984); 6 of 544
(CPM)		270,500 claim	E.M.S. Namboo-diripad	11th, Jan. 1982	L	5.80 (1984); 22 of 544
39. Indonesia	169,442,000	250 est. (exile)[r]	Sadiatjaya Sudiman[s]	7th Ext., Apr. 1962	O	n/a
40. Japan	118,896,000	480,000 claim	Tetsuzo Fuwa	16th, Jul. 1982	L	9.4 (1984); 26 of 511
H. Kampuchea	6,118,000					
(KPRP)		700 est.	Heng Samrin	4th, May 1981	R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(DK)		*No current data*	*Pol Pot*	*Unknown*	*O*	*n/a*
41. Korea (North) (KWP)	19,630,000	3,000,000 claim	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 1980	R	100 (1982); all 615 approved by KWP
42. Laos (LPRP)	3,732,000	35,000 est.	Kaysone Phomvihane	3rd, Apr. 1982	R	n/a
43. Malaysia (CPM)	15,330,000	1,100 est.[t]	Chin Peng	1965	O	n/a
(MCP)[u]		*800 est.*	*Ah Leng*	*Unknown*	*O*	*n/a*
44. Mongolia (MPRP)	1,860,000	76,240 claim	Dzhambiin Batmunkh	18th, May 1981	R	99.0 (1981); all 370 approved by MPRP
45. Nepal	16,578,000	5,000 est.[v]	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd, 1968	O	n/a
46. New Zeland	3,238,000					
(CPNZ)		50 est.	Richard C. Wolfe	Jan. 1979	L	— (1984); none
(SUP)		100 est.	George Jackson	6th, Oct. 1982	L	0.5 (1984); none
47. Pakistan	96,628,000	200 est.	Imam Ali Nazish	1st, cland., 1976	O	n/a
48. Philippines	55,528,000					
(PKP)		400 est.	Felicismo Macapagal	8th, 1980	U	(1984)
(CPP/NPA)		*30,000 claim 7,500 est.*	*Rafael Baylosis*	*Unknown*	*O*	*(1984)*[w]
49. Sri Lanka	15,925,000	6,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	12th, Jan. 27–29, 1984	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168[x]
50. Thailand	51,724,000	1,200 est.	Virat Angkhathavorn (active leader)	5th, cland., Feb. 1984	O	n/a
51. Vietnam	59,030,000	1,730,214 claim	Le Duan	5th, Mar. 1982	R	97.9 (1981); all 496 approved by VCP

[q]General Secretary Hu has suggested that re-registration of party members may reduce the rolls by some 400,000. *The Washington Times*, Dec. 10, 1984.
[r]The party is split between a pro-Beijing faction (with 200 members) and a pro-Moscow faction (50).
[s]Sudiman presumably is in Moscow. The leader of the pro-Beijing faction is Jusuf Adjitorop, who has long been in Beijing.
[t]The Communist Party of Malaya, which does not recognize the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, has an estimated 200 additional members in Singapore.
[u]The Malaysian Communist Party has separated itself from the CPM (with its ethnic Chinese focus) to make an appeal as Marxist party for all nationalities in Malaysia.
[v]For all factions, with pro-Beijing and neutralist elements in the majority.
[w]The CPP, through the National Democratic Front, urged a mass boycott of the 1984 elections.
[x]Won in a January 1981 by-election.

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Eastern Europe and USSR[a]	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
52. Albania (PPSh)	2,906,000	122,000 claim	Enver Hoxha	8th, Nov. 1981	R	99.9 (1982); all 250 to Democratic Front
53. Bulgaria	8,969,000	825,876 claim	Todor Zhivkov	12th, Mar.–Apr. 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 400 to Fatherland Front
54. Czechoslovakia	15,420,000	1,623,000 claim	Gustáv Husák	16th, Apr. 1981	R	99.0 (1981); all 350 to National Front
55. Germany (East) (SED)	16,717,000	2,202,277 claim	Erich Honecker	10th, Apr. 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front
56. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,681,000	232,000 claim	János Kádár	12th, Mar. 1980	R	99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front
57. Poland (PZPR)	36,887,000	2,186,000 claim	Wojciech Jaruzelski	Ext. 9th, Jul. 1981	R	99.5 (1980); all 460 to Fatherland Front
58. Romania	22,683,000	3,400,000 claim	Nicolae Ceauşescu	13th, Nov. 19–22, 1984	R	98.5 (1980); all 369 to Front of Socialist Democracy and Unity
59. USSR	274,860,000	18,500,000 claim	Konstantin Chernenko	26th, Mar. 1981	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 approved by CPSU
60. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	22,997,000	2,500,000 claim	Dimce Belovski (Sec. of Presidium)	12th, Jun. 1982	R	— (1982); all 308 to Socialist Alliance

Middle East[a]	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
61. Algeria (PAGS)	21,351,000	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres	6th, Feb. 1952	O	(1982)
I. Bahrain (NLF/B)	409,000	Negligible	Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajajai	Unknown	O	n/a
62. Egypt	47,049,000[y]	500 est.	Farid Mujahid	Unknown	O	(1979)
63. Iran (Tudeh)	43,820,000	2,000 est.	Nureddin Kianuri[z]	1965	O	3.0 (1980); none
64. Iraq	15,000,000	No current data	Aziz Muhammad	3rd, May 1976	O	— (1984)
65. Israel	4,235,000[aa]	1,500 est.	Meir Vilner	19th, Feb. 1981	L	3.4 (1984); 4 of 120
66. Jordan	2,689,000	1,000 est.	Faiq Muhammad Warrad	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
67. Lebanon	2,601,000	15,000 claim	George Hawi	4th, 1979	L	— (1972); none
68. Morocco (PPS)	23,565,000	2,000 est.	'Ali Yata	3rd, Mar. 1983	L	2.3 (1984); 2 of 306
69. Palestine CP	4,500,000	200 est.	Bashir al-Barghuti (?)	1st, 1984 (?)	O	n/a
70. Saudi Arabia	10,794,000	Negligible	Ahmad Musa	2nd, Aug. 1984	O	n/a
71. Syria	10,075,000	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakdash	5th, May 1980	L	0.0 (1981); none
72. Tunisia	6,970,000[bb]	2,000 est.	Muhammad Harmel	8th, Feb. 1981	L	0.78 (1981); none
J. Yemen—Aden (YSP)	2,147,000	26,000 claim	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani	2nd, Ext., Oct. 1980	R	— (1978); all 111 approved by YSP

[y] *The New York Times*, June 20, 1984.
[z] Kianuri is in prison; Ali Khavari is the provisional party leader in exile.
[aa] Includes the population of East Jerusalem.
[bb] From results of 1984 census.

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Western Europe[a]	Mid-1984 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d]
73. Austria	7,579,000	12,000 est.	Franz Muhri	25th, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L	0.66 (1983); none
74. Belgium	9,872,000	10,000 est.	Louis van Geyt	24th, Mar. & Dec. 1982	L	2.3 (1981); 2 of 212
75. Cyprus (AKEL)	662,000	14,000 claim	Ezekias Papaioannou	15th, May 1982	L	32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats
76. Denmark	5,112,000	10,000 est.	Poul Emanuel	27th, May 1983	L	0.7 (1984); none
77. Finland	4,873,000	50,000 claim	Arvo Aalto	20th, May 25–27, 1984	L	14.0 (1983); 27 of 200
78. France	55,600,000[cc]	610,000 claim	Georges Marchais	24th, Feb. 1982	L	16.2 (1981); 44 of 491[dd]
79. Germany (West)	59,387,000 (excl. W. Berlin)	50,482 claim	Herbert Mies	7th, Jan. 6–8, 1984	L	0.2 (1983); none
80. Great Britain	56,023,000	16,000 est.	Gordon McLennan	38th, Nov. 1983	L	0.03 (1983); none
81. Greece (KKE)	9,984,000	42,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis	11th, Dec. 1982	L	10.9 (1981); 13 of 300[ee]
(KKE–I)		*12,000 est.*	*Yiannis Banias*	*3rd, May 1982*	*L*	*1.3 (1981); none*[ff]
82. Iceland (AB)	239,000	3,000 est.	Svavar Gestsson	Bienn. cong., Nov. 1983	L	17.3 (1983); 10 of 60
83. Ireland	3,575,000	500 est.	John Stewart	18th, May 1982	L	— (1982); none
84. Italy	56,998,000	1,700,000 claim	Alessandro Natta	16th, Mar. 1983	L	29.9 (1983); 198 of 630[gg]
85. Luxembourg	366,000	600 est.	René Urbany	24th, Feb. 4–5, 1984	L	5.0 (1979); 2 of 59
86. Malta	329,599[hh]	100 est.	Anthony Vassallo	Ext., May 18–25, 1984	L	1.0 (1981); none
87. Netherlands	14,437,000	10,000 est.	Elli Izeboud	Ext., Feb. 4, 5, 12, and 27, 1984	L	1.9 (1982); 3 of 150
88. Norway	4,145,000	500 est.	Hans I. Kleven	18th, Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 1984	L	0.3 (1981); none
(AKP)		*1,000 est.*	*Paal Steigan*	*3rd, Apr. 1983*	*L*	*0.7 (1981); none*
89. Portugal	10,045,000	200,000 est.	Alvaro Cunhal	10th, Dec. 1983	L	18.0 (1983); 44 of 250
90. San Marino	22,000	300 est.	Ermenegildo Gasperoni	10th, 1980	L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
91. Spain (PCE)	38,435,000	84,000 est.	Gerardo Iglesias	11th, Dec. 1983	L	3.8 (1982); 4 of 350
(PC)		25,000 claim	Ignacio Gallego	1st, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L	n/a
92. Sweden (VPK)	8,335,000	17,500 claim	Lars Werner	26th, Nov. 1981	L	5.6 (1982); 20 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claim	Rolf Hagel	27th, 1983	L	0.1 (1982); none
93. Switzerland (PdAS)	6,477,000	4,500 est.	Armand Magnin	12th, May 1983	L	0.9 (1983); 1 of 200
94. Turkey	50,207,000	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, Oct. or Nov. 1983	O	(1983)
95. West Berlin (SEW)	2,000,000	4,500 est.	Horst Schmitt	7th, May 25–27, 1984	L	0.7 (1981); none

[cc]From the 1982 census.

[dd]The PCF won only 11.2 percent of the French vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament. Subsequent public opinion polling confirmed the slump in communist support to 11 percent of the French electorate. *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Feb. 18, 1985, p. 30.

[ee]The KKE won 11.6 percent of the Greek vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament.

[ff]The KKE–I won 3.4 percent of the Greek vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament.

[gg]The Italian Communist Party won 33.3 percent of the Italian vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament, against 33.0 for the Christian Democrats.

[hh]Malta Central Statistical Office.

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LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP	Communist Workers' Party
APK	Communist Workers' Party
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist)
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPP/NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, a.k.a. Kampuchean Communist Party)
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KKE–I	Greek Communist Party (Interior)
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party
MPLA–PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Party of Labor
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party
PC	Communist Party (Spain)
PCE	Communist Party of Spain
PCT	Congolese Labor Party
PdAS	Swiss Party of Labor
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
PIT	Party of Independence and Labor
PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
PPP	People's Party of Panama
PPP	People's Progressive Party (Guyana)
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
PSUM	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
RVP	Revolutionary People's Party
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
SUP	Socialist Unity Party
SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
VPK	Left Party Communist
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

Alessandro Natta to replace the deceased Italian party leader Enrico Berlinguer, and of Dzhambiin Batmunkh to replace an allegedly ailing Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal in Mongolia. In Senegal, Seydou Cissoko was "promoted" to chairman of the Party of Independence and Labor and replaced as general secretary by Amath Dansoko at the party congress in September.[10]

There were 30-odd national conferences or congresses of communist movements during 1984, two in the case of the Popular Vanguard Party in Costa Rica. Of particular note was the national conference of the ruling party in Angola, attended by some 500 delegates from all of the country's 18 provinces and dedicated to preparations for the December 1985 party congress.[11] The Workers' Party of Ethiopia held its founding congress in September, attended by 1,742 delegates.[12]

By and large there was little change in the legal status of communist movements during 1984. Communist organizations in Iraq and Honduras became illegal, while the party in Uruguay moved closer to legal status. Communist parties continued to rule 15 countries (with these parties accounting for about 75 million of the total 80 million communists enumerated by Zagladin). Of these countries, 10 belong to the "socialist commonwealth" as well as holding full membership in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). This mostly pro-Soviet core is outweighed in membership by the Chinese, plus the Albanian, Laotian, North Korean, and Yugoslav parties. Elsewhere, communists left government coalitions in France and Bolivia; only in Martinique and San Marino do communists now serve as minority members of governing coalitions.

Pro forma elections resulted in near-unanimous votes for the ruling parties in Benin, the Congo, and the Soviet Union. The Sandinista Front of National Liberation recorded a 67.0 percent showing and garnered 61 of 96 seats in November 4 elections marred by withdrawal of some opposition forces and by an ongoing anti-government insurgency. In more genuinely democratic settings, communist parties fared less well. The two Indian communist parties were unable to withstand Rajiv

[10]Curiously, the December 1984 issue of *World Marxist Review* (Toronto) carries an article by Cissoko, with him still identified as General Secretary.

[11]"MPLA Conference," ibid., Jan. 15, 1985.

[12]*The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 1984.

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Gandhi's landslide victory: the Communist Party of India's representation in the Lok Sabha declined from 12 to 6, while the Communist Party (Marxist) lost 14 of its 36 seats. The Communist Party of Réunion saw its share of the vote decline from 32.73 percent in the 1983 assembly elections, to 29.8 percent in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament, to 25.5 percent in cantonal elections in December 1984. In Denmark, the communist share dropped from 1.1 to 0.7 percent. Also in European Parliament balloting, the French Communist Party slipped to 11 percent of the French vote, but the Italian Communist Party scored its first electoral plurality, with 33.3 percent of the vote compared to 33.0 percent for the Christian Democrats. In Ecuador, party leader René Mauge Moskera polled 4 percent as a presidential candidate of the Broad Left Front, and the Front won 3.6 percent of the of the vote for the legislature, both gains from the 3.2 won by the leftist Popular Democratic Union in the 1979 national elections. In Uruguay, the local communist party won some 6 percent of the vote when it was permitted to run within the Broad Front coalition.

We turn now to some highlights of developments in the various geographic areas.

Africa (Subsaharan). The most significant development in this region was the founding of a Workers' Party of Ethiopia after five years of preparation. Newly elected secretary general of the WPE, Mengistu Haile Mariam stated, in a speech transmitted by Addis Ababa Radio domestic service on September 6, 1984, that "the objective of our future struggle is the building of socialism."[13] Seven of the 11 members of the WPE Politburo are military men. The number of Cubans propping up the Mengistu regime had dropped from some 20,000 in 1977 to about 5,000 as of early 1985,[14] conceivably in connection with their transfer to Angola.

The Zimbabwe African National Union elected President Robert Mugabe to the vacant position of first secretary at its 5th Congress, in August. Mugabe pledged to transform the country into a one-party socialist state along Marxist-Leninist lines,[15] which could possibly raise its status to that of a "revolutionary democratic" regime in Moscow's eyes. He later announced that the first general elections since independence five years ago would be held in March 1985.[16] In July, the Congolese Labor Party held a congress at which it reelected its secretary general and added five of his supporters to the Politburo. In Mozambique, President Samora Machel, who also heads the ruling FRELIMO party, dismissed three hard-line Marxists from his cabinet in June, the first signs of a split in the leadership in 15 years. The dismissed officials were in charge of interior, security, and natural resources.

As a result of an agreement signed between Mozambique and South Africa at Nkomati on March 16, 1984, the African National Congress apparently lost its staging bases in Mozambique.[17] Although the South African Communist Party (SACP) insurgents have been reduced to several hundred, the party reportedly held a 6th Congress in London in December. This gathering described the party's role in the "revolutionary union" headed by the African National Congress (controlled by the SACP), adopted a new party statute, and elected a new central committee, with Moses Mabhida retained as secretary general.[18]

The Americas. There were three major regional conferences of communist parties during the year, all dutifully attacking as warlike the policies of US President Ronald Reagan and giving unanimous support for the Soviet policy line. On March 2–4, 12 parties, mostly from the Caribbean, met in Guyana; on June 11–13, a larger group from 21 countries in Central America and the Caribbean met in Havana; and on July 6–7, 13 parties, mostly from the South American continent, met in Buenos Aires.[19] In Cuba, the ruling communist party has scheduled its 3rd Congress for December 1985.[20] A long-range development policy being worked out with the Soviet bloc should receive formal approval at that time. Havana continues to be dependent on outside assistance—drawing an estimated US$4 billion in economic aid and another US$1 billion in military assistance from the Soviet Union alone during 1984.[21]

Elections in Nicaragua have already been mentioned above. A member of the ruling Sandinista junta has openly acknowledged that the country's ruling ideology is Marxism-Leninism.[22] Despite a deteriorating economy

[13]Trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East & Africa* (Washington, DC), Sept. 18, 1984, p. R/38.

[14]*The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1985.

[15]*The New York Times*, Aug. 9, 1984.

[16]Ibid., Jan. 24, 1985.

[17]B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "U.S. Is Planning to Aid Mozambique's Military," *The New York Times*, Jan. 17, 1985.

[18]TASS dispatch from London, "A Forum of Communists," *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1985.

[19]On the meeting in Guyana, see *Mirror* (Georgetown), Mar. 11, 1984; on the Havana meeting, *Granma* (Havana), English edition, July 1, 1984; and on the meeting in Buenos Aires, *Noticias Argentinas* (Buenos Aires), July 6, 1984, and *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1984.

[20]*Pravda*, Dec. 29, 1984.

[21]*The New York Times*, May 2, 1984; and Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1984*, CPAS 84-10002, Washington, DC, September 1984, Table 86, p. 117.

[22]See comments by Bayardo Arce Castano, Coordinator of the Political Committee of the FSLN, at a meeting with the pro-Soviet Nicaragua Socialist Party in Managua. Transcript published in *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), July 31, 1984.

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and a foreign debt of more than US$4 billion, Nicaragua continues to serve as a conduit for military equipment going to communist guerrillas in El Salvador.[23] The latter, numbering an estimated 6,000 to 8,000,[24] boycotted the Salvadoran presidential election and runoff in March and May, and continue acts of sabotage. It is too early to tell whether the dialogue initiated between the guerrillas and President José Napoleon Duarte on October 15 in the village of La Palma will bring some relief from the fighting that has taken an estimated 50,000 lives during the past five years.

In Peru, the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) group continues to resort to terror, having already caused some 5,000 deaths (approximately equal to its estimated total membership). The more orthodox Peruvian Communist Party operates through the (Marxist) United Left Coalition, which is now the second largest political group in the country. Chile, too, has experienced considerable violence, with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front both maintaining unofficial links with the communist party. The latter recently issued a leaflet calling upon the Chilean armed forces to oppose the Pinochet government.[25] Forced into clandestine existence, the communists belong to the Popular Democratic Movement, which preaches both violence and nonviolent struggle. By contrast, the likelihood of violence in Colombia was apparently reduced as a result of agreements for a cease-fire between the government and major leftist insurgents, first of all the 15,000-member Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), which is associated with the Communist Party of Colombia.[26]

In Grenada, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (successor to the New Jewel Movement) participated in the November elections, winning only 5 percent of the vote. In Venezuelan municipal elections, the largest Marxist group, the Movement Toward Socialism, was able to garner only 4 percent of the vote. This poor showing by the Left may have occasioned a visit by a delegation from the CPSU to Caracas in December.[27] (The results in Uruguay have already been noted).

Asia and the Pacific. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced on October 20, 1984, that besides continuing its successful "responsibility system" reforms in the countryside, it intends to press forward with urban economic reforms as well. Party cadres are to be instructed to develop new "guidance" planning, make better use of price and tax levers, remove the government from management, and raise the technological and managerial standards in all urban enterprises.[28] Just before year's end, Soviet First Deputy Premier I. V. Arkhipov signed in Beijing three major economic agreements aimed at increasing the volume of trade between the USSR and China and providing new Soviet investment, technology, and economic advisers.[29] Although political relations still remain tense because of Moscow's refusal to comply with Beijing's three major demands—removal of troops from China's northern border, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and cessation of aid to Vietnam in its program of subjugating Kampuchea—this important economic pact will likely remove some of the chill from relations between the Soviet and Chinese communists.

On December 21, Deng Xiaoping and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher signed a treaty legitimizing the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 under the principle of "one country–two systems." Deng would doubtless like to achieve a similar arrangement with regard to Taiwan.

North Korea continues to seek improved economic relations with its immediate neighbors and other states. In September, Pyongyang invited Japan Socialist Party Chairman Masashi Ishibashi for a visit looking toward expanded economic relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo.[30] Talks between North and South Korea in November were temporarily disrupted by a Soviet defection in the demilitarized zone dividing the two states, but are expected to resume. On September 8, North Korea announced a new joint venture law which is more extensive than similar Chinese legislation in spelling out protections and remittance procedures for the investment and earnings of would-be Western partners.[31]

In the Philippines, insurgents of the New People's Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) killed more than 60 government troops in ambushes at the time of the March elections (the CPP, through the National Democratic Front, had opted to boycott the elections). Estimates of the precise strength of the NPA vary greatly, but all observers agree that its military activities have greatly ex-

[23]On Nicaragua's role in supplying the Salvadoran insurgents, see the report of a briefing in Washington by Gen. Paul F. Gorman, commander of the United States Southern Command. *The New York Times*, Aug. 9, 1984.

[24]Ibid., Jan. 9, 1985.

[25]Gaston Vargas, "Two Words," Moscow Radio in Spanish to Chile, Dec. 14, 1984 in *FBIS–SOV*, Dec. 17, 1984, p. K/3.

[26]*The New York Times*, Apr. 3, 1984.

[27]TASS report in *Pravda*, Dec. 15, 1984.

[28]*Beijing Review*, Oct. 29, 1984, pp. 3–16, documents section. See also Robert Delfs, "Free-market Communism," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 25, 1984.

[29]*The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1984.

[30]Charles Smith, "A Thaw in the North?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 4, 1984.

[31]"Pyongyang Warns of Capitalist Contamination While Seeking Trade With West," *Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea* (Seoul), October 1984, p. 14. For the text of the new law, see ibid., pp. 15–18.

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panded, with operations at company strength carried out in a number of areas.[32]

Despite Vietnam's appalling economic problems,[33] Hanoi's communist leadership continued to display steadfast determination to bring Indochina under its hegemony. With strong backing from the USSR, which now supplies advanced Mi–24 "Hind" combat helicopters, Su–22 swing-wing fighter aircraft, missile attack boats, tanks, and a variety of surface-to-air missiles, Vietnamese troops began a concerted winter offensive in late December 1984 aimed at crushing Cambodian guerrilla resistance forces located around four major refugee camps on the Cambodian-Thai border. The Vietnamese apparently wanted first to destroy the viability of the noncommunist forces of former premier Son Sann and of Norodom Sihanouk, with the aim of leaving only the Democratic Kampuchean forces of discredited Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot as an alternative to the Heng Samrin regime backed by Hanoi.[34]

In Afghanistan, despite Soviet tactics of "migratory genocide" in which between 250,000 and 1 million Afghans have died and nearly 4 million have been driven to seek refuge in Pakistan or Iran, mujahidin resistance to the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal regime continues five years later. Even though Soviet forces carpet bomb villages and assault valleys with helicopter-borne commandos, there are still strong mujahidin bases less than 10 miles from Kabul, and the guerrillas are learning to use SAM–7 anti-aircraft missiles and small ground-to-ground rockets.[35]

Eastern Europe and the USSR. The deaths of General Secretary Andropov in February and of Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov in December underscored the passing of the "old guard" from the CPSU leadership, a development that was only postponed for a time by the designation of an ailing Konstantin Chernenko (from that same generation) to replace Andropov. The young (born in 1931) Mikhail Gorbachëv has evidently moved into the vulnerable position of heir apparent and deputy to Chernenko. His prime contender is Grigoriy Romanov (born in 1923), who was brought to Moscow by Andropov and seems to share the late General Secretary's commitment to police methods discipline, and expansion of military and industrial power. He reportedly controls the defense establishment and heavy industry, which places him in a strong position. Aging leadership is also an issue in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic.

Moscow continues its efforts to control and coordinate the activities of its East European allies through the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). At a mid-June CEMA summit, the Soviet attempt to integrate member economies more closely met with opposition from several countries desiring better economic relations with the West. In the autumn, Moscow prevailed on East Germany's Erich Honecker and Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov to cancel visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, but Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu went ahead with his visit to Bonn in October.

Poland continues to be Moscow's biggest headache in Eastern Europe. The unique phenomenon of a career military officer serving as head of the Polish party and government may well be troubling to traditionalist party leaders in Moscow. This may explain the presence in Warsaw of an 800-man Soviet military mission, under Soviet General S. F. Shcheglov.[36] Moscow would presumably prefer to have someone with greater experience in the management of party affairs heading the Polish party, which currently seems in considerable disarray. In the summer of 1980, the party claimed 3,149,000 members and candidate members. Over the next two years, it lost almost 800,000 members, and by December 1983, it claimed only 2,186,000.[37]

The Middle East. The ruling Yemen Socialist Party in South Yemen claimed an increase of 7,000 in its membership and strengthened its military/economic ties with the Soviet Union. Elsewhere in the region, communists were able to participate in only two elections, retaining their four seats in Israel's legislature and increasing their representation in Morocco's to two. In Iran and Iraq, local communists remained hostage to a war situation over which they have no control. Iran's Tudeh party remains banned, its leader Nureddin Kianuri in prison. The splintered movement in Egypt witnessed the arrest and trials of its leaders.[38] Only in Lebanon and "Palestine" were there signs of some activism on the

[32]See Guy Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 28, 1984.

[33]David Jenkins, "A Country Adrift . . .," ibid., Nov. 8, 1984.

[34]Author of the *YICA* profile on Vietnam Douglas Pike reports that in the 1980's, Soviet arms aid to Vietnam flowed at a rate of US$1 billion a year, about three times the flow of USSR aid to Vietnam during the Vietnam war.

[35]"Afghan Rebels Grow Stronger As War Wears On," *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle*, Dec. 30, 1984; and Craig Karp, *A 5-Year Summary: Afghan Resistance and Soviet Occupation*, Special Report No. 118, US Department of State, Washington, DC, December 1984.

[36]Article by General Leon Dubicki, a defector from Poland, in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), June 4, 1984.

[37]*Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), May 1984. Adam Schaff, a noted Polish communist ideologist, was expelled from the party in 1984 on the grounds that his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with party membership. See *The New York Times*, June 30, 1984.

[38]See Amnesty International, *International Report—Egypt: Violation of Human Rights*, London, 1983, pp. 3, 5, 7.

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part of local communists.[39] A TASS dispatch from Beirut reported on a "declaration" issued by (unspecified) "fraternal" parties from Arab countries, which contained the predictable anti-American/anti-Israeli propaganda;[40] the statement presumably originated from a meeting in either Damascus or Beirut.

Although signs of local communist activity in North Yemen are nonexistent, Moscow has continued its efforts to cultivate the Sanaa government. The Soviet Union has supplied 75 percent of the equipment for North Yemen's air force, 85–90 percent for its army, and almost 70 percent for its navy. In October, North Yemen's President, Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, visited Moscow, where he signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR.[41]

Western Europe. The well-advertised "opening to the Left" appears to be moribund for now in both France and Italy. At mid-year, French Communists withdrew from the coalition government of socialist François Mitterrand. In Italy, socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi turned down the request of Italian communists for one of that country's two seats on the executive commission of the Common Market.[42] On Cyprus, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) was notified by President Spyros Kyprianou that his Democratic Party would no longer cooperate with the communists.[43]

The region is still affected by Eurocommunism. In Finland, the communist party expelled all pro-Soviet hard-liners from the Central Committee on May 26, 1984, a move likely to be on the agenda of an extraordinary congress scheduled for March 1985. The CPSU's concern with this situation was evident in an article by M. Kostikov and V. Mikhailov in *Pravda* of December 13, 1984. A major split in the Norwegian party appears to be the reason for calling an extraordinary congress of that movement for the spring of 1985. The Communist Party of Great Britain is involved in a possible bifurcation, resulting from the expulsion of 22 Communists for "factional ultra-left propaganda."[44] In the Netherlands, a hard core of orthodox Marxist-Leninists left the party in February to form an Alliance of Communists in the Netherlands.[45] The Greeks and Spaniards each have two parties, one loyal to Moscow, the other not. The Spanish split occurred in January 1984 with the formation of the rival Partido Comunista, which absorbed pro-Soviet dissidents who had earlier left or been expelled from the PCE. PCE Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias condemned the break-away group as an "exercise in dead theory" and accused it of serving the interests of the Right by "sowing confusion and dividing the working class."[46] Even in the French party one now finds signs of disaffection with the Soviets. Only the Austrian, Cypriot, Danish, Luxembourg, West German, and Portuguese parties echo fully Moscow's line.[47]

[39]On the Lebanese party, see "Appeal of the Lebanese Communists," *Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1985. Regarding the Palestine Communist Party, its ability to "function most openly" is viewed as "one of the curiosities of the Israeli occupation." Al-Barghuti, jailed for 8 years under Jordanian rule, now edits a weekly party newspaper, *al-Tali'ah* (The Vanguard), in East Jerusalem. See *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Feb. 12, 1984.

[40]TASS dispatch from Beirut, "Declaration of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Arab Countries," July 19, 1984.

[41]*Pravda*, Oct. 11, 1984.

[42]*Est et Ouest* (Paris), September 1984, pp. 7–10; and *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 2, 1985.

[43]TASS report over Moscow Radio, Dec. 23, 1984, in *FBIS–SOV*, Dec. 31, 1984, p. G/4.

[44]*Morning Star* (London), Dec. 18, 1984.

[45]Some 350 members of this break-away group attended a meeting on October 6–7, 1984, convened to prepare for a founding party congress in October 1985.

[46]Kevin Devlin, "Spain's Other Communist Party," RFE–RL, *RFE Research*, Feb. 10, 1984, RAD Background Report, 8/84; also *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1984, and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1984. As Devlin observed, Moscow and Prague sent official delegations, although the Soviet ambassador to Madrid, Yuriy Bubinin (who had attended the PCE Congress in December 1983), was notably absent, suggesting a wish to play both horses in Spain. Devlin likens Moscow's behavior to the CPSU's dispatch of a delegation to the 1977 founding congress of the pro-Soviet splinter Communist Workers' Party in Sweden and continued relations with it, as well as with the Left Communist Party despite the latter's protests.

[47]*The Economist*, June 2, 1984, pp. 36–37.

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Communist Fronts in 1984

Wallace Spaulding

ALTHOUGH 1984 was not a year of major changes in the organization and activity of the leading Soviet-line international front groups, it is important to track Moscow's ongoing utilization of such instrumentalities to promote Soviet foreign policy objectives.

In recent years there have been annual consultative meetings of representatives of most or all of the 10 major front groups. In February 1984, the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) hosted such a meeting in Prague, apparently attended by representatives of all major fronts except the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL),[1] which had also missed similar gatherings in 1982 and 1983.[2] However, in October, the IADL itself showed new signs of life with its 12th Congress, attended by some 600 delegates—apparently the largest front meeting of 1984.[3]

Among other groups attending the 1984 consultative meeting were three minor fronts which were also listed in attendance at the previous two annual consultative meetings and thereby appear to be striving to project a separate identity—the World Federation of Teachers' Unions (a trade union international belonging to the World Federation of Trade Unions—WFTU); the International Institute of Peace (the World Peace Council's research body); and the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (AALAPSO or OSPAAL). Although the last-mentioned group appears to be an extension of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) into Latin America, it also has its own links to other fronts through its president, Susumo Ozaki of Japan, who is a vice-president of the IADL,[4] and through its secretary general, Melba Hernandez of Cuba, who is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council.[5]

The most noteworthy personnel changes in the major international fronts during 1984 occurred in the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS), and AAPSO. In February, Vilmos Cserveny of Hungary became secretary general of the WFDY, succeeding fellow countryman Miklos Barabas, who was given the job of secretary general of the Hungarian National Peace Movement.[6] At the 14th IUS Congress in April, Georgios Michaelides of Cyprus replaced India's Srinivasan Kunalan as secretary general, with Miroslav Stepan of Czechoslovakia remaining the president.[7] In addition, in late December, it was announced that Ahmad Hamrush had been nominated to succeed the ailing Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi as AAPSO's president, a slot allocated to an Egyptian by the rules of the organization.[8]

It is also interesting that WFTU President Sándor Gáspár was replaced as secretary general of the Hungarian National Council of Trade Unions by Lajos Mehes and given the presidency of the latter body instead.[9] Such a job shift is generally regarded as a graceful demotion, and I assume it to be related to his liberal tendencies, previously noted by me.[10] Gáspár also lost his position as Hungary's representative on the WFTU Gen-

[1]Radio Prague, Feb. 26, 1984.

[2]*Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Mar. 23, 1982, and Oct. 21, 1983.

[3]Ibid., Nov. 9, 1984. If the IADL is to be more active, it will still be under the old leadership, as Joe Nordman (France) was reelected president and Amar Bentoumi (Algeria) was reelected secretary general.

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[4]*Barricada* (Managua), July 18, 1984.

[5]*New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 4, 1984, p. 2.

[6]Radio Budapest, Feb. 19, 1984.

Prague CTK, Apr. 16. 1984; and Sofia BTA, Apr. 11–16, 1984.

[8]*Al-Jumhurriyah* (Cairo), Dec. 30, 1984.

[9]*Hungarian Trade Union News* (Budapest), March 1984, p. 2.

[10]See my section "International Communist Organizations" in Robert Wesson, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1983* (hereafter, *YICA 1983*), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984, p. 397.

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Table 1. Major International Communist Front Organizations

	Year founded	Head-quarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
World Peace Council	1949	Helsinki	No data	No data	142
World Federation of Trade Unions	1945	Prague	Ca. 206 million	92[a]	81
Women's International Democratic Federation	1945	East Berlin	Over 200 million	135[b]	117[b]
World Federation of Democratic Youth	1945	Budapest	Over 150 million	Over 270	123
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	1957	Cairo	No data	87	No data
International Union of Students	1946	Prague	Over 10 million	120 (?)[c]	112 (?)[c]
World Federation of Scientific Workers	1946	London	Ca. 500,000[d]	ca. 40[d]	Over 70
International Organization of Journalists	1946	Prague	Over 180,000	No data	Over 120
Christian Peace Conference	1958	Prague	No data	No data	At least 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	1946	Brussels	Ca. 25,000	No data	Nearly 80

[a] *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Nov. 2, 1984.
[b] *Women of the Whole World* (East Berlin), No. 1, 1984, p. 5.
[c] National student unions from Malawi, Lesotho, and Papua-New Guinea were admitted as new members at the April IUS Congress. Sofia BTA, Apr. 16, 1984.
[d] Radio Prague, Mar. 14, 1984.

eral Council to the aforementioned Mehes,[11] the job evidently going with the secretary generalship of the national organization.

There were also a number of changes at the vice-presidential level in the front organizations during the year. Rodolfo Mechina replaced the deceased Amerigo Terenzi as Italian vice-president of the WPC,[12] but it is not known who, if anyone yet, has replaced the deceased Argentinian WPC vice-president Alfredo Varela. A Syrian, A. al-Asad, was noted as a vice-president of AAPSO in April, bringing the total of AAPSO vice-presidents to nine on the eve of its Sixth Congress.[13] That congress, in Algiers in May, reelected the ailing Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi as president and Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn of Iraq as secretary general, and provided slots for 17 vice-presidents—four from "liberation movements," seven from African countries, and six from Asian countries—an expansion almost entirely in the African sphere.[14] Three new WFDY vice-presidents were also noted during the year: Nguyen Van Ky of Vietnam, Li Jong Gun of North Korea, and Binoy Viswam of India.[15] The IADL Congress in October added a South African vice-presidential slot, which it filled with Archie Gumede.[16]

In the front secretariats, Miguel Gonzalez Regas replaced fellow Colombian Oscar Gonzalez as one of the two deputy secretaries general of the WFDY; also, Andre Gerhardt (Poland), Joe Sims (USA), Jackie Selibi (South Africa), Konstantin Stathis (Greece), Mihai Botorog (Romania), and Freddy Fernández (Venezuela) were identified as new secretaries.[17] Dev Kumar Ganguli replaced fellow Indian K. G. Srivastava as one of the WFTU's five secretaries.[18] Elson Concepción (country unknown) was noted as the new secretary for Latin America of the International Organization of Journalists, possibly replacing either Miguel Arteaga (Cuba) or Leopoldo Fernandez Vargas (Colombia).[19] Similarly, Phil Spillman (country unknown) and Pavi Aarolainen (Finland) apparently joined the World Peace Council Secretariat during the year, while Denmark's Carl Rosschou left that body.[20] Finally, it was revealed that Archpriest Georgiy Goncharov was the "representative of the Russian Orthodox Church at the CPC [Christian Peace Conference] Central Office in Prague."[21] This suggests that the Russian CPC Deputy Secretary General, Archimandrite Sergey Fomin, may not actually be resident at CPC headquarters and that it is actually Goncharov who gives the on-the-spot Soviet guidance there normally provided at an international communist front's headquarters.[22]

During 1984 there were modest additions to previous information regarding the membership and affiliates of the major fronts. These are noted, with source information, in the accompanying Table 1, which summarizes current knowledge on the fronts.

[11] *Népszabadság* (Budapest), April 10, 1984.
[12] *L'Unitá* (Rome), Dec. 3, 1984.
[13] *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 24, 1984; on the number of AAPSO vice-presidents on the eve of the congress, see my section on "International Communist Organizations" in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1984* (hereafter, *YICA 1984*), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984, p. 431.
[14] Algiers, APS, May 31, 1984.
[15] *WFDY News* (Budapest), Nos. 3, 6, and 7, 1984.
[16] *The Star* (Johannesburg), Nov. 1, 1984.
[17] *WFDY News*, 1 2, 3, 6, 7, and 12, 1984.
[18] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 2, 1984.
[19] *IOJ Newsletter* (Prague), No. 8, 1984.
[20] *New Perspectives*, Nos. 2, 4, and 11, 1984.
[21] *CPC Information* (Prague), June 11, 1984.
[22] On this pattern, see my "International Communist Organizations," in *YICA 1983*, p. 394.

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Policies of the Fronts in 1984

What themes did these fronts pursue in their work during 1984? Throughout the year the peace theme remained paramount. The stage had been more or less set by the end of 1983, when WIDF Secretary General Mirjam Vire-Touminen declared that her organization's activity during the following year would be devoted totally to struggling for peace and against nuclear war.[23] This was followed by a WIDF "Consultative Meeting on Disarmament" in East Berlin in late January 1984. The action programs of both the WPC and WFDY, as well as these two organizations' largest gatherings of the year—the January WPC Presidential Committee meeting in West Berlin, the April WPC Bureau meeting in New Delhi, and the February meeting of the WFDY Executive Committee in Havana—shared this emphasis.[24] In addition, the 14th IUS Congress (in Sofia in April) and the 36th WFTU General Council meeting (in Sofia in October) each had a special session devoted exclusively to the peace subject, the only such special session at each gathering. "Peace" was also the primary subject for consideration at the IADL Congress in Athens, at least as indicated in the account of the event in *Pravda* of October 22, 1984, and it also seems to have dominated the 47th session of the Executive Council of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) at Varna in April.[25]

The tendency at these gatherings was to focus on American deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe as the most immediate danger to peace, but then to foster a false image of objectivity by proceeding to a point-by-point program that appeared to treat both the American and the Soviet sides equally.[26] Both the WPC's *1984 Objectives of the Program of Action*, which appeared early in the year and the WFTU General Council's resolution "40th Anniversary of the Victory over Hitlerite Fascism," which came out late in the year,[27] manifest this dual approach. In fact, the "equal" demands of the two documents are so similar that they are worth comparing in order to illustrate the "coordination" involved in the whole front effort (see Table 2).

Table 2: Examples of the Even-handed Approach

WPC *Objectives*	WFTU resolution
Halt in deployment of new missiles in Europe and the dismantling of those already deployed (first point)	Halt in deployment of new missiles in Europe and the dismantling of those already deployed (first point)
Renunciation by all nuclear states of the first use of nuclear weapons (second point)	Renunciation by all nuclear states of the first use of nuclear weapons (second point)
Immediate freeze in testing, production, and storage of nuclear weapons (third point)	Total ban on nuclear weapons (third point)
Prohibition of the neutron bomb and of chemical and bacteriological weapons (fourth point)	Ban on research, manufacture, stockpiling, and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (fourth point)
Ban on militarization of outer space (fifth point)	Ban on militarization of outer space (eighth point)
Establishment of nuclear-free zones in Nordic, Balkan, and central Europe (last part of sixth point); free Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean of nuclear arms (first part of ninth point)	Creation of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world (seventh point)

In sharp contrast to this even-handed approach was the following statement that came out of the April WPC Bureau meeting in New Delhi: "The WPC considers that under prevailing conditions, the struggle to end the deployment of the new US nuclear missile weapons and to dismantle and withdraw those already deployed is the main task for the planet's peace movement."[28] This was one of the stronger statements on the subject by any front organization, but similar sentiments were also expressed by the January WPC Presidential Committee

[23]East Berlin ADN, Dec. 30, 1983.

[24]See WPC, *1984 Objectives of the Program of Action*, Helsinki, n.d., pp. 5–6, 17–18; *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 23–25 and Feb. 9–10, 1984; and *Pravda*, Apr. 10, 1984.

[25]Sofia BTA, Apr. 10, 1984.

[26]This shift from a one-sided to a more "equal" approach was already discernible in 1983. See my section on "International Communist Organizations" in *YICA 1984*, pp. 434–35. The even greater intertwining of these two approaches during 1984 may have reflected a more indecisive Soviet leadership.

[27]Loc. cit.; and *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), No. 12, 1984, p. 19.

[28]*Pravda*, Apr. 10, 1984.

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meeting in West Berlin, the March–April WFDY Youth Peace Meeting in Copenhagen, the April WFTU Bureau meeting in Paris, and the June CPC Presidential Board meeting in Warsaw.[29] It was also emphasized in the WPC's call for an early-December "week of action" involving demonstrations outside US diplomatic and military installations abroad, the implementation of which in such irrelevant (to the issue at hand) places as Kabul gave ample evidence of the contrived nature of the campaign.[30] Finally, the row between official delegations from the USSR and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the representatives of more truly neutral "equal responsibility" peace groups, on the other, at the July European Nuclear Disarmament (END) meeting in Perugia over 59 East-bloc dissidents who were not able to attend the gathering is illustrative.[31] These dissidents could certainly have approved the "equal" propositions enumerated in the WPC *Objectives* and the WFTU resolution cited above, and their linkage of these with human rights and civil rights issues is, ironically, mirrored in the WPC document, whose twelfth point is: "to defend human rights and the rights of the people to struggle against . . . the political practices of repressive regimes."[32]

The issue of development in the Third World was an important secondary emphasis during the year. This could be seen especially in the October WFTU General Council meeting, where "the role of trade unions in solving economic problems of developing countries" was the first item on the agenda and appeared to be the theme most publicized.[33] The "right to development" was just behind the "right of peace and security" as an emphasis at the 12th IADL Congress.[34] The 6th AAPSO Congress related the arms race to economic backwardness, just as the WPC *Objectives* cited the arms race and the threat of nuclear war as hindrances to the creation of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO).[35] An NIEO, in which the allegedly unequal relationships between the developed and underdeveloped worlds would be replaced by ones of "equality and mutual benefit" as specifically manifested in "Socialist"–Third World relationships, is in fact the stated objective of the fronts.[36] Singled out for attack are the transnational corporations (accused of engaging in "plunder") and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (accused of imposing "draconian conditions" on their borrowers).[37] In April the WPC cosponsored a seminar in Katmandu specifically devoted to the NIEO.

There was also much activity focused on youth during the year, in preparation for the World Youth Festival, cosponsored by WFDY and IUS and scheduled for Moscow in the summer of 1985 (designated as International Youth Year by the UN). Three large preparatory committee meetings were held: in Havana in February, in Sofia in April, and in Moscow in November. This third meeting, attended by 517 delegates from 117 countries, was addressed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko, and by Boris Ponomarëv, CPSU secretary and alternate Politburo member and de facto chief of the CPSU's International Department—an indication of the importance Moscow attaches to this effort. The November meeting also saw the establishment of a Permanent Commission of 43 representatives to act as a coordinating body between the Soviet preparatory committee and like committees already set up in 87 other countries.[38] Tying in with this youth emphasis was a series of sketches of various WFDY affiliates that were published in *World Marxist Review*, beginning with the April 1984 issue.

The IADL, WPC, WFTU, WIDF, WFDY, AAPSO, and IUS participated in the sponsorship of an International Conference of Solidarity with Nicaragua and for Peace in Central America, held in Lisbon in May. This same group, minus the WIDF and IUS, staged a conference on Korean unification, held in Paris in March.[39] Other topics treated by the fronts in a significant manner during the year were: an attack on South Africa's "apartheid regime" at a meeting in Harare in May, cosponsored by the WFTU; a meeting of solidarity with the "liberation struggle" in South Africa and Namibia, held in Cologne in October, sponsored by the International Committee on Southern Africa, a joint group of the WPC and AAPSO; support of Greek Cypriots against the Turks, at a meeting in Nicosia in November, supported by the WPC; a meeting discussing a New International Information Order (to give the Third World "fair treatment" in the media) held in Kabul in November–December, sponsored by AAPSO. Commentary on the Middle East and traditional attacks on Israel were less evident in 1984, but AAPSO at its 6th Congress was able to get PLO leader Yasir Arafat to address the opening session, and the IOJ's International Committee on Defense of Journalists (meeting at Varna in August) appears to have concentrated on Palestine.[40]

[29] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Feb. 10, 1984; *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), Apr. 2, 1984; *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Apr. 27, 1984; and *CPC Information*, June 11, 1984.
[30] See Moscow TASS, Dec. 12, 1984; and *Pacific Tribune* (Vancouver), Nov. 21, 1984.
[31] *La Stampa* (Rome), July 19, 1984; and *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), July 19, 1984.
[32] WPC, *1984 Objectives*, p. 19.
[33] *World Trade Union Movement*, No. 12, 1984, p. 4.
[34] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 9, 1984.
[35] Moscow TASS, May 31, 1984; cf. Point 10, WPC, *1984 Objectives*, p. 18.
[36] See *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 9, 1984.
[37] *World Trade Union Movement*, No. 12, 1984, pp. 4–5.
[38] *People's Democracy* (New Delhi), Nov. 18, 1984.
[39] *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), special issue, April 1984.
[40] Sofia BTA, Aug. 9, 1984.

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Books

Brezhnev's Foreign Policy

William E. Griffith

HARRY GELMAN. *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984.

THIS is a remarkable, indeed an essential book. What is more, it has appeared at just the right time. Since there is now some prospect of meaningful US-USSR arms control negotiations, which American public opinion clearly favors, it becomes again important for the West to see the Soviet Union, and especially its foreign policy, as clearly as possible. Harry Gelman has performed a yeoman service toward this goal. It would be difficult to improve on one of his concluding statements:

Both because of their weakness and because of their strengths, the Soviet leaders are likely to continue to be impelled to press outward, responding to their vision of their precarious legitimacy and ever-imperiled security and in the process discovering, as opportunities permit, new advantages that must be defended.... (p. 218)

It follows, Gelman adds, that the Soviet "attacking compulsion" is insatiable. This is not surprising: few great powers, and fewer statesmen, have resisted opportunities.

One of the great strengths of this book is that it combines analysis of Soviet foreign policy with excellent Kremlinology. No mean feat, as anyone who has tried it can testify. Gelman is an experienced and finely-honed Kremlinologist, and his analysis of factional struggles in the Brezhnev era is, in my judgment, worthy of that done for earlier periods by Robert Conquest and Michel Tatu.[1] Space constraints forbid my summarizing his Kremlinological conclusions in great detail, so only a few must suffice. First, he rightly stresses the greater role played by the military under Leonid Brezhnev, and the institutionalization of that role through the Defense Council, from which Brezhnev excluded for some time even such senior Central Committee secretaries as Mikhail Suslov and Andrey Kirilenko. This was, as Gelman points out, a return to Stalin's *divide et impera* policy of using Politburo committees. The Defense Council, with its institutionalized military as well as political representation, was able under Brezhnev's chairmanship to subvert and supersede the authority of the full Politburo in military matters.

Gelman also has an important section on the growing role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee during the Brezhnev era. As he points out, this department, long headed by Boris Ponomarëv, increased its role in policy formulation and direction toward Third World liberation movements and Western Europe. With respect to the latter, this became particularly noticeable during the Soviet struggle against INF deployment. (I wonder, though, whether its role remained so important once Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko became a full Politburo member.) Gelman unfortunately does not discuss the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, of which less is known, but which clearly plays a very important and perhaps even a key role in dealing with communist parties and the states they rule. Nor

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[1]Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR: the Struggle for Stalin's Succession 1945–1960*, New York, Harper and Row, 1970; Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, New York, Viking, 1969.

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does he discuss differences within and among the various other bureaucracies, about which some excellent studies do exist.[2]

WITH RESPECT to the single main problem of Soviet (and of American) foreign policy, the Soviet-American relationship, Gelman begins by pointing out that Soviet policy is both defensive and coercive and that Soviet "détente policy" is intended in large part to further the exploitation of the Soviet competitive advantage. He adds that Moscow wants to have the United States and the rest of the world recognize the legitimacy of an expandable Soviet empire, the right of the Soviet Union to play a continually greater role in the world, and finally, the justness of asymmetrical rights in military security—what Moscow likes to call "equality and equal security"—that is, that the USSR should have military nuclear parity with all of its actual and potential nuclear opponents (thus putting the United States into a permanent position of nuclear inferiority). Moreover, in the Soviet view, the United States should not link Soviet-American relations to Soviet actions in the Third World, while the Soviet Union has the right to insist on linkage between Sino-US and Soviet-US relations. What this means, of course, as Gelman adds, is that the Soviet Union refuses to have its own military and political "overinsurance" questioned or, to put it even more clearly, that the Soviet Union tries not to accept in reality what it constantly declaims is its goal: nuclear and political parity with the United States.

The Soviets were in favor of détente with the United States, the author points out, as long as it did not affect the stream of their expansionism, in which détente was only an "island which neither halted nor changed" it (p. 116). They were for détente because of their desire to prevent or limit better American relations with China; to carry out a successful *Westpolitik* in Western Europe, especially in West Germany; and to get credits and technology transfer from the capitalist world, especially from the United States, West Germany, and Japan. But Moscow was not prepared to accept the kind of limits on its strategic buildup that would have made less great the US public's fear of and reaction to it. Moreover, after the early 1970's the Soviets began, as Gelman analyzes it, to fear that the profits of détente they had hoped for were being eroded. Notably, the Jackson and Stevenson amendments effectively blocked US Export-Import Bank credits and technology transfer in return for which the Soviets had, surprisingly, been ready to allow much larger Jewish emigration. Also, Anwar al-Sadat and Henry Kissinger maneuvered the Soviets out of Egypt.

Then came 1975, the key year in the decline of détente. Although Moscow's hopes in Portugal were disappointed, it thought it had won in Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, the Clark amendment stopped Kissinger's attempt to prevent the Soviet-Cuban-MPLA victory in Angola. This and the inglorious American evacuation of its embassy in South Vietnam probably convinced Moscow that America's imperial will was permanently diminished. Gelman also makes the valuable, often neglected, point that Brezhnev's failure at his November 1974 meeting in Vladivostok with President Gerald Ford to get any compensation for the NATO Forward-Based Systems (FBS) in Western Europe probably contributed greatly to the Soviet decision to begin a large-scale SS-20 buildup targeted on Western Europe, minimally to compensate for FBS.

Gelman then analyzes the events of the next two years, 1978 and 1979, which marked at least the temporary interment of détente. The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia in 1978 enabled National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to go to Beijing and negotiate there with Deng Xiaoping on the steps that resulted in Sino-US diplomatic normalization. The Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty of November 1978, which Hanoi needed in order to get Soviet aid and deter China's interference with Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, marked the attainment of a long hoped for Soviet objective: the southern encirclement of China and the establishment of Soviet air and naval bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay athwart the US air and

[2]For the International Department's role in Sino-Soviet relations, see Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's China Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1983; William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Rapprochement?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1983, and "Sino-Soviet Relations in the Asian Quadrangle," a paper delivered at the 13th Sino-US Conference on Mainland China," Taipeh, June 11–17, 1984 (publication forthcoming in the conference proceedings). On Soviet-East European relations, see Michael J. Sodaro, "In the Shadow of the Missiles: East German and Soviet Perceptions of West German Foreign Policy," Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC), unpub. ms.; Ronald Asmus, "The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle: The Dialectics of Détente and Discord," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), forthcoming; Fred Oldenburg, "Are Moscow's Shadows Lengthening?" *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), August 1984; and Eberhard Schultz and Peter Danylow, *Bewegung in der Deutschen Frage?* (Movement on the German Question?), Bonn, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, No. 33, 1984. Controversy over East-West relations has involved very high levels of the Liaison Department and of the international departments of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Central Committee Secretariats: see Mátyás Szürös (Secretary for International Affairs, Hungarian CC Secretariat), "Interaction of the National and the International in Hungarian Policy," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), January 1984, tr. in *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), Spring 1984; M. Stefanák and I. Hlivka (Chief and Deputy Chief, International Department, Czechoslovak CC Secretariat), "The National and International in the Policy of the KSC," *Rudé právo* (Prague) Mar. 30, 1984; O. V. Borisov (pseud. for O. B. Rakhmanin, First Deputy Chief, Department for Liaison, CPSU CC Secretariat), "A Union of a New Type," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 4, 1984. (Rakhmanin has been one of the strongest polemicists against the Chinese; see Rozman and Griffith.) For the CPSU CC International Department, see Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1984.

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sea lanes from the Philippines to the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, and the Persian Gulf. Finally, there came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which was meant, as Gelman rightly puts it, to protect Soviet offensive gains in the area. (So much for "defensive" versus "offensive" arguments about it.) What Moscow had not expected, but what its actions then precipitated, was President Jimmy Carter's reversal of American policy—a move to catch up with, not lead, US public opinion, and one which, given Moscow's policies, would have happened sooner or later anyhow, albeit perhaps not so infelicitously.

THROUGHOUT his analysis, Gelman ties in domestic and foreign policy in the Soviet Union and the United States. As he puts it:

By resorting instinctively to preemptive repression in response to the domestic threat it felt détente posed, the Soviet leadership in the end undercut its ability to exploit the many asymmetrical vulnerabilities that détente simultaneously exposed in American society. (p. 173)

In his final chapter, Gelman surveys the problems of Brezhnev's later years: the growing economic crisis; Brezhnev's declining health and his consequent boosting of his client Konstantin Chernenko; the successful challenge to this arrangement mounted by Yuriy Andropov, who replaced first Suslov and eventually Brezhnev himself. Although the book was finished before Andropov's death, Gelman struck just the right concluding note about Andropov's policies: discipline and reform and, if necessary, discipline before reform. His balance sheet of Brezhnev's achievements is favorable: much greater Soviet military power, including maintenance of the SS-20 advantage; Soviet gains in Afghanistan and Indochina; containment of the Polish and Chinese dangers, largely by military intimidation; and the firm maintenance of the monopoly of power by the Politburo aristocracy. Not at all a bad record of achievement, one might think.

WHY, THEN, does it seem less impressive today? Primarily, in my judgment, because the global "correlation of forces" has by now begun to change in favor of the United States and against the Soviet Union. This is so, I think, for two "subjective" and one "objective" reasons. The first was the decision of the Reagan administration simultaneously to break the inflationary spiral, refuel economic growth, and increase US military power. Whatever the domestic costs, these three objectives appear to have been achieved. More important, their achievement is recognized by opinion-forming strata in the United States and abroad, including (albeit unadmittedly) in the camp of "real existing socialism." Conversely, the Soviet Union has come to be perceived not as a future to be emulated but as a military power to be feared, and the latter less than before. (The collapse of Soviet prestige among Parisian *rive gauche* intellectuals is slowly but surely spreading throughout Europe and the Third World as well.) Moscow's apparent decision to cut its losses in Mozambique and turn Samora Machel over to the non-too-tender mercies of the South Africans has confirmed a new trend that Gelman does not discuss and could hardly have been expected to foresee, namely, the erosion of Soviet influence in southern Africa.

The second new development, which has also largely occurred after Gelman finished his book, is something that is still in part only adumbrated and may not come off at all. If it does, it will be of major importance for the global correlation of forces. I refer to the already successful agricultural reform in China, Deng Xiaoping's recently announced decision to extend the reform to urban areas, and the ideological absolutization of these policies by Beijing's recent proclamation that Marxism and Leninism cannot solve all of China's problems. If China's modernization continues on this path, and it can do so successfully only if massive importation of capitalist technology goes on, China will become more powerful and therefore less intimidated by the USSR. It will also become more tied economically with Japan and the West. Although the recent visit of First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov to Beijing again demonstrates that China is peripherally reciprocating Soviet desires for a partial Sino-Soviet détente, Moscow shows no signs of making concessions to Beijing or to Tokyo on the key issues separating it from China and Japan—Indochina and the southern Kuriles respectively. It thus seems that Moscow has committed basically the same error with Beijing and Tokyo that, as Gelman points out, it has with Washington: its appetite having grown with eating, Moscow is not prepared to rein it in.

A THIRD, "objective," development underlies the other two and is, in my judgment, the principal characteristic of the present epoch: the revolution in high technology, or high-tech. (Gelman unfortunately does not discuss this issue at all.) Briefly, the world is in the grip of a revolution in microelectronics and biotechnics more rapid, pervasive, and important than the Industrial Revolution itself. In this revolution the United States and Japan are increasingly getting ahead in nonmilitary high-tech, and the United States is getting farther ahead in military high-tech. It is unclear whether

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Western Europe will be able to overcome its high-tech backwardness vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. States of the Pacific rim (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) are keeping the pace. The Soviet Union, and even such a developed socialist state as East Germany, are falling more and more behind and can hope to bridge this high-tech gap only by economic reforms even more drastic than less developed China is undertaking, with the resultant risk of loss of political control. (That the Soviet Union is a multinational state makes such reforms even more difficult.)

The Soviet Union today is not collapsing, nor is it likely to collapse soon. But it does seem likely to have an economic growth rate for the near future of around two percent. Uniquely among developed countries, its mortality rates for males and infants are rising, because of pandemic alcoholism and inferior medical care. Its Muslim population is growing five times as fast as its non-Muslim population and is subject to infection by Islamic fundamentalism. These phenomena do not make rapid Soviet high-tech progress very likely.

It is in the military field that Soviet high-tech backwardness is the most serious problem for Moscow. One need only review the June 1982 losses inflicted by the Israeli air force on Syria's air force and anti-aircraft missiles to understand that electronic counter-measures (ECM) and counter-counter-measures (ECCM) have revolutionized conventional air combat. Precision-guided munitions (PGM) are doing the same for ground combat. The accuracy of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on both sides is such that the competition is shifting to command-control-communication and intelligence (C^3I), where ECM and ECCM can only be degraded by elaborate, highly sophisticated hardening. Finally, the Soviet volte face on its refusal to resume arms control negotiations until NATO's INF deployment was dismantled was the result not only of President Ronald Reagan's landslide reelection but also, and probably even more, of Moscow's concern about Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI), often called "star wars." Whether or not SDI will work, or should, is for the present not the issue. Rather, without some major unilateral US limitation on its SDI capability (which the Soviets probably exaggerate as Russians always have exaggerated Western technological advantage), the US military high-tech advantage will, in fact, regardless of Reagan's wishes, reestablish qualitative US military superiority. This will be so not only because US military and nonmilitary high-tech is superior to that of the Soviet Union but especially because capitalist high-tech is increasingly becoming multinationalized in ownership, management, and research and development— leading to interpenetration and rapid spinoff. This gives the United States payoffs for its own military high-tech.

THUS, in addition to the asymmetrical vulnerabilities of which Gelman rightly speaks with respect to the United States, the Soviet Union is developing several asymmetrical vulnerabilities itself. Moreover, while the US vulnerabilities are largely connected with political will, the Soviet ones are related more to technological capability and ideological appeal. Under circumstances of such double asymmetry, can arms control negotiations succeed? Gelman's conclusion with regard to this policy question seems to me balanced, judicious, and sensible. He writes:

Nothing that has been said here is intended to imply that a civil bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union is unfeasible or that arms control agreements with the Soviet Union are innately undesirable. On the contrary, a continual search for the possibility that areas of compromisable interest exist is highly desirable, both to preserve and reinforce the Western consensus and periodically to probe the evolution of attitudes within the Politburo. What is essential, however, is to strive to ensure that this search does not undermine sober expectations about the enduring nature of Soviet competitive urges. . . . It is the responsibility of Western elites to be willing to look steadily at the totality of Soviet behavior, to raise the political costs of venturesome Soviet conduct, to strive as best they can to narrow the avenues of Soviet opportunity, and in general to so conduct themselves as to encourage the valuable Leninist trait of prudence in the face of adverse circumstances. (pp. 217–18)

GELMAN'S BOOK does not focus on the truly decisive change that has occurred in international politics as a result of the introduction of nuclear weapons. That the United States and the Soviet Union can destroy each other, most of the rest of the Northern Hemisphere, and perhaps much of the Southern as well, does seem to me to be a clear and present danger. And, what is far more important, it is so perceived by the rest of the world. Gelman writes of the great differences in West European and US perceptions of the Soviet Union. Differences on this topic within the US are almost as great. It would seem to follow that the rulers of both the Soviet Union and the United States have increasingly had to take into account—due to their own fears and their estimates of the fears of others—this new factor of rising public fear of nuclear destructibility. (That this increase of fear is, I think, unjustified, is irrelevant.) We

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should also not underestimate the effect of the fear of nuclear war on, for example, educated West European and American youth: the peace and nuclear freeze movements are declining, but the Labour Party in Britain and the Social Democratic Party in West Germany no longer support the NATO deterrent consensus. The Reagan administration, too, has felt it desirable, indeed probably necessary, to adjust to the greater US public support for arms control negotiations.

Because it was written before this development, Gelman's book does not show that the climate in the West on Soviet-American relations is once again changing. This does not mean that "détente" is again just around the corner; far from it. Nor does it mean that Reagan is transforming himself into a Carter; even farther from it. Nevertheless, a successful American and NATO policy toward the Soviet Union cannot disregard these changes in Western public opinion, for that would be the politics of the impossible. Thus, in addition to Gelman's reasons for arms control negotiations, there is another one: the necessity—if only because it is unavoidable—that Western governments respond to the desire of their publics, including now the American public, that such negotiations with the Soviet Union be seriously undertaken.

There is one other, more controversial reason for such talks, and for détente itself. While détente's opponents in the West fear lest it destabilize the West and favor the East, its opponents in the East fear that it will destabilize the East by spreading Western influence there. Indeed, the latter has occurred, whereas the West does not seem all that destabilized by 1985 (although it seemed in more danger of becoming so in 1982 when Mr. Gelman finished his book). Pierre Hassner has set forth the classic analysis of why détente is both stabilizing and destabilizing.[3] An optimist might with some reason conclude that the West has shown itself better at the détente game than the East. A pessimist might conclude that Leo Labedz was right when he called it a game of "competitive decadence." But a moderate pessimist might well think that the Soviet Union is more threatened with decay than the United States, especially in this age of the high-tech revolution. One thing does seem clear: neither the Soviet nor the American leaderships can indefinitely resist pressures for the resumption of détente. Therefore, since this game cannot or should not be avoided, it behooves the West to play it as well as it can.

Fortunately for the West, and especially for the United States, the high-tech correlation of forces is indeed changing in its favor—and forms an important compensating factor, should public opinion again threaten to impede a realistic, prudent policy toward Moscow. Gelman's book provides an indispensable background for such a policy, and his concluding recommendations provide an excellent précis.

[3]Pierre Hassner, "Europe: Old Conflicts, New Rules," *Orbis*, Fall 1973, and "Europe from Cold War to Hot Peace," *Défense nationale* (Paris), March 1973.

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Revamping China's Military

Shu-shin Wang

THOMAS C. ROBERTS. *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War.* Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1983.

DAVID G. MULLER, JR. *China as a Maritime Power.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

HARLAN W. JENCKS. *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

THE CHINESE People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest army in the world, totaling some 4.23 million personnel—3.5 million ground forces, 330,000 naval forces, and 400,000 air force.[1] Yet, the PLA is not a potent fighting force. Its equipment is generally unsophisticated or obsolete; its tactics and strategy outdated. For the most part, its troops are insufficiently trained and uneducated. Morale is said to be low and indiscipline high. Politically, the PLA is encumbered by factional conflict and bureaucratism.[2]

To overcome these substantial shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping, China's most powerful leader, has taken steps to reform the military, calling for the modernization of all facets of PLA operations, mission, and equipment, as well as for the professionalization of PLA officers and soldiers. More important, he has attempted to reassert the party's absolute control over the army.[3] How successful has Deng been? Has China modified its military strategy? To what extent, and in which facets, has the army modernized? Is the party once again in complete control of the military? The answers to these questions are extremely important to the understanding of China's political and military development.

ANY assessment of the PLA's changing role, of course, must begin with an examination of the PLA's past. For decades, China's defense policy was dominated by Mao Zedong's theory of People's War. This doctrine, as Thomas Roberts and Harlan Jencks both point out, emphasizes people rather than weapons and relies on protracted, guerrilla warfare and the tactic of "luring the enemy in deep."[4] To be effective, such a defense requires a combined force of field armies, local forces, and militia. Colonel Roberts, former associate research fellow at the National Defense University and subsequently army attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing, focuses on the third component of these forces, the Chinese militia, examining its organization, mission, equipment, training, and relationship with the regular forces of the PLA.

Roberts's study is notable not so much for its assessment of the militia's role in People's War—he deems it crucial—but for its emphasis on the continuing importance of the People's War doctrine in Chinese defense strategy. Indeed, according to Roberts, "analysis of the evolution of PRC militia policy in the years from 1973 to 1981 leaves no doubt that People's War doctrine, with its component strategy of 'luring deep,' remains the keystone of planning for the ground defense of China..." (p. 109). But Roberts supports his

[1]See *The World Journal* (New York), Jul. 30, 1978; *Ming Pao Daily* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), Jul. 8, 1981; *The Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 1982; *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 29, 1982; and *The Gazette* (Montreal), Jan. 27, 1983.

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[2]For details, see *The Gazette*, May 13, 1981; *Wenhui Bao* (Shanghai), May 17, 1981; *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), Jan. 1, 1982, p. 15; *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), Aug. 12, 1982, Jan. 12, 1983, and Jan. 10 and Apr. 20, 1984; *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), Oct. 21, 1982; *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 5, 1982, and Jan. 5 and 9 and Apr. 4 and 20, 1984; *China Times* (Washington, DC), Apr. 23, 1983, and Mar. 28, 1984; and *Ming Pao Daily*, Oct. 31, 1983.

[3]See *The Gazette*, Sept. 9, 1980; *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 5, 1981, Mar. 6, 1983, and Feb. 1, 1984; *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), Jan. 20, 1982; *Hsing Tao Daily* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), Feb. 5, 1982, and Jul. 29, 1983; New China News Agency (hereafter Xinhua), Mar. 13, and Jul. 27, 1982; and *China Times*, Mar. 21, 1984.

[4]See Roberts, p. 2, and Jencks, p. 259.

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thesis with material that is outdated; his conclusion, which is based on an examination of the development of the militia from the early to the mid- and late 1970's, seems sound for that period. Mao was still alive, and the Gang of Four led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, attempted to use urban militia as a means to seize power. Even after Mao's death in September 1976 and the downfall of the Gang of Four a month later, China's political and military power was controlled either by Maoists, like Hua Guofeng, or by conservatives, like Ye Jianying.[5] Given such a political climate, it was inevitable that Chinese leaders would emphasize People's War and its militia component.

This situation changed dramatically after 1978. Deng outmaneuvered his Maoist rivals at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 and consolidated his control of the party at the next party congress in September 1982. Moreover, the PLA's poor showing in the border war against Vietnam in February 1979 exposed serious weaknesses in China's combat capability, as the Chinese military relied primarily on "human wave" tactics to overrun Vietnamese positions. Although China achieved some limited goals in the war, it paid a great price—high costs and heavy casualties.[6]

These factors accelerated Deng's reforms of the army. First, he and his supporters revised the concept of People's War, stressing the need to accommodate "modern conditions," in particular the relationship between people and weapons in a modern military: "In modern warfare," Deng noted, "the quantity of the armed forces should be decreased, not increased."[7] Next, they downgraded the role of the militia to a minor position in China's military strategy, deeming it useless in a nuclear war. At present, only on-duty or border militia (one part of the armed militia) is highly trained and well-equipped. Otherwise, the organizations of the common militia and the basic militia are very loose or exist in name only; militiamen receive virtually no military training, and most are not armed.[8] Finally, Deng and his colleagues accelerated the development of China's strategic weapons. Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, the prime mover in this regard and a staunch supporter of Deng, has persistently advocated concentrating military spending on China's nuclear arsenal and strategic missiles in order to hasten the modernization of the PRC's national defense.[9] Indeed, China has done so. For example, in 1982 it successfully test-fired its first submarine-based ballistic missile, moving China closer to a nuclear capability at sea; and in 1984 it launched its first communications satellite, which potentially can be used for military purposes.

This is not to say, however, that China has completely abandoned the doctrine of People's War. Indeed, as noted in *Beijing Review* in August 1982, no matter how advanced Chinese weapons and military equipment become, China "will persist in People's War... and further enrich and develop [it] in light of the new situations and modes of operation."[10] In my opinion, this indicates not that the current emphasis on "People's War under modern conditions" is nothing really new, as Jencks contends (p. 259), but that China is now evolving a more sophisticated two-pronged deterrent—using its strategic weapons to deter a nuclear war, and using its huge population and vast territory to deter a conventional war.

A CHANGE in Chinese naval strategy occurred a few years earlier than that in the ground forces. David Muller, a commander in the United States Navy, has contributed considerably to our understanding of China's emergence as a maritime power. Commander Muller analyzes the evolution of China's merchant marine and naval strategy since 1945, and provides useful information for further analysis. This is a pioneering work, and it is highly readable.

Prior to the appearance of Muller's study, few, if any, would have thought of China as a maritime power. Before the mid-1970's, China's merchant marine and navy were not highly developed. The Chinese navy lacked tradition, and both services saw their missions curtailed because of China's excessive isolationism during the Cultural Revolution, as well as the leftists' penchant for People's War at Sea (pp. 47, 119, and 155). After Deng's ascend-

[5]See Shu-shin Wang, "Party-Army Relationship in the People's Republic of China, 1959-1977: Ideological Conflict and Power Struggles Between Political and Military Elites," Ph.D. diss., West Virginia University, 1977, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI, 1978. See also Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1981, pp. 1-21.

[6]For details, see *Jiefangjun Bao*, Mar. 26, 1979; *Ming Pao Monthly* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), April 1979, pp. 19-26; *The Trend Monthly* (Hong Kong), March 1980, p. 9; *The Gazette*, Sept. 28, 1981; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), June 11, 1982, p. 24; *The Economist* (London), Mar. 12, 1983, p. 47; *The Perspective* (Hong Kong), June 16, 1983, p. 50; and *China Times*, Apr. 14, 1984.

[7]Cited in *Ta Kung Pao*, Aug. 2, 1982.

[8]In the past two months, I have interviewed more than 30 Chinese people who recently emigrated to Canada and the United States from China. It is interesting to note that in their opinion, China's militia is not as important as before.

[9]See *Ta Kung Pao*, Nov. 11, 1981; Zhang Aiping, "Several Questions Concerning the Modernization of China's National Defense," *Hongqi* (Beijing), Mar. 1, 1983, pp. 21-24, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 17, 1983, pp. K/6-7; Xinhua, Mar. 3, 1983; *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Mar. 4, 1983; *Ming Pao Daily*, Mar. 31, 1983; and *FEER*, Apr. 7, 1983, p. 21.

[10]Cited in *Beijing Review*, Aug. 2, 1982, p. 20.

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ancy, however, China moved from an isolationist to an open-door economic policy, and the Chinese navy changed from a People's War at Sea to a modern warfare doctrine (pp. 151, 158, 160, 168, 172, 184, and 188). By the early 1980's, China had become one of the largest merchant shipping powers in the world (p. 233), and its navy (in terms of personnel the third largest in the world, behind the United States and the Soviet Union) was already strong enough to undertake a variety of missions in support of China's regional interests and objectives (p. 224).

Muller stresses that China's development as a maritime power is only beginning (p. 1). In the future, he contends, Chinese leaders will further strengthen China's sea power in order to help modernize China's economy, explore for offshore oil, develop China's fishing industry, protect and promote China's maritime economic and territorial interests (including the islands in the South China Sea), deal with Soviet military expansion in the Far East, and "liberate" Taiwan (pp. 1–2 and 191).

Muller's optimistic appraisal seems justified. To bolster its merchant marine, China has developed its shipbuilding industry considerably. In 1982, Chinese shipyards built 1 million tons of merchant ships, an 11.9 percent increase over the previous year; by 1983, China had built up its merchant marine from an old, decrepit fleet totaling about 1 million tons into a modern fleet of some 10 to 11 million tons.[11] This rapid expansion of the merchant marine will undoubtedly contribute significantly to the development of the navy, which is already the beneficiary of a vigorous building program of submarines, destroyers, frigates, fast-attack aircraft, amphibious vessels, and support ships. In 1983, China built its first nuclear submarine equipped with guided missiles. That same year, under the leadership of Liu Huaqing, the commander of the navy and a Deng loyalist, China established three special research committees for naval development, revealed plans to build over the next decade five aircraft carriers and a dozen submarines equipped with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, and announced its decision to modernize its two biggest classes of surface warships—the Luta-class missile destroyer and the Jiangnan-class missile frigate, both with new electronic warfare equipment, missiles, and helicopters.[12]

Even so, owing to lingering technological weaknesses, the Chinese navy is still deployed in a coastal-defensive rather than a blue-water offensive posture. For example, the navy has no long-range submarines, no anti-submarine missiles, no operational surface-to-air missile system, and no up-to-date ship radar, electronics, and communications equipment.[13] To deal with the growing Soviet presence in Asia, China will no doubt continue its recent efforts to import some of this sophisticated technology and advanced equipment from the United States.[14] Otherwise, it will be unable to keep abreast of the rapidly changing Soviet force projections in the region.

HARLAN JENCKS, a research associate at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and a major in the US Army Reserve, focuses on the broader issues of military modernization and professionalization and party-army relations. According to Jencks, China's military modernization depends on the country's overall economic and technological development; its military professionalization is increasingly characterized by apolitical behavior on the part of the PLA's officer corps; and its party-army relationship is marked by the persistent loyalty of the army to the party.

Jencks's emphasis on the importance of technological-economic development in China's military modernization coincides with the PRC's long-term economic strategy. In the view of Deng and his supporters, without the modernization of agriculture, industry, and science and technology, the modernization of national defense cannot be realized.[15] Thus, the pragmatists have accorded economic and technological modernization highest priority in their modernization program.

However, Jencks's conclusions on the characteristics of China's military professionalism and party-army relations are oversimplified and not entirely consistent with the facts. Unless China changes the nature of its political and military systems, which seems unlikely, the Chinese military cannot avoid involvement in politics. On the one hand, the army is the pillar of the party. Mao's dictum that

[11] See *The Gazette*, Dec. 22, 1982, and Nov. 14, 1983.

[12] For details, see *China Times*, Jul. 30 and Nov. 26, 1983; *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 8, 1983; *The Gazette*, Nov. 26, 1983; and *Ming Pao Daily*, Nov. 29, 1983.

[13] As for the weaknesses of the Chinese navy, see *The Gazette*, Oct. 19, 1981; Richard Breeze, "The Wide, Blue Yonder," *FEER*, June 11, 1982, pp. 21-26; *Hsing Pao Daily* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), Jan. 29, 1983; and *China Times*, Apr. 20 and Jul. 23, 1983.

[14] The United States and China recently reached an agreement (though have not yet signed contracts) on the sale of military equipment to help modernize China's destroyer fleet. The items to be purchased are modern towed sonars, Mark 46 torpedoes, the Phalanx close-in (rapid-firing) weapons system, and gas turbine engines. The Chinese also agreed to an April 1985 port call by three American destroyers to Shanghai, the US Navy's first such port call since the communist takeover in 1949. See Daniel Southerland and Fred Hiatt, "U.S. Arms Sales to Help China Modernize Navy," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 12, 1985.

[15] See *Jiefangjun Bao*, Feb. 1, 1978; *The New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1978; *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 11, 1981 and Feb. 1, 1982; and *Business Week* (New York), Sept. 28, 1981, p. 55.

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"political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is still meaningful today. The recent record suggests that some powerful military men played an important role in the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, in Deng's second rehabilitation in 1977, and in Deng's defeat of Hua Guofeng and the consolidation of his control between 1978 and 1982.[16] On the other hand, the army serves many functions: a fighting force, a political force, and an economic production force (p. 254). PLA officers and men have participated in almost all of the more than 80 political campaigns the party has launched since 1949 and are at present thoroughly involved in the first stage of the party's rectification campaign.[17]

Jencks also seems to underestimate the Chinese military's interest in political activities and political power.[18] Take the career of Li Desheng for example. Li is a Politburo member and the commander of the Shenyang Military Region. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), he strongly supported the leftists and was promoted to party vice-chairman by Mao and his wife, Jiang Qing, at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. After Mao's death and the downfall of the Gang of Four, he established a close relationship with Hua and Ye Jianying, at the time two of China's most prominent leaders. When Deng regained power for the second time in 1977, Li gradually sided with him. In recent years, Li has repeatedly expressed his strong support for Deng and has severely criticized Deng's leftist opponents.[19]

The critical role played by PLA officers in the establishment of the provincial revolutionary committees in 1967 and the rebuilding of the provincial party committees in 1970 are further examples of military involvement in politics. In fact, in each of these events, military men in effect controlled all local power. When Mao ordered them to return to the barracks immediately after Lin Biao's demise in 1971, however, many military men used various tactics to retain their civilian posts. The party was able to reverse this situation completely only in 1980, when it implemented a series of reorganizations of the provincial party committees and finally abolished the provincial revolutionary committees.[20]

Despite Mao's dictum that "the party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party,"[21] the army's loyalty to the party has tended to be relative rather than absolute. For his part, Mao relied heavily on "divide and rule" tactics to control the army, compromising on certain issues if necessary. Deng has followed Mao's lead in this, primarily because there are still many factions within the army. Although Deng has been able to replace a large number of his opponents in the PLA with his supporters, the army remains the most potent center of opposition to his pragmatic policies—the downgrading of Mao's role in the Chinese revolution; the emphasis on economic liberalization, in particular the production responsibility system; the reemergence of the preeminence of intellectuals; the soft-pedalling of class struggle; the sidestepping of the army's special role in society; and the extensive use of a system of mandatory retirement as an important component of the effort to consolidate the party.[22]

In view of the Chinese Communist movement in the past 30 years, five hypotheses about party-army relations can be verified. First, the more intraparty conflict, the harder it is for the party to control the army; second, the more intra-army conflict, the easier it is for the party to control the army; third, the greater the intraparty conflict, the greater the importance of the army's role in the conflict; fourth, the greater the intraparty cohesion, the less the army's role in the policy-making process; and fifth, the greater the incompatibility of political goals between party and army, the harder it is to reconcile differences among the various groups and factions.[23]

ALTHOUGH Jencks provides a broad overview of almost all aspects of the Chinese military system since 1945, many statements in *From Muskets to Missiles* are ambiguous, contradictory, or wrong. For example, Jencks includes Ye Jianying in his list of "top PLA leaders" who have avoided involvement in politics (p. 29). Actually, Marshal Ye (age 86) is highly political. According to

[16]See Chang, loc. cit., p. 3; Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1978, pp. 1–11; and Richard D. Nethercut, "Leadership in China: Rivalry, Reform, and Renewal," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983, pp. 30–35.

[17]See *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 6, 1984, pp. K/1–3.

[18]*China Times*, Jul. 30, 1983.

[19]See *The World Journal*, Nov. 19, 1982; *Ming Pao Daily*, Apr. 16, 1983; *China Times*, Apr. 16 and May 6, 1983; and *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 13 and Jul. 4, 1983. Deng probably views Li's opportunism as an extremely dangerous threat to a smooth transition of power to his successors, Hu and Zhao. Thus, in my opinion, Deng will likely remove Li from his powerful position when the time is ripe.

[20]For details, see Zhang Yanwu, "China's Local Military Men and the Impact of Their Behavior on China's Political Future," *Ming Pao Monthly*, March 1980, pp. 2–11; *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 11, 1980; and David S. G. Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 1967–1979: An Obituary," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1981, pp. 49–78.

[21]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963, p. 272.

[22]For details, see *Chung Pao Monthly* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), October 1980, pp. 15–17; *Ming Pao Monthly*, May 1981, p. 9; *Cheng Ming*, Jan. 1, 1982, pp. 11–17; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Apr. 25, 1982, Jan. 12, 1983, and Jan. 10 and May 13, 1984; *Jiefang Ribao* (Shanghai), Aug. 28, 1982; *Ming Pao Daily*, Sept. 8, 1982; *FEER*, Sept. 10, 1982, pp. 14–15; *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 20 and Nov. 5, 1982; and *China Times*, Oct. 15 and Nov. 11, 1983, and Jan. 16 and May 15 and 25, 1984.

[23]Cited in Wang, op. cit., p. 440.

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Ellis Joffe, Ye "undoubtedly views himself (and is viewed by others in China) not solely as a representative of the military, but as a national leader whose concerns are not restricted by institutional boundaries."[24] Moreover, Ye has become the leader of the opposition to Deng's pragmatic policies. Although he was forced to resign his post as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—China's head of state—in 1983, Ye retains the vice-chairmanship of both the party's Military Affairs Commission (MAC) and the state's Central Military Commission, as well as membership on the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Recently, Ye has had to make certain concessions to Deng, and his public image and prestige seem to be diminishing somewhat.[25]

Jencks also claims that the PLA high command "surely welcomed and encouraged" what he terms the reversal of the "radical revision" of 1977–79,[26] which, he notes, is "hardly evidence" of "fundamental civil-military conflict" (p. 126). From 1979 to 1981, however, many mid- and high-level military officers did strongly oppose Deng's new political line and policies in part because they still deeply believed in Mao's revolutionary line and in part because Deng's new policies damaged their vested interests.[27]

The author compounds this misperception when he observes that "there appear to be virtually no radical Maoists (or 'Whateverists,' as they are currently called) among either commanders or commissars, especially in the main forces" (p. 245). He bases this judgment in part on official statements which "claim that when the 'gang of four' attempted to 'encourage ultra-democracy and ferret out capitalist-roaders' in the PLA in 1976, they met with solid resistance from all ranks at all levels" (p. 245). Jencks's account is misleading for two reasons. First, he confuses the radical Maoists and the "Whateverists." In official Chinese parlance, "radical Maoists" refer to the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan) and their followers, while the "Whateverists" refer to Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and their followers.[28] Second, and more important, 70 percent of the officers above the rank of deputy division commander were appointed during the Cultural Revolution; it is these officers who so far have constituted a major obstacle to Deng's pragmatic policies in the army.[29] Is it possible, under such circumstances, that there were no radical Maoists at the commander and commissar levels when the Gang of Four were arrested by Hua and his supporters in October 1976? Finally, owing to Jiang Qing's incredible notoriety, her enemies were virtually everywhere. Thus, by 1976, rapidly increasing numbers of anti-Jiang forces could be found in the party, the government, the army, and the society.[30] Is it not understandable that many radical Maoists in the army dared not stand up to support Jiang?

A RELATED area of some controversy is how to assess the interplay of ideology, military ethics, and power politics in party-army relations. In his examination of three of the most important party-military confrontations in PRC history, Jencks claims that Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, and Lin Biao "were all purged when they lost out in struggles for political power" (p. 253). Of the three, however, only Lin seems to fit neatly into the author's categorization. Peng's dismissal appears more the result of an ideological conflict than of a power struggle. He strongly opposed Mao's Three Red Banners policy—the general line of socialist construction,[31] the Great Leap Forward, and the people's commune—and insisted on the modernization of China's military. There is no concrete evidence that Peng intended to seize political power from Mao in the late 1950's, although Roderick MacFarquhar has speculated, wrongly I think, that he may have been used for this purpose by Zhang Wentien, an ambitious and politically astute alternate

[24]Ellis Joffe, "Party and Military in China: Professionalism in Command?" *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1983, p. 56.

[25]See *China Times*, Oct. 18, 1983. Ye apparently has had to concede not only to Deng's efforts to purge the ranks of the military, but also to Deng's open-door policy and economic reforms. See also John F. Burns, "40 High Officers Retire in China in Army Shake-Up," *The New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1984.

[26]*The so-called reversal of the radical revision of* 1977–79 to which Jencks alludes probably refers to Deng and his followers' June 1979 replacement of Hua Guofeng's ambitious 10-year economic plan (1976–85) with a plan of their own. In other words, according to Jencks, the PLA supported Deng's scrapping of Hua's economic plan and welcomed the new economic policies. As a matter of fact, a large number of military men opposed Deng's new policies.

[27]For details, see *Hua-Ch'iao Jih-Pao* (New York), June 2, 1979; *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 10, 1979, Oct. 27 and Dec. 19, 1980, and Feb. 11, 1981; *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 2, 1980; *Beijing Ribao*, Jan. 15, 1981; *The World Journal*, Jan. 17, 1981; *The Economist*, Mar. 21, 1981, p. 43; Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 77826, Apr. 14, 1981, p. 45; *JPRS*, No. 78709, Aug. 10, 1981, pp. 17-18, 50-53, and 71-74; *JPRS*, No. 79210, Oct. 15, 1981, pp. 25–28; *JPRS*, No. 79391, Nov. 6, 1981, pp. 43 and 47–49; *JPRS*, No. 79457, Nov. 17, 1981, pp. 59–61; *JPRS*, No. 80020, Feb. 3, 1982, pp. 60–61; *JPRS*, No. 80051, Feb. 8, 1982, pp. 50-51; *Ming Pao Daily*, Apr. 24 and Jul. 8, 1981; Xinhua, Apr. 28, 1981; *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 11, 1981; and *Cheng Ming*, Oct. 1, 1981, pp. 8–11.

[28]See Chang, loc. cit., for a comprehensive listing of the various factions in China between 1977 and 1981.

[29]See *Cheng Ming*, Apr. 1, 1981, pp. 7–8; *Ming Pao Monthly*, May 1981, p. 11; *Business Week*, Sept. 28, 1981, p. 55; and *JPRS*, No. 79457, Nov. 17, 1981, p. 61.

[30]Chao Tsun, "The Downfall of the Gang of Four," *Ming Pao Monthly*, November 1976, pp. 6–7.

[31]The general line stressed the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture through the simultaneous use of both modern and traditional methods of production. See, e.g., Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside: Rural Societal Policies in the People's Republic of China 1949–1979*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980, p. 24.

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Politburo member.[32] Luo seems to fall somewhere in the middle: like Peng, he opposed the People's War doctrine and advocated the modernization of the PLA; on the other hand, he sided with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, both victims during the Cultural Revolution.

This raises the more general issue of how military leaders are likely to resolve conflicts with party leaders in the future. Unfortunately, Jencks's study sheds little light on this topic. For one thing, the China Jencks sees is one in which serious "conflict" between the army and the party is unlikely. Military and party leaders may "quarrel over power or specific policies or priorities," but this apparently is not critical since "civilian and military men who share [the] 'revisionist' perspective appear to be in unchallenged control of China" (p. 268). According to this logic, military opposition to Deng's pragmatic policies is defined only as a quarrel. What then constitutes a conflict—only some unspecified type of military coup d'état Jencks refers to on page 256?

For another, Jencks advises against "making predictions with respect to individuals" since it is "hazardous" and "unnecessary" to do so (p. 268). But in China today politics is highly dynamic: the rule of man is still more important than the rule of law; and differentiation of functions and specialization among party, government, and army are just being developed. Thus, the study of personality of Chinese leaders remains an important element in our understanding of China's political development. Take Deng Xiaoping for example. Few would deny that Deng has moved China along a markedly different course than had either Mao Zedong or Hua Guofeng, even though he, like them, still strongly insists on the "four upholds"—the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leading role of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.[33]

WHAT has Deng's different course meant for the Chinese military? What measures has he taken to reform the army? And how successful has he been? Deng's main objectives have been to eliminate leftists, conservatives, and incompetents from the PLA, strengthen modern military training, revise outdated military tactics and strategy, regularize army procedures, and improve military equipment.[34] He has made some progress. He has managed to purge, or force into retirement, a large number of his political opponents from the army;[35] provide specialized scientific and technical training to both officers and troops; accelerate the production of strategic nuclear weapons; revise the People's War doctrine to accommodate modern conditions; reinstate insignia of rank; and replace some types of obsolete weapons with Chinese-made new ones.[36] He has also converted the Railroad Engineer Corps, comprising some 170,000 workers, to civilian status.

Yet, many problems persist. Despite Deng's efforts to reinvigorate the PLA leadership by promoting many younger and middle-aged cadres to high posts, most of the high-ranking military officers are old-timers. For example, the average age of the MAC chairman (Deng) and vice-chairmen is 81.8, and the average age of the commanders of the 11 military regions is close to 70. Moreover, although most of the top military leaders at the central and local levels are Deng loyalists, there is still considerable resistance from both leftists and conservatives throughout the PLA.[37] While they outwardly support Deng, they privately refuse to endorse his political line or carry out his policies either inside or outside the army. Indeed, Deng sees the persistence of Maoists in the PLA as one of China's most pressing problems: "If we cannot solve this problem before we die, our country will be in a great turmoil."[38]

[32]See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 204–5. Judging from the data and analysis put forward in the Union Research Institute's seminal study *The Case of Peng Tehhuai, 1959-1968* (Hong Kong, URI, 1968), I see no concrete evidence to support such a speculation.

[33]For details, see *Hongqi*, Jul. 16, 1983, pp. 2–6; Deng Xiaoping, "Suggestions on the Drafting of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (March 1980–June 1981)," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 1, 1983, p. 23; and Deng Xiaoping, "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership (August 18, 1980)," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 3, 1983, pp. 14–15.

[34]For details, see *Cheng Ming*, Dec. 1, 1981, pp. 9–10, and Apr. 1, 1983, pp. 7–9; *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 24, 1982, Feb. 25, Jul. 13, and Oct. 27, 1983, and Mar. 1 and Apr. 4, 1984; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Feb. 22, 1983, and May 18, 1984; *China Times*, Feb. 26, June 27, Aug. 1 and 5, and Nov. 28, 1983, and Feb. 6 and 24, Mar. 3 and 27, and May 5, 15, 23, and 26, 1984; *Ming Pao Daily*, Mar. 21, May 2, Jul. 16 and 25, Aug. 1, Sept. 20, and Nov. 23, 1983; Xinhua, May 6, Jul. 13, and Nov. 20, 1983; *International Daily News* (Toronto), Sept. 12, 1983; *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1983, and Apr. 9 and 10, 1984; *The Gazette*, Sept. 28, 1983; *Sino-American Daily News* (San Francisco), Oct. 20, 1983; and *Hsing Tao Daily*, Jul. 29 and Oct. 29, 1983.

[35]For example, in what has been called in the American press the "most important shake-up in China's General Staff in years," 40 top officers at the corps level or above (i.e., equivalent to three-star generals and above) were forced into retirement. According to a previously unpublished speech (made public on Dec. 29, 1984, but delivered to an Oct. 22, 1984, session of the party's Central Advisory Commission), Deng emphasized the need to promote people in their 30's and 40's, though he acknowledged that asking "old cadres to give up their positions to young people . . . is a very big problem." "Yet," he said, "we have to do this. We must move along this road." See Burns, loc. cit.

[36]For details, see *Ta Kung Pao*, Jan. 20, 1982, and Jul. 27, 1983; *Hsing Tao Daily*, Feb. 5, 1982; *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 24, 1982, Mar. 6, 1983, and Apr. 4, 1984; *Beijing Review*, Aug. 2, 1982, pp. 19–23, and *Beijing Review*, Aug. 9, 1982, pp. 5–6; *The New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1982; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Feb. 22, 1983; *China Times*, Feb. 26, June 6, and Sept. 23, 1983, and Feb. 6 and 23, Apr. 9 and 20, and May 26, 1984; and *Ming Pao Daily*, May 2, Jul. 25, and Oct. 1, 1983. In addition, China has manufactured the F-89, which has the ability to engage in air operations in bad weather and at night. See *International Daily News*, Feb. 29, 1984; and *China Times*, Apr. 16, 1984.

[37]See *FEER*, Apr. 7, 1983, p. 20; *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 1, 1984; *China Times*, May 14 and 15, 1984; and *Jiefangjun Bao*, May 15 and 18, 1984.

[38]Cited in *China Times*, Sept. 3, 1983.

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The pace of the effort to upgrade the educational and professional standards of the Chinese military has not been as speedy as Deng would have hoped. The bulk of enlisted men (80 percent) come from peasant backgrounds, and approximately two-thirds of the officers are still unqualified (many have only an elementary-school education).[39] The process of modernizing PLA weaponry has also proceeded slowly. This is due in part to the enormity of the task and the relative scarcity of key resources; it is also due in part to the policy preferences of the current leadership. According to a number of American military experts, it would take US$80–100 billion to help the Chinese army in its initial modernization program and to equip it with US weapons.[40] Even if China could afford such an outlay, and it cannot, it is unlikely that Chinese leaders would purchase massive amounts of foreign equipment. At present, Deng and his supporters prefer to develop China's own weapons system, importing only certain types of sophisticated weaponry and technology deemed essential.[41] As a result, PLA weaponry and equipment will most likely improve only gradually.

DENG is now 80 years old. The longer he lives, the better it is for his protégés Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the persistence of his policies, and political stability in China. At present, Deng alone has both the prestige and the ability to dominate the party, the government, and the army. Thus, after he dies, China's domestic situation will likely change. The groups that make up Deng's faction may splinter, and opposition to the Hu and Zhao forces may increase. Given such circumstances, the army may be able to exert considerable pressure on Deng's successors to change their pragmatic policies. In any event, China's political stability will be based on a collective leadership and depend on compromise among the various groups and factions.

It is in light of such prospects that Deng has directed the current program of modernization and professionalization of the PLA. Much will depend on the ongoing consolidation and rectification of the party (1983–1986)—and the PLA has been assigned a major role[42]—as well as the reform of the economy and of the Chinese educational system. But no matter how ardently Deng tries to diminish the PLA's power and prestige, the military will continue to play a decisive role in China's political future, and the party's control over the army will remain relative and not absolute.

[39] *FEER*, Apr. 23, 1982, p. 15; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Apr. 20, 1983; *Hsing Tao Daily*, Apr. 23, 1983; and *International Daily News*, Sept. 12, 1983.

[40] *JPRS*, No. 78709, Aug. 10, 1981, p. 73.

[41] Zhang, loc. cit., p. 22; and Yu Qiuli, "Modernization of National Defense and Building of People's Army," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 1, 1983, p. 15.

[42] See *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 6, 1984, pp. K/1–3. See also, "First-Phase Party Rectification Units in PLA Uphold Principle of Self-Education, Score Fine Results in Totally Negating the 'Cultural Revolution' from Theory to Practice," *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 5, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 10, 1984, pp. K/1-5.

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How Stalinist Was Mao's China?

Thomas P. Bernstein

MARK SELDEN and VICTOR LIPPIT, Eds. *The Transition to Socialism in China.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1982.

VICTOR NEE and DAVID MOZINGO, Eds. *State and Society in Contemporary China.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983.

ANITA CHAN, RICHARD MADSEN, and JONATHAN UNGER. *Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Village in Mao's China.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.

VIVIENNE SHUE. *Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949–56.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980.

SPECTACULAR shifts in direction have marked the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Only a few years ago, during the radical phase of Mao Zedong's rule, China was embarked upon a unique ideological and developmental course, or so it seemed in the West. Western scholars heralded China's exceptionalism, a key component of which was a socialist transformation that appeared to differ sharply from that followed in the Soviet Union. The PRC's conscious deviation from Soviet patterns was traced to Mao's questioning of the relevance of the Soviet model in the mid-1950's, his criticism of Stalin (for example, for having exploited the peasants), his rejection of fundamental concepts of Soviet socialist construction, and his open condemnation in the 1960's of "Khrushchev's Phony Communism." For Mao, the Soviet Union became China's "teacher by way of negative example," and he outlined specific steps that China must take in order to avoid following the revisionist errors of its northern neighbor.[1]

Much of the Maoist critique of the Soviet Union appeared to be aimed at the Stalinist core of the Soviet system and not merely at Nikita Khrushchev's innovations. As Maoists articulated an alternative socialist vision, they sought to implement policies that Stalin had jettisoned early on as being utopian, such as egalitarianism. Maoist social and political goals went hand in hand with an economic approach that also seemed to diverge from that of the Stalin era in its stated emphasis on balanced and decentralized development and on a cooperative relationship with the peasants. Many outside observers, including some of the authors under review here, saw Mao as grappling seriously with the core deficiencies of Marxist-Leninist systems, notably their tendency toward bureaucratic elitism and atrophy of popular participation.

IF CHINA'S divergence from Soviet patterns was a central theme of Western scholarship of the radical era (1958–1976), convergence is a central theme of post-Mao reappraisals. Indeed, as Mark Selden and Victor Lippit put it in their introduction, "at critical junctures, notably during the socialist high tide [that is, the collectivization of 1955–56], the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution periods, certain striking similarities between Maoist and Stalinist politics may be observed . . ." (p. 14).[2] This new image is based on revelations made public by Chinese leaders during a sweeping critique of the leftist era that began in December 1978, when the historic 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee inaugurated the current reform period.

This critique, the findings of which are reflected in various articles in both the Selden-Lippit and Victor Nee-David Mozingo anthologies, charges that in terms of economic

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[1]See "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World," in A. Doak Barnett, *China After Mao*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 123–95. See also Moss Roberts et al., Eds., *A Critique of Soviet Political Economy by Mao Tse-tung*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1977.

[2]The editors attribute this formulation to one of their contributors, Edward Friedman.

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policy, rather than having pursued balanced development, Mao's China actually gave absolute priority to heavy industry, followed a Stalinist extensive growth strategy of relying on huge investment rates, and squeezed the peasants via price scissors and procurements. The critique further charges that Mao's much-vaunted class struggle waged against elitist bureaucrats produced not a more egalitarian or participatory socialism, but a society dominated by an arbitrary and abusive bureaucracy, whose special privileges, often secured through the "back door," were similar to those enjoyed by the Soviet elite. Perhaps most telling, the critique asserts that terror was a hallmark of the radical Maoist era, especially of the Cultural Revolution, defined now as lasting not for three but for ten years (1966–76). Repression did not simply consist of uncontrolled violence perpetrated by fanatical Red Guards or of the well-known Chinese practice of thought reform, but of a wide-ranging "Soviet-style" police and prison camp terror, the full dimensions of which have yet to be adequately understood.[3]

One of the most remarkable features of this turnabout in perception has been a surfacing of the contrast between the stated intent and the actual outcome of Maoist innovations. "One is arrested by the gnawing realization," concludes Andrew Walder in his study of the Maoist legacy in Chinese industry, "that the only 'Maoist experiment' that ever existed was to be found in the intellectual reconstructions of Western observers" (Selden-Lippit, p. 235). Ironically, most Western scholars missed what Mao himself had found in 1959, namely, that Stalinism could be an unanticipated outcome of radical initiatives. During a moderate phase of the Great Leap Forward, Mao spoke as follows of the people's communes, formerly viewed widely as a radical departure from Soviet orthodoxy:

We should make a comparison between Stalin's agricultural policies and our own. Stalin had too much enthusiasm. With the peasants, he drained the pond to catch the fish. Right now, we have the same illness.[4]

It was not just with regard to communes that Maoist practices unintentionally came to resemble Stalinism. Walder, writing in Selden-Lippit on Maoist experiments with workers' participation, wage egalitarianism, and management reform, concludes that the results ran "in precisely the opposite direction from that which Maoists intended and Western observers expected" (p. 220). Instead of leading to greater worker participation, "power became concentrated completely in the hands of a single administrator at each level of the factory, especially after 1967" (p. 221). Thus, intent notwithstanding, rather than constituting "a genuine departure from Soviet patterns established under Stalin," Maoist efforts at reform actually intensified, not alleviated, "the problems characteristic of centralized Soviet-style economies" (p. 216). With regard to the Chinese system as a whole, Tang Tsou, writing in Nee-Mozingo, also takes note of unanticipated consequences:

Mao's successors were forced to ask the fundamental question why a movement for class and human liberation had developed into one of the most oppressive systems in Chinese history—what the Chinese communists call "feudal fascism." (p. 56)

And in the same volume, Maurice Meisner views the cult of Mao Zedong, in intensity an analogue to the Stalin cult, as a "grotesque outcome of a movement that had been launched under a doctrine that demanded the restoration to society of the powers usurped from it by the state" (p. 125).

THIS CHANGE in perception raises a host of questions. Was convergence with Stalinism the dominant trend of the radical era, or was it only one of several competing currents? Stated somewhat differently, is the current perception essentially a reaction to an earlier, distorted picture of Maoist China, or a valid, substantive reappraisal made possible by new research and the release of previously unavailable data? After all, only a cursory glance reveals major differences between the Maoist and Stalinist eras at least on the level of events. There is simply no Soviet equivalent to Mao's mobilization of the masses against the party as an institution during the Cultural Revolution. To be sure, Soviet specialists have found that leftist, populist pressures, especially against bourgeois intellectuals, made themselves felt "from below" during the Soviet First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), pressures that resembled those of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.[5] But their scope, scale, duration, and impact were so modest as to constitute a difference in kind, not just degree. However, the leftist outbreaks in both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Cultural Revolution were encouraged or initiated "from above."

[3]Accounts of prison experiences during the Cultural Revolution era have emerged in Chinese fiction. See, e.g., Wang Ruowang, "Hunger Trilogy," *Shouhuo* (Shanghai), No. 1, 1980, pp. 116–73.

[4]"Mao Tse-tung's Speeches at the Chengchow Conference," February and March 1959, *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Winter 1976–77, p. 18.

[5]See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–31*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1978, esp. Fitzpatrick's chapter, "Cultural Revolution as Class War."

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The point to be made here is that there were many roads to Stalinism. Indeed, it was Mao's *un*-Stalinist mobilization of the Red Guards that contributed to the emergence of a Stalin-type personal despotism. But why did it happen? Why did stated ideological intent diverge so far from actual outcome? Moreover, if convergence with Stalinism was the dominant trend of the Maoist era, what happened to differences in revolutionary origins, to which much attention has been paid in Western literature, and which were thought to have decisively influenced post-revolutionary developments in China?[6] What, in other words, became of the Yan'an model of "mass-line" state-society relations after 1949 or after 1957?[7] How could Maoism have degenerated into a "feudal-fascist dictatorship," as a Chinese post-Mao label would have it, one eerily reminiscent of Nikolay Bukharin's charge that Stalin was engaged in the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasants"?[8]

These questions are only partially answered in the books under review. For one thing, determining the extent of convergence of the two systems requires full-fledged comparison and explanation of similarities and differences. But this is not a task undertaken in these studies, which deal with China alone. The Selden-Lippit and Nee-Mozingo anthologies implicitly or explicitly only *raise* the question of the extent to which Stalinist tendencies arose in China. For another, these volumes do not provide the reader with a fully worked out definition of Stalinism. Rather, the term is used as a way of calling attention to the growth in China of abusive state power. Stalinism is taken to mean a despotic, all-powerful bureaucratic state that relies on coercion and terror. To Selden and Lippit, who are disillusioned by Maoism but continue to search for a morally acceptable socialism, Stalinism is the very antithesis of what they want. Their ideal is a socialism in which the form of state or cooperative ownership is invested with the substance of popular control. By this definition, it would seem that there are no socialist systems anywhere, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia. Certainly China does not qualify. The issue they pose, then, is why, how, and to what extent state power in China grew to Stalinist dimensions.

Not all authors in the anthologies, however, agree that Chinese state power did become overwhelming, abusive, and exploitative. Victor Nee, for instance, writing on the rural militia, argues that local power—an important theme in modern Chinese history—served to check the reach of national power, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. While Nee is not able to show that local leaders could "blunt and even sabotage unpopular policies" (p. 243)—his only example coming from the highly unusual circumstances of the Cultural Revolution—he does show that in the rural areas personal ties and patronage networks affected the way in which the state wielded power. David Mozingo, moreover, suggests that because of the involvement of the military in politics, the Chinese party-state was less than monolithic. Whereas in the Soviet Union power was transferred early on from party soldiers to party bureaucrats, in China, he notes, this process was not completed, enabling the military to play a much more independent political role.

This raises important questions about differences in Stalin's and Mao's power. After the Great Purge (1936–38), Stalin was beyond challenge; his lieutenants fought only among themselves. Mao, by contrast, withstood several serious challenges to his leadership, most notably that by Lin Biao, his designated successor, in 1971. To be sure, Mao prevailed and was able a few years after Lin's fall to transfer long-entrenched regional military commanders. But a full-scale comparative analysis of top-level power relations is needed before deciding whether it is valid to assign the Stalinist label to Mao.

IF THE dominant theme in the two anthologies is that Mao's China did come to resemble Stalin's despotic regime, why and how did this resemblance come about? Four explanations emerge. The first two focus on the roots of total state power; the last two on its perpetuation. First, Tang Tsou attributes the emergence of an all-powerful state to the enormous crisis China faced in the first half of the 20th century, a crisis that led to a search for and acceptance of totalistic solutions. Tsou also points to Mao's own penchant for dictatorship, which emerged as early as 1942 in Yan'an, when Mao attacked pluralism, demanding complete conformity from writers, and implicitly, therefore, from all professional groups.[9]

A second explanation focuses on international factors and is sug-

[6]See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979, for a structural analysis of this point.

[7]The ideal of the "mass line" style of leadership was "from the masses, to the masses." Leaders were to take the "scattered and unsystematic" ideas of the masses, study them, shape them into coherent and systematic ideas, and then go back to the masses to explain and put them into action. This process was to be repeated endlessly, the ideas becoming "more correct" with each cycle. See Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 275–76.

[8]See, e.g., Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 2nd. Ed., Rev., New York, Random House, 1970, p. 377. For an in-depth study of Bukharin's views on collectivization and the peasantry, see Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography*, New York, Knopf, 1973.

[9]For a thoughtful analysis of Mao's dealings with writers during the Yan'an period, see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895–1980*, New York, Viking Press, 1981.

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gested separately in Selden-Lippit by the Japanese economist Kojima Reiitsu and the American political scientist Edward Friedman. Threats from the United States and later the Soviet Union, they contend, were at least in part responsible for the growth of overwhelming state power. This is a thesis that deserves fuller, comparative analysis. China, after all, is not the only instance of a revolutionary system whose leaders, because of real or perceived foreign threats, develop a siege mentality, and thus rationalize repression and totalitarian mobilization. In his stimulating essay, "Maoism, Titoism, Stalinism," Friedman explores this foreign-domestic linkage by focusing on Mao's opposition to Titoist political currents that had emerged within the Chinese leadership in 1949. He did this, according to Friedman, in order to demonstrate his loyalty to Stalin and to secure Soviet assistance, but in a context in which Mao regarded Tito's acceptance of American support, coming at a time when China faced intense American hostility, as a form of betrayal. The same reasoning led Mao to oppose Khrushchev's 1955 reconciliation with Tito and to continue on a Stalinist course.

Friedman's argument reinforces an old explanation, namely, that Chinese Stalinism originated during the years of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Friedman sees Mao as embarking on a unique course only during the Great Leap Forward, for the Leap's "campaign politics, moral incentives, and despecialization would be found neither in Titoism nor in Stalinism" (p. 196). In a chapter in the Nee-Mozingo volume, however, Friedman offers a somewhat different view, charging Mao with being "guilty of Stalinism starting in 1957" (p. 168), when Mao launched the antirightist terror campaign against those who had spoken out too boldly during the liberal Hundred Flowers episode. Mao's reaction to this sprouting of so many "poisonous weeds" culminated in his 1962 thesis, "never forget class struggle," which was not dissimilar to Stalin's call for the sharpening of the class struggle in the 1930's.

A third explanation looks at the institutions created as a result of the emulation of Soviet industrialization strategy. Several authors note that the resulting fusion of economic, political, and bureaucratic power enormously strengthened the state, a situation that radical Maoist assaults were unable to change. Indeed, Mao himself complained in early 1961 that even though he had been talking about reversing the priority given to heavy industry for five years, state plans had not changed.[10] Even after Mao's complaint, heavy industry continued to be accorded priority, despite the post-Leap slogan "Agriculture as the Foundation."[11]

The fourth explanation concerns the Maoist failure to change China's Soviet-style economy, a failure that was due not only to the power of competing interests but also to the programmatic limitations of Maoism. As Dorothy Solinger suggests (in the Nee-Mozingo volume), one of the fundamental reasons why Maoists did not get very far in making changes was that they rejected the one antidote to bureaucratic power that would have made a difference—the market. Assorted political leaders and economists favored the market at various points in the 1950's and 1960's, but they did not prevail. For Mao, the market was revisionism incarnate. As Solinger notes, moreover, hostility to commerce is both a legacy of traditional China and a part of the Marxist tradition; the two strands merged in Mao's thought. Having rejected the market as a potential mechanism to bring about needed change, Maoists could only experiment with administrative decentralization, relying on a vigorous cadre force indoctrinated in Maoist values as well as in class struggle.

But implementation was chaotic, taking place in an environment of factional struggle, violence, and intolerance. Most important, as Walder stresses, Maoists did not really know how to attain what they wanted. They groped for more equality and greater worker participation but lacked an understanding of how to achieve these goals. Walder asserts that the goals of increasing participation and equality were not in themselves utopian. However, bringing them about would have required measures congruent with worker interests. The collapse of the work ethic could have been avoided if, for instance, equality had not been promoted simply by freezing wages, which in turn created new inequalities, especially among young workers. Radicals failed to think through the consequences of their policies. In the final analysis, Mao's own limitations as a radical thinker were at fault.[12]

IF ANY aspect of Maoist state-society relations was thought to have been the very antithesis of Stalinism,

[10]See *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), 1967 Compilation, Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1974, pp. 258–59.

[11]It is interesting to note that during the current reform period, a fundamental shift in investment priorities among the three sectors of heavy and light industry plus agriculture has also not been achieved, though policy has aimed in the direction of such a shift. This points to the existence of powerful, conservative interests in favor of heavy industry, and calls for comparison with the Soviet case, for example, Khrushchev's struggle with the "steel eaters." See, e.g., Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 225–26.

[12]Walder suggests that Mao was actually only critical of the later, conservative Stalin, but not of the Stalin of the "revolution from above" who believed in strong leadership buttressed by commitment. Friedman, writing in Nee-Mozingo, also quotes Chinese critics who see Stalinist elements in Mao's thought.

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it was the rural one. But here, too, post-Mao "revisionists" see convergence. In language reminiscent of Alec Nove's essay on Soviet "Peasants and Officials,"[13] William Hinton, the well-known author of a highly sympathetic account of rural revolution, *Fanshen*, observes in the Selden-Lippit volume:

In the real order that determines priorities in China, peasants occupy the lowest rung, just as they always have historically. Any official at any level takes precedence over a peasant.... Anything created by a peasant who lives in the administrative sphere of a higher official, if it will enhance the latter's career, can be moved, removed, manipulated, or expropriated by that official just as if he were the lord of a feudal fief. (p. 114)

As Friedman sees it, and Selden concurs, the turn to Stalinism in rural China came in 1955, during all-out collectivization, for it was then that "Mao abandoned his prior policy of voluntary, gradual cooperativization, a policy which still held late in July 1955, for an embrace of Stalin's policy of forced, rapid collectivization" (Selden-Lippit, p. 184). This switch to coercive collectivization came about, argues Selden in a detailed analysis of socialist transformation, because of the state's need for accumulation, itself the product of overambitious industrialization targets. In so doing, Mao opted for the Stalinist approach of social engineering from the top down, tragically extinguishing the democratic possibilities of the cooperative movement, and leading to greatly enhanced arbitrary state power over local communities. Selden supports his case with rich data, for example, on the destruction of rural handicrafts (pp. 53–54), thereby establishing a little known similarity with the Soviet case.[14] In the "conflict between a state bent on centralizing resources for efficient modern processing and export and the handicraft industry," he notes, "the state won" (p. 53). He further argues that the land of the middle peasants was expropriated during the high tide and that long-term consequences were income stagnation and the discrediting of socialist ideals.[15] This line of argument, incidentally, is quite similar to that offered by Chinese leaders after 1978.

In analyzing Chinese collectivization, Selden notes that it differed from its Soviet counterpart in that violence, resistance, and killing were largely absent. The Chinese case, he concludes, was one of "nonviolent coercion." But such a qualification raises doubt as to the appropriateness of the Stalinist label, for violence was at the core of the Soviet collectivization process. Indeed, in analyzing not only Soviet collectivization but the entire Stalin era, Moshe Lewin concludes: "For a good quarter of a century, extracting grain from the peasants amounted to a permanent state of warfare against them and was understood as such by both sides."[16]

That Chinese collectivization was largely free from violence was due to a number of reasons. Unlike their counterparts in the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists had fairly strong local party organizations and a measure of local support. Mao's agrarian policy was not as inimical to peasants' interests as was Stalin's. To be sure, as Kojima points out, extraction was a major issue in China; and similar to the Soviet case in 1932–33, it was carried to the point of famine at least once, in 1959–60. But even then, the cause lay in extraordinary miscalculations rather than in a deliberate "war" against the peasants.[17] The point that emerges is that both Soviet and Chinese collectivization belong to the same class of events: they are instances of state-induced change in which agriculture was subordinated to state purposes. But within this broad similarity, the differences were so substantial that subsuming both under the heading of "Stalinism" distorts reality.

Friedman and Selden both view the collectivization drive in 1955 as a watershed in PRC history. Before then, they contend, the establishment of agricultural producers' cooperatives (APC's) was essentially voluntary and aligned with peasants' material interests, though marred occasionally by resort to coercion. But, notes Seldon, the "high tide–great leap strategies, for all their originality and boldness, and for all the genuinely heroic achievements of millions of workers and peasants, set back the prospects of socialism." Thereafter, continues Selden, for many Chinese, the "mutual benefit" of the "promise of socialism in general and cooperation in particular" gave way to the "permanent sacrifice of the individual to the Party and state and the perpetual deepening of

[13]Alec Nove, "Peasants and Officials," in Jerzy F. Karcz, Ed., *Soviet and East European Agriculture*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 57–76.

[14]For a discussion of the destruction of handicrafts in the USSR, see K. C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies," in Donald W. Treadgold, Ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1967, p. 339. Selden's findings on Chinese handicrafts supersede Yeh's earlier research which had held that "the Chinese tried to preserve the handicraft industries and to encourage them to expand." See ibid. and corresponding footnote.

[15]The current restoration of household farming may be seen as a response to the underlying rural crisis caused by collectivization. But also see the discussion of Chen Village in this essay.

[16]Moshe Lewin, " 'Taking Grain' : Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements before the War," in D. Abramsky, Ed., *Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr*, London, Macmillan, 1974, p. 282.

[17]For an analysis of the Chinese famine in light of the Soviet experience, see T. P. Bernstein, "Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great Leap Forward," *Theory and Society* (Amsterdam), May 1984, pp. 339–77.

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class struggle" (p. 86). By decoupling revolutionary change from the promise of cooperation and mutual prosperity, the Maoists altered, negatively, the course of socialist transformation in China (p. 87).

Selden's thesis is certainly thought-provoking. But is it accurate? From a purely theoretical point of view, the feasibility of truly voluntary collectivization is questionable, if only because peasants' fear of "free riders" would necessitate leadership and organizational pressures to overcome their reluctance to join in a collective undertaking.[18] Moreover, Vivienne Shue's *Peasant China in Transition*, a thoroughly researched study of socialist transformation from land reform to collectivization, and based on data from Hunan and Hubei provinces, provides empirical evidence that suggests that the pre-1955 transformation was not really voluntary. She does note that the party rejected the use of force against peasants, treating cadre "commandism" as a serious deviation from party policy. But voluntariness was constrained by class struggle against designated enemies, which must have had an impact on the motivations of those not so attacked. Chinese leaders succeeded, she concludes, because they were able gradually and skillfully to cut off all but the socialist option for change. As rural trade, marketing, and credit were socialized, the route to smallholder prosperity was increasingly limited, leaving peasants with no alternative except accommodation. Material incentives made such accommodation more attractive than it otherwise would have been, but Shue's rich material on the implementation of various economic policies makes it clear that this manipulative process prohibited peasants from making a genuine choice. Thus, Shue sees the "high tide" of collectivization not as a significant departure from earlier party policy, but as the culmination of the preparatory period of cutting off smallholder options. It was based on Mao's belief that local cadres were willing and anxious to move ahead quickly and that poor peasants were eager to get hold of middle peasants' assets. A fundamental difference from the Soviet case therefore lies in the Chinese capacity to tap intravillage cleavages, whereas in the Soviet Union, village conflicts tended to be muted by the overriding salience of state-peasant conflict.[19]

STATE-PEASANT relations in the 1960's and 1970's, the heyday of Maoist radicalism, are explored in *Chen Village*, coauthored by three American sociologists, Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger. This study of a village in southern Guangdong Province is based on interviews with 26 former residents who migrated to Hong Kong, most but not all illegally. Twelve were peasants, born and raised in the village; 14 were recent graduates of junior- and senior-high schools who had been "sent down" to the countryside from Guangzhou (Canton) in 1964.[20] The authors detail the impact on the village of the various campaigns that were a hallmark of the Maoist era, tracing village activities from the socialist education movements of 1963–66, through the Cultural Revolution proper (1966–69), to the numerous follow-up campaigns of the last years of Mao's rule. What makes this study so valuable is that it shows how national policies translated themselves into the world of village politics, interacting with local conflicts, interests, and cleavages.

Chen Village is not typical of all of rural China, a point the authors recognize. It is not only the proximity to Hong Kong that makes for a difference, but also that post-Mao generalizations about rural China during the radical era do not fully apply to this case. Instead of being passive victims of a pattern of unrelieved leftist oppression,[21] the authors found that a good many peasants were in fact committed to Maoism, though only for a few years. And instead of experiencing the economic stagnation which is said to have characterized rural China between 1957 and 1977, Chen Village prospered, as peasant incomes from the collective sector doubled between 1964 and 1968. However, incomes then declined by a third, remaining below the high of the 1960's until after Mao's death in 1976 (p. 247).

Three issues of comparative interest emerge. The first concerns the Soviet and Chinese imposition of arbitrary and irrational directives. In the Soviet case, such directives were a central theme of the entire Stalin period and a major cause of peasant dissatisfaction. In the Chinese case, assuming Chen Village is somewhat typical at least in this regard, irrational directives were a periodic problem, as during the Great Leap Forward and again in the 1970's. To be sure, the Maoist period witnessed endless higher-level interventions into the affairs of Chen Brigade and its constituent production teams. Sometimes this intervention came in

[18]See the discussion in Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979.

[19]See also Thomas P. Bernstein, "The State and Collective Farming in the Soviet Union and China," in Raymond Hopkins et al., Eds., *Food, Politics, and Agricultural Development*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, pp. 73–106.

[20]The practice of "sending down" Chinese urban dwellers to the countryside was an important part of the party's overall policy to reduce urban unemployment while promoting rural revolution and development. See Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

[21]For one such wholesale indictment, see Li Xuechang, "Leftist Errors in Village Work," *Shanghai Shehui Kexue*, No. 1, 1981, pp. 26–32.

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very direct form, as from February 1965 to December 1966, when a work team of 13 members lived with the peasants, carrying on the "Big" Four Cleanups campaign (politics, economics, ideology, organization) against cadre corruption. In this case, the aim was to mobilize peasants to expose the misdeeds of their leaders, in the process educating the former and purifying the latter. Other campaigns aimed at promoting class struggle, "cleansing class ranks," and curtailing private economic activity. But in addition to political goals, campaigns also aimed at increasing output by getting peasants to work harder, to adopt better work methods, and to carry out important infrastructural projects, such as land improvement.[22]

A central finding of this study is that the peasants in Chen Village responded to higher level interventions so long as these campaigns were linked with efforts to increase concrete material payoffs. This linkage existed in the years of increasing prosperity, 1964–68, but was later severed. Campaigns became more and more arbitrary, resulting in the imposition of requirements that peasants grow unsuitable crops and curtail essential sideline occupations and private plots. The authors sum up this change as follows:

In the Four Cleanups the peasants had discovered that the time-consuming projects demanded by the workteam were in the village's own interest. After the Four Cleanups workteam had left, they had continued to innovate and to engage in labor-intensive projects to improve the village infrastructure. Now, however, they were relearning to distrust all higher-level claims and to resent the imposition of new policies from outside. As of the mid-1970s, most of the Chens just wanted the state to leave their teams alone. (pp. 240–41)

A second issue is extraction or procurement. In Selden-Lippit, Kojima argues that peasants bore the burden of national accumulation in the early and middle 1960's. But in Chen Village, procurement does not seem to have been an issue in the early 1960's. Perhaps this was due to the village's poverty; it had so little to sell to the state. However, even after production increased, and the village began to prosper, state procurement did not seem particularly burdensome. In fact, it was resented and resisted only in the early 1970's, when the state, in a fashion familiar to students of Stalinist grain practices, kept adding to existing quotas, asking for "Loyalty Grain," "Aid Vietnam Grain," and "Prepare for War" grain (that is, against the Soviet Union). Local reserves were also supposed to be built up, adding to the pressure on consumption. Whereas the quest for grain under Stalin was the central factor defining regime-peasant relations, in Chen Village, this quest became painful only at times.

A third point concerns peasant commitment. As the authors report, even by the mid-1960's, communist ideology had little impact on peasant attitudes in Chen Village. Thus, in the fall of 1965, the work team there received instructions that its "principal mission" was to teach peasants the "sacred virtue and power" of Mao Zedong Thought (p. 74). To help accomplish this task, the work team conducted mandatory five-day intensive training sessions on Mao's teachings and installed a broadcast system with some 30 speakers. Young people embraced the new faith. The genuinely true believers were the urban youths who had been sent down from Guangzhou. Peasant youths were also eager, but a bit less so, owing to familial obligations that inhibited them from challenging their elders. (Richard Madsen's essay on peasant youths in the Nee-Mozingo volume is a telling analysis of how these cross pressures worked themselves out.) But they too, as well as older peasants, were excited by the Maoist vision of a "relatively egalitarian society bound together by selfless commitment to the common good" (Madsen in Nee-Mozingo, p. 251). It was a commitment that had a tinge of religion, both in its ceremonial and in its witchhunting propensities. It thus had a coercive aspect, but it was also based on self-interest. Commitment was strong among peasants who lacked labor power and hence depended on the collective. And it was based on the prosperity of 1964–68:

The Mao study, the broadcasts, the contests, praise, and criticism resulted in a greater work discipline. People felt under greater pressure to conform; but they also believed in the power of Mao's teaching to give them better lives, just so long as they faithfully obeyed his words. (pp. 86–87)

The authors' findings that normative commitment existed, even in a context of coercive intolerance, comes as something of a surprise. After all, since 1978, the Chinese have been telling the outside world that Cultural Revolution Maoism was nothing more than a contrived fraud imposed upon an unwilling society. One explanation for the upsurge of commitment in Chen Village, which the authors touch on, is that it was

[22]Chen Village, of course, proceeded apace from land reform after "liberation" through lower and higher collectivization to communization during the Great Leap Forward. But the Leap had a disastrous effect on the village, as it did almost everywhere in the Chinese countryside. When many of the Leap's policies were either discarded or reversed in 1961, Chen Village, as a whole, was designated a "production brigade" and was divided into five production teams, each composed of 40 or so families. See *Chen Village*, pp. 24–27.

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an analogue to a millenarian movement. But the main reason is peasant self-interest. As William Parish and Martin Whyte suggested several years ago and as the current authors agree, peasant commitment hinged on the extent to which ideology was congruent with peasant or local interests.[23] Changes in the 1970's validate this point. As prosperity declined and outside intervention became more irrational and extreme, peasant devotion and belief declined. Events such as the fall of Lin Biao reportedly dealt "a shattering blow" to the beliefs of young people (Madsen in Nee-Mozingo, p. 260). Indeed, peasant alienation from the regime increased greatly in the 1970's. It was a case of burnout, which undoubtedly figured as a key factor necessitating the post-Mao retreat away from collectivism.

The 1970's, as well as the Great Leap Forward of 1958–60, were periods in which the state's alienating impact resembled the Stalinist pattern. But what is different is that at least in this village, there was a period in which quite a few peasants apparently embraced Maoism, though a Maoism premised on material incentives, namely, the furtherance of local prosperity. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, except for the patriotic surge during World War II, it appears doubtful that serious commitment to the regime existed at any time in the Stalinist village, apart from a few fringe elements or outsiders. In making this comparative point, it must be observed, however, that there are virtually no studies of Soviet villages during the Stalin period that provide a similarly detailed exposition of the interplay of national policies with local village politics.[24] But to the extent that the existing picture of Soviet villages is accurate, it seems that the kind of upsurge in commitment that swept through Chen Village is unique to China.

THE DECLINE in support that occurred in Chen Village and the increasingly coercive and abusive stance of the state were not confined to rural China. One common source of declining support in both the Chinese countryside and the city can be found in the lack of opportunity for upward mobility. Peasants in China were bound to the land in a way far less easy to circumvent than in Russia, where large-scale migration had occurred even when the regime sought to restrict it. Perhaps even more damaging, workers' chances to be promoted declined in China, as Walder indicates, and urban youths, instead of having a chance to move up through the educational system, were sent by the millions to the villages to become peasants. (Many of the "sent down youths" in Guangdong, including those in Chen Village, became disillusioned and fled to Hong Kong for this reason.) Workers and peasants in Stalin's Russia, by contrast, had numerous avenues for upward mobility, generated by industrialization, purges, and war. Stalin created an achievement-oriented educational system and proved willing to absorb the technically trained into the party, thereby generating powerful sources of support.[25] In Maoist China, however, trends were going in the opposite direction. Mao's quest for "revolutionary successors" led to a destructive assault on educational excellence, on opportunity, and on the intelligentsia, leading on the whole to a major loss of support and legitimacy. In the case of mobility, the differences between the two systems were profound.

The Maoist era, then, differed in substantial ways from its Stalinist counterpart. To be sure, there were substantial areas of convergence, but it is only detailed comparison that can reveal the extent of similarity and the extent to which common underlying forces tending towards convergence operated. This is a task that remains to be undertaken.

[23]William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 334.

[24]For one exception, see Fedor Belov, *The History of a Soviet Collective Farm*, New York, Praeger, 1955. Soviet specialists are increasingly interested in understanding mass responses to Stalinism. See, e.g., Robert T. Manning, *The Collective Farm Peasantry and the Local Administration: Peasant Letters of Complaint in Belyi Raion in 1937*, Pittsburgh, PA, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1984. For a fictional, though insightful, account of the local scene, see Fyodor Abramov's *The New Life: A Day on a Collective Farm*, New York, Grove Press, 1963.

[25]Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1929–39," *Slavic Review* (Stanford, CA), September 1979, pp. 377–402.

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING

TO THE EDITORS: Donald Burton, in his article "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending" (*Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983), comments on "some recent criticisms of CIA estimates of Soviet military spending." In the course of his discussion, he attempts to demonstrate that the estimates of real Soviet weapons growth for the years 1960–79 reported in my book *False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup* and the methodology used to derive them are defective. He tries to show that my criticism of the CIA's method is misguided and, by inference, that my own estimates must therefore be incorrect.

The decisive link in his chain of argument is the assertion that my estimates are derived by adjusting the CIA statistics 6 percent a year for improvement in weapons technology. This is not the case. My ruble estimates for Soviet weapons expenditures in 1960–70 are calculated from real weapons output statistics in 1960 and 1970, and are extrapolated to 1979 without utilizing any information on the presumed rate of intervintage technological progress. My dollar estimates are derived directly from the ruble estimates by adjusting the latter for index number relativity. Thus, Burton's argument falls through, and he ends up merely reasserting, not proving, the soundness of CIA methods and estimates.

Burton's faith in the reliability of the agency's direct-costing methodology is based on his belief that the CIA correctly counts Soviet weapons, accurately determines their qualitative characteristics, and—for its dollar estimates—properly values all equipment with prices obtained from the US Department of Defense. However, he does not substantiate these assertions.

Indeed, he overlooks inconsistencies in the classified literature between the CIA's statistics on weapons delivery and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data on weapons production, and neglects to alert the reader to the extreme volatility of the CIA's real weapons growth series. He misleadingly asserts that the CIA can accurately assess qualitative improvements in Soviet weapons through the magical use of "parameters" of "initial operating capability" (pp. 88–89). He fails to disclose that the Agency's estimates are adjusted with learning curve procedures that are disputed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. He tells us that CIA's dollar-cost estimates are correct even though the underlying dollar prices do not always correspond with documented Department of Defense acquisition costs. Instead of demonstrating that the CIA's data on weapons prices in rubles are really sufficiently extensive to sustain his strong inferences about hidden inflation, he merely says that that Agency's price sample is extensive (and fails to reveal that this is true only for the subperiod 1967–73). Instead of admitting that the merit of the CIA's direct-costing method was disproved by data obtained directly from the books of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, which showed that Soviet weapons outlays in 1970 were at least treble what CIA had previously estimated for that year, he lamely contends that the CIA would have revised its procurement estimate for 1970 upward from 5.5 billion to 17 billion rubles even if this revision had not been forced upon it by the "new information."

Acceptance of the CIA's estimates thus requires two acts of faith. One must believe without demonstration that the Agency possesses the data required to ensure accurate direct costing, and that the contradictions seemingly besetting its estimates have scientifically valid explanations that for unspecified reasons the CIA chooses not to disclose.

The merit of my own estimates rests in their correspondence with DIA statistics on weapons production, weapons characteristics, and battle order; their consistency with the "new information"; their congruence with the tapestry of Soviet economic statistics; the fact that the behavior they imply seems reasonable given other evidence of a Soviet military buildup; and the way they resolve diverse anomalies besetting the CIA's estimates.

My own estimates follow accepted economic practice. I start by computing "best" benchmark estimates for 1960 and 1970—years for which weapons production statistics derived from official data correspond either with the CIA's direct-cost calculations or with information obtained from the books of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. On the basis of these computations it can be shown that Soviet weapons outlays in 1960 (valued at 1955 ruble prices) lie at the lower end of a narrow range between 5 billion and 6.3 billion rubles, and that procurement expenditures for 1970 (valued at 1970 prices) fall toward the upper end of a similarly narrow range between 16.3 billion and 18.5 billion rubles.

The large change in nominal weapons outlays between any set of points in the estimate intervals for 1960 and for 1970 shows that the assessment of the real rate of growth of Soviet weapons procurement for 1960–70 depends primarily on contending evaluations of the behavior of Soviet weapons prices during the 1960's. The evidence carefully assembled in *False Science* is relatively unequivocal on this important point.

The official Soviet wholesale price index for the machine-building and metalworking industries shows ruble prices falling 1.4 percent a year from 1960 to 1970, and corresponding data generated during the 1967 price reform indicated no price change in either direction for the years 1955–67. Given the small discrepancy between these sources and the possibility that adjustments made by Soviet statisticians for qualitative improvement may have been excessive, I deduced that my benchmark estimates were

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probably accurate measures of real outlays at constant 1955 and/or 1970 prices but could deviate by as much as 1.5 percent a year in either direction. This yielded estimates of growth in real weapons procurement of between 10.3 and 14.6 percent a year, with a mean of 12.5 percent (or 0.1 percent below William Lee's estimate in *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955–75: An Unconventional Approach,* New York, Praeger, 1977).

This core finding enabled me to infer that the weapons growth trend was highly correlated with official Soviet noncivilian machinebuilding statistics adjusted for nondefense outlays, and to use this correspondence to extrapolate post-1970 weapons procurement trends. The results obtained in this way are consistent with statistics on the machinebuilding labor force derived by the Defense Intelligence Agency (Major General Schuyler Bissell, Deputy Director, DIA, "Economic Assessment of the Soviet Union and China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1983,* June 29 and September 20, 1983, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 78) and with official Soviet statistics on real civilian machinebuilding growth incorporated (without significant adjustment) in the CIA's own Soviet national income series (CIA, *USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950–1980,* Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Dec. 8, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, Table A12, pp. 79–81; Table 1, p. 243; and Table A1, p. 354).

My estimates of double-digit percentage rates for real growth in weapons procurement are also compatible with Department of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency data on weapons production in 1974–83, valued at constant 1974 dollar prices, which indicate that the Soviets cumulatively outproduced the US by 177 percent (Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984,* Washington, DC, February 1, 1983, Table I.B.1, p. 24; *Soviet Military Power, 1982,* Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, 1982, pp. 12–14; *Soviet Military Power, 1983,* pp. 78–80; *Soviet Military Power, 1984,* pp. 98–99; and Steven Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup: An Economic Analysis of Its Size, Scope, and Sustainability," unpublished manuscript, November 1984).

CIA statistics place the disparity at 35.4 percent, i.e., four-fifths less (See CIA, *Soviet Defense Procurement Trends and Prospects,* Testimony of Donald Burton Before the Subcommittee on Armed Forces of the US Senate, November 1, 1979; DDI Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Security Economics, of the Joint Economic Committee, Sept. 20, 1983; and Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup..."). My estimates are consistent with Soviet civilian machinebuilding trends, as well as with plausible theories of Soviet intent.

These estimates also serve the useful function of pinpointing a principal vulnerability of the CIA's methodology: the treatment of technological growth. In chapters 4 and 7–11 of *False Science,* I show that the cost-estimating relationships used by the CIA do not take proper account of intervintage technological progress in Soviet weapons, and that if proper allowance were made for this factor, the Agency's estimates would not only correspond closely with my own, but would no longer exhibit 12 major behavioral anomalies documented in chapter 18 of *False Science.* This finding has now been substantiated further by a detailed analysis of Department of Defense statistics on weapons production and battle order that reveals that the CIA's real arms procurement series cannot possibly reflect properly the improvements in Soviet weapons technology (Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup...").

Burton's critique of my estimates does not attempt to evaluate rigorously the logical foundations of my method, the suitability and reliability of the data used to derive them, or the collateral evidence that established their merit. He is also unconvincing in countering the inferences that I draw—from contradictions between the CIA's pre- and postrevision estimates—about the unreliability of direct costing and the CIA's underestimation of improvement in weapons quality. His explanation that the Agency's admitted 200-percent costing underestimate for 1960–70 was not caused by undetected improvements in Soviet weaponry, but by the use of outdated physical and technical assessments that underestimated the growth of real costs, misses the mark and concedes my point. Rising real costs (in constant 1970 prerevision prices—i.e., essentially 1955 prices) necessarily imply that Soviet weapons were qualitatively improved and that the Agency's direct costing method is downward biased, unless it can be shown, as Burton fails to do, that factor productivity in the military machinebuilding sector fell rapidly and continuously throughout the 1960's.

The evidence adduced against my dollar estimates is less recondite. Burton attempts to show that the magnitude of my tactical fighter aircraft estimates is implausibly high by asserting that the CIA's average unit cost estimates for Soviet and American aircraft are already on a par, so that any further adjustment for intervintage technological progress would illogically imply that Soviet fighter aircraft are more expensive than their American counterparts.

This assertion is backed up by the claim that the unit cost of the average Soviet fighter grew 7 percent a year from 1950 to 1982 on account of technological improvements. The exact rate is neither here nor there because, as was pointed out earlier, my own estimates are computed by extrapolation and do not depend on the Agency's estimates. Nonetheless, if the unit cost of Soviet aircraft has risen to the US level because of technological gains, my hypothesis that the principal flaw in the Agency's method is the underestimation of intervintage technological progress would be called into question.

It is easily demonstrated, however, that Burton's contention cannot be correct. Official Department of Defense statistics contained in the table previously cited from Caspar Weinberger's *Annual Report to the Congress FY '84* reveals that the Soviets produced twice as many fighter aircraft as the US over the period 1974–79. If the CIA actually estimated the average unit cost of a Soviet fighter to be "somewhat more than that of US aircraft in the 1980's" (p. 89), the cumulative dollar value of Soviet aircraft built in 1974–79 should exceed that of US counterparts by roughly two to one. Yet, CIA estimates reported by Burton himself to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress flatly contradict this implication. Instead of trailing total Soviet aircraft costs by a factor of two to one, US tactical aircraft costs exceed those of the Soviets by 8.5 percent—34.4 billion to 31.7 billion dollars, measured in 1978 prices (Rosefielde, *False Science...,* Table 13.8, p. 178). Thus, the Agency's dollar costs per unit do not obviously contradict my hypothesis that the major shortcoming of direct costing is the underestimation of intervintage technological progress.

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The evidence that Burton adduces to substantiate the CIA's assertion that most of the change in the ruble cost of Soviet weapons between 1960 and 1970 is explained by hidden price inflation—instead of by real growth (as the official Soviet price reform data indicate)—is very imprecise. He argues vaguely that "hidden" inflation was driven by "open" input cost inflation, and asserts that weapons' subsidies were terminated in 1967. No guidance is provided concerning the comparative size of these causes, but Burton clearly implies that the subsidy effect is significant.

This implication is easily disproved. According to Pëtr Sokolov, the source Burton cites (P. Sokolov, Ed., *Politicheskaya ekonomika: Sotsializm—pervaya faza kommunisticheskogo sposoba proizvodstva* [Political Economy: Socialism—The First Phase of the Communist Method of Production], Moscow, Voyenizdat, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* [Washington, DC], JPRS 63693-2, December 1974, p. 287), Soviet weapons prices included a "profit charge" of approximately 12 percent after 1967, but not before. The CIA's prerevision estimate of 5.2 billion rubles in Soviet weapons outlays in 1970 (valued at 1955 prices) should therefore have been increased to 5.8 billion rubles on this account. The difference between these figures, 0.6 billion rubles, explains 5 percent of the disparity between the agency prerevision and postrevision ruble estimates for 1970. The subsidy effect thus is very small, and provides only the scantest support for Burton's hypothesis of hidden inflation. The effect could easily have been offset by increases in factor productivity that lowered unit costs a comparable amount.

Moreover, his theory implies improbable price behavior. Burton maintains that hidden inflation in the military machinebuilding sector corresponds with the rate he estimates for machinebuilding generally—i.e., 4 percent a year. This assertion however is strongly contradicted by the 11–12.9 percent Paasche rate of hidden weapons inflation (using 1970 quantity weights) implied by his statistics for 1960–70, and by the 9.0 percent rate implied by the CIA's latest estimates for the 1970's.

These rates are not only implausible in their own right, but are strikingly inconsistent with the CIA's estimates for civilian machinebuilding, which indicate the absence of any hidden inflation for 1960–80 (Rosefielde, "The Strong Separability of Defense and Civilian Growth Potentials: A Reassessment of Soviet Growth Prospects in the 1980s," a paper presented at the 15th Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Kansas City, Oct. 22, 1983, Table 10). The Agency thus is in the incongruous position of arguing either that the Soviet Ministry of Defense is the principal victim of hidden inflation or that similar rates of hidden inflation occur throughout the economy but have not yet been taken into account. The latter alternative provides an escape route of sorts, but would necessarily imply that the real gross national product of the Soviet Union fell continuously in absolute terms during the entire course of the 1970's. The implausibility of this implication demonstrates the tenuousness of Burton's position.

Burton also assails my estimates on intuitive grounds, contending that they are extreme because they do not lie midway between Franklyn Holzman's and William Lee's estimates as do the CIA's estimates (p. 86). At the same time, he implies that Soviet weapons outlays, according to my calculations, grow many times faster than the Agency's estimate of the growth of Soviet GNP—and that this disparity renders them suspect.

Arguments of these sorts are irrelevant. CIA estimates show Soviet civilian machinebuilding, especially consumer machinebuilding, to be growing several times faster than GNP. If these civilian rates are plausible, why rule out rapid weapons-production growth on intuitive grounds? Similarly, if the scientific evidence favors one set of estimates, why reject them because they violate some fanciful golden mean?

The dollar and ruble weapons series I compute measure real growth because they are valued at constant, factor-scarcity-based transaction prices, given rational, purchasers' preferences. The dollar prices reflect scarcities in a workably competitive regime (the United States); the ruble prices take account of scarcities through the average-factor-cost conventions governing Soviet price formation. As a consequence, both series can be used validly to compare the level and trend of US and Soviet real weapons values. The ruble series may additionally be employed to measure the Soviet defense burden, understood as the share of national income spent on national security services—a concept that merely describes the pattern of social consumption, and tells us little either about the static opportunity costs of defense or about weapons growth potential.

Real dollar estimates of Soviet weapons growth calculated in this way reflect weapons utility under the usual axioms of purchasers' rationality because dollar prices formed in a workably competitive environment take adequate account of the forces of supply and demand. The weapons utilities in question do not precisely pertain to American preferences (because US military leaders do not select the Soviet output mix) or to Soviet preferences (because these preferences do not determine prevailing US market prices). They represent, instead, the conditional utility that would have prevailed had the US acquired the Soviet weapons mix without greatly altering domestic US weapons prices.

Utility defined in this way has its obvious limitations, but it implies nonetheless that changes in real Soviet weapons values are positively, monotonically, and ordinally correlated with changes in military utility. Similarly, with regard to international comparison, dollar estimates may slightly overstate or understate the value of Soviet weapons (because had the US purchased the Soviet mix, the price of specified weapons would have varied in accordance with demand, short-run supply constraints, and economies of scale, i.e., learning), but should for the most part correctly indicate ordinal disparities in weapon utilities.

The same line of argument holds for ruble estimates, but must be qualified because the relationship between specific demand and utility is mediated through the accounting conventions of the Soviet pricing system. This difficulty obscures, but does not alter, their basic meaning.

Although the mathematical conditions required to assure that real values for Soviet weapons are ordinally transitive indicators of weapons utilities are rigorously developed in chapter 16 of *False Science*, Burton dismisses this demonstration without attempting to expose its flaws. He contends that dollar estimates measure costs, not values, and therefore are properly employed only for the calculation of "the overall size and direction of Soviet defense programs in resource terms" (p. 85). He also maintains that ruble estimates are indicators of cost, not value, and serve solely as measures of the economic burden of defense, which he misdefines as "the capabilities of the Soviet economy for sustaining the

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current military buildup (and, conversely, economic incentives for seeking arms restraints) . . ." (p. 85).

The theoretical premises Burton relies on to deny that dollar estimates are valid ordinally transitive indicators of weapons utility are not meticulously elaborated, but from the tenor of his remarks they appear to involve two unstated premises: first, the vague layman's notion that goods may "cost" more than they are "worth"; and second, the notion that weapons utility can only be appraised in terms of their scenario-dependent military effectiveness.

The adage that goods may cost more than they are worth means, in the present context, that goods are not produced at least cost, do not precisely reflect consumers' preferences, and/or are sold above their marginal cost because the market is not in competitive equilibrium. There can be no doubt that the market for defense goods is imperfect, and that actual weapons utilities therefore are less than they might be. This deficiency however in no way implies that dollar prices are grossly distorted by excess profits; that relative prices of weapons are biased; that the ratio of actual to potential utility of the US weapons mix diverges systematically from the same ratio for the Soviet mix; or that real weapons estimates are not ordinally transitive indicators of military utility. "Cost" may exceed "value"—as Burton appears to believe—but disparities of this sort neither prove his contention that dollar estimates measure real resource costs more faithfully than they measure utility, nor disprove my inference derived from neoclassical utility theory that they are legitimate ordinal measures of weapons utility.

Similarly, while it is a truism that the ex post military utility of weapons is scenario-dependent, assessments of comparative military power can be validly made for cases where the scenario's impact is expected to be neutral. In these instances, theory clearly teaches that if the dollar value of the Soviet battle order exceeds that of the US battle order, the potential military utility of Soviet forces is correspondingly greater.

Burton's interpretation of the CIA's and my ruble estimates is even more strained. The defect here is not the separation of costs from values, but the unstated assumption that Soviet accounting prices are based on average factor costs and therefore do not reflect utilities. This assumption overlooks the fact that the Soviet leadership determines the structure of gross national product and the Ministry of Defense determines the weapons mix. Utility considerations affect weapons characteristics and the weapons mix just as much as factor costs affect prices, and as a consequence it is improper on theoretical grounds to assume, as Burton does, that real weapons statistics reflect competitive factor costs better than they do utilities of the system's leadership.

Both the ruble and dollar estimates of real weapons growth that I compute indicate that the Soviet arms buildup is likely to continue at a near double-digit pace for the foreseeable future, the CIA's latest revisions notwithstanding. Similarly, my dollar estimates of the Soviet and US battle orders demonstrate that the military balance, which was nearly on a par in 1974, has shifted decisively in the Soviet Union's favor (Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup. . ."). These findings imply that the cumulative arms procurement disparity for 1960–79 and the quality-adjusted imbalance in real battle order today are likely to widen further during the 1980's; that Soviet GNP will grow more rapidly than the CIA presently forecasts; and that the share of GNP originating in the defense sector will increase apace. Whether this process will require the diversion of resources from civilian to defense use is a further issue that depends on the comparative dynamic productivity potential of the military machinebuilding and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy. Indications are that a modest diversion of resources to military use will occur, but will not seriously limit the Soviets' capacity to extend their arms buildup (Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup. . .").

Burton disputes these conclusions (p. 86), contending that even if my estimates were correct, they reflect cost, not utility, and thus imply neither widening asymmetries in military power nor a sustainable increase in the Soviet defense burden. Here, as before, his judgments are undermined by his defective grasp of utility theory and his faulty understanding of the determinants of economic growth.

An annotated version of my comments documenting all assertions made herein was sent to Mr. Burton and is available from me on request. For an expanded treatment of these themes, see the forthcoming second edition of *False Science*.

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TO THE EDITORS: Donald Burton's allegations in *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983, that I overestimate Soviet military expenditures are false. Few, if any, individuals inside or outside the United States Government are more familiar with the evidence that my estimates are right on the mark than Mr. Burton, who directed the US Central Intelligence Agency's own flawed estimating procedure for more than a decade.

Every fact and figure that has caused the CIA to revise its estimates of Soviet military outlays in the last decade has only confirmed my estimates. In particular, in 1975 the CIA discovered that Soviet military outlays in 1970 were at least 50 billion rubles, not the 24 billion rubles that the CIA had previously estimated. As Mr. Burton now admits, these new data indicated that the CIA had greatly underestimated not only the magnitude but also the rate of growth of Soviet military outlays. My own estimates, made before receipt of the new data, corresponded quite neatly with that new information (see the accompanying table). And Mr. Burton contends that I overestimate Soviet defense expenditures?!

If one starts with the CIA's prerevision estimate of 24 billion rubles for Soviet military outlays in 1970 and subtracts the CIA's estimate of Soviet research and development (R&D) expenditures for that year, one arrives at about 17 billion rubles, or a bit less than the published Soviet "defense" budget of 17.9 billion rubles in 1970. In fact, for more than 15 years the CIA consistently estimated Soviet military outlays, without R&D, at essentially the same level as the published Soviet "defense" budget (which does not include R&D and from which procurement of weaponry had been removed during the Korean War).

Table 1: Soviet Military Outlays, 1970 and 1972

(billions of rubles)

Year	Soviet data	Prior Lee estimates
1970	50	43–49
1972	58	51–58

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In terms of the Soviet budget, intelligence data for 1970 and 1972 showed 32–33 percent of the Soviet budget going to the military. My estimates put the share at 30–32 percent. By contrast, if one compares the CIA's pre-revision estimate of 24 billion rubles in Soviet military outlays in 1970 (see William Colby, then the CIA director, in US Congress, *Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Executive Session, April 12, 1974, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, figure on p. 68) with the declared Soviet state budget for 1970 of 154.6 billion rubles (*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1970* [The National Economy of the USSR in 1970], Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 730), one finds that defense got something like 15.5 percent of the budget.

And what of the record since 1972? In November 1979, Mr. Burton testified before Congress that the CIA estimated Soviet military outlays for 1977 at 53–58 billion rubles (US Senate, *Soviet Defense Expenditures and Related Programs*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Procurement of the Committee of the Armed Services, Nov. 1, 1979, Feb. 4, 1980, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 130). Having doubled its estimates for 1970 from 24 billion to 45 billion rubles, plus or minus 5 billion, the CIA now had the Soviets spending less (53–58 billion rubles) in 1977 than in 1972, when Soviet military outlays were reportedly 58 billion!

But the situation is worse than that, because actual CIA estimates have been lower than Mr. Burton claims. This is because the CIA has persisted in using its "building block" method. The CIA estimates are derived from a computer-assisted model for which the CIA's own acronym is "SCAM." In late 1975, when the CIA decided to revise its estimates to try to reflect new Soviet data, it ignored my pleas that they simultaneously correct the "building block" methodology fed into SCAM.

For seven years after its 1976 revision of its own estimates, the CIA alleged that SCAM was estimating the growth of Soviet military outlays at 4 to 5 percent a year. Mr. Burton repeats this claim on page 88 of his article in *Problems of Communism*: "The most recent ruble estimates still show a long-term upward growth trend since the late 1950's of some 4–5 percent per year in real terms."

However, the revised CIA estimates published in the 1976–79 period themselves showed a (mid-point) growth rate of only 3.7–3.8 percent a year since 1965, not Mr. Burton's alleged 4–5 percent a year. In his testimony before Senator Harry F. Byrd's Subcommittee on General Procurement in November 1979 cited above, Mr. Burton indirectly admitted as much when he said:

Our analysis of uncertainties in our methodologies indicates that if the computer growth rate is in error, it is likely to be low rather than high. Therefore, we express our estimate as a range, 4 to 5 percent, to highlight the uncertainty.

Indeed! Thanks to an April 30, 1983, press release of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress issued by Chairman William Proxmire, and to a paper delivered by Myron Rush at a conference sponsored by the United States Information Agency in February 1983, we now know that the growth indicated by the CIA model has been much lower all along. From 1976 on, good old SCAM computed the growth of Soviet military expenditures not at 3.8 or 4–5 percent a year but at only 2 percent a year. The latter rate of growth for total defense outlays implies zero—or perhaps even declining—growth in weapons procurement outlays. Why? Because SCAM will show some growth in operating costs. Then, too, military R&D also shows a substantial rate of growth in CIA's SCAM. These two factors easily account for the entire 2 percent annual growth in total outlays. That implies *no* growth in procurement after 1975–76 in CIA's SCAM.

It is easy to approximate the likely product of CIA's SCAM in the 1970's. Begin with the mid-point of the revised CIA estimate for 1970, 45 billion rubles plus or minus 5 billion; grant 3.8 percent annual growth for 1970–76 (although this too may be fictitious); and then add SCAM's magnificent 2 percent growth rate for 1976–80. Result: according to the CIA's SCAM, the Soviets spent about 61–63 billion rubles on the military in 1980, in the CIA's "rubles" (more on these "rubles" below). This is nearly 12 percent of the CIA's estimate of 525 billion rubles for Soviet GNP in 1980, and hence is compatible with the CIA position that the Soviets have been spending 11–13 percent of their GNP on defense.

If, however, we choose to treat the CIA's "1970 rubles" as Soviet rubles, translating 1970 prices into current prices as the Soviets do, the CIA's SCAM implies that Soviet military outlays in 1980 were about 55 billion rubles in 1980 prices. By remarkable coincidence, this is about 19 percent of the Soviet 1980 budget, nearly the same share that the CIA estimated for 1970 prior to 1976, i.e., before it raised procurement estimates from 24 to 45 billion rubles.

Once again my own estimates are considerably higher than the product of CIA's SCAM. My estimates for 1980 are 105 to 124 billion rubles in 1970 prices and 91 to 109 billion rubles in 1980 prices (these estimates are from my report *Trends in Soviet Defense Expenditures*, Analytical Assessments Co., Los Angeles, AAC-TR 10001/79, updated and converted to current rubles from data in the 1980 volume of *Narodnoye khozyaystvo*). The mid-point of my estimates in 1980 prices—or 100 billion rubles—is one-third of the Soviet 1980 budget, or about the same share of the budget as indicated in 1970 and 1972, for which we have hard data on Soviet military outlays. My estimates for 1980 are not "overestimates." They are right on the mark.

If this is not the case, it behooves Mr. Burton and the CIA to explain the political processes by which the late Mr. Brezhnev, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, reduced the military's share of the USSR budget from about 33 percent in 1972 to about 19 percent in 1980. Equally it behooves them to explain how the Soviets accomplished the military buildup of the 1970's while spending such a diminishing share of the Soviet budget and with very little growth in procurement outlays. Implicitly, the CIA is back to its previous myth of a super-efficient Soviet defense sector that grinds out more and more technologically sophisticated weapons each year at the same cost.

Furthermore, in 1970, 50 billion rubles was about 12 percent of Soviet GNP. In 1980, 61 billion rubles for the Soviet military was no more than 10 percent of Soviet GNP (in 1970 prices). Yet the CIA claims its estimates are 11 to 13, or 12 to 14 percent of Soviet GNP. On the other hand, the CIA's GNP accounts published in 1982 allocate no more than 2–4 percent of Soviet GNP to the Soviet military in 1980 (CIA, *USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development*, 1950–1980, Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, US

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Congress, Dec. 8, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 67).

Contrary to Mr. Burton's allegations that the CIA occupies the middle ground, its revised estimates are as much at odds with the realities of the 1970's—Soviet political processes, the military buildup, the abundant evidence from Soviet economic data—as its prior estimates were at odds with the realities of the 1960's.

When Mr. Burton denies the role of the new Soviet data on military expenses in the CIA's sharp 1976 revision of its previous estimates for 1970 (p. 87), he is rewriting history à la George Orwell's *1984*. The unexpected arrival of this data finally forced the CIA to *double* its estimates for Soviet military outlays and to more than *triple* its estimates for the procurement component thereof. Already around 1972, I had brought to Mr. Burton's attention Soviet studies of machinery and equipment ruble/dollar ratios indicating that the CIA was underestimating Soviet procurement outlays by more than a factor of three. At the time, he summarily rejected the Soviet calculations because, he said, the Soviets did not know how to calculate ruble/dollar ratios.

By the time the new data were received, the CIA did have some of the new price data that Mr. Burton now alleges were the basis of the entire revision. But the CIA was talking about raising its estimates by only 4 to 5 billion rubles, not by 20 to 25 billion. Moreover, CIA analysts were quite confident that only a minor adjustment was required by the new price data to which Mr. Burton refers, because they had twisted the new data on 1972 down from 58 billion rubles to about 30 billion rubles for total Soviet military outlays in that year.

In his note, Mr. Burton reveals one of the factors that likely contributes to the CIA's persistent underestimates of Soviet military outlays:

> *The final piece of the puzzle fell into place in 1975 with the receipt of information revealing that estimates of military RDT&E expenditures were much too low, and permitting more confident estimates* (p. 87).

For many years prior to 1975, my estimates put total Soviet outlays for R&D at least 50 percent higher than the reported Soviet outlays for "science"—which the CIA had stubbornly accepted at face value for two decades despite conflicting evidence. The new information on the scale of Soviet R&D outlays required no change in my estimates.

Mr. Burton alleges that my procurement estimates are invalid because one Mr. Abbott, in an unpublished CIA paper, arrived at different results using my methods. Not having seen this "demonstration" of the error of my ways, it is difficult to respond. However, Mr. Burton offers one clue to what Mr. Abbott probably did: start out with the wrong number. Mr. Burton refers to figures from Soviet input-output tables which give a substantially lower (by 18 to 30 billion rubles) value of the gross output of Soviet machinery—data that he surmises may not have been available to me.

In fact, I did have access to these input-output data. But as I demonstrated at some length in my book *(The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955–75,* New York, Praeger, 1977, pp. 40–42, 59–60, 62–64, 67–68, 76, and 232–33), the Soviets have distorted their input-output table data on machinery output to disguise the true magnitude of Soviet military procurement outlays. If Mr. Abbott began his calculations with data understating total machine-building output by 18 to 30 billion rubles, his results are likely to be wrong.

I need not go into the long history of my attempts to get the CIA to acknowledge that its "constant rubles" are not Soviet "constant rubles." Mr. Burton finally admitted as much in his November 1979 testimony before Senator Harry Byrd's Subcommittee on General Procurement. In a word, CIA prices are only its own constructs and not prices the Soviets use for military outlays. Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures in Soviet ruble prices tell us a great deal about Soviet objectives, policies, and national priorities. Such prices may be used to calculate the burden of defense on the Soviet economy and provide essential insight into the willingness of Soviet leaders to build up their military power at the expense of economic growth and domestic consumption. When CIA "rubles" are used for these purposes, the results are erroneous, misleading, even irrelevant, despite the fact that the CIA is generally viewed as the definitive US government source for estimates of Soviet defense expenditures.

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MR. BURTON RESPONDS: It comes as no surprise that the arguments put forth in my review of William Lee's and Stephen Rosefielde's estimates of Soviet defense spending have had no effect on either one's views. Lee continues to use his machine-building residual methodology and Rosefielde seems even more convinced of the validity of his methodology, whatever that may be. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, both remain wedded to the unorthodox view that the Soviet constant-price series are valid indices of real economic activities. But this, too, is not surprising in view of the importance of such an assumption to their respective methodologies.

Lee's discovery that the actual rate of growth of the CIA estimates for the years after 1976 was lower all along than the 4–5 percent rate that the CIA was proclaiming requires some explanation. The explanation is also pertinent to understanding the CIA's recent downward revision of its estimates. This brings us back to the nature of the direct-costing methodology and the interpretation of its results.

The 4–5 percent growth rate was a long-term rate deriving from physical evidence regarding observed programs and activities. Rather than being constant from year to year, the annual rates of growth making up this long-term trend formed a cyclical pattern over time, reflecting the phasing in and out of major weapons procurement programs. Thus, the calculated reduction in the annual growth rates after 1976 that Lee refers to was both expected and consistent with the long-term trend.

The long-term estimate was buttressed by the expenditure implications of the intelligence projections of Soviet procurement programs for the early 1980's. Like the estimates of past and current programs, these, too, were based largely on direct evidence: the production program already in progress, the new weapons observed in the final stages of development, and the identification of new production capacity available for their manufacture. But they included an important additional assumption: that the planned programs would be executed according to the rational production schedules that had been characteristic of Soviet procurement programs in the past.

The projections at the time showed a sharp acceleration beginning in 1980 that was in keeping with the long-term trend. Although the Soviets were obviously encountering mounting difficulties with their economy, there was no evidence of difficulty with any of their military programs. The most prudent forecast under these conditions seemed to be to anticipate implementation of the planned programs as in the past, unless

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or until evidence to the contrary should arise.

I am removed now from direct involvement in estimating Soviet defense spending for some five years, and have not even held a security clearance for almost two years. While I have not been privy to any intelligence information on the subject, it seems obvious—given the direct-costing methodology and published data on slowing growth of Soviet defense spending—that at least some of the major new weapons production programs that the Soviets had planned for the 1980's must have fallen behind schedule for one reason or another, or have been put on hold or abandoned. In any case, it is important to note that the slowdown in the growth of military procurements is a real one, not just a monetary phenomenon.

How are we to interpret this slowdown? Perhaps the first thing to ascertain is its timing. Most of the open-source reporting that I have seen on the subject dates the change in the rate of growth of Soviet military procurements back to 1977, when the annual rate first showed a decline. This seems wrong to me, since the Soviets continued throughout the decade of the 1970's to develop new weapons and build new capacity for their production. The pattern of the last half of the 1970's was thus consonant with the long-term growth in Soviet defense spending dating all the way back to Stalin's time. The secular change did not take place until the 1980's, when the tempo of the programs planned in the 1970's fell behind expectations.

The reasons for the slowdown in the 1980's (as opposed to the cyclical slowdown in the late 1970's) are less easy to come by. The concurrent slowdown in the Soviet economy would seem to point to resource constraints. Or they may be having difficulties mastering the new technologies embodied in their new weapons, causing interruptions in the production schedules that had proceeded so smoothly in the past. A detailed analysis of the nature of the interruptions should provide important clues in this respect. Which programs have been abandoned? Which put on hold? Which are simply not meeting production schedules? Given the unsettled political situation since Brezhnev's death, it seems unlikely that the shortfalls in production reflect a reduction of the political power of the military. One thing seems clear: given the Soviet rhetoric against the US in the early 1980's, the slowdown was not intended as a peace overture.

Finally, what can be said about the effects of the slowdown in the Soviet defense spending increases on the military investment balance between the US and the USSR, i.e., the comparative levels of new weapons procurements of the two countries? Can we not take some comfort from the recent trend? Unfortunately, the answer is, precious little. It is important to remember that it is the level of expenditures, not the rate of their growth, that is more important in drawing investment balances. The Soviet decline is in the rate of growth, not in the level of expenditures (which has been affected only at the margin). The focus in the Western news media on the decline in the rate of growth of Soviet defense spending is fostering a false sense of security; the annual levels of Soviet weapons procurements remain enormous, substantially higher than those of the United States, even after the large increases in the latter country's defense spending in recent years. Redressing this imbalance would take much more than an erosion of a few percentage points in the annual growth rate of Soviet outlays.

Rosefielde's comments raise some new misconceptions regarding the US intelligence community's estimates of Soviet defense spending. His discussion is misleading in implying substantial differences between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency on matters relating to military-economic estimates. Unless things have changed since my involvement in these matters, these simply do not exist. With respect to production estimates, both have access to the same evidence, and when differences do arise, they are almost always reconciled in short order. The direct-costing operation is actually a joint enterprise with close cooperation on the costing of individual weapons systems. The DIA uses the resulting dollar-cost and constant-price ruble estimates as its own.

The notion that the DIA has production estimates that are inconsistent with its dollar and ruble cost estimates is simply in error. The only difference that I am aware of between the CIA and the DIA is the latter's use, in addition, of a current-price ruble estimate that it calculates on its own and which it explains as differing from the constant-price estimate because of price inflation.

The attempt to disprove my contention that the CIA/DIA unit costs for Soviet fighters of the 1980's are higher than those of the US fighters is typical of Rosefielde's analytic methods. As he notes, this issue is critical to him because if it is true, his own adjustments yield costs for Soviet aircraft that defy credibility, at some three times the costs of US fighters of comparable capabilities. As proof that I must not be telling the truth, he compares dollar-cost and quantity balances for the period 1974–79 to show that the estimated costs for Soviet fighters must actually be substantially lower than those for US fighters. The fact is that these data are not germane to his argument, inasmuch as the bulk of the Soviet aircraft in production after 1982 are completely new models that were not in production in the 1974–79 period. The US aircraft being produced in the 1980's, on the other hand, are essentially those introduced in the earlier period. The unit-cost estimates reflect the enhanced technical characteristics of the new Soviet models and are higher than those for any of the late US models.

As a closing point, I feel compelled to express the feeling that any military man who has ever pondered such matters must find Rosefielde's theoretical discourse equating military utility and costs of production within any one country, let alone between countries, quite naive. Economists versed in the weapons acquisition process and defense accounting practices in the United States would be similarly critical. Finally, students of the Soviet economy and of Soviet military-industrial practices and decision-making would find the cost/military utility relationship in the USSR even more tenuous that that in this country.

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UKRAINIAN FAMINE

TO THE EDITORS: The article "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine" by James E. Mace (*Problems of Communism*, May–June 1984, pp. 37–50) surveys information about the famine of 1932–33 and considers its causes. It concludes that 7.5 million people in Ukraine died prematurely from this famine (p. 39) and charges the Soviet government (or more exactly Stalin) with "genocide" and "creating a famine by act of policy" (p. 37), implying that this genocide was carried out with the "motive" (p. 40) of weakening nationalism. "The famine," Mace writes, "seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a 'final solution' on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union" (p. 37). "Placed in this context," the author argues, "the famine of 1933 makes sense as one of a series of policies designed to neutralize Ukrainians as a political factor, indeed as a social organism in

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the Soviet Union" (p. 49).

I certainly have no intention of defending Soviet agrarian, social, or, national policy in this period, which I consider to have been inexcusable, but as a historian working on this period I must register my concern about the standard of academic discussion of this very important topic, which in my opinion has seriously deteriorated in recent years. Dr. Mace's contribution adds to this deterioration. I would like to address two questions of importance: (1) the scale of the famine, and (2) the causes of the famine and whether it was related to the issue of Ukrainian nationalism.

Mace's treatment of the scale of the famine consists of three parts: a survey of eyewitness accounts and reports, the demographic conclusions of Sergei Maksudov, and Mace's own "more accurate" demographic estimates.

Mace gives the impression that all eyewitness accounts by victims, repentant perpetrators, and journalists support his analysis of the scale and causes of the famine, and that it is only a few incorrigible Stalinists, like Walter Duranty and Louis Fischer, who deny this picture and attempt to "aid the Soviet state in suppressing the story" (p. 38). This is far from true. There was no uniform picture of the scale and causes of the famine. Among the evaluations of eyewitnesses and experts listed by Dana Dalrymple ("The Soviet Famine of 1932–4," *Soviet Studies* [Glasgow], No. 3, 1964, p. 259), the scale of excess mortalities varies between 1 and 10 million, with an average of 5.5 million. Most of these figures refer to the *entire* Soviet Union, and so the appropriate figure for Ukraine would probably be about 3.5 to 4 million. These sources as a whole indicate a scale of mortality that is about half the level claimed by Mace.

Space does not permit me to analyze all of these eyewitness and expert evaluations here. I would only point out that eyewitness evaluations are often found to be exaggerated and that most of the expert evaluations listed by Dalrymple and Mace were made from a less certain data base than is now available. This last point may be illustrated from the work of William Henry Chamberlin and of Naum Jasny—two of the most authoritative of the experts listed.

Dalrymple cites Chamberlin as the authority for evaluations of 4 million and over 7.5 million deaths (loc. cit., p. 259). However, the 7.5 million figure is one that Chamberlin heard but did not himself believe (see his article in *Foreign Affairs* [New York], April 1935, p. 432). In his well-known book *Russia's Iron Age* (London, Duckworth, 1935), Chamberlin makes an evaluation of "not less than three or four million" (p. 88), but many years later, after the results of the 1939 census and Frank Lorimer's analysis of the demographic data, Chamberlin became noticeably more cautious in his assessment of famine mortality and referred more vaguely to "several millions" (see W.H. Chamberlin, *Beyond Containment*, Chicago, IL, H. Regnery Co., 1953, p. 188).

The case of Naum Jasny is even more dramatic. Jasny's evaluation of 5.5 million excess deaths in the famine, listed by Dalrymple, was made in 1949 and was based to a large part on assigning all of Lorimer's calculated excess mortality to the famine (N. Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1949, pp. 552–53). Years later, after Jasny had carried out his famous evaluation of the size and significance of the labor camps and had worked more on Soviet economic development, he clearly had revised his earlier estimates quite substantially, from 5.5 million to "hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million," who "died in the winter of 1932/33" (N. Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization, 1928–1952*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 110–11).

Dalrymple has produced a misleading survey of famine evaluations by giving so much weight to early, subjective, demographically ill-informed evaluations and by ignoring later, better-informed evaluations. Mace has made matters worse by implying that Dalrymple and his sources support an evaluation of the famine twice as large as they do.

Mace relies heavily on Maksudov's analysis of the scale of mortality and of the geography of the famine. Lack of space prevents me from presenting a full analysis of Maksudov's complex mortality estimates here. His major faults are that he places too much reliance on the official 1931 population estimate (which he mistakenly considers to have been a census), and on the population projections that he makes using uncorrected official data. If these serious errors are taken into account, Maksudov's 7.5 million losses (excluding children) would fall to roughly the same figure as that estimated by Lorimer 26 years earlier, i.e., 4.8 to 5.5 million, for the entire 1926–39 intercensal period (see F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, pp. 231–36).

Maksudov's analysis of the geography of the famine is a useful contribution to our understanding, but Dr. Mace grossly exaggerates what it shows. Professor Maksudov used the age structure of the population as recorded in the 1959 census for different regions to compare the number of survivors of the generation born between 1930 and 1934 with the number of survivors born between 1935 and 1939 for the different regions. He concentrated on females, the less mobile sex, and he has shown that whereas for Ukraine, the 1930–34 female survivors number 83 percent of the 1935–39 survivors, in the RSFSR, the proportion was 92.7 percent. This does appear to be a reflection of the relative levels of the demographic crisis as experienced in Ukraine and in the RSFSR. However, we should note that it is a reflection not just of excess mortality, but also of birth deficits, and we should also attempt to quantify the significance of this. Given normal aging processes and the observed increase in birthrates in the late 1930's (particularly after the prohibition of abortion), it is not surprising that the 1930–34 cohort of survivors is less numerous than the 1935–39 cohort. Now, in order to bring the Ukrainian ratio up to the same level as the RSFSR ratio, we would need to add an additional quantity equivalent to 10 percent of the 1935–39 Ukrainian cohort, i.e., about 210,000. If we were to add in the males, the addition required would reach about 500,000. This, Maksudov's data would indicate, is the magnitude of the differential population loss (mortality plus birth deficit) in Ukraine by those cohorts born between 1930 and 1934 (which we would expect to be the most vulnerable). In order to account for a Ukrainian famine excess mortality of 7.5 million, we would have to assume that mortality in the other, less vulnerable, age groups accounted for well over 15 times as much excess mortality as in the most vulnerable age groups. This is highly unlikely. Maksudov's indications of the geography of the famine indirectly show that the number of famine victims in Ukraine was much lower than is claimed by Mace.

What Mace claims to be "a more accurate estimate of Ukrainian population loss" is in fact an extremely crude set of population projections. No consideration is taken of the age and sex structure of the population, as in the methods used by Lorimer, Maksudov, and Yuriy Avksent'yevich Korchak-Cherpurkovskiy, or of changes in birthrates. A highly dubious series of annual growth rates for the period 1926 to 1931 is used to calculate a "probable Ukrainian population of

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34,165,000 on the eve of the famine (1931)" (p. 38).

By deflating the 1939 Ukrainian population figure (28.1 million) with the annual growth rates current in 1958–59, Mace estimated a 1934 population figure for the Ukraine of 26.21 million. The discrepancy between Mace's 1934 estimated figure of 26.21 million and his 1932 "probable" figure is 7.95 million. Mace assumes that a quarter of a million died in dekulakization and another quarter of a million in the repressions of 1936–39, and hence he is left with "almost 7.5 million Ukrainians who died in the famine" (p. 39).

The problems with these figures and this procedure are numerous. Mace's probable Ukrainian population in 1931 is already 2.5 million larger than the 31.6 million official Soviet population projection for July 1, 1931 (*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* [The National Economy of the USSR], Moscow, Statistika, 1932, p. 403). And the latter figure is itself already greatly exaggerated. Mace's figure probably exaggerates reality by 3 to 3.5 million.

On the other hand, his 1934 estimate is far too low. The following table summarizes reported crude birthrates, crude death rates, and growth rates; the levels implicit in Mace's estimation; and a set of what I consider more realistic estimates. Using the more realistic growth rate of 8 per thousand, instead of 13.9 per thousand, one would arrive at a 1934 estimated Ukrainian population of about 1 million more than that estimated by Mace. Overall, Mace's "more accurate demographic estimation" needs to be reduced by between 4 and 4.5 million to be compatible with the official demographic data. This would result in a level of 3 to 3.5 million Ukrainian deaths. I think that this is still likely to be overestimated because the official crude death rate figures are probably underestimated.

Concerning Mace's other calculations, it is clear that the extent of assimilation of Ukrainians into the Russian nationality explains most of the apparent discrepancy.

With respect to the causes of the famine, Mace provides little analysis other than to note the obvious fact that it came about "primarily as a result of excessive grain procurements" (p. 44). The reason for the excessive grain procurements is what we need to analyze, and Mace offers nothing except the assertion that "one cannot understand the famine without understanding the turnabout in Soviet nationalities policy—from seeking to foster to seeking to absorb national cultures.... The famine must therefore be understood within the context of an attempt to impose a final solution on the 'Ukrainian problem' as it had hitherto existed" (p. 49). The reason why one should accept this interpretation is never explained in the article other than in terms of coincidence: "Since it coincided with far-reaching changes in Soviet nationality policy, and since the areas affected were inhabited by groups most resistant to the new policy, the famine seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a 'final solution' on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union" (p. 37).

This is highly unsatisfactory and appears to me to be confusing consequences with causes. Western historiography on the famine of 1932–33 normally places great emphasis on the serious nature of the grain problem in the late 1920's and early 1930's. There is much debate about the causes of the grain problem: the real level of production, the impact of the agrarian revolution, the pricing policy, the impact of collectivization, the procurement policy, the real domestic requirements, the level of stocks, the strategy of promoting grain exports, the necessary level of strategic reserves for the army, the level of reserves in general, the effect of the weather in specific years, etc. But it is generally agreed that it was the grain problem, Soviet conceptions of it, and the methods adopted in the attempt to solve it—in the actual climatic and political circumstances of the 1927–32 period—that produced the crisis and famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga area. It was not the famine itself as much as the methods that were used in the attempt to solve the grain problem that are seen as having the major historical and political significance. (See the work of Moshe Lewin, Jerzy Karcz, R.W. Davies, Dana Dalrymple, and the Soviet historian Yu. A. Moshkov for accounts of the grain problem, and of grain procurement policies and their significance.) Under this interpretation, the reversal in the nationalities policy in the Ukraine, like the famine itself, was simply one of the consequences of the critical grain problem. Mace offers nothing to challenge this view, and he, therefore, has little basis for his implication that the famine was created in order to weaken Ukrainian nationalism. This, of course, is not to deny that Ukrainian nationalism was in fact weakened as a consequence of the action taken in connection with the famine.

Annual Growth of Population in Ukraine
(per thousand population)

	Year (s)	Crude birth-rate	Crude death rate	Growth rate
Official data	1926	42.1	18.1	+24.0
	1927	40.3	17.8	+22.5
	1928	37.8		
	1929	35.2		
	1930	32.8		
	1940	27.3	14.3	+13.0
	1958	21.0	6.9	+14.1
	1959	20.9	7.3	+13.4
Mace estimate and implicit assumptions	1934–39	(21.0)	(7.1)	+13.9
Wheatcroft estimate and assumption	1934–39	(24.0)	(16.0)	+ 8.0

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MR. MACE RESPONDS: If I am to respond to S.G. Wheatcroft's charge that I have contributed to a lowering of the level of scholarly discussion, I must begin by saying something about the previous level of the discussion. With the exception of several works by Ukrainian émigré scholars, which our profession has completely ignored, Dana Dalrymple's pioneering study published 20 years ago is about all we have, and it was primarily concerned with merely establishing the fact that the famine took place.

Mr. Dalrymple limited himself mainly (but by no means completely) to Western journalistic accounts; made no use of demography; had no knowledge of Soviet nationality policy; and did not even have the tools to consider whether there might be a link between the famine and considerations of nationality policy. His mortality estimate was derived by simply averaging the estimates that had been given by the various journalists whom he cited. His interpretation was derived solely from well-known facts about the decline in productivity accompanying the forced collectivization of agriculture and the Soviet state's de-

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mand for grain.

Until recently, there was little if any further discussion of the problem. How could my attempt to go beyond this valuable but rudimentary work done two decades ago contribute to the level of discussion of this issue? How can one lower the level of an issue if practically no discussion of it is taking place? Even if I my judgments were to prove wrong, it would seem that the very act of raising the issue could only serve to raise the level of discussion, if only by provoking Dr. Wheatcroft's response.

In his letter, Wheatcroft accuses me of misusing eyewitness accounts and reports of the famine. He is correct in stating that the estimates cited in the first installment of Dalrymple's pioneering work range from 1 to 10 million and average 5.5 million. Had he read the second installment of Dalrymple's work, "The Soviet Famine of 1932–34: Some Further References," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1965, pp. 471–74, he would have found the range even greater, since Dr. William Horsley Gannt of Johns Hopkins medical school, who was in the Soviet Union working with Pavlov in the 1930's, reported being told by Soviet officials that perhaps as many as 15 million had died in the famine.

Of course, there were a number of accounts, ranging from the type that states: "I saw people starving and think a million people must have perished" to those that state: "Soviet official X told me that in region Y the number of dead has been estimated at Z million." It would seem obvious that the latter type of account should have somewhat greater weight than the former, and the latter type tends toward higher figures than does the former. For example, Adam Tawdul in *The New York American* of August 18, 1935, reported that Mykola Skrypnyk, shortly before his death, told him that eight to nine million persons had died during the famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus; on August 19, Tawdul related the report of another official that 1 to 2 million had perished in the Volga Basin. Interestingly, Walter Duranty, whose reports in *The New York Times* during that period leave much to be desired, and whom Dalrymple lists as having estimated 2 million dead, told the British Embassy in Moscow that he thought the figure of 10 million famine dead an entirely credible figure (British Foreign Office reports from Mr. Strang to Sir John Simon, Sept. 26, 1933). Although Duranty failed to tell whence he obtained this figure, he had a reputation for having much better access to Soviet officialdom and a much better knowledge of Soviet reality than his journalistic record would indicate. It would therefore seem likely that these rather high figures circulated in the Soviet Union at the time. Their accuracy, of course, remains an open question because of widespread violations of official regulations prohibiting unregistered burials (which would seem necessary to an accurate tabulation), but a simple averaging of the figures offered by those whom Dalrymple cited (and his list of citations is by no means exhaustive) does not, as Dr. Wheatcroft would have it, place an upward limit on mortality figures for the famine. Perhaps Chamberlin, who heard the figure of 7.5 million but did not believe it, should have. Perhaps Naum Jasny, who calculated a mortality figure in the hundreds of thousands, was wrong.

Next, Dr. Wheatcroft accuses me of overreliance on Sergei Maksudov's work, which I rely upon primarily for demographic evidence of the geography of the famine. I have no idea where he gets the notion that Maksudov mistook the 1931 population estimate for a census, but this is simply not true (one may either read Maksudov's work or ask him; I did both and fear that Wheatcroft did neither). As to whether Maksudov relies excessively on this estimate and on uncorrected data, Wheatcroft makes an assertion but not an argument. I shall have to leave it to Maksudov to refute whatever argument Dr. Wheatcroft may choose to make.

As for Frank Lorimer's estimate, 4,800,000 excess deaths is only a partial figure intended to cover persons age 12 or older at the time the 1939 census was taken (Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, p. 236) and not a lower variant for all excess mortality in 1926–39. Lorimer's total estimate of 5,522,000 excess deaths for the period (p. 133) leaves room for only 678,000 total excess deaths in the entire under-12 age group, a gross underestimation given the fact that infants are abnormally susceptible to famine and other harsh living conditions. The principal difference between Lorimer's estimate and Maksudov's higher one is in the latter's more realistic estimate of the number of excess deaths in the under-12 age group.

Now, Maksudov compares the number of survivors of three generations, those born in 1925–29, in 1930–34, and in 1935–39, not just two as Wheatcroft states. Since the figures are from the 1959 census and rural females do change their place of residence (even if less frequently than their male and urban counterparts), any abnormal trough in the age structure of the population corresponding to the group born in 1930–34 would tend to become less marked over the course of time. Thus, an abnormal trough in the age structure of the Ukrainian SSR (pre-1939 borders) observed in 1959, a full quarter-century after the event responsible for it, might well be brought up to the USSR average by adding half a million males and females to that age group, as Wheatcroft suggests, but this would certainly not be enough to account for the mortality that caused the trough in the first place, since it becomes shallower over time. An indication of how deep this trough was initially may be gained from the fact that Ukrainian schoolteachers with whom I have spoken tell of village schools that were closed in the late 1930's because all the children who would have been of school age had perished from famine in their infancy.

Maksudov observes this trough throughout the Ukrainian SSR of the period (except for Chernihiv oblast, where—survivors indicate—local forests served to reduce mortality by providing the population alternative means of sustenance), throughout the Kuban and Don regions, to a less marked degree in parts of the Volga Basin, in Kazakhstan (where mass mortality began earlier, for other reasons, and thus may be excluded from our analysis), and in one oblast of Western Siberia (an anomaly probably explained by the fact that the "Ural-Siberian" method of collectivization began there and agricultural policies were carried out with exceptional vigor there in succeeding years).

I disagree with Maksudov's assumption that net interrepublic migration was zero, and for this reason I believe that his assignment of 4.5 million famine victims to the Ukrainian SSR is too low. While significant numbers of Ukrainians fled to other republics, official attempts to curtail this movement and to return to the Ukrainian SSR those who had fled probably meant that this movement of population out of Ukraine was greatly exceeded by officially sponsored settlement of villagers from outside the republic in villages depopulated by the famine.

With this last point in mind, I made some rough calculations based on the number of ethnic Ukrainians in the USSR (which also would include the roughly 30 percent of the Kuban population that was Ukrainian) and came up with a probable mortality figure of 7.5 million, uncorrected for changes in national identification or for probable falsification of the 1939 census. I also presented a second figure,

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based on comparisons with the growth of Byelorussians, yielding a mortality estimate of 6.7 million. Neither was intended to be other than what I called them—i.e., "rough estimates"—and they were presented in order to show that the true figure could easily be well in excess of Maksudov's minimum of 4.5 million. Given the dubious nature of Soviet population figures in the 1930's—especially those of the 1939 census (in view of the suppression of the 1937 census)—I do not believe it possible to render more than a rough estimate.

In earlier works I have hazarded a guess of 5 to 7 million Ukrainian famine victims as a conservative estimate. However, 5 million would seem an excessively low minimum for ethnic Ukrainians if we take into account (1) the great probability that the number of non-Ukrainian victims in the Ukrainian SSR was more than offset by Ukrainian victims in the equally famine-devastated North Caucasus (then 30 percent Ukrainian, with Ukrainians concentrated in the countryside); (2) the fact that migration to Ukraine, being encouraged by the government, probably far exceeded migration out of Ukraine, which the authorities did everything in their power to prevent; and (3) mortality among the aged, a group almost as vulnerable to famine as the very young, who (actuarially speaking) would likely have died natural deaths by 1939 and whose somewhat premature demise in 1933 would therefore not be reflected in the 1939 census.

On the other side, there is the problem of changes in national identification. Since Ukrainization remained official policy even in Ukrainian communities outside the Ukrainian SSR until 1933, seven of the twelve years between the census of December 1926 and January 1939 were characterized by de-Russification, and only five years, by Russification—too brief a period for any assimilatory policy to show significant results. However, the different criterion of nationality employed in 1939 undoubtedly served to reduce the total number of Ukrainians from what it would have been had the 1926 yardstick been used. To what extent this was offset by inflation of the results of the 1939 census is impossible to quantify, but it seems unlikely that this factor, which Wheatcroft inaccurately alludes to as assimilation, could have affected much more than a million persons, leaving us with a figure in the range of 6 to 7 million Ukrainian famine victims, which is roughly consistent with an estimate of 8 to 11 million famine victims for the USSR as a whole.

Wheatcroft also challenges the population growth figures upon which my estimate is based. Administrative estimates, based upon the compilation of reports for the rayon level, might not be absolutely accurate, but they are the best indicators we have to go on. At least, there is no reason to consider them less accurate than the lower figures from Gosplan that he suggests he used. Indeed, since Ukrainians were concentrated in the countryside, where birthrates and the natural rate of population growth were higher than in the Ukrainian SSR as a whole, it is quite likely that calculations based on these rates for the entire republic population would tend to understate population growth. The same is true for the lower assumed growth rate employed to calculate natural population growth in 1934–38, since, as Wheatcroft points out, the birthrate ceased to decline in the 1930's and began to increase, indicating a higher rate of growth than my assumption, and implying an even greater number of famine victims than would my own rough calculations.

In order to fill out Wheatcroft's table on the natural rate of population growth in the Ukrainian SSR, in 1927–31, I reproduce here a table from V.I. Naulko, *Ethnichnyi sklad naselennya Ukrains'koi RSR. Statystyko - kartohrafichne doslidzhennya* (The Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical-Cartographic Inquiry), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1965, p. 84. The reader may note how similar these figures—which Dr. Wheatcroft considers dubious—are to the partial figure he himself presents. As for my allegedly implicit assumption of a mortality rate of 7.1 per 1000 annually in 1934–38, the annual growth figure of 13.9 per 1000 which I (explicitly) assumed, fits perfectly well into the trend of the period, whether we assume an annual average mortality rate of 16.0 and birthrate of 29.9 per 1000 or a birthrate of 30.5 and a mortality rate of 15.6 per 1000. Wheatcroft's own assumption of a birthrate of 24.0 per 1000, necessary to his derivation of the surprisingly low 8 per 1000 figure of annual natural population growth sharply contradicts his own statement (made in explanation of the fact that there were more persons born in 1935–39 than in 1930–34) that birthrates increased in the late 1930's, particularly after the adoption of anti-abortion legislation. If birthrates in 1935–39 were higher than those in 1930–34, the former could not possibly have averaged 24 per 1000 given the much higher rates for 1930 and 1931. However, a moderately lower natural rate of population growth for the years 1934–39, say 13.0 per 1000, is certainly an assumption within the realm of the possible. This would produce a lowering of the estimate of famine mortality by about 210,000, and we might revise upward the number of Ukrainian victims of other repressions so as to lower our famine mortality by another 200,000. We would still be left with an estimate of more than 7 million Ukrainians having died in the famine.

Natural Rate of Population Growth in the Ukrainian SSR in 1927–1931

(per thousand population)

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931
Birthrate	40.3	38.0	35.3	32.9	30.5
Mortality rate	17.8	16.5	17.6	17.9	16.0
Natural growth	22.5	21.5	17.7	15.6	14.5

SOURCES: For 1926–27, Lorimer, op. cit., p. 81; for 1927–29, M.B. Ptukha, *Ocherki po statistike naseleniya* (Outline Statistics on Population), Moscow, Statistika, 1960, p. 447; for 1940, 1958–59, *Naseleniye SSSR, 1973: Statisticheskii sbornik* (The Population of the USSR, 1973: Statistical Compilation), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 71.

In order to reach an irreducible minimum, let us assume that 1.5 million persons who would have been counted as Ukrainians in 1926 were counted as Russians in 1939 (an extraordinarily high figure equal to one-half the total number of Ukrainians residing in the North Caucasus in 1926); that in every other aspect the 1939 census was as accurate in counting Ukrainians as was the 1926 census; that no person who died in the famine would otherwise have been dead by 1939; and that the natural rate of population growth for Ukrainians in the USSR was zero during the famine. This irreducible minimum would be over 5.5 million Ukrainians. Needless to say, not all these conditions pertained, and the real figure must have been substantially higher.

Wheatcroft is correct in stating that in any attempt to analyze why the famine took place, one needs to examine the reason for excessive procurements. I was under the assumption that this is precisely what my article attempted to do. Rather than repeat my argu-

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ment, to which there seems to be little in the way of response, let us consider what Wheatcroft does say.

In the first place, he refers to Western historiography of the famine. With the obvious exception of Dalrymple's work of 1964–65, I am at a loss in understanding just what historiography he means. Surely not Mose Lewin's monograph, which concludes at Stalin's March 1930 "Dizzyness from Success" speech, over two years before the beginning of the famine. Lewin's article on grain procurement (" 'Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurement before the War," in S. Abramsky and B. Williams, Eds., *Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr*, Hamden, CT, Archon Books, 1974, pp. 281–323) devotes less than a full page to the famine (pp. 295–96), hardly a major appraisal. Regardless of other indisputable merits of this article, about all Lewin says concerning the famine is to refer the reader to Dalrymple and to repeat a few points of the latter's interpretation. Jerzy Karcz's "Thoughts on the Grain Problems," (*Soviet Studies*, April 1967, pp. 399–434) deals exclusively with the Soviet state's inability to induce the peasantry to part voluntarily with the grain it produced and with the crucial role this grain crisis *of the late 1920's* played in the Soviet decision to introduce forced wholesale collectivization of agriculture as a more effective instrument of extraction. He, too, tells us nothing of the famine. If R.W. Davies has continued his study of the Soviet countryside past 1930, I have certainly not seen it. And if one wants to refer to Soviet scholarship, I would suggest that *on the famine* the Soviet Ukrainian works cited in my article are far more useful than Moshkov, but that no Soviet works are particularly forthcoming on this issue. Therefore, when it comes to *non-émigré* historiography of the famine, Dalrymple's article is about all that we have.

Dalrymple's main thesis was that a man-made famine took place in the USSR and that millions died because of excessive grain procurements ("The Soviet Famine of 1932–34," *Soviet Studies*, January 1964, pp. 264–65). Having little information on the precise territories affected or the time it ended (he—like Ewald Ammende before him—was taken in by accounts in the Hearst press in 1935, which were "updated" to indicate that the famine continued into 1934, whereas any of the numerous eyewitnesses who came to the West after World War II would have told him that the famine actually ended in 1933), Dalrymple adopted the obvious interpretation: that the state carried out excessive procurements because of a generalized need for more grain.

Robert Conquest and I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with Dr. Dalrymple at a public forum in the fall of 1983. Without abandoning his earlier interpretation, Dalrymple conceded, "it may be that the coincidence of the famine and other forms of repression against Ukrainians warrant the more severe charge of genocide" (Robert Conquest, Dana Dalrymple, James Mace, Michael Novak, *The Man-Made Famine in Ukraine*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 16).

From this alone, it would seem that the jury is still out. What, in Dr. Conquest's opinion and mine, tips the scales away from the interpretation attributing the famine to the government's generalized determination to get grain and in the direction of the interpretation that understands the famine also as an instrument of nationality policy is the fact that the famine stopped at the Byelorussian-Ukrainian border in the north and the Russo-Ukrainian border in the northeast (though not, of course, along the border with the largely Cossack areas east of Ukraine). As Conquest put it during our discussion: "Not only were peasants not allowed out [of Ukraine] to find food, but when they did leave, they were not allowed to return with food. A physical blockade prevented anyone from bringing even a few loaves into Ukraine. This is a clear sign that there was a definite intention to localize the famine in Ukraine, and there was no famine on the other side [of the border].... There is a total difference on either side of the border" (ibid., p. 22). I have made this same point on a number of occasions, including in the article that Dr. Wheatcroft has chosen to criticize. This would seem a crucial issue that he seems to overlook, except to assert that both the famine and accompanying reversal of Soviet nationalities policy are derivative of the all-important grain problem.

The reversal of Soviet nationality policy can be seen as a consequence of collectivization only in a very limited sense. Stalin (*Sochineniya* [Works], Moscow, Gosizdat, 1946, Vol. 7, p. 72) believed that "the nationality problem is *by its essence* a problem of the peasantry." In the traditional context of the Russian Empire, this made sense because outside Russia proper Russians tended to be concentrated in the cities and non-Russians in the countryside. *Korenizatsiya* (indigenization) thus was a policy designed to placate non-Russians who were mainly in the countryside, and was complementary to the New Economic Policy (1921–27) of placating the peasantry in economic terms. The abandonment of the latter policy and its replacement by the forced collectivization of agriculture meant that the state could not hope to placate the peasantry, including, of course, the non-Russian peasantry, and the national concessions earlier made to rural-based nations lost much of their political justification. Hence, attacks upon the leadership of non-Russian communist parties began about the same time as collectivization (1929–30), and soon thereafter (1930 on) began the mass arrests of so-called "bourgeois nationalists," i.e., political, cultural, and religious figures, who had hitherto worked in relative freedom (sometimes with state support) but were now equated with treasonable plotters seeking to dismember the Soviet Union. As I argued in my article, the famine constituted the culmination of this process among groups considered most troublesome (the Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Volga Germans), a culmination that took the form of a body blow against the demographic basis of these groups, the so-called "rural masses."

It is, of course, true that the state sought to obtain as much grain as possible to finance a rapid industrialization, and this provided a major impetus for the compulsory collectivization of agriculture. It might plausibly be argued that it was this desire for grain that led the state to starve millions of its citizens to death, were it not for the fact that the geography of the famine does not bear out this interpretation. For example, a cursory examination of the age structure of rural females in Kharkiv oblast (on the Russo-Ukrainian border) indicates an abnormally small number of individuals who would have been born during or immediately before the famine. Directly opposite this oblast, on the Russian side, is Belgorod oblast, and here no such anomaly is to be seen. This yardstick, first applied by Maksudov, gives clear indication that Kharkiv oblast was deeply affected by the famine, but Belgorod oblast was not. On the other hand, the famine affected even grain-deficit areas in Ukraine, where sugar beets was the main crop. Obviously, the state's desire for grain could not plausibly have motivated it to leave grain producing regions like Belgorod oblast alone, while creating a condition of mass starvation in sugar regions like Vynnytsya oblast. And if Dr. Wheatcroft doubts the realiability of Maksudov's work as an indicator of the geography of the famine—and he does not directly challenge it on this

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ground—there are a significant number of survivors now living in the West who will bear this out. Some, in fact, now reside in Great Britain, and I would be most happy to place Dr. Wheatcroft in touch with some of them.

However, to deny independent historical and political importance to the complete reversal of Soviet nationality policy—i.e., a complete change in the national-administrative structure and nature of the Soviet state—cannot seem other than myopic. To deny such importance to the deaths of millions—and this is equally true whether one accepts Wheatcroft's figures or mine—through the hitherto unknown instrumentality of a man-made famine, is simply unconscionable. To deny that I have failed to challenge the view that the famine was merely a consequence of the state's generalized desire for grain simply ignores the main argument of my article. It would seem that Dr. Wheatcroft has attempted to refute an argument without understanding it or the development upon which it is based, the reversal of Soviet nationality policy in the 1930's.

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DIFFERING VIEWS ON KAMPUCHEA

TO THE EDITORS: In an essay in *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1984) reviewing two books on Kampuchea co-edited by me, Mr. Kishore Mahbubani incorrectly claims that in Dr. David Chandler's 1977 testimony to the US Congress, "one does not find any description of Khmer Rouge atrocities" (p. 70). Dr. Chandler in fact accused the Khmer Rouge of "murder, face-to-face, and in large numbers," noting also: "I am certain that many of my friends...have been killed," "because of the jobs they held under the old regime, or because they didn't take the revolutionary side." "People with higher education, money, authority, even with Western-style clothes were seen as traitors. Thousands of these people, it seems, were killed in the early days of the regime or were allowed to die." (The precise bibliographical citation to this testimony is as follows: US Congress House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Human Rights in Cambodia*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, May 3, 1977, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 14, 16, 44. Also, reprinted on pp. 63–66 of these hearings is Dr. Chandler's article "Transformation in Cambodia: The Most Radically Altered Country in the World" originally printed in *Commonweal*, Apr. 1, 1977, which contains more details about the violence and harsh conditions to which Pol Pot's regime subjected its people. Mr. Mahbubani owes Dr. Chandler an apology.

A misprint in one of the books reviewed, which seems to have misled Mr. Mahbubani on another point, should be corrected here. The phrase "pro-revolutionary institutions" on page 7 of *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea* should read "pre-revolutionary institutions."

A second error is Mr. Mahbubani's own. He states (p. 68) that Hou Yuon, the author of two of the chapters in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–81*, was killed by Pol Pot "before 1975." This is incorrect, as is demonstrated on p. 390 of that book. Hou Yuon opposed the 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh and other Pol Pot policies, and was killed some time afterward. Since the book was completed, I have also seen the diary of a Pol Pot cadre, which notes: "In 1975 we dealt with the contemptible Hou Yuon."

Mr. Mahbubani chides me, saying, "Kiernan significantly fails to mention" Timothy Carney's 1977 statement that "the case for a national rural tinderbox'" in Kampuchea in the 1960's "'remains to be proved'" (p. 69). Let us assume for the moment that I stated, which I did not, that the case had already been proved. Would I have been remiss in failing to note Carney's views? If so, then Mr. Mahbubani, by his own criterion, is equally guilty for failing to note the points on which Carney *agrees* with me.

Let us look at the facts. I described Carney's essay as "thoughtful" (*Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, p. 306). In the footnote to which Mr. Mahbubani refers, I noted a matter that "Carney had correctly pointed out," and recommended "Carney's valuable book" (ibid., p. 85). Mr. Mahbubani complains that I refer "approvingly" to the work of Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, but he "significantly fails to mention" that I did the same for Carney's work. The idea of praising a good book with which one may nevertheless disagree appears to be unthinkable to Mr. Mahbubani. He demonstrates his own level of scholarly independence when he gives a potted history of the 1970–75 war (p. 68) that omits any mention of the 1970 US invasion or of the massive bombardment of Kampuchea in 1969–73.

Mr. Mahbubani claims (p. 70) that Khmer Rouge "refusal to accept...domination over Indochina" by Hanoi makes it "not surprising that the Vietnamese should show a preference for recruiting former Khmer Rouge cadres into the Heng Samrin regime." Does he realize what he is saying? I am equally confounded by his implication (p. 71) that events *since 1982* disprove my description in *1980*, of the situation in 1980 (*Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, p. 385).

In his attacks on "those who sympathize with communist revolutions" (p. 69), Mr. Mahbubani "significantly fails to mention" the important role played by Singaporean diplomats such as himself in maintaining the Khmer Rouge's Democratic Kampuchea as an alternative government in the UN since its overthrow in 1979. What he rightly calls "one of the most horrendous periods of communist rule the world has ever seen" (p. 68) continues to haunt the Khmer people in more ways than one. The tragedy of Kampuchea is that the only forces resisting a Khmer Rouge return are those of Vietnam and Heng Samrin.

BEN KIERNAN
Monash University
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TO THE EDITORS: I have just read Mr. Kishore Mahbubani's review, in the July-August 1984 *Problems of Communism*, of two books on Cambodia to which I contributed. I generally disagree with Mr. Mahbubani's views and have presented my own perceptions elsewhere, in particular in my book *Cambodia 1975–1982* (Boston, South End Press, 1983). Here I would only like to clarify several inaccuracies in his essay.

For one, it is hardly legitimate to treat Pen Sovan simply as the "one leader...who tried to steer a course just a little independent of his Vietnamese masters" (p. 69). Indeed, until his overthrow, Pen Sovan was considered by all "experts" to be Vietnam's man in Cambodia, and it was only when he was dismissed that they suddenly decided he must have been loyal to someone else and therefore ousted at Vietnam's behest.

It is also inaccurate to state that "Cambodia has never been a threat to Vietnam" (p. 72). Cambodia threatened Vietnam, and increasingly, under Pol Pot, and whatever the accuracy of Nguyen Co

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Thach's alleged remarks to Stephen Solarz regarding Hanoi's primary concern with the "'Chinese threat'" (p. 70, n. 9), some degree of Vietnamese military retaliation was justified by the repeated Cambodian attacks across the Vietnamese border during 1977–78.

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TO THE EDITORS: Kishore Mahbubani's essay "Cambodia: Myths and Realities" in the July–August 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism* is a disservice to the academic community. He resorts to polemical and unscholarly methods in reviewing two recent books on Kampuchea—David Chandler and Ben Kiernan's *Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea* and Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua's *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*. These volumes—which are edited by the leading Kampuchean specialists in the English-speaking world—deserved better.

Two examples demonstrate Mr. Mahbubani's approach. First, on p. 70 he takes David Chandler to task for failing to denounce the excesses of the Pol Pot regime and for neglecting an important source, François Ponchard's *Cambodia, Year Zero*. But Chandler's testimony was given in May 1977, and he could hardly have been expected to consult a book published a year later. Moreover, in 1977 the nature and extent of atrocities being committed in Kampuchea by Pol Pot was not an easily established fact, as my review of the early literature pointed out (see "New Evidence on Kampuchea," *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1981, pp. 91–96).

Similarly, Ben Kiernan is criticized for his observations, made in 1980, that he could not find evidence of Vietnamese settlement in eastern Kampuchea; Mahbubani implies that Kiernan overlooked documentary evidence, but the documents referred to (p. 71) were in fact issued only in May and September 1982 and did not become available to outside analysts until even later that year. Thus, Kiernan could hardly be faulted for failing to take them into account in 1980.

Such tactics detract from Mahbubani's own arguments that Vietnam dominates Kampuchea via a program of settlement and that the current Phnom Penh regime is a puppet of Hanoi. Indeed, they impede the important effort to comprehend historical background to the present situation in Kampuchea.

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MR. MAHBUBANI RESPONDS: While I am grateful to the three writers for drawing my attention to certain factual errors I made, I am astonished that notwithstanding all the evidence presented in my review, Benjamin Kiernan continues to insist that "the only forces resisting a Khmer Rouge return are those of Vietnam and Heng Samrin." How can Heng Samrin "resist" the return of the Khmer Rouge when both he individually and one-third of his regime are former Khmer Rouge cadres? A three-member group representing the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights of New York concluded after a visit to the Thai-Cambodian border in early November 1984 that both the Vietnamese Government and the Heng Samrin regime officials were widely involved in the arrest and torture of Cambodian citizens. This was because "a disproportionate number of people in the police and security apparatus [of the Heng Samrin regime] are ex-Khmer Rouge" (*The New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1984). If all the Khmer Rouge cadres agreed tomorrow to accept the Vietnamese domination of Cambodia, Hanoi would happily accept all these cadres notwithstanding what they might have done in the past. The evidence speaks for itself. The biggest criticism to be made of the two volumes I reviewed (each co-edited by Mr. Kiernan) is that this central point of the linkage between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge is ignored.

Kiernan's selective quoting from my review prevents him from understanding how the Vietnamese preference for absorbing Khmer Rouge cadres (significantly, Kiernan decides not to challenge this point in his letter) is linked to the Khmer Rouge refusal to accept Vietnamese domination of Indochina. He should re-read my paragraph in full. The point I was making was that since the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge did not split for ideological reasons, it was not surprising that the Vietnamese should show a preference for absorbing former Khmer Rouge cadres, who belong to the same ilk.

Both Kiernan and Carlyle Thayer have tried to defend David Chandler. To my surprise, Kiernan does this by referring to the same congressional testimony that I cited. Kiernan is right: there is a "description of Khmer Rouge atrocities" in Chandler's testimony. However, it is a "description" that Chandler put in because he wished to *suggest* that American bombing, rather than the Khmer Rouge leaders, were really responsible for these atrocities. The reaction of a Congressman who was present at the hearing gives us a profound insight into Chandler's testimony. Congressman William F. Goodling said to Chandler: "I know you are not trying to oversimplify it and say the slaughter of one million or two million people—however many million people were slaughtered—is justified, but I cannot understand how you think we should sit back and not speak out while this is going on..." (p. 18). Chandler did not respond to Goodling. Do I owe Chandler an apology? I invite the reader to decide after reading Chandler's testimony in full.

Thayer's defense of Chandler is disingenuous. François Ponchaud's book may not have been published in 1977, but long before the book appeared, Ponchaud made the same points in a series of articles published in *Le Monde* in 1976. Chandler, whom I acknowledged in my review to be one of the best scholars on Cambodia, must surely have been aware of these articles.

Thayer and Kiernan correctly state that Kiernan writing in 1980/81 would not have

CORRECTIONS

A sentence in Young C. Kim's article "North Korean Foreign Policy," published in the January–February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, was rendered incorrectly. The sentence beginning 13 lines from the top of column 1 on page 12 should read:

> "Indeed, there are indications that the North Korean government has been groping for a more pragmatic way of dealing with the South, the pursuit of which would not be incompatible with the resort to assassination of South Korean officials should the opportunity present itself."

Also, on page 16, columns 1 and 2 were inadvertently reversed.

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had access to the documents issued in 1982 by the Heng Samrin regime. That is a fair point. Still, some questions remain. How is it that Kiernan, in his "extensive travels" in Cambodia, failed to notice any Vietnamese settlers? They did not start arriving only in 1982. Also, why has Kiernan not publicly conceded that he was wrong in his earlier assessment that Vietnam would not send settlers into Cambodia?

Michael Vickery states that the repeated Cambodian attacks across the Vietnamese border during 1977–78 justified some degree of Vietnamese military retaliation. Perhaps. The real question is: Does it justify the invasion and occupation of Cambodia for over six years? The Pol Pot regime also conducted similar attacks across the Thai-Cambodian border. Would Vickery also claim that Thailand had a right to invade and occupy Cambodia?

Finally, I need to respond to Kiernan's finest polemical point: that Singapore diplomats like myself have helped to defend Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the United Nations. Perhaps Kiernan is unaware that no country, not even Vietnam, has challenged the seat of Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations in the last two years. Why? This is because the international community, unlike Kiernan, is not deceived by Vietnamese propaganda. Each year (by increasing votes, so far), the United Nations has endorsed resolutions sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the restoration of Cambodian independence. The ASEAN-proposed resolution also calls for the Cambodians to be allowed to decide their own future, in the confidence that if given a real choice, they will choose neither the Khmer Rouge nor the current Vietnamese occupation. Why does Kiernan have so little faith in the ability of the Cambodians to determine their own future that he would prefer to entrust their fate to the hands of both the Vietnamese and former Khmer Rouge cadres?

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New York

On March 11, 1985, when this isssue of *Problems of Communism* was in page proofs, Radio Moscow reported the death of party General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko and, shortly thereafter, announced the selection of Mikhail Gorbachëv as his successor. The contents of this issue, by and large, reflect perceptions prior to these events, although the texts of several articles were amended slightly in light of Chernenko's passing.—**Eds.**

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